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EDITORIAL 
Public finances are a key driver in the EU for economic recovery as the depth of the recession and credit 
constraints require fiscal policy action. This has been recognised in the European Economic Recovery 
Programme, which includes an EU-wide, and globally, coordinated effort for discretionary fiscal support 
to the EU economy. An even larger support of the EU's economy is coming from automatic stabilisers. 
Across Member States however, the fiscal policy needs, possibilities and responses have differed 
strongly, reflecting notably initial different macroeconomic starting positions and market pressures. 
The fiscal support for the economies together with rising interest rates in some countries and heavy public 
interventions in the financial system has led to a sharp deterioration in public finances. And there are 
significant upside risks for further increases in debt levels when considering that the resolution of the 
banking sector in the EU is only advancing slowly. But past experiences teach useful lessons on how 
fiscal costs of banking crises can be contained and which factors can facilitate to eventually bringing the 
fiscal houses back in order. This includes on the banking crisis resolution side a transparent, resolute and 
swift strategy, without regress to regulatory forbearance, as well as a fair and uniform treatment of market 
participants backed by strong public institutions and legal frameworks. For the fiscal consolidation part, 
strong fiscal governance frameworks, notably national fiscal rules, are a factor of success. 
Today's challenging times have also been a stress test for the Stability and Growth Pact. With the newly 
built-in flexibility of the reformed Pact in 2005, the EU fiscal framework has allowed on the one hand, to 
provide the appropriate support to the EU economies in exceptional times while, on the other hand, set a 
clear path for future fiscal adjustments. While the fiscal consolidation in the past several years has created 
some buffer in most countries, the need to improve the preventive arm of the Pact needs to be carefully 
considered when emerging from the crisis. This includes particularly the lack of some Member States to 
use the "good" pre-crisis times to improve the state of their public finances which would have let them 
enter the crisis from even more comfortable starting positions. Moreover, past budgetary surveillance has 
not been sufficiently comprehensive in accounting for the role of fiscal policy in allowing the build-up of 
internal and external imbalances.  
This year's Public finances in EMU report reviews how Member States have tackled the challenges from 
the financial and economic crisis and assesses the prospects for public finances and policy needs ahead. 
The report follows a well-known and successful formula of past years, essentially consisting of four 
major elements. The first element is a detailed description and analysis of recent budgetary developments, 
with a focus this year on the EERP, and an assessment of the outlook. The second element of the report is 
an examination of the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework. This year the main issues are (i) the statistical 
treatment of public interventions in the financial system, (ii) ways to improve the measure of the 
cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, (iii) the measurement of the quality of public finances and (iv) 
developments in Member States' fiscal frameworks. The third element consists of analytical studies. The 
2009 report assesses in detail the fiscal costs of past financial crises and their determinants, and draws 
important policy conclusions for handling today's crisis. Moreover, the report studies the link between 
house price developments and public finances during booms and busts and the role for fiscal policy in 
busts when fiscal space is constrained. The fourth and final element of the report provides an overview of 
fiscal developments in the 27 Member States. 
Since the first report was released in 2000, the issues of Public Finances in EMU have sought to raise 
awareness and understanding of key fiscal developments and policy challenges. They also reviewed and 
launched ideas on how to strengthen the framework for economic governance and to improve its 
enforcement. Given the unprecedented challenging times for public finances, this year's tenth edition of 
the report, as those in previous years, should be an important contribution to the debate on fiscal policy in 
the EU and remain a key reference for practitioners and policy-makers.  
 Marco Buti 
 Director-General 
Economic and Financial Affairs 
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Reports on Public Finances in EMU 2000-2009 
The ten reports on Public Finances in EMU that have been issued since the first edition in 2000 can be 
found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/specpub_list9257.htm
The set of reports provides an overview of budgetary developments and evolving budgetary surveillance 
since the start of EMU. Moreover, all issues include two or three studies on topical issues, providing 
impetus to the development and implementation of the EU fiscal framework:  
2000 The Stability and Growth Pact one year on. 
Focus on taxation in the EU. 
2001 Fiscal policy and cyclical stabilisation in EMU.   
The quality and sustainability of public finances. 
2002 Public expenditure in EU countries. 
Is there a role for discretionary fiscal policy in EMU?  
Key budgetary issues for the candidate countries of central and eastern Europe.  
2003 Public investment and its interaction with the EU’s budgetary rules. 
Can fiscal consolidations in EMU be expansionary? 
Meeting the EU’s budgetary requirements: national expenditure rules and fiscal relations 
across levels of government. 
2004 The benefits of fiscal discipline. 
The quality of public finances: What role within the EU framework for economic policy 
coordination? 
2005 Structural reforms and budgetary objectives. 
Fiscal challenges during convergence in the recently acceded Member States. 
2006 National numerical fiscal rules and institutions for sound public finances. 
Fiscal policy in good times. 
2007 How to stick to medium-term budgetary plans. 
Lessons from successful fiscal consolidations. 
2008 The quality of public finances and growth: a conceptual framework. 
The efficiency of tax systems. 
2009 The fiscal costs of financial crises: past evidence and implications for today's crisis.  
Public finances in booms and busts. 
SUMMARY AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Financial and economic crisis hits budgetary developments and 
prospects 
Public finances in the EU have come under unprecedented stress as they play 
a central role in overcoming the financial and economic crisis. The EU 
economy has been particularly hard hit by the shockwave of the crisis, which 
emanated and quickly spread from the United States, due to the EU's strong 
export dependence, its integration and role in global capital markets, and 
large external and internal macroeconomic imbalances that had built up in a 
number of Member States. For 2009, the EU's real GDP is projected to fall by 
4% before stabilising at -0.1% growth in the course of 2010. Due to the depth 
of the recession and credit constraints, public finances in the EU are 
shouldering a particular burden by responding to the crisis with three 
objectives: (i) addressing demand shortfalls in the short run through fiscal 
stimulus measures and letting automatic stabilisers play, (ii) restoring the 
health of the financial sector and supporting the intermediation function of 
financial markets and (iii) contributing to long-term growth prospects, inter 
alia by ensuring sustainable budgetary developments. 
Unparalleled 
challenges in face of 
the current crisis… 
With its European Economic Recovery Programme (EERP) the EU has 
defined an effective framework for addressing the economic downturn 
combining active fiscal stimulus with structural reforms. The programme, 
endorsed by the European Council in December 2008, calls for discretionary 
fiscal support of at least 1.5% of GDP. This EU-wide, and also globally, 
coordinated response is a crucial contribution to tackling the global economic 
crisis in which all countries with sufficient fiscal space need to play a role in 
filling short-term demand gaps. Model simulations by the Commission 
services clearly indicate that a coordinated policy response has a considerably 
larger impact on output and is thus eventually less costly, since leakages are 
contained, than those undertaken by a single country. Overall, Member States 
have adopted or announced fiscal stimulus measures totalling 1.1% of GDP 
in 2009 and 0.7% of GDP in 2010. Of the total, 1% of GDP is on the revenue 
and 0.8% of GDP on the expenditure side. These stimulus measures are 
estimated by Commission services to contribute to about ¾% of real GDP 
growth in 2009 and about ⅓% in 2010. 
… make public 
finances a key driver 
for economic 
recovery … 
The fiscal support packages adopted under the EERP have broadly followed 
desirable general principles but some risks on their effectiveness remain. The 
set of principles includes the well-known "three Ts" (timely, temporary and 
targeted) in addition to the need for a coordinated approach taking into 
account cross-country differences in fiscal space. As regards the timeliness, 
there were initially concerns that under the projected growth path the impact 
of the EERP could take effect relatively late in the cycle. But with the 
materialisation of the downward risks to the projections this concern has 
evaporated. As regards the targets of measures, to a large extent they have 
been geared toward those with the highest multiplier effects and therefore the 
greatest potential to mitigate the impact of the crisis on economic activity. 
However, the support of individual industries in some Member States, while 
successful in filling short-term demand gaps, needs to be weighed against its 
potential longer-term distortionary effects. As regards temporariness, this is 
assured for the majority of measures (e.g., frontloading of public investment 
and tax relief for which discontinuation has been announced). However, there 
... through 
coordinated EU fiscal 
stimulus packages … 
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remains a risk that especially some of the revenue measures become 
entrenched.  
In addition to discretionary measures, an even larger support of the EU's 
economy is coming from automatic stabilisers. The larger size of 
governments in the EU than in the United States, particularly the more 
extensive social security systems explains the greater importance of this 
channel of support to economic activity in the EU compared to the United 
States. As a consequence, the average budget deficit in the EU already 
worsened in 2008 to 2.3% of GDP from 0.8% in 2007 (1.9% in 2008 and 
0.6% in 2007 in the euro area) and is expected to widen further by 5.0% of 
GDP by 2010 (4.6% of GDP deterioration for the euro area).  
… and the functioning 
of automatic 
stabilisers. 
Taking into account that some Member States have been particularly hard hit 
by the crisis and some had difficult initial macroeconomic starting positions, 
fiscal policy needs and possibilities differ across the EU. Even though the 
overall level of interest rates has fallen substantially to before crisis levels, 
the significantly higher risk premiums that financial markets are requesting 
on sovereign bonds for some Member States can be very costly and 
counteract fiscal stimulus policies, in particular if risk premia spread to the 
wider economy. Thus, Member States need to carefully manage their fiscal 
space in light of sustainability concerns. The Commission services latest 
assessment of long-term sustainability, using the conventional indicators and 
classification (albeit not accounting for the impact of the crisis on potential 
growth) has already evidenced a strong increase in sustainability risks, 
independently of the potential materialisation of contingent liabilities linked 
to the banking sector.  
But responses differ 
across countries … 
… accounting for 
differences in fiscal 
space. 
Across EU Member States, the financial and economic crisis is sharply 
ratcheting up public debt-to-ratios, not only as a consequence of fiscal 
support to ailing economies but also due to direct public interventions in 
banking systems. The public debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU which just 
surpassed the 60% mark in 2008 (from 58.7% in 2007) is expected to jump 
by 21 percentage points to 79.4% of GDP until 2010. For the euro area the 
increase is projected to be somewhat smaller at about 18 percentage points 
between 2007 and 2010. So far, about 3⅓ percentage points of the increase in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio until 2010 in the EU (5 percentage points in the 
euro area) is attributed to stock-flow adjustments, which in turn reflect 
predominantly the acquisition of financial assets and are recorded "below-
the-line" (i.e., affecting public debt but not the deficit). However, accurately 
accounting in fiscal statistics for these and other operations in support of the 
financial sector is not unproblematic as representative market prices may not 
be available during a financial crisis and a measure of fair value may only be 
inferred indirectly. Eurostat is in the process of drawing up guidance on the 
statistical treatment of public operations to support the financial sector. So 
far, Member States have supported their banking sectors with measures 
amounting to about 13% of GDP and have approved funds worth another 
31% of GDP. The largest share (7.8% of GDP in terms of measures taken; 
24.7% of GDP in terms of measures approved) are guarantees on bank 
liabilities, which do not affect public debt and deficits unless they are called 
upon. The rest pertains to relief of impaired assets, liquidity support and 
capital injections. To what extent these operations risk eventually adding to 
Public debt ratios are 
quickly shooting up … 
… including from 
public interventions in 
the financial systems. 
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the fiscal bill is still uncertain, but some lessons can be drawn from past 
financial crises.  
Experiences with past crises yields some lessons on potential fiscal costs 
for resolving the current crisis  
Past financial crises have generally been very costly. When analysing a 
subset of 49 crisis episodes from the 122 systemic financial crises that 
occurred since 1970 around the world, one finds that net direct fiscal outlays 
to rehabilitate the banking system averaged 13% of GDP but were much 
higher, over 50% of GDP, in some emerging market economies. These 
figures already account for the values recovered (until six years after the 
crisis broke out) from assets acquired by the public sector. Recovery rates 
were rather low at only 20% on average with few notable exceptions, such as 
Sweden. 
In past crises public 
intervention was 
expensive ... 
Increases in public debt ratios, the most comprehensive measure to capture 
fiscal implications from financial crises, went far beyond the direct costs 
attributable to tackling the financial sector problems and amounted to, on 
average, 20% of GDP during the crisis, which lasted on average 4½ years. 
That these increases were linked to the crisis is corroborated by the 
Commission services' econometric evidence. Most of the ratcheting up of 
debt ratios occurred in the first two crisis years and was rooted in the 
expenditure side, including crisis-related budgetary outlays ensuing from the 
operation of automatic stabilisers and substantially higher interest payments 
for some emerging market economies. These reflect the sizeable economic 
slowdowns as output gaps are estimated to have widened by on average by 
1% per annum during past financial crises. To some extent, increased 
discretionary fiscal stimulus to counter the economic downturns also added to 
the overall budgetary deterioration of on average 2% of GDP during the full 
length of the crisis. However, country case studies indicate that active fiscal 
stimulus was not as widespread as one might expect, since countries' fiscal 
space was frequently constrained due to rapidly weakening market 
confidence in the public sector. In the few cases of relatively large 
expansionary fiscal activism, such as Sweden and Japan, there are many 
indications that the success of policies put in place in the wake of a financial 
crisis was rather limited. Overall, the process of rising debt ratios has proved 
difficult to reverse. Even a decade after the start of the crisis, most 
governments ran public debt-to-GDP ratios above pre-crisis levels.  
… leading to high and 
difficult to reverse 
debt levels. 
Large fiscal stimulus 
was less common. 
Experience shows that some factors have contributed to containing the level 
of direct fiscal costs, i.e. outlays from rescuing and rehabilitating the 
financial sector. Lower direct fiscal costs and higher recovery rates were 
achieved notably, taking into account of the severity of the crisis, when the 
bank resolution strategy was implemented swiftly, was transparent and 
received broad political support, backed by strong public institutions and 
legal frameworks, consistent in terms of fair and uniform treatment of market 
participants, and included a clear exit strategy. Within this broad framework, 
econometric results show that some individual measures have been 
associated with higher recovery rates. This includes recapitalisation and 
liquidity support, presumably reflecting that they were extended to viable 
institutions that recovered after the crisis. Moreover, the econometric analysis 
shows that the use of asset management companies was linked to 
Some measures have 
limited the taxpayers' 
bill of crisis 
intervention. 
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significantly higher recovery rates only when the government effectiveness, 
i.e. the quality of public administration as well as the legal and judicial 
system, was strong. The size and complexity of the asset portfolio also seems 
to have impacted the effectiveness of asset management companies. Thus, 
experience suggests that they can be a useful tool in managing non-
performing assets, when certain conditions are in place, but are not a panacea. 
What do these experiences imply for the direct fiscal costs of today's crisis? 
The global nature of the current crisis adds to the factors of fiscal risks and 
reduces the policy options. This includes first the much larger sizes of 
banking systems in the EU today than in past crises and consequently the 
larger size of impaired assets and recapitalisation needs. Second, recovery 
values of today's impaired assets may be much lower than of those in the past 
due to several factors. The complicated nature and high leverage of many 
financial assets makes them more difficult to manage, unwind and recover 
than in the case of past crises, when assets included predominantly real estate 
and other loans. Moreover, a protracted slowdown of the economy, given the 
global nature of the crisis, compared to many V-shaped output developments 
in earlier crises supported by sharp real depreciations of the currencies and 
export-led growth, is likely to depress recovery values including through 
lesser availability of foreign and, more generally, private investors. And 
finally, delays in the implementation of a comprehensive strategy for the 
resolution of the banking system across the EU and the use of regulatory 
forbearance may add to the fiscal bill. Against this background today's crisis 
includes only few aspects that allow a more optimistic view on containing 
fiscal implications. This regards foremost the generally stronger legal and 
judicial systems and the greater transparency and more uniform applications 
of national bank resolution policies than in the past, even though in the EU 
significant differences in institutional strengths remain. These factors could 
positively impact recovery rates and help contain fiscal costs. 
Today's globalised 
crisis risks to be at least 
as expensive as past 
crises … 
Thus, on balance there are considerable risks that rehabilitating the EU's 
banking system would require substantial public outlays. Of the total public 
resources approved for the support of the EU banking system (about 44% of 
GDP so far) most are guarantees that may not be called upon. In a benign 
scenario much of those outlays may either be recovered or not even 
materialise. However, in a more adverse scenario net direct fiscal costs could 
add up to about 16½% of GDP. This broadly matches the average bank 
rescue costs from past systemic crises. This cost estimate is derived by 
assuming that capital injections would be doubled from the currently 
approved amount of 2.6% of GDP, which appears rather small in comparison 
to recent estimates of impaired assets in Europe. Moreover, the scenario 
calculation uses the already approved amounts for other public bank 
interventions (including guarantees) and applies to this the lower end of a 
range of recovery rates in line with past crises.  
Some lessons can also be drawn for the effectiveness of fiscal support of the 
economy whose likelihood for the success is intertwined with that of bank 
resolution policies. Experience suggests that without a resolute clean-up of 
bank balance sheets, the impact of fiscal policy can be muted as long as 
uncertainty and constraints to providing loans and stimulate private demand 
prevail. Thus, in the EU any lagging behind of bank resolution policies risks 
to add to the fiscal bill. Going forward, efforts to restoring the health of the 
… particularly, if bank 
resolution efforts are 
not stepped up. 
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financial sector need to be stepped up, even when it implies high upfront 
fiscal outlays, so as to ensure the full effectiveness of fiscal measures in 
support of an economic recovery. 
Budgetary surveillance to anchor exit strategies and long-term 
adjustment 
The expected sharp budgetary deteriorations and increases in public 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios, in addition to pressures on many Member States' 
public finances from rising age-related spending, will eventually require 
tough choices with a view to maintaining long-term sustainability. While the 
EU's fiscal framework provides the appropriate anchor for future 
adjustments, some areas of improvement have emerged. 
In stormy times, the 
SGP provides a 
compass. 
The Stability and Growth Pact contains the sufficient flexibility to cope with 
the unprecedented challenges of the crisis while at the same time providing a 
framework for future consolidation strategies. In particular, while the opening 
of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) when breaching the 3% of GDP 
deficit threshold is in all but exceptional cases a requirement, the deadline for 
the correction of the excessive deficits takes into account the relevant factors 
in the economy. In particular, in the existing and newly opened excessive 
deficit procedures, the pace of adjustment recommended to Member States 
takes explicitly into account their different room for fiscal manoeuvre. Since 
the Public Finance Report 2008 release, a new recommendation has been 
issued for the United Kingdom, which was already in excessive deficit 
procedure. For Hungary, the deadlines for the deficit correction were 
maintained while they were extended until 2013 for the United Kingdom to 
account for the sharp deterioration of public finances due to the crisis. 
Moreover, following deficits in excess of 3% of GDP in 2008, new excessive 
deficit procedures were opened for France, Greece, Ireland and Spain in the 
first half of 2009. Deadlines for the correction of the excessive deficits range 
from 2010 to 2013. Given the rapid and strong worsening of public finances 
in 2009 also for a number of other Member States, including notably Latvia, 
Malta, Poland and Romania, the opening of further EDPs is expected in the 
course of this year.  
EDPs have been 
opened for many 
Member States … 
While the immediate focus for countries with sufficient fiscal space is still on 
supporting the economy, credible exit strategies are a precondition for the 
effectiveness of this support. The absence of a roadmap for the future course 
of policies may exacerbate uncertainty and risk-aversion, and thereby make 
the crisis more persistent. A majority of Member States envisaged, under 
their Stability and Convergence Programmes, already some structural 
improvements of their budget positions in 2010 and a further withdrawal of 
fiscal stimulus from 2011 on. However, the SCP consolidation plans appear 
to have been built on rather optimistic economic assumptions risking anew 
driving a gap between plans and outcomes as already witnessed under more 
favourable circumstances.  
… allowing flexibility 
and providing 
orientation for exit 
strategies. 
In addition to the European fiscal framework, national fiscal frameworks can 
provide credible and transparent commitments for fiscal adjustment paths. 
The past has taught useful lessons in that respect. Strong fiscal frameworks 
have been success factors for consolidation, including after the financial 
crises in Finland and Sweden in particular. National fiscal rules and medium-
Strong national fiscal 
governance 
reinforces the EU 
framework. 
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term budgetary frameworks can provide credibility, transparency and 
medium-term orientation to fiscal policy making in times when difficult 
choices need to be made. Moreover, fiscal institutions can play useful roles in 
monitoring and advising on fiscal plans as well as providing underlying 
macroeconomic assumptions for the annual budget preparation. Thus, exit 
strategies for EU Member States could benefit strongly from commitments to 
improving and/or adhering to existing fiscal rules and medium-term 
frameworks. Examples of countries where fiscal framework offer substantial 
room for improvement are Hungary, Latvia and Romania, which have 
received balance of payments assistance from the EU, and who are seeking to 
strengthen their fiscal governance frameworks, with the support of the 
European Commission and the IMF, as part of their adjustment processes. 
Going forward, Member States have confirmed the importance of fiscal 
governance frameworks and committed to step up their efforts to report on 
them as a contribution to improve budgetary surveillance and for exit 
strategies. 
Generally, a review of fiscal governance frameworks across EU Member 
States by the Commission services confirms their rising importance but also 
identifies remaining shortfalls. In recent years, in particular some new 
Member States have introduced fiscal rules and other Member States plan 
further revisions and strengthening of their rules in particular in light of the 
crisis experience. Overall, current weaknesses of fiscal rules relate mostly to 
their enforcement and monitoring mechanisms as well as media visibility, 
which could serve as an informal enforcement device. Moreover, revenue 
rules, which pre-define how excess revenues should be used, are not yet 
wide-spread. Their use might have helped particularly in pre-crisis "good" 
times to keep the spending of revenue windfalls in check and improve fiscal 
positions.  
Some progress has 
been achieved. 
Strong fiscal governance is one avenue to better quality of public finances 
(QPF) which has gained new urgency as Member States' public finances have 
come under unprecedented stress. This also includes more effectively 
collecting and using scarce public resources with a view not only to creating 
additional fiscal space but also to backing the long-term economic growth 
potential of the economy and ensuring sustainability. For example, a number 
of Member States' initiatives under the EERP, including higher and "greener" 
investment, go in this direction while also regional policies provide a tool for 
more effectively targeting resources for investment. Thus, since raising the 
quality of public finances will be an important contribution to consolidation 
and exit strategies the Commission services have made progress in 
identifying and developing indicators that would contribute to more 
systematically analyse and compare the status and development of QPF in 
Member States. This includes also the provision by Eurostat on first and 
second-level government expenditure data (COFOG), at least partially, for all 
Member States.  
Better quality of public 
finances can be 
another pillar for exit 
strategies. 
Despite the usefulness of the anchor that the EU budgetary surveillance 
framework has provided, the current crisis has also exposed some 
weaknesses. These include the following areas for which improvements need 
to be made. First, some Member States have not sufficiently used the "good" 
pre-crisis times to improve the state of their public finances which would 
have let them enter the crisis from much more comfortable starting positions. 
Going forward 
budgetary 
surveillance should be 
strengthened. 
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In particular, revenue windfalls during asset price boom periods are often 
misread as durable improvements in the underlying budget position. Creating 
a sufficient safety margin to accommodate debt increases during bust phases, 
can avoid amplification of booms, and assure greater resilience during 
downswings. Countries with limited fiscal space – i.e., a high public debt, a 
high share of non-discretionary expenses and potential large tax revenue 
shortfalls together with competitiveness challenges threatening medium-term 
growth perspectives – need to engage in particularly cautious fiscal policies 
in booms to avoid adverse financial market reactions and constraints on the 
fiscal stabilisation tool during busts, leading to deep recessions.  
Second, past budgetary surveillance has not been sufficiently holistic in 
accounting for the role of fiscal policy in allowing the build-up of internal 
and external imbalances. Broader surveillance based on a wider set of 
indicators could provide a useful signalling device for the capacity of 
countries to meet their financial obligations. A broad definition of fiscal 
space, covering a wider set of variables would facilitate early indication of 
risks of budgetary stress and, by the same token, of the ability to conduct 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies when favourable conditions revert sharply. 
Such monitoring also needs to be consistent with a deeper analysis of 
underlying fiscal positions during booms, when revenues may be swollen by 
temporary factors not captured in cyclical adjustment calculations. In 
addition to the usual indicators of government debt and deficit, particular 
attention could be given to external and domestic imbalances, including 
contingent liabilities related to private sector credit, foreign currency 
liabilities and current account developments. A regular competitiveness 
surveillance exercise within the euro area which was already initiated by the 
Eurogroup on the basis of a first Commission report and follows up on 
findings in the Commission's EMU@10 Report would also be useful in this 
respect. 
And third, in the past most deviations from Member States' fiscal plans, as 
laid out in their SCPs, were rooted in expenditure overruns. Thus, budgetary 
surveillance should devote more attention to developments of the expenditure 
side, while Member States could tackle this issue with stronger fiscal 
frameworks. 

Part I 
Current developments and prospects 

SUMMARY 
The EU economy is in the midst of its deepest and 
most widespread recession in the post-war era. 
Playing a central role in overcoming the financial 
and economic crisis, public finances in the EU 
have come under unprecedented stress. As the 
effectiveness of monetary policy has been stunted 
in the financial crisis, public finances in the EU are 
shouldering a particular heavy burden by 
responding to the crisis with three objectives: (i) 
addressing demand shortfalls by letting automatic 
stabilisers play and through fiscal stimulus 
measures, (ii) restoring the health of the financial 
sector and supporting the intermediation function 
of financial markets and (iii) contributing to the 
long-term growth prospects. 
With its European Economic Recovery 
Programme (EERP) the EU has defined an 
effective framework for combating the economic 
downturn. The programme, endorsed by the 
European Council in December 2008, calls for 
discretionary fiscal support of at least 1.5% of 
GDP. Model simulations indicate that a 
coordinated policy response, such as the EERP, 
has a considerably larger impact on output and is 
thus eventually less costly, since leakages are 
contained, than those undertaken by a single 
country. Overall, Member States have adopted or 
announced fiscal stimulus measures totalling 1.1% 
of GDP in 2009 and 0.7% of GDP in 2010. Of the 
total, 1% of GDP is on the revenue and 0.8% of 
GDP on the expenditure side. The fiscal support 
packages adopted under the EERP have broadly 
followed the well-known "three T principles" for 
effective fiscal stimulus (timely, temporary and 
targeted), in addition to the need for a coordinated 
approach taking into account cross-country 
differences in fiscal space. The stimulus measures 
are estimated to contribute to about ¾% of real 
GDP growth in 2009 and about ⅓% in 2010. 
In addition to discretionary measures, an even 
larger support to the EU's economy is coming from 
the operation of automatic stabilisers, which is 
amplified by the reversal of previous revenue 
buoyancy. As a consequence, the average budget 
deficit in the EU already worsened in 2008 to 2.3% 
of GDP (from 0.8% in 2007) (the euro area budget 
deficit was 1.9% of GDP in 2008 compared to 
0.6% in 2007) and is expected to widen further by 
5.0% of GDP until 2010 (4.6% of GDP 
deterioration for the euro area). 
Rising deficits, low growth and subdued inflation, 
as well as implemented support to the financial 
sector, feed through in debt developments. From 
its low (58.7%) in 2007, the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the EU surpassed the 60% mark in 2008 
and is expected to jump by 21 percentage points to 
79.4% of GDP until 2010. For the euro area the 
increase is projected to be somewhat smaller at 
about 18 percentage points between 2007 and 
2010. The high deficit levels, which are to a 
significant extent structural considering the nature 
of the economic and financial shocks, suggest 
further rising debt ratios in the years beyond 2010.  
Coupled with the perspective increases in age-
related expenditure, a slow-down in potential 
growth and possible calls on government 
guarantees extended in the context of financial 
rescue packages, failure to achieve a timely return 
to sound budgetary positions might have a 
destabilising effect on public finances in several 
countries. Looking forward, a desirable fiscal 
stance needs to weigh appropriately stabilisation 
and sustainability considerations. While the 
immediate focus for countries with fiscal space is 
still on supporting the economy, credible exit 
strategies are a precondition for the effectiveness 
of this support. The absence of a roadmap for the 
future course of policies, can exacerbate 
uncertainty and risk-aversion, and thereby make 
the crisis more persistent. A majority of Member 
States envisaged, under their Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, already some structural 
improvements of their budget positions in 2010 
and a further withdrawal of fiscal stimulus from 
2011. However, the SCP consolidation plans 
appear to have been built on rather optimistic 
economic assumptions risking anew driving a gap 
between plans and outcomes as already witnessed 
in calmer economic times in the past. 
Since the Public Finance Report was last issued in 
2008, a new recommendation was issued for the 
United Kingdom, which, like Hungary, was 
already in excessive deficit procedure. The 
deadlines for the deficit correction were extended 
until 2013 for the United Kingdom to account for 
the sharp deterioration of public finances due to 
the crisis. Moreover, following deficits in excess 
of 3% of GDP in 2008, new excessive deficit 
procedures were opened for France, Greece, 
Ireland and Spain in the first half of 2009. 
Deadlines for the correction of the excessive 
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deficits range from 2010 to 2013. Given that 
virtually all Member States (exluding Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Luxemburg, Finland and 
Sweden) are projected to have deficits in excess of 
3% of GDP by 2009, the opening of further EDPs 
is to be expected. In the existing and newly opened 
excessive deficit procedures, the pace of 
adjustment recommended to Member States 
considers their different room for fiscal 
manoeuvre. 
The EU's fiscal framework provides the anchor for 
future adjustments. The Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) is flexible enough to allow corrective action 
to be implemented in time frames consistent with 
the recovery of the economy, with rapid fiscal 
consolidation being called for only in cases of 
immediate sustainability risk e.g. as reflected in 
high sovereign risk premia. The 2005 reform has 
introduced the possibility of revising the 
recommendations for the correction of the 
excessive deficit including an extension of the 
deadline in case of adverse economic 
developments with major unfavourable 
consequences for public finances. This possibility 
is meant to cater for budgetary outcomes falling 
short of targets on account of the deterioration of 
the underlying economic scenario. The reasons for 
the deviation and the overall economic and 
budgetary situation should be carefully considered 
when deciding on the revised recommendations.  
1. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS HITS BUDGETARY 
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 
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1.1. TIMES OF CRISIS  
The economic situation and outlook remains 
uncertain as the world faces its worst crisis since 
the Second World War. The initial shocks 
stemming from the financial market developments 
have been followed and amplified by the negative 
feedback-loops between the real economy and the 
financial markets. In addition, the legacy of 
accumulated imbalances in the world economy 
may lead to a painful adjustment process, thus 
further extending the period of weakness in 
economic activity. The Commission services' 
spring 2009 forecast projects real GDP growth for 
both the EU and the euro area at -4.0 % in 2009.  
The downswing is broad-based across countries, 
although sizeable differences exist. Some EU 
Member States will be subject to a more 
pronounced and/or protracted downturn, 
depending on their exposure to the financial crisis 
and the global manufacturing cycle, domestic and 
external imbalances, including a substantial 
housing-market correction or other country-
specific factors. Part IV of this volume discusses 
these country differences and their implications for 
fiscal space and fiscal policy. In the large Member 
States, GDP is expected to fall by between -1.4% 
and -5.4% this year, with the downswing being 
particularly marked in Germany and the United 
Kingdom, and more protracted in Spain. In some 
smaller EU economies the output loss could be in 
excess of 10% of GDP. 
GDP would shrink for seven consecutive quarters, 
from late 2008 to mid-2010, and would only very 
gradually recover thereafter. While the EU 
economy is expected to return to positive growth 
rates on a quarterly basis from the third quarter of 
2010, GDP growth is expected to be slightly 
negative for the year 2010 as a whole (at -0.1%). 
The outlook remains exceptionally uncertain, but 
upside and downside risks are broadly balanced.  
The economic downturn is increasingly visible in 
the labour market. From the low of 6.7% in early 
2008, the EU unemployment rate has increased 
rapidly. In March 2009 it already stood at 8.3%. 
Reacting with some lags to GDP growth, 
unemployment is likely to rise notably during this 
and next year, reaching an annual average of more 
than 10% in the EU by 2010. Reversing this trend 
will be a major policy challenge for the EU 
economy, as the worsened outlook also impacts 
public finances. 
1.2. FISCAL STIMULUS AND LARGE 
AUTOMATIC STABILISERS SUPPORT 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EU  
As the financial and economic crisis began to 
intensify after the summer of 2008, the European 
Commission published a Communication in 
November 2008, outlining a European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EERP; Boxes I.1.1 and I.1.2) to 
combat the economic downturn. This plan was 
later affirmed by the European Council. Given the 
extent of the crisis, the plan called for an 
immediate and co-ordinated effort to boost 
demand, suggesting a fiscal policy response 
equivalent to 1.5% of EU GDP. This figure 
includes actions at the EU as well as the Member 
State level. The fiscal stimulus comes on top of the 
important role that automatic stabilisers play in the 
EU and public support to the financial sector. Over 
2009-2010, the additional support to economic 
activity as measured by the change in the budget 
balance is estimated to amount to 5.0% of GDP. 
This section provides an overview and analysis of 
the budgetary support to the EU economy. (1)  
(1) In addition to support of the economy there have been 
massive public interventions in financial systems. Overall, 
governments have approved support totalling 35% of GDP, 
most of which are guarantees. How these are treated in 
fiscal statistics is reported in Part II.1. More details on the 
rescue measures and their fiscal implications are provided 
in Part III. 
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Table I.1.1: Fiscal stimulus measures in 2009 and 2010 by Member State (in % GDP)
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AT 1.8 0.2 1.6 0.4 1.4 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.8
BE 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4
BG** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CY 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZ 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5
DE 1.4 0.3 1.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.9
DK** 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.8
EE 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
EL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ES 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.6
FI 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.7
FR 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1
HU** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IE 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
IT** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
LT** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LV** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LU 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.1 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
MT 1.6 0.0 1.6 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.7 1.6
NL 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.0
PL 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.5
PT 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1
RO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SE 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.6
SI 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5
SK 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
UK*** 1.4 0.1 1.4 0.4 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
EU-27 1.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.7
EA-16 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.8
2009
* Figures for 2010 represent changes with respect to 2008, i.e. include permanent measures taking effect in 2009 plus the net effect of measures taking 
effect in 2010. 
**Measures in Bulgaria are conditional on the improvement in macro-economic imbalances. Overall, a neutral fiscal stance is assumed. Denmark 
recently decided to postpone the reintroduction of a mandatory “special pension contribution” by one year. Since the pension scheme is outside the 
general government sector but the contribution is tax-deductible this postponement will improve the general government balance. Hungary, Italy,
Lithuania and Latvia have adopted fiscal packages in response to the downturn, but their net impact is either neutral or deficit-reducing. 
*** The measures announced by the UK are affecting the financial years 2008/09 and 2009/10. These measures have been reattributed, to the extent 
possible, in accordance with their impact on the calendar years 2009 and 2010.The latest UK measures, announced in April 2009, are not included in 
the calculation. 
Source: Commission services.
Since autumn 2008, governments of a vast 
majority of Member States have taken action in
line with the EERP (Table I.1.1). Overall, Member 
States have adopted or announced fiscal stimulus 
measures in response to the economic downturn
amounting to a total of 1.1% of EU GDP for 2009 
and 0.7% of EU GDP for 2010. The scale of the 
measures varies strongly from one Member State
to another. In 2009 the largest fiscal stimulus in the 
euro area is being run in Spain, and is of the order
of 2.3% of GDP; other sizeable stimuli are 
undertaken by Austria (1.8% of GDP), Finland
(1.7%), Malta (1.6% of GDP), Germany (1.4% of
GDP) and Luxembourg (1.2% of GDP) . Outside 
the euro area the largest fiscal stimuli come
notably from the UK (1.4% of GDP) and Sweden 
(1.4% of GDP). Since these are countries facing a 
sharp economic slowdown, their budgetary 
positions are deteriorating fast. 
A similar picture of the distribution of fiscal
stimuli across EU Member States is expected for 
2010 (Table I.1.1). Only few Member States, 
including notably Spain, will already next year
start to reverse their earlier stimulus measures.  
However, given the limited room for fiscal
manoeuvre in some Member States, they 
effectively contribute hardly or not at all to the 
EERP. Within the euro area Cyprus, Greece, Italy 
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and Slovakia belong to this group. Outside the 
euro area they include Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Romania. (2) In fact, given 
strong market pressures, in light of great stress on 
public finances as well as, in part, large external 
and internal imbalances, several new Member 
States have requested balance-of-payments support 
(see for details Box I.1.3).  
The EERP comprises broadly equally in size 
revenue and expenditure measures (Box I.1.2). 
They pursue different aims: support to household's 
purchasing power, increased spending on labour 
market policies, reduction of taxes, social security 
contributions and other measures directly aimed at 
business, increased public investment.  
The fiscal support packages adopted under the 
EERP have broadly followed desirable general 
principles but some risks on their effectiveness 
remain. The set of principles includes the well-
known "three Ts" timely, temporary and targeted 
in addition to the need for a coordinated approach 
taking into account cross-country differences in 
fiscal space. As to the timeliness of the stimulus, 
reductions in social security contributions and 
support measures in favour of lower income 
brackets and families appear promising and the 
same applies to the frontloading of payments such 
as VAT to enterprises. Conversely various tax cuts 
are likely to take much longer to have any impact, 
and so do additional infrastructure projects. The 
stimulus packages are generally well-targeted
towards the sources of the economic challenge, 
giving support to credit-constrained households 
and enterprises, supporting employment and 
directly increasing demand. A large part of the 
measures in support of households is targeted at 
low-income earners, who are expected to be 
especially hard hit by the slowdown. The increased 
public infrastructure investment is mainly targeted 
at the ailing construction sector. By contrast, 
reductions in various taxes often do not 
discriminate between the particularly vulnerable 
groups and others. As to the temporariness of the 
stimulus, the measures in support of labour 
markets, the stepping-up of public infrastructure 
(2) In fact, some of these countries, both within and outside the 
euro area, have designed fiscal stimulus packages. 
However, as these are being offset by other planned 
measures, the net effect on budget balances is either neutral 
or deficit-reducing. 
investment and a large part of the measures aimed 
at enterprises are of a temporary nature, with their 
negative impact on government finances being 
reversible. On the other hand, a large part of the 
revenue related measures, particularly tax cuts and 
reductions in social security contributions, may 
prove difficult to reverse and hence have a more 
permanent character (possible exceptions are VAT 
cuts which are explicitly designed as temporary 
measures).  
The effectiveness of the measures implemented in 
the context of the EERP is being confirmed by 
simulations with the Commission's QUEST III 
model (Box I.1.2). Here the overall impact of a 
fiscal stimulus of 1% of GDP in 2009 and 0.5% of 
GDP in 2010 is estimated to provide a real GDP 
growth stimulus of about ¾ percentage points in 
2009 and ⅓ percentage points in 2010.  
In total, i.e. also accounting for the effect of 
automatic stabilisers, fiscal policy is providing 
support to the economy in the region of 5.0% of 
GDP over the period 2009 and 2010, equivalent to 
more than € 600 billion. (3) The largest share of 
this overall support comes from the operation of 
automatic stabilisers which are particularly strong 
in the EU. The estimated impact of the automatic 
stabilisers is around 3.2% of GDP over 2009-2010. 
In contrast to the budgetary impact of new 
expansionary measures, automatic stabilisers do 
not provide a short-term boost to the economy, but 
rather produce a stabilising effect on the economy 
over the cycle without requiring discretionary 
interventions by fiscal authorities. The two 
elements most frequently stressed to exert this 
effect are progressive tax systems and 
unemployment benefits. (4) However, the bulk of 
automatic stabilisation originates not from those 
two factors but rather from the size of government. 
In particular, it is the inertia in adjusting the level 
of non-cyclical expenditure – the majority of 
public spending – that produces the largest 
stabilising      effect.      In      other     words,     the 
(3) This 5.0% of GDP estimate does not include guarantee 
schemes, which do not require upfront funding, but which 
nevertheless could result in significant budgetary outlays in 
case of default on the guaranteed liabilities. 
(4) Tax revenues increase more than proportionally when GDP 
rises and similarly expenditure for unemployment benefits 
drop in economic good times, which improves the fiscal 
position and produces a countercyclical effect. 
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Box I.1.1: The European Economic Recovery Plan
In response to the current economic crisis, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) was officially
launched with the Commission Communication of 26 November 2008, which was later affirmed by the
European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008. (1) Against the background of the scale of the crisis, and
given that most economic policy levers, and especially those which can affect consumer demand in the short
term, are in the hands of the Member States, such a co-ordinated approach is needed. The fact that Member
States have very different starting positions, in terms of fiscal room for manoeuvre in particular, makes
effective coordination all the more important.
Apart from delivering a short-term economic stimulus, the strategic aims of the EERP also are: to help 
Europe to prepare to take advantage when growth returns; speed up the shift towards a low carbon economy;
lessen the human cost of the economic downturn and its impact on the most vulnerable. Indeed the Recovery 
Plan is supposed to be implemented against the backdrop of the fundamental principles of solidarity and
social justice. It has two key pillars, and in addition also covers monetary and credit aspects, and external
action (the latter in order to work towards global solutions to global economic challenges).
The first pillar is a major injection of purchasing power into the economy, to boost demand and stimulate
confidence. On a proposal from the Commission Member States and the EU have agreed on an immediate
fiscal impulse amounting to at least € 200 billion (1.5% of GDP), in order to boost demand. This consists of 
a budgetary expansion by Member States of € 170 bn (around 1.2% of the EU's GDP), and EU funding in 
support of immediate actions of the order of € 30 bn (around 0.3% of EU GDP), and occurs in full respect of 
the Stability and Growth Pact.
Apart from being accompanied by structural reform measures in the context of the Lisbon strategy (see next
paragraph below), the fiscal stimulus should be based on several principles. First, it should be timely, 
temporary, targeted, and co-ordinated. Second, it can combine a mix of revenue and expenditure
instruments, such as public expenditure; guarantees and loan subsidies to compensate for the unusually high 
current risk premia; well-designed financial incentives; lower taxes and social contributions. Last but not
least, it is conducted within the Stability and Growth Pact. Extraordinary circumstances combining a
financial crisis and a recession justify a co-ordinated budgetary expansion in the EU. This may lead some
Member States to breach the 3% of GDP deficit reference value. However, for Member States considered to
be in an excessive deficit, corrective action will have to be taken in timeframes consistent with the recovery 
of the economy. The Stability and Growth Pact is therefore applied judiciously ensuring credible medium-
term fiscal policy strategies. Member States putting in place counter-cyclical measures have normally
submitted an updated Stability or Convergence Programme by the end of December 2008. This update
spelled out the measures that will be put in place to reverse the fiscal deterioration and ensure long-term
sustainability. The Commission then has assessed the budgetary impulse measures and Stability and 
Convergence Programmes based on updated forecasts and has provided guidance on the appropriate stance.
In this context the following criteria have been relied upon: ensuring the reversibility of measures increasing 
deficits in the short term; improving budgetary policy-making in the medium term through a strengthening 
of the national budgetary rules and frameworks; ensuring long-term sustainability of public finances, in
particular through reforms curbing the rise in age-related expenditure.
The second pillar is grounded in the Lisbon strategy and rests on the need to direct short-term action towards
implementing structural reforms aimed at raising potential growth, promoting resilience, and reinforcing 
Europe's competitiveness in the long term. Indeed at the operational level there should be a close connection
between the fiscal stimulus and action in the four priority areas of the Lisbon Strategy (people; business;
infrastructure and energy; research and innovation). In order to achieve this, the EERP sets out a
comprehensive programme to direct action to 'smart' investment, which means investing in the right skills
(1) COM (2008) 800 final, 'A European Economic Recovery Plan'. The thrust of this Recovery Plan was confirmed in
the Commission Communication 'Driving European Recovery' of 4 March 2009. See COM (2009) 0114 final.
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
for tomorrow's needs, in energy efficiency and clean technologies, and in infrastructure and inter-connection 
to promote efficiency and innovation. Some of these actions are designed to frontload EU funding directly to
contribute to the fiscal stimulus and assist Member States with the implementation of their policies, while
others are intended to improve the framework conditions for future investments, reduce administrative
burdens and speed up innovation. Specifically, ten actions are included in the Recovery Plan: to (1) launch a
major European employment support initiative; (2) create demand for labour; (3) enhance access to
financing for business; (4) reduce administrative burdens and promote entrepreneurship; (5) step up 
investments to modernise Europe's infrastructure; (6) improve energy efficiency in buildings; (7) promote 
the rapid take-up of green products; (8) increase investment in R&D, innovation and education; (9) develop
clean technologies for cars and construction; (10) provide access to high-speed internet for 
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Box I.1.2: Fiscal policy measures
The European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP; Box I.1.1) also provided broad guidelines on the types of
measures which, if adopted in a coordinated way, are likely to result in cross-country synergies and positive
spill-over effects. (1) Within the framework of a common approach country-specific measures to support 
demand should aim at producing immediate results, be of limited duration, and target the most important and 
most affected sectors of the economy. A distinction can be made, on the one hand, between expenditure and
revenue related measures and, on the other, between the different aims of the measures.  
The EERP encouraged choosing the instruments from a range of options depending on country-specific
circumstances, thus including both revenue and expenditure instruments. Given that discretionary public
spending is in general considered to have a stronger positive impact on demand in the short run than tax
cuts, as consumers might prefer to save rather than consume, a higher share of expenditure-related measures
often has been wished for. However, provided that tax cuts are (expected to be) limited in time, thereby
avoiding neutralising anticipatory effects of larger tax liabilities in the future, and delivered directly and
upfront, the effect on consumption could still be substantial. In addition, a number of operations that do not
affect the general government balance have also been taken by Member States. The measures which can be
considered pursue the following aims:
• Support to households' purchasing power. Reduction in taxes and social security contributions and 
direct aid aimed at households, such as income support for households, lowering taxes for
households (including energy subsidies), supporting housing or property markets and decreasing
VAT. In this category, the great majority of Member States have adopted measures.
• Increased spending on labour market policies, such as wage subsidies and intensifying active
labour market policies. Only few Member States have adopted noteworthy measures in this area.  
• Reduction of taxes, social security contributions, and other measures directly aimed at business,
such as tax breaks, earlier payment of VAT returns, facilitating company financing, state aid and
stepping up export promotion were adopted in almost half of all Member States. 
• Increased public investment, such as public investment in infrastructure, supporting investment
aimed at greening the economy, and/or improving energy efficiency were adopted in close to half
of all Member States.
This menu of options can be assessed on the basis of the three criteria: timely, targeted, and temporary:
As to the timeliness of the stimulus, reductions in social security contributions, social measures in favour of
lower income households and families with children can provide early support to household purchasing 
power. Regarding cuts in indirect taxes, however, necessary adaptations in retailers' pricing strategies are
likely to entail a time lag before the effect feeds through. The timeliness with which income tax cuts impact
on household purchasing power depends crucially on the administrative modalities. On the business side, 
while the frontloading of payments such as VAT to enterprises should have a rather immediate stimulus
effect, other supporting measures may impact only gradually. Given the inevitable implementation lag of
additional infrastructure projects, their direct stimulating effect will probably not materialise before the
second half of the year. Lower social contributions paid by employers should have an immediate positive
impact on job retention throughout the economy. 
(1) The box draws largely on European Commission (2009), 'A first horizontal assessment of National Recovery
Programmes in response to the European Economic Recovery Plan', Note for the Economic and Financial Committee.
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
The stimulus packages are generally well-targeted towards the sources of the economic challenge, giving 
support to credit-constrained households and enterprises, supporting employment and directly increasing
demand through public investment. The increased public infrastructure investment is mainly targeted at the
ailing construction sector. As for the measures in support of households, a large part is targeted at low-
income earners who are expected to be especially hard hit by the slowdown. By contrast, reductions in direct 
and indirect taxes often do not discriminate between the particularly vulnerable groups and others. Capital
injections and direct guarantees with the purpose of increasing lending to credit constrained private
enterprises are often targeted at small and medium and export-oriented enterprises.
As to the temporariness of the stimulus, one has to distinguish between different types of actions. The
measures in support of labour markets, the stepping-up of public infrastructure investment and a large part
of the measures aimed at enterprises are of a temporary nature, with their negative impact on government
finances being reversible. On the other hand, a large part of the revenue related measures, particularly tax
cuts and reductions in social security contributions, appear to be of a permanent nature and may prove
difficult to reverse. (Exceptions are VAT tax cuts explicitly designed as a temporary measure with a fixed
reversal date.) Overall, given that revenue based measures represent the majority of the total, a significant
part of the stimulus measures does not seem to be of a temporary nature.  
Finally, regarding empirical evidence, the Commission services have performed simulations on the impact
of discretionary fiscal policies on economic activity under conditions of a financial crisis by including credit
constraints in the QUEST III model. (1) The main results of these simulations suggest that: (i) while the 
introduction of credit constraints raises the multiplier for transfer and tax shocks, government consumption
or investment shocks continue to have a relatively higher impact on GDP; (ii) a permanent shock is much
less effective in supporting economic activity than a temporary shock as the anticipation effects of larger tax
liabilities weigh more negatively on current consumption and investment; (iii) the introduction of credit-
constraints also raises the multiplier for permanent transfer and tax shocks, but its size remains much smaller
than that for transitory shocks. Overall the large difference between the multipliers for temporary and
permanent fiscal shocks underscores the importance that budgetary measures should be credibly contingent
on the foreseen duration of the downturn: private agents need to believe the expansionary measures will be
timely reversed and not become permanent. Non-reported results also show that cross-country spill-over
effects of fiscal shocks are positive and effects of a joint fiscal stimulus are larger than when acting alone.
The Table below displays the simulation results for the measures announced by the Member States in their
fiscal stimulus packages grouped according to their broad area of impact. The overall result is that the
stimulus measures (estimated at 1% of GDP in 2009 and 0.5% in 2010) will have a positive impact on GDP
growth of around 0.8% in 2009 and about 0.3% in 2010 for the EU as a whole.
Graph 1: Model simulation of the impact of fiscal stimulus packages in the EU
Fiscal  me asures as % of GDP 2009 2010
Supporting household purchas ing power 0.5 0.2
Labour market 0.1 0.0
Measures aimed at companies (exc l. inves tment incentives) 0.2 0.1
Increasing/bringing forward inves tment 0.3 0.1
Total 1.0 0.5
GDP grow th imp act 0.8 0.3
Source:  Commiss ion  serv ices  based on QUEST III model.
(1) The results of the simulations reported are based on a DGSE model consisting of two regions: the European Union and
the rest of the world (ROW). The results concern the EU economy and assume that both the EU and the ROW
undertake simultaneously a 1% of GDP fiscal stimulus in 2009. The regions are differentiated from one another by
their economic size and calibrated on bilateral trade flows. The EU is characterised in the model by relatively high
transfers and unemployment benefits, high wage taxes, high price rigidities and labour adjustment costs, and a low
elasticity of labour supply. Multipliers are generally smaller in the EU due to higher nominal and real rigidities and to
benefit and transfer generosity. The model allows for housing investment and includes credit constrained households
along the lines suggested by the recent literature on the financial accelerator mechanism. For more detail on the
Commission services' QUEST model see Ratto et al. (2008).
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implementation of discretionary expenditure levels 
in line with plans leans against the current decline 
in aggregate output. Because of the significantly 
larger government sector in the EU (in 2008 the 
average expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the EU was 
46.8%, compared to 39.1 % in the US), automatic
stabilisers play a more important role than in the 
US. 
Box I.1.3: EU balance-of-payments assistance
In the ongoing financial and economic crisis, some EU Member States outside the euro area have come
under external financing stress and sought financial assistance. The Community can provide balance-of-
payments support to non-euro area Member States through its medium-term financial assistance facility
under Article 119 of the Treaty. The assistance (1) aims to overcome short-term liquidity constraints while,
through policy conditionality, supporting the correction of underlying macroeconomic and financial
imbalances. The funds for the loans under the Facility are raised by the Commission (on behalf of the
Community) on financial markets, and are on-lent to the recipient country at the same conditions (i.e., the 
borrowing country benefits from the AAA credit rating of the Community). 
While the facility is in principle a free-standing instrument, in practice the Community financial assistance is 
provided in the context of broader concerted financing packages, involving other stakeholders as appropriate
(IMF, World Bank, other IFIs, bilaterals). This enhances the leverage and effectiveness of the financial
support. Policy conditionality is enshrined in a Memorandum of Understanding agreed with the authorities.
The Commission monitors compliance with conditionality and decides on the release of subsequent
instalments, following consultation of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC). 
Policy conditionality in the context of the EU balance-of-payments assistance focuses on the key challenges
that need to be tackled to restore a sustainable external position; in the ongoing programmes for Hungary,
Latvia and Romania these have been fiscal policy, fiscal governance, financial stability (including rescue
packages and strengthening of supervision and regulation) and structural reforms.  
In order to be able to respond effectively in the current crisis environment, the ceiling for the EU balance-of-
payments Facility was raised from €12 to €25 billion in late 2008 and further to €50 billion on 5 May 2009.
A total €14.6 billion has been committed so far under the Facility, following the approval of loans to
Hungary (€6.5 billion, Latvia (€3.1 billion) and Romania (€5 billion). The assistance is provided in five 
instalments for Hungary over one year, six instalments for Latvia and up to five instalments for Romania
over two years, conditional on a comprehensive economic policy programme. Two tranches of €2 billion 
each have so far been released for Hungary and one tranche of €1 billion for Latvia. For Romania, the
Memorandum of Understanding specifying the size and timing of each instalment has not been concluded
with the authorities yet. 
Table 1: Balance-of-payments assistance (as of 7 May 2009)
Hungary Latvia 1/ Romania
Total assistance package €20 bn €7.5 bn €20 bn
EU (Art. 119) €6.5 bn €3.1 bn €5 bn
IMF €12.5 bn €1.7 bn €12.95 bn
Other multilaterals €1 bn €0.5 bn €2 bn
Bilaterals … €2.2 bn/1 …
Notes: 1/ Contributions by Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia.
Sources:  European Commission and IMF.
(1) The facility is governed by Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002. 
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Table I.1.2: Euro area - The General government budget balance (% of GDP) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total revenue (1) 44.8 45.3 45.5 44.8 44.7 44.4
Total expenditure (2) 47.3 46.6 46.1 46.6 50.1 51.0
Actual balance (3) = (1) - (2) -2.5 -1.3 -0.6 -1.8 -5.4 -6.5
Interest (4) 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.2
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 0.4 1.6 2.3 1.2 -2.4 -3.3
One-offs (6) 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -1.3 -2.2
Cyclically adjusted  balance (7) -2.5 -1.9 -1.9 -2.9 -3.9 -4.7
Cyclically adj. prim. balance = (7) + (4)  0.4 0.9 1.1 0.1 -0.9 -1.5
Structural budget balance = (7) -(6) -2.7 -2.0 -1.8 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6
Change in actual balance: 0.4 1.2 0.7 -1.2 -3.6 -1.1
  - Cycle 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.8
  - Interest -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
  - Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.2 0.7 0.2 -0.8 0.0 0.0
  - One-offs 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.1 -0.9
  - Structural budget balance 0.3 0.7 0.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.8
Note: Differences between totals and sum of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source:  Commission services.
1.3. SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR THE BUDGET BALANCE 
AND PUBLIC DEBT 
In 2008, the budgetary positions in the euro area 
and the EU deteriorated for the first time in five
years, recording a major setback in comparison to
the previous year. The euro-area average headline 
deficit reached 1.9% of GDP, up from 0.6% of
GDP in 2007 (Table I.1.3). Almost the same
deterioration took place in the EU as a whole, 
where the average budget deficit declined by 1.2 
percentage points reaching 2.3% of GDP in 2008 
(Table I.1.4). In both the euro area and the EU the 
deterioration in the headline deficit was matched
by an only slightly smaller deterioration of the 
structural budget balance, i.e. the budget balance
net of cyclical factors and one-off and other
temporary measures (1.0% of GDP in the euro area
and 1.1% in the EU). Taken at face value this 
result would seem to suggest that only to a lesser 
extent the deterioration in the headline deficit was
due to cyclical factors, and that primarily it was of 
a structural nature. However, the estimates of the
structural budget balance are likely to be affected 
by the earlier exceptional buoyancy of tax
revenues which has started to go into reverse along 
with the economic cycle. (5) 
In 2008, the deterioration in the (nominal) budget
balance was particularly sizeable in Ireland (where
(5) Tax revenues were much higher than projected in the SCPs 
in 2005-2007.
a minor surplus was turned into a deficit of more
than 7% of GDP) and in Spain (where a large 
surplus was turned into a deficit in excess of the 
reference value of the Treaty), and to a lesser 
extent also in Malta, Slovenia, Italy, and Greece. 
In the latter the headline deficit, already beyond 
the 3% threshold, continued to rise. In Cyprus the 
previously large surplus shrunk considerably.  
As to France, here the deficit slightly deteriorated 
from 2.7% of GDP to 3.4%. Hence in all these 
Member States of the euro area the deficit in 2008
exceeded the reference value of the Treaty. In 
Germany effectively a balanced budget was
maintained. The only country to report a notable 
improvement was the Netherlands who managed to
increase their surplus to 1.0% of GDP. Apart from
Cyprus and the Netherlands only Luxembourg and
Finland posted surpluses in 2008, the latter still at
a level of 4.2% of GDP. 
An even stronger negative impact was felt outside 
the euro area in 2008, where relative to the 
previous year the budgetary position weakened in 
many Member States. Very large deteriorations of
more than four percentage points were recorded in
the Baltic States. In the Czech Republic the deficit 
remained approximately constant below the 3%
threshold, while in Poland the deficit rose above it, 
and in Hungary it remained there. However, in
Romania and in the United Kingdom the deficit 
deteriorated to 5.4 and 5.5% of GDP respectively 
and hence clearly exceeded the 3% of GDP 
reference value of the Treaty. As to the remaining 
Member States outside the euro area, Bulgaria, 
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Denmark, and Sweden all reported surpluses in 
2008.  
Looking ahead to 2009 and 2010, the public 
finance situation is expected to dramatically
deteriorate in the light of slowing economic
growth. The Commission services’ spring 2009
forecast projects euro area (EU) real GDP to 
contract by 4.0 (4.0)% in 2009, compared to an
expansion of 0.8 (0.9)% in 2008, and to stagnate at
-0.1 (-0.1)% in 2010. Against this growth outlook, 
the aggregate deficit of the sixteen Member States
which have adopted the single currency, is
expected to reach 5.3% of GDP in 2009, 3.4 
percentage points higher than the year before. 
Based on the no-policy-change assumption a 
further deterioration to 6.5% of GDP is projected
in 2010. Broadly the same profile is expected for
the EU as a whole. The deficit is forecast to rise to
6.0% of GDP in 2009, from 2.3% in 2008, and to
continue to rise to 7.3% of GDP in 2010.  
Outside the euro area, the development of 
budgetary positions is likely to be more diverse.
The headline deficit in Hungary is forecast to stay 
slightly above the 3% threshold in both 2009 and
2010. In the Czech Republic, and to an even larger
extent in Poland, the deficit is expected to remain
well above the reference value of the Treaty in
both years. In Romania it is projected to stay 
broadly constant at over 5% of GDP while for the
United Kingdom a continuous further budgetary
deterioration is forecast beyond 2008. Hereby the 
deficit in the United Kingdom is expected to reach
13.8% of GDP during 2010. For Latvia, and to a
lesser extent for Estonia and Lithuania, a very 
significant budgetary worsening is also projected, 
resulting in a breach of the reference value of the 
Treaty in all three Baltic States over the forecast 
horizon. Bulgaria is the only Member State outside 
the euro area which is forecast to stay close to 
balance in both 2009 and 2010, while even 
Denmark and Sweden are expected to run deficits
above the 3% threshold over the forecast horizon. 
In structural terms, i.e. net of cyclical factors and 
one-off and other temporary measures, the 
projected deterioration in both the euro area and
the EU in 2009 is smaller than that of the headline 
deficit, but still significant given that many
Member States support their economies with
discretionary measures under the EERP. In
Table I.1.3: Budget balances of EU Member States (% of GDP) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010
BE 0.3 -0.2 -1.2 -4.5 -6.1 -1.5 -2.2 -3.2 -4.0 2.3 1.5 0.7 0.0
DE -1.5 -0.2 -0.1 -3.9 -5.9 -1.2 -1.2 -2.4 -3.9 1.6 1.6 0.6 -0.9
IE 3.0 0.2 -7.1 -12.0 -15.6 -1.8 -7.5 -9.8 -12.2 -0.9 -6.4 -7.6 -9.0
EL -2.8 -3.6 -5.0 -5.1 -5.7 -4.5 -6.5 -5.7 -4.7 -0.4 -2.1 -1.0 0.1
ES 2.0 2.2 -3.8 -8.6 -9.8 1.6 -3.9 -6.8 -8.2 3.2 -2.4 -5.2 -6.3
FR -2.3 -2.7 -3.4 -6.6 -7.0 -3.9 -4.3 -5.5 -5.5 -1.2 -1.5 -2.7 -2.5
IT -3.3 -1.5 -2.7 -4.5 -4.8 -2.9 -3.4 -2.6 -2.8 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.0
LU 1.4 3.6 2.6 -1.5 -2.8 0.9 2.0 0.6 0.1 1.1 2.3 1.2 0.7
NL 0.6 0.3 1.0 -3.4 -6.1 -1.0 -0.5 -2.6 -4.3 1.2 1.7 0.0 -1.6
AT -1.6 -0.5 -0.4 -4.2 -5.3 -1.8 -1.8 -3.2 -3.8 -1.5 -1.0 -1.2 -0.9
PT -3.9 -2.6 -2.6 -6.5 -6.7 -3.3 -3.8 -5.5 -5.1 -0.5 -0.9 -2.5 -1.8
SI -1.3 0.5 -0.9 -5.5 -6.5 -1.7 -2.5 -4.9 -5.2 -0.4 -1.3 -3.3 -3.4
FI 4.0 5.2 4.2 -0.8 -2.9 3.2 2.8 0.8 -0.7 4.6 4.2 2.1 0.7
MT -2.6 -2.2 -4.7 -3.6 -3.2 -3.3 -4.9 -3.6 -2.8 0.0 -1.6 -0.2 0.7
CY -1.2 3.4 0.9 -1.9 -2.6 2.7 0.1 -2.1 -2.1 5.8 2.9 0.2 0.1
SK -3.5 -1.9 -2.2 -4.7 -5.4 -3.8 -4.7 -5.0 -4.7 -2.4 -3.5 -3.7 -3.3
EA-16 -1.3 -0.6 -1.9 -5.3 -6.5 -1.8 -2.8 -3.9 -4.7 1.1 0.2 -0.9 -1.5
BG 3.0 0.1 1.5 -0.5 -0.3 2.0 0.2 0.3 1.6 3.1 1.0 1.1 2.4
CZ -2.6 -0.6 -1.5 -4.3 -4.9 -2.5 -3.4 -4.0 -3.7 -1.4 -2.3 -2.9 -2.5
DK 5.2 4.5 3.6 -1.5 -3.9 3.0 4.2 1.2 -0.4 4.5 5.6 2.9 1.2
EE 2.9 2.7 -3.0 -3.0 -3.9 -0.8 -4.1 -1.0 -1.9 -0.7 -3.9 -0.6 -1.4
LV -0.5 -0.4 -4.0 -11.1 -13.6 -4.5 -5.8 -9.5 -11.5 -4.1 -4.9 -8.1 -9.2
LT -0.4 -1.0 -3.2 -5.4 -8.0 -2.8 -5.2 -4.3 -5.5 -2.1 -4.5 -3.1 -3.9
HU -9.2 -4.9 -3.4 -3.4 -3.9 -5.5 -4.5 -1.7 -2.0 -1.5 -0.2 3.1 2.9
PL -3.9 -1.9 -3.9 -6.6 -7.3 -3.2 -5.3 -6.0 -5.6 -0.9 -3.1 -3.1 -2.7
RO -2.2 -2.5 -5.4 -5.1 -5.6 -4.4 -7.9 -5.2 -4.7 -3.7 -7.2 -3.7 -3.1
SE 2.5 3.8 2.5 -2.6 -3.9 1.9 1.7 -0.5 -1.9 3.7 3.4 0.9 -0.5
UK -2.7 -2.7 -5.5 -11.5 -13.8 -3.7 -5.6 -10.0 -12.2 -1.5 -3.3 -7.8 -9.2
EU-27 -1.4 -0.8 -2.3 -6.0 -7.3 -2.0 -3.1 -4.6 -5.5 0.7 -0.4 -1.8 -2.5
Budget balance Structural balance Structural primary balance
Note: The structural budget balance is calculated on the basis of the commonly agreed production function method (see European Commission 2004).
Source:  Commission services.
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particular, the structural balance is estimated to 
deteriorate by 1.1% of GDP in the euro area and 
by 1.5% of GDP in the EU as a whole. A further 
deterioration is projected for 2010, amounting to 
another 0.8% of GDP in the euro area and 0.9% in 
the EU as a whole. However, when making these 
estimates one should bear in mind that measuring 
cyclically-adjusted balances is not straightforward, 
in particular during a crisis such as the current one. 
Against the backdrop of the group of euro-area 
countries that have already achieved their medium-
term budgetary objective (MTO) having thinned 
out dramatically in 2008, structural fiscal positions 
are forecast to deteriorate further over the 
projection horizon. In both 2009 and 2010 only 
Luxembourg is expected to attain its MTO. 
Outside the euro area, a similar picture emerges 
and only Denmark and Bulgaria (both marginally 
so) are forecast to attain their MTOs in 2009 and 
2010 respectively. However, it is clear that aiming 
again seriously to attain the MTOs will be a crucial 
element in any exit strategy from the current 
economic crisis.  
Turning to government debt, rising debt-to-GDP 
ratios reflect the deteriorating public finances, 
ailing economies, and public interventions in the 
financial system (Table I.1.5). In the euro area, in 
2008 the ratio rose by 3.3 percentage points to 
69.3%. A further increase to 72.8% of GDP by 
2010 is projected as primary deficits are coupled 
with a negative contribution from economic 
growth and the additional effect of rising interest 
expenditure. 
In the EU as a whole, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
projected to rise steeply from its level of 61.5% in 
2008 to 72.6% in 2009, and to rise further to 
79.4% in 2010, not least because of a very 
significant increase in the debt ratios in the UK. 
Finally, risks for further debt increases stem from 
public intervention in the financial sector. (6) 
Aggregate figures tend to mask diverging 
developments at the country level. There are 
several Member States which before the crisis had 
low or very low debt levels, which however are 
now rising sharply. This group of countries 
includes Ireland, Latvia and the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, three euro area-countries are expected 
to surpass again the 100% of GDP public debt 
threshold by 2010. Notably, Italy already had a 
public debt-to-GDP ratio above 100% of GDP and 
given that debt has increased again this condition 
is expected to last throughout until 2010. In 
Belgium the government debt ratio rose again in 
2008, after having remained on a steady downward 
path for many years. It stood at 84.0% of GDP in 
2007, but is forecast to exceed the 100% of GDP 
threshold by 2010. In Greece the debt ratio, from a 
trough of 94.8% in 2007, is also expected to 
increase over the forecast horizon, up to 108.5% of 
GDP in 2010. As to the other Member States with 
debt ratios above the 60% of GDP threshold in 
2008, namely Germany, France, Portugal, 
Hungary, Malta, and Austria, further increases of 
these ratios are projected in all of them. 
(6) See Part III.6 of this report. 
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Table I.1.4: Composition of changes in the general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio in EU Member States (% of GDP) 
Change in 
debt ratio
2007 2008 2009 2010 2008-10 Primarybalance
Interest & 
growth 
contribution
Stock-flow
adjustment
BE 84.0 89.6 95.7 100.9 11.4 2.7 8.2 0.5
DE 65.1 65.9 73.4 78.7 12.8 3.9 8.1 0.7
IE 25.0 43.2 61.2 79.7 36.4 22.2 12.2 2.0
EL 94.8 97.6 103.4 108.0 10.4 1.4 5.6 3.4
ES 36.2 39.5 50.8 62.3 22.8 14.8 4.0 4.1
FR 63.8 68.0 79.7 86.0 18.0 7.8 6.2 4.1
IT 103.5 105.8 113.0 116.1 10.3 -0.2 10.3 0.2
LU 6.9 14.7 16.0 16.4 1.7 3.1 1.1 -2.5
NL 45.6 58.2 57.0 63.1 4.8 4.2 6.1 -5.5
AT 59.4 62.5 70.4 75.2 12.7 3.3 7.3 2.1
PT 63.5 66.4 75.4 81.5 15.1 7.0 6.6 1.4
SI 23.4 22.8 29.3 34.9 12.1 8.6 2.9 0.6
FI 35.1 33.4 39.7 45.7 12.3 0.9 3.0 8.3
MT 62.1 64.1 67.0 68.9 4.8 -0.2 4.8 0.2
CY 59.4 49.1 47.5 47.9 -1.3 0.0 0.4 -1.7
SK 29.4 27.6 32.2 36.3 8.7 7.3 1.1 0.3
EU-16 66.0 69.3 77.7 83.8 14.5 5.5 7.3 1.6
BG 18.2 14.1 16.0 17.3 3.2 -0.8 0.7 3.3
CZ 28.9 29.8 33.7 37.9 8.1 6.9 2.1 -0.9
DK 26.8 33.3 32.5 33.7 0.3 2.2 3.3 -5.2
EE 3.5 4.8 6.8 7.8 3.0 6.0 1.5 -4.5
LV 9.0 19.5 34.1 50.1 30.7 21.0 9.7 0.0
LT 17.0 15.6 22.6 31.9 16.3 10.8 5.6 0.0
HU 65.8 73.0 80.8 82.3 9.3 -2.4 8.9 2.8
PL 44.9 47.1 53.6 59.7 12.7 8.1 4.4 0.2
RO 12.7 13.6 18.2 22.7 9.1 7.6 1.4 0.2
SE 40.5 38.0 44.0 47.2 9.2 3.7 3.1 2.4
UK 44.2 52.0 68.4 81.7 29.7 20.2 5.7 3.8
EU-27 58.7 61.5 72.6 79.4 17.8 7.4 8.4 2.0
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio Change in the debt ratio in 2008-10 due to:
Note:  Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services.
Table I.1.5: Euro area - Government revenue and expenditure (% of GDP) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Total revenue 45.5 44.8 44.7 44.4
Taxes on imports and production (indirect) 13.5 12.9 13.0 13.0
Current taxes on income and wealth 12.4 12.2 11.8 11.5
Social contributions 15.1 15.3 15.5 15.4
of which actual social contributions 14.1 14.2 14.4 14.3
Other revenue 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5
Total expenditure 46.1 46.6 50.1 51.0
Collective consumption 7.9 8.0 8.6 8.7
Social benefits in kind 12.1 12.3 13.1 13.4
Social transfers other than in kind 15.8 16.0 17.5 18.0
Interest 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.2
Subsidies 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3
Gross fixed public capital formation 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.8
Other expenditures 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5
Note: Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services.
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1.4. GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND 
EXPENDITURE  
In 2008, the observed deterioration in budgetary 
positions in the euro area was largely the result of 
a lower revenue-to-GDP ratio (Table I.1.6). The 
slight increase in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio was 
mainly due to higher social benefits and transfers. 
As to the revenue side, a negative contribution 
came from taxes on imports and production and 
also from taxes on income and wealth, the latter 
not least due to a rapid decline of corporate income 
taxes (Box I.1.3). Section I.3 confirms this view of 
the composition of the deterioration in the budget 
balance. It shows that compared to the plans 
presented in the 2007 updates of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, significant nominal 
expenditure overruns came together with large 
revenue shortfalls. Much lower than expected 
nominal growth further exposes these 
developments in the expenditure-to-GDP ratios. A 
similar pattern can be observed for the EU as a 
whole (Table I.I.7).  
According to the Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast, it is the massive deterioration 
mainly on the expenditure side of the budget which 
explains the worsening of structural balances over 
the forecast horizon in most Member States.  
For the euro area, a projected rise in the 
expenditure ratio of 4.4 percentage points of GDP 
is forecast for 2009-2010.   
As to the outlook for 2009 and 2010, most change 
in composition is expected on the expenditure side. 
Collective consumption and social benefits and 
transfers are expected to considerably rise over the 
forecast horizon, which can only partly be 
explained by the operation of automatic stabilisers. 
The rest is due to discretionary measures. To a 
limited extent, the projected fiscal expansion also 
boosts growth-enhancing spending items: gross 
fixed public capital formation is projected to 
increase somewhat in both the euro area and the 
EU in 2009. However, the reduction in the share of 
interest expenditure that has contributed to a better 
allocation of available resources in past years is 
coming to a halt due to the crisis. On the revenue 
side composition effects are forecast to be small, 
mostly pertaining to a reduction in taxes on income 
and wealth. 
Overall Member States budgetary plans for 2009 
and 2010 have been compiled against a 
background of great uncertainty and exhibit many 
risks, on both the revenue and expenditure 
sides. (7) Eventually a consolidation strategy will 
need to be pursued to return to sound fiscal 
positions and ensure long-term sustainability. 
(7) See Part I.3 of this report. 
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Table I.1.6: Government revenue and expenditure (% of GDP) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010
BE 48.1 48.4 48.5 48.2 48.3 49.8 52.9 54.3
DE 43.9 43.7 43.5 42.3 44.2 43.9 48.2 49.0
IE 35.7 33.7 33.7 33.9 35.7 41.0 45.8 49.1
EL 40.0 39.9 40.8 40.0 43.7 44.9 45.3 45.2
ES 41.0 36.8 36.4 36.9 38.8 40.5 45.2 47.1
FR 49.7 49.6 49.4 49.9 52.3 52.7 55.6 56.4
IT 46.6 46.4 46.5 46.5 47.9 48.8 51.2 51.1
LU 41.0 43.6 44.0 42.9 37.2 40.7 44.2 45.7
NL 45.6 46.8 46.1 45.6 45.3 45.4 48.3 50.2
AT 47.9 47.6 47.0 47.3 48.5 48.6 51.6 52.1
PT 43.1 44.2 42.6 42.4 45.7 45.9 48.9 48.7
SI 42.9 41.6 41.7 41.6 42.4 43.6 47.7 48.6
FI 52.6 52.3 52.0 51.3 47.3 48.3 52.8 54.3
MT 40.4 40.7 41.1 41.2 42.6 45.3 44.4 44.8
CY 46.4 45.6 44.1 44.1 42.9 44.0 44.4 45.0
SK 32.7 32.1 32.2 32.1 34.4 34.9 38.3 39.4
EA-16 45.5 44.8 44.7 44.4 46.1 46.6 50.1 51.0
BG 41.6 41.4 40.8 40.9 41.5 37.4 39.5 39.3
CZ 41.6 40.7 40.7 41.1 42.6 42.4 45.9 47.6
DK 55.4 54.8 52.8 53.4 50.9 51.8 55.0 57.0
EE 38.2 36.5 38.2 38.4 35.5 40.9 45.0 47.3
LV 37.6 36.0 34.1 34.7 35.9 39.5 46.8 49.8
LT 33.9 33.9 34.8 36.0 34.9 37.2 39.5 42.7
HU 44.9 45.5 46.1 46.4 49.7 49.9 50.8 52.0
PL 40.0 39.6 40.2 40.3 42.1 43.1 46.1 46.8
RO 34.0 32.7 32.2 32.5 36.6 38.5 38.5 38.9
SE 56.4 55.1 53.0 52.7 52.5 53.1 56.6 57.3
UK 42.6 41.8 41.4 41.6 44.0 47.7 50.5 52.4
EU-27 45.1 44.5 44.3 44.1 45.7 46.8 50.1 51.1
Revenue Expenditure
Source:  Commission services.
26 
Part I
Current developments and prospects 
Box I.1.4: The behaviour of tax revenues and the financial crisis
Tax revenues tend to follow economic activity but can nevertheless be subject to substantial variation near
turning points of the economic cycle. Events such as a systemic financial crisis can exacerbate these trends
further. (1) Looking backward, the experience of Finland and Sweden shows that countries facing a severe
financial crisis and a pronounced economic slowdown can experience large variations in tax elasticities
ranging from a large increase (before the crisis) to a steep fall (during the crisis). Graph 1 plots the
development of the apparent tax elasticities for Finland (2) and shows that at the outbreak of the previous
financial crisis which lasted from 1991 to 1994, the total tax elasticity still tended to increase but then
experienced a sharp decline after 1991 (-0.41 in 1993). (3) The tax elasticity rebounded in subsequent years
to stabilise at levels comparable to the pre-crisis period.
Graph 1: Long-run evolution in total tax elasticities in Finland 1980-2007
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Source: Commiss ion  serv ices , Ameco.
Overall the cyclical component of tax revenues (and as a result also total tax revenues) dropped considerably
in Finland and Sweden during the financial crisis after having experienced a steep increase in the years
preceding the crisis as shown in Graph 2. The past experiences of Finland and Sweden suggest that tax 
revenues can remain relatively high when economic activity starts worsening and tax revenues are still high
against the backdrop of past revenue windfalls. After the outbreak of the crisis, however, tax revenues may
fall rapidly due to the fact that tax revenues may react disproportionately strongly to the deterioration of
economic activity. This is true in particular for the most volatile components of tax revenues, such as
corporate and property taxes.
(1) See European Commission (2009), 'A First Horizontal Assessment of National Recovery Programmes in response to
the European Economic Recovery Plan'. Note for the Economic and Financial Committee, ECFIN/C2/REP 50229.
(2) No consistent data (i.e. based on ESA95) are available for Sweden for the period considered in Graph 1.
(3) For more details on Finland's and Sweden's financial crises and the fiscal implications see Part III, in particular
Section III.4.
(Continued on the next page)
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Graph 2: Cyclical component of general government revenue, % of GDP 1980-2008 
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Source:  Commission services, Ameco.
At the current juncture similar developments seem to be occurring in a number of EU Member States,
especially in those that are most exposed to the relatively high volatility of the aforementioned tax
components. Indeed, high tax revenues in the EU until 2007 tended to be associated with large revenue 
windfalls which in some countries such as the UK, Spain or Ireland were closely linked to property tax
revenues (including taxes on housing market transactions) and buoyant corporate tax revenues.
Graph 3 provides evidence for this by reporting the apparent total tax revenues with and without the
aforementioned items for a selected group of EU Member States comprising the countries that have
benefited most from corporate and property tax revenues during the period 1999-2007. (1)3 It shows that
overall, since 2003, tax revenues stemming from corporate and property taxes had in general led to an
increase in the overall tax revenue ratio, in some cases quite substantially so (for instance, in the UK the 
variation in the tax revenue ratio was higher by 0.8 percentage points in 2006, by +0.9 in Ireland in the same
year, by +0.6 in France in 2006 due to the influence of corporate and property taxes, and by +0.7 in Spain in
2005). The shortfalls associated with these tax components in the current cyclical downturn are now leading 
to a disproportionately steep fall in the tax revenue ratio. A protracted deterioration in overall economic
activity could exacerbate this negative trend further.
(1) Recently acceded Member States are not taken into account as time series were in general much shorter.
(Continued on the next page)
28 
Part I
Current developments and prospects 
29 
Box (continued) 
Graph 3: Annual change in total tax revenues with and without property and corporate taxes in
selected EU countries (percentage points of GDP)
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The extraordinary economic downturn and the 
associated strong deterioration of budgetary 
positions has put a strain on the EU fiscal 
framework based on the Treaty requirement to 
avoid excessive deficits, as well as on the 
requirement for Member States to achieve and 
maintain their medium-term budgetary objective 
(MTO). (8) 
In 2008, the number of Member States with a 
nominal deficit above 3% of GDP increased to 
eleven, from just two in 2007 (see Table I.I.3). 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast, in 2009 the government deficits 
would exceed the 3% of GDP threshold in the 
Treaty in nearly all Member States (the only 
exceptions being Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Sweden and Estonia). Based 
on a no-policy change scenario, in 2010 the deficit 
would remain below 3% of GDP only in Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Finland.  
Within a context where the near-totality of the EU 
is likely to become subject to the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP), the enforcement of the 
rules-based framework of the Treaty and Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) reflects the common 
interest of Member States to anchoring strategies 
for exit from short-term support and for ensuring 
the sustainability of public finances. The flexibility 
introduced by the 2005 reform of the SGP allows 
(8) Article 104 of the Treaty lays down an excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) where the reference values for deficits 
and debt are 3% and 60% percent of GDP respectively. 
This procedure is further specified in Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1467/97 “on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure”. The 
obligation for Member States to achieve and maintain their 
MTO is laid out and specified in Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1466/97 “on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies”. These two regulations are part of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, representing its “dissuasive” 
and “preventive” arm, respectively. Relevant legal texts 
and guidelines can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/other_pages/other_pa
ges12638_en.htm
 Enforcement mechanisms of the EU budgetary surveillance 
framework are described in Box I.2.1 in Public Finances in 
EMU 2008. 
Member States in excessive deficit to implement 
corrective action in time frames consistent with the 
recovery of the economy, with rapid fiscal 
consolidation being called for only in cases of 
immediate sustainability risk. Furthermore, the 
reform established the possibility of revising the 
recommendations for the correction of the 
excessive deficit including an extension of the 
deadline in case of adverse economic 
developments with major unfavourable 
consequences for public finances. This possibility 
is meant to cater for budgetary outcomes falling 
short of targets on account of the deterioration of 
the underlying economic scenario.
This section reviews the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure since spring 2008.  
2.2. THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
Proceeding in a chronological order, in July 2008, 
the Council adopted recommendations under 
Article 104(7) for the United Kingdom to correct 
its excessive deficit by the financial year 2009/10 
at the latest. (9) At the same time, the Council, 
based on a proposal by the Commission, 
considered that Poland had corrected its excessive 
deficit and therefore abrogated its decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Poland in 
accordance with Article 104(12) of the Treaty. (10) 
Furthermore, the Greek authorities reported in 
October 2008, validated by Eurostat, that the 
general government deficit had breached the 3% in 
2007, contrary to the April 2008 notification, as a 
result of a statistical revision. 
The second half of 2008 saw a strong deterioration 
of budget balances across the board. A number of 
factors explain the rapid increase in general 
government deficits and debt, with the operation of 
automatic stabilisers amplified on the revenue side 
by a reversal of previous windfall, being 
supplemented by discretionary measures taken in 
(9) In March 2008, the UK authorities notified that the United 
Kingdom's general government deficit in 2008/09 was 
planned to reach 3.2% of GDP, thus exceeding the 3% of 
GDP reference value. 
(10) Poland's general government deficit decreased to 1.9% of 
GDP in 2007, from 3.9% of GDP in 2006. 
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the context of the European Economic Recovery 
Plan (EERP; see Section I.1 for further details). 
The rise in deficits implies that a temporary 
departure from medium-term budgetary targets 
was unavoidable. At the same time, the sudden 
deterioration of economic and budgetary 
conditions proved the importance of preparing in 
good times room for manoeuvre for a downturn.  
In its Recommendations with a view to bringing an 
end to the situation of an excessive government 
deficit issued in April 2009, the Council 
highlighted the importance of achieving the MTO 
for an appropriate budgetary management of 
economic downturns.  
Following the rapid deterioration of public 
finances, France, Ireland, Latvia, Malta and Spain 
notified a breach of the reference value for the year 
2008. In February 2009 the Commission adopted 
reports under Article 104(3) for all above countries 
and for Greece. In the case of Malta, the 
Commission concluded that the conditions of 
closeness and temporariness were satisfied, which 
led to the decision that no further steps would be 
taken at that point. In April 2009, following an 
opinion of the Commission and on the basis of 
recommendations from the Commission,  the 
Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in 
France, Spain, Ireland and Greece and set 
deadlines for correction in accordance with Article 
104(6-7). Furthermore, the Council considered, in 
accordance with Article 104(8), that the United 
Kingdom had not taken effective action in 
response to the recommendations formulated under 
Article 104(7) in July 2008 and issued new 
recommendations based on Article 104(7). For 
Latvia the follow-up steps under Article 104(5-7) 
were delayed due to ongoing negotiations on 
medium-term financial assistance. 
According to data notified by the authorities in 
March 2009 and subsequently validated by 
Eurostat, the 2008 general government deficit in 
Malta was revised upward to well above the 3% of 
GDP reference value. Also Poland, Lithuania and 
Romania reported general government deficits 
exceeding 3% of GDP for 2008 in the context of 
the April 2009 notification. Accordingly, in May 
2009 the Commission adopted reports under 
Article 104(3) for all four Member States.  
In the following paragraphs, details on the 
surveillance mechanisms in the Member States 
involved in an excessive deficit procedure both 
inside and outside the euro area are discussed in 
the English alphabetical order of Member States. 
2.2.1. The surveillance mechanism in the euro 
area Member States 
France 
According to the December 2008 stability 
programme update of France, the general 
government deficit in France was planned to reach 
2.9% of GDP in 2008, 3.9% in 2009, and 2.7% in 
2010. On 6 February 2009, the French Minister of 
the Economy, Industry and Employment 
announced, in a letter addressed to the 
Commissioner of Economic and Financial Affairs, 
an upward revision of the deficit estimates to 3.2% 
of GDP in 2008, 4.4% in 2009 and 3.1% in 2010. 
Therefore, the 3% of GDP reference value would 
already have been exceeded in 2008. The debt was 
estimated to be at 68.0% of GDP in 2008, rising to 
73.9% in 2009.  The rise in the deficit is due partly 
to the measures taken in line with the EERP, as 
announced on 4 December 2008 by the French 
President. According to the French government, 
the recovery plan would raise the deficit by 0.9% 
of GDP over the next two years, with the main 
impact in 2009, but would have no long-term 
impact on the deficit.  
In its February 2009 report in accordance with 
Article 104(3) the Commission considered the 
deficit to be close to the reference value. Although 
France suffered from a sharp economic slowdown 
near the end of 2008, the deficit was not deemed to 
be caused by a severe economic downturn in the 
sense of the Treaty. The excess over the 3% 
threshold was also considered a reflection of the 
fact that, since 2002, the deficit in France has been 
high and did not leave any room for manoeuvre for 
a downturn. In spite of the Commission's policy 
advice of 28 May 2008, the necessary fiscal 
consolidation was not carried out or planned. 
Finally, the deficit was not considered temporary, 
as the Commission services' January 2009 interim 
forecast projected the general government deficit 
to reach 5.4% of GDP in 2009, to decline to 5.0% 
in 2010 as the budgetary impact of the recovery 
plan is phased out. Therefore the deficit criterion 
in the Treaty was not fulfilled. Additionally, the 
general government gross debt ratio was estimated 
in the December 2008 updated stability 
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programme at 66.7% of GDP, above the 60% of 
GDP Treaty reference value (up from 63.6% in 
2006 and 63.9% in 2007). The Commission 
therefore concluded that the debt ratio was not 
sufficiently diminishing towards the reference 
value and that the debt criterion in the Treaty was 
not fulfilled either. 
The Council decided on 27 April 2009, in 
accordance with Article 104(6), that an excessive 
deficit existed in France. It was further noted that 
the French budgetary situation was affected by a 
sharp deterioration of the economic environment 
resulting from the global financial crisis. Therefore 
special circumstances were deemed to exist in 
France, allowing a correction of the excessive 
deficit in a medium-term framework. This resulted 
in the Council issuing recommendations in 
accordance with Article 104(7), setting a deadline 
for correction by 2012 at the latest and requiring a 
strengthening of the foreseen annual average fiscal 
effort to at least 1% of GDP. Consolidation would 
start in 2010, after the implementation of stimulus 
measures taken in line with the EERP. After six 
months time (i.e., after 27 October 2009), the 
Commission will assess whether effective action 
was taken. 
Greece 
According to data notified by the Greek authorities 
in October 2008, the general government deficit 
reached 3.5% of GDP in 2007, thus exceeding the 
3% of GDP reference value. The 2007 deficit was 
revised upwards from 2.8% of GDP notified in 
April 2008. The revision, which was validated by 
Eurostat on 22 October 2008, (11) included arrears 
paid to the EU budget following the GNI revision 
and a reduction of surpluses from extra-budgetary 
funds and social security funds. The general 
government gross debt was estimated at 94.8% of 
GDP, above the 60% of GDP reference value.  
In its February 2009 report under Article 104(3) 
the Commission considered that the deficit was 
still close to the reference value, although it had 
reached the maximum deviation that could be 
considered still close to the Treaty reference value. 
However, the deficit was not deemed to be 
(11) News Release 147/2008 of 22 October 2008 on the 
provision of data for the excessive deficit procedure. 
exceptional as it did not result from an unusual 
event or a severe economic downturn in the sense 
of the Treaty. Since the Commission services' 
January 2009 interim forecast projected the general 
government deficit net of one-offs to reach 4.4% 
of GDP (or 3.7% of GDP including one-offs) in 
2009 and 4.2% in 2010 assuming no policy 
change, the breach could not be considered 
temporary. In view of the large imbalances of the 
Greek economy and, given the lack of room for 
fiscal manoeuvre, the government did not adopt 
any short-term stimulus package in response to the 
economic slowdown, in line with the EERP. In 
consideration of the above, the Commission 
concluded that the deficit criterion in the Treaty 
was not fulfilled. Furthermore, the Commission 
considered that the debt ratio could not be seen as 
“sufficiently diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace” in the sense 
of the Treaty, implying that the debt criterion in 
the Treaty was not fulfilled either. 
The Council decided according to Article 104(6) 
on 27 April 2009 that an excessive deficit existed 
in Greece. At the same time, it addressed 
recommendations in accordance with Article 
104(7) to Greece, specifying that the deficit should 
be corrected by 2010 at the latest. Fiscal 
consolidation was deemed urgent for recovering 
competitiveness losses and addressing the existing 
external imbalances. In view of the mounting level 
of debt and the projected increase in age-related 
expenditure, the Council was of the opinion that 
the Greek authorities should improve the long-term 
sustainability of public finances by continuing the 
on-going reforms in the healthcare and pension 
system. After six months time (i.e., after 27 
October 2009), the Commission will assess 
whether effective action was taken. 
Ireland 
According to the addendum to the October 2008 
stability programme update, submitted by the Irish 
authorities on 9 January 2009, the general 
government deficit in Ireland reached 6.3% of 
GDP in 2008, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP 
reference value. Meanwhile, general government 
gross debt stood at 40.6% of GDP, below the 60% 
of GDP reference value but nearly 16 percentage 
points above the level in 2006-07, of which around 
9 percentage points was due to increased cash 
deposits. While Ireland took some measures 
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supporting the economy in line with the European 
Economic Recovery Plan, they are part of a 
broader medium-term budgetary strategy geared 
towards consolidation. 
The Commission considered in its February 2009 
report under Article 104(3) that the Irish deficit 
was not close to the reference value. However, the 
excess over the 3% of GDP reference value was 
deemed to be exceptional as it resulted from a 
severe economic downturn in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
scale of the downturn was unexpected, with the 
end-2007 update of the stability programme 
expecting real GDP growth of +3% in 2008, while 
the Commission services’ January 2009 interim 
forecast estimated growth at -2% in 2008. The 
deficit was not considered temporary. The 
Commission services’ January 2009 interim 
forecast projected that the deficit would widen to 
11% of GDP in 2009 and worsen further to 13% of 
GDP in 2010 on a no-policy change basis. The 
January 2009 addendum to the stability 
programme targeted a deficit of 9.5% of GDP in 
2009 before falling gradually to a value below 3% 
of GDP in 2013, based however on yet to be 
specified consolidation measures. In view of the 
above, the Commission concluded that the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled. 
The Council decided on 27 April 2009, in 
accordance with Article 104(6), that an excessive 
deficit existed in Ireland. Furthermore, it 
considered that special circumstances existed on 
account of the size of the required adjustment and 
the very weak economic background, allowing a 
correction of the excessive deficit in a medium-
term framework. This resulted in the Council 
setting a deadline for correction of the excessive 
deficit in 2013, in accordance with Article 104(7), 
corresponding to an average annual fiscal effort of 
at least 1½% of GDP from 2010. After six months 
time (i.e., after 27 October 2009), the Commission 
will assess whether effective action was taken. 
Malta 
According to data reported by the authorities in the 
context of the October 2008 notification, the 
general government deficit in Malta was planned 
to reach 3.3% of GDP in 2008, thus exceeding the 
3% of GDP reference value. General government 
gross debt was projected at 63.8% of GDP, above 
the 60% of GDP reference value. Subsequently, in 
the budget for 2009 presented on 3 November, and 
repeated in the December 2008 update of the 
stability programme, the planned deficit ratio for 
2008 was confirmed at 3.3% of GDP, while debt 
was projected at 62.8% of GDP. The increase of 
the deficit was partly the result of Malta's response 
to the call for stimulus measures in line with the 
EERP. 
The Commission issued a report in accordance 
with Article 104(3) in February 2009, concluding 
that the excess was close to the reference value. 
The breach of the threshold was not deemed to be 
exceptional in the sense of the Treaty, since it did 
not originate from an unusual event or a severe 
economic downturn in 2008. The Commission 
considered the deficit to be temporary, as the 
outcome for 2008 was affected by a deficit-
increasing one-off cost of 1% of GDP in 2008. 
Furthermore, the Commission services' January 
2009 interim forecast projected a fall in the deficit 
ratio from 3.5% of GDP in 2008 to 2.6% of GDP 
in 2009 (2.9% excluding further one-offs). The 
Commission concluded that the deficit criterion in 
the Treaty was not fulfilled. The debt was 
considered to be diminishing sufficiently and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace, suggesting that the debt criterion in the 
Treaty was fulfilled. Since the Maltese deficit 
satisfied the double condition of closeness and 
temporariness, in line with the Treaty other 
relevant factors were taken into account. On 
balance, these relevant factors were deemed 
relatively favourable, while the medium-term 
budgetary strategy remained geared towards 
making further progress with consolidation. It was 
therefore concluded that that no further steps under 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure were necessary. 
In the context of the April 2009 notification, the 
Maltese authorities reported a revised figure for 
the 2008 general government deficit of 4.7% of 
GDP. The general government gross debt ratio was 
estimated at 64.1% of GDP in 2008, above the 
60% of GDP Treaty reference value. Since the 
revised deficit figure was markedly higher than the 
previous one, the Commission considered it 
necessary to issue a new report under Article 
104(3) in May 2009 and concluded that the deficit 
could no longer be considered as close to the 
reference value. Since the Commission services' 
spring forecast projects the general government 
33 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
balance at 3.6% in 2009 and 3.2% in 2010 under a 
no policy change assumption, the excess was also 
no longer deemed to be temporary. As in the 
previous assessment, the deficit was not seen to be 
caused by exceptional circumstances in the sense 
of the Treaty. The Commission therefore 
concluded that the deficit criterion in the Treaty 
was not fulfilled. Furthermore, based on the new 
data and the most recent Commission services’ 
forecast, the debt ratio was considered not to be 
"sufficiently diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace" in the sense 
of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
from a medium-term perspective. This suggested 
that the debt criterion in the Treaty was not 
fulfilled either. 
Spain 
According to the January 2009 update of the 
stability programme, Spain's general government 
deficit reached 3.4% of GDP in 2008, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value. The 
programme foresees a further deterioration to 5.8% 
of GDP in 2009 before recovering to 4.8% in 
2010. To a significant extent, the spike in 2009 is 
the result of expansionary fiscal measures adopted 
by the Spanish authorities in response to the 
economic downturn and in line with the EERP. 
Government gross debt is estimated to be 39.8% of 
GDP, rising to 47.3% in 2009 and 51.6% in 2010, 
but remaining below the 60% of GDP reference 
value. 
The Commission concluded in its February 2009 
report in accordance with Article 104(3) that the 
excess was close to the reference value. The deficit 
was not considered exceptional, since it did not 
result from an unusual event or a severe economic 
downturn in 2008 in the sense of the Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact.  The excess over the 
3% of GDP reference value could not be seen as 
temporary, since the Commission services’ 
January 2009 interim forecast projected the general 
government deficit to increase to 6.2% of GDP in 
2009, before falling to 5.7% of GDP under the 
customary assumption of no policy change. In 
view of the above, the Commission concluded that 
the deficit criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled. 
The Council decided on 27 April 2009, in 
accordance with Article 104(6), that an excessive 
deficit existed in Spain. In view of both the sharp 
economic downturn and the size of the required 
budgetary correction, special circumstances were 
deemed to exist, allowing for correction in a 
medium-term framework. The Council therefore 
addresses recommendations in accordance with 
Article 104(7) to Spain specifying a correction by 
2012 at the latest. This is to be achieved through 
an average annual fiscal effort of at least 1¼% of 
GDP, as planned in the January 2009 update of the 
stability programme, starting consolidation in 2010 
after the implementation of stimulus measures 
taken in line with the EERP. After six months time 
(i.e., after 27 October 2009), the Commission will 
assess whether effective action was taken. 
2.2.2. The surveillance mechanism in the non-
euro area Member States 
Hungary 
The spring 2004 fiscal notification of Hungary 
reported a general government deficit in 2003 of 
5.9% of GDP, well above the reference value. On 
this basis and following a recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council decided in July 2004 that 
an excessive deficit existed in Hungary. At the 
same time, the Council issued a recommendation 
under Article 104(7) recommending that the 
excessive deficit situation be corrected by 2008. In 
January 2005, following a recommendation by the 
Commission in accordance with Article 104(8), the 
Council considered that Hungary had not taken 
effective action in response to its recommendation. 
Since Hungary is a Member State with a 
derogation within the meaning of Article 122 of 
the Treaty, (12) the Council issued another 
recommendation based on Article 104(7) in March 
2005, confirming the 2008 deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit.  
After a substantial deterioration of the budgetary 
outlook in Hungary, the Council decided in 
November 2005, acting pursuant to Article 104(8), 
that Hungary had for the second time failed to 
comply with the recommendations under Article 
104(7). Accordingly, the Council addressed a new 
recommendation under Article 104(7) to Hungary 
(12) Member States with a derogation are to avoid excessive 
deficits but in the event of inadequate action established 
under Article 104(8), further recommendations can be 
addressed only on the basis of Article 104(7) as Articles 
104(9) and Article 104(11) do not apply to them. 
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in October 2006, postponing the deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit to 2009.  
In the April 2009 EDP notification Hungary 
reported a deficit of 3.4% of GDP for 2008, almost 
1 percentage point lower than the target 
recommended by the Council, with the additional 
improvement mostly due to expenditure savings 
and measures addressing tax evasion. This 
corresponds to a structural improvement of 1 
percentage point. The expectation of a better than 
targeted overall performance in the period 2007-
2008 was also expressed in the fourth progress 
report submitted by the Hungarian authorities in 
November 2008, which foresaw a deficit target of 
2.6% of GDP in 2009, in line with the 
considerably revised 2009 budget, which was 
adopted by Parliament on 17 December 2008. 
While the Hungarian budgetary policy remains 
aimed at correcting imbalances, leaving no room 
for expansionary measures, the 2009 deficit target 
was revised upward due to the worsened growth 
outlook. 
Latvia 
According to the convergence programme update 
submitted by the Latvian authorities on 14 January 
2009, the general government deficit in Latvia was 
estimated to have reached 3.5% of GDP in 2008 
and was expected to deteriorate further to 5.3% in 
2009. The debt stood at 19.4% of GDP in 2008, 
projected to rise to 32.4% in 2009. From 2009, in 
line with the EERP and with the authorities' 
economic stabilisation plan adopted in December 
2008 in response to the international financial 
assistance, Latvia has aimed its budgetary policy 
more clearly at correcting the existing external and 
internal imbalances. 
In February 2009, the Commission deemed, in its 
report under Article 104(3), that the deficit was 
close to the reference value. The excess was 
considered to be exceptional, resulting from a 
severe economic downturn in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
According to the Commission services’ January 
2009 interim forecast, real GDP growth in Latvia 
was projected to be strongly negative in the years 
2008 and 2009 (-2.3% and -6.9% respectively). 
The deficit was not considered temporary, as the 
January 2009 interim forecast projected that the 
deficit would widen to 6.3% of GDP in 2009 and 
worsen further to 7.4% of GDP in 2010 on a no-
policy change basis. The Commission therefore 
concluded that the deficit criterion in the Treaty 
was not fulfilled. The follow-up steps under 
Article 104(5-7) have been delayed to reflect the 
outcome of the negotiations in the framework of 
the medium-term financial assistance.  
Lithuania 
In the April 2009 notification the Lithuanian 
authorities estimated the general government 
deficit to have reached 3.2% of GDP in 2008, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold, while 
planning a deficit of 2.9% in 2009. The debt ratio 
was reported to be at 15.6% of GDP in 2008 and 
was projected at 22.2% in 2009. From 2009 
onwards, in line with the EERP, Lithuania, which 
is facing significant external and internal 
imbalances, has adopted a budgetary policy which 
clearly aims at correcting such imbalances. 
The Commission adopted a report under Article 
104(3) in May 2009. In this report, the deficit was 
considered to be close to the reference value. The 
excess over the reference value was not deemed to 
be exceptional in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2008. Since the 
Commission services' spring forecast projects the 
deficit to rise to 5.3% of GDP in 2009 and further 
to 8.0% in 2010 on a no policy change basis, the 
deficit was not considered temporary. The 
Commission concluded that the deficit criterion in 
the Treaty was not fulfilled.  
Poland 
According to the April 2009 EDP notification 
submitted by the Polish authorities, the general 
government deficit reached 3.9% of GDP in 2008, 
thus exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value, 
while a deficit of 4.6% was planned for 2009. The 
debt ratio was estimated at 47.1% of GDP in 2008 
and projected to rise to 51.0% in 2009. The rise in 
the deficit in 2009 is partly due to expansionary 
measures taken in line with the EERP. 
In May 2009, the Commission prepared a report 
under Article 104(3). In this report, the deficit was 
not considered to be close to the reference value. 
The excess over the reference value was also not 
deemed to be exceptional in the sense of the Treaty 
and the Stability and Growth Pact in 2008. Since 
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the Commission services' spring forecast projects 
the deficit to rise to 6.6% of GDP in 2009 and 
further to 7.3% in 2010 on a no policy change 
basis, the deficit was not considered temporary. 
The Commission therefore concluded that the 
deficit criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled.  
Romania 
In the April 2009 notification the Romanian 
authorities reported a deficit of 5.4% of GDP for 
2008, breaching the 3% of GDP reference value. A 
slight improvement to 5.1% of GDP was foreseen 
for 2009. The general government debt ratio was 
reported to be at 13.6% of GDP in 2008 and was 
projected at 17.9% in 2009. From 2009, in line 
with the EERP and with the authorities' request for 
medium-term financial assistance, Romania has 
geared its budgetary policy more clearly towards 
correcting the existing external and internal 
imbalances. 
The Commission prepared a report under Article 
104(3) in May 2009. In this report, the 
Commission concluded that the deficit could not 
be considered close to the reference value. 
Furthermore, the excess was not deemed to be due 
to special circumstances in the sense of the Treaty 
and the Stability and Growth Pact in 2008. The 
deficit was not considered temporary, since the 
Commission services' spring forecast projects the 
deficit to be at 5.1% of GDP in 2009 at 5.6% in 
2010, assuming no policy change. The 
Commission concluded that the deficit criterion in 
the Treaty was not fulfilled.  
United Kingdom 
According to the data notified by the UK 
authorities in March 2008, the general government 
deficit in the financial year 2008/09 was expected 
to reach 3.2% of GDP (3.3% according to the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast) and 
further deficit-increasing measures were 
announced by the government in May 2008. The 
general government gross debt was projected to 
remain below the 60% of GDP threshold, although 
on a rising trend.  
In the light of this, on 11 June 2008 the 
Commission adopted a report under Article 104(3) 
of the Treaty on the public finance situation in the 
United Kingdom, thereby initiating the excessive 
deficit procedure vis-à-vis the UK. The 
Commission concluded that the planned 
government deficit remained close to the reference 
value but that the excess over the reference value 
could not be qualified as exceptional within the 
meaning of the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The excess could not be seen as 
temporary, since the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast projected a general government 
deficit of 3.3% of GDP in 2009/10 in the absence 
of new discretionary deficit-reducing measures. 
This implied that the deficit criterion in the Treaty 
was not fulfilled 
In July 2008, the Council decided according to 
Article 104(6) that an excessive deficit existed in 
the United Kingdom. The consideration of relevant 
factors did not suggest the presence of special 
circumstances warranting a departure from the 
standard deadline for correcting the deficit.  
Accordingly, the Council decided pursuant to 
Article 104(7) that the headline deficit should be 
brought below the 3 % of GDP reference at the 
latest by financial year 2009/10, corresponding to a 
structural improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP in 
2009/10.  
From the second half of 2008 onwards, the UK has 
been heavily affected by the unfolding financial 
and economic crisis, which has led to a sharp 
deterioration in the general government balance. 
Furthermore, the UK undertook discretionary 
fiscal stimulus measures in line with the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) as agreed by the 
European Council on 11-12 December 2008, 
affecting the general government balance in the 
financial years 2008/09 and 2009/10. In the April 
2009 EDP notification, the United Kingdom 
reported a deficit of 5.5% of GDP for the financial 
year 2008/09. The 2009 budget, which was 
presented on 22 April 2009, revised the deficit 
estimate for 2008/09 to 7.2% of GDP. For the 
subsequent years, the Commission services' spring 
forecast foresees a further deterioration to a deficit 
of 13.0% for 2009/10 and 12.8% for 2010/11. The 
government debt ratio is forecast to increase from 
55.3% for 2008/09 to 83.3% for 2010/11. 
On 27 April 2009, the Council considered in 
accordance with Article 104(8) that the UK 
authorities had not taken effective action in 
response to the July 2008 Council 
recommendations and the Council issued new 
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Table I.2.1: Overview EDP steps - Euro area Member States
Article of
the Treaty
FR EL IE MT ES
Starting phase
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 104.3 18.2.2009 18.2.2009 18.2.2009 13.5.2009 18.2.2009
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 104.4 27.2.2009 27.2.2009 27.2.2009 29.5.2009 27.2.2009
Commission adopts:
 -opinion on existence of excessive deficit 104.5 24.3.2009 24.3.2009 24.3.2009 24.3.2009
 -recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 104.6 24.3.2009 24.3.2009 24.3.2009 24.3.2009
 -recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 104.7 24.3.2009 24.3.2009 24.3.2009 24.3.2009
Council adopts:
 -decision on existence of excessive deficit 104.6 27.4.2009 27.4.2009 27.4.2009 27.4.2009
 -recommendation to end this situation 104.7 27.4.2009 27.4.2009 27.4.2009 27.4.2009
  -deadline for taking effective action 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009
  -deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2012 2010 2013 2012
CountrySteps in EDP procedure
Source:  Commission services.
recommendations in accordance with Article
104(7). (13) In light of the progressively acute
deterioration in economic conditions and prospects
the Council decided that special circumstances
exist in the case of the UK, allowing correction 
over the medium term.  
(13) Pursuant to point 5 of the Protocol on certain provisions
relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the obligation in Article 104(1) of the 
Treaty to avoid excessive general government deficits does 
not apply to the United Kingdom unless it moves to the 
third stage of economic and monetary union. While in the 
second stage of economic and monetary union, the United 
Kingdom is required to endeavour to avoid excessive 
deficits, pursuant to Article 116(4) of the Treaty.
Therefore, the Council set a new deadline for 
correction of the excessive deficit by the financial
year 2013/14, strengthening the foreseen average
annual fiscal effort to clearly beyond 1% of GDP, 
to begin after the planned stimulus measures in
2009. After six months time (i.e., after 27 October
2009), the Commission will assess whether 
effective action was taken. 
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Table I.2.2: Overview EDP steps - Non-euro area Member States 
Article of
the Treaty
HU LV LT PL RO UK
Starting phase
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 104.3 12.5.2004 18.2.2009 13.5.2009 13.5.2009 13.5.2009 11.6.2008
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 104.4 24.5.2004 27.2.2009 29.5.2009 29.5.2009 29.5.2009 25.6.2008
Commission adopts:
   -opinion on existence of excessive deficit 104.5 24.6.2004 2.7.2008
   -recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 104.6 24.6.2004 2.7.2008
   -recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 104.7 24.6.2004 2.7.2008
Council adopts:
   -decision on existence of excessive deficit 104.6 5.7.2004 8.7.2008
   -recommendation to end this situation 104.7 5.7.2004 8.7.2008
    -deadline for taking effective action 5.11.2004 8.1.2009
    -deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 financial yr
2009/10
Follow-up of the article 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken
Council adopts conclusions thereon
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action 104.8 22.12.2004 24.3.2009
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 104.8 18.1.2005 27.4.2009
Commission adopts recommendation for new Council recommendation to end 
excessive deficit situation 104.7 16.2.2005 24.3.2009
Council adopts new recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 104.7 8.3.2005 27.4.2009
   -deadline for taking effective action 8.7.2005 27.10.2009
   -new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2008 financial yr
2013/14
Follow-up of the NEW article 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.7.2005
Council adopts conclusions thereon
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action 104.8 20.10.2005
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 104.8 8.11.2005
Commission adopts recommendation for new Council recommendation to end 
excessive deficit situation 104.7 26.9.2006
Council adopts new recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 104.7 10.10.2006
   -deadline for taking effective action 10.4.2007
   -progress report submitted 26.4.2007
   -new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2009
Follow-up of the NEW article 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.6.2007
Council adopts conclusions thereon 10.7.2007
CountrySteps in EDP procedure
Source: Commission services.
3. PLANS IN THE STABILITY AND CONVERGENCE 
PROGRAMMES ACKNOWLEDGE DIFFERENT ROOM FOR 
FISCAL MANOEUVRE 
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3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This section provides an overview of the 2008-
2009 updates of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCP) submitted by Member States 
by April 2009. It first discusses the 2008 
implementation of the plans presented in the 2007 
updates and the budgetary policies planned for the 
period 2009-2010, against the background of the 
current sharp economic downturn and the overall 
fiscal stimulus proposed in the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP; see Box I.1.1) 
presented by the Commission on 26 November 
2008 and endorsed in December by the European 
Council. The widespread increase in debt-to-GDP 
ratios, risks linked to contingent liabilities and 
implications on long term sustainability are also 
highlighted. At the end of this section, table I.3.2 
provides an overview of the key projections and 
budgetary plans in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCP) updates and table I.3.3 gives 
an overview of the summary assessment and 
policy invitations by country in the Council 
Opinions adopted by April 2009.  
This round of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and the related assessment reflect the 
unprecedented burden posed on fiscal policy by 
the current crisis through three different channels: 
(i) the operation of the automatic stabilisers; (ii) 
the discretionary measures adopted, where 
appropriate, in line with the EERP; and (iii) the 
actions to support the financial system.
Understandably, given the rapidly changing 
economic environment and early submission of 
some updates, the programmes' targets are subject 
to substantial downside risks linked to the 
generally favourable macroeconomic scenarios on 
which they are based. In fact, several Member 
States have already announced revisions of their 
targets for 2009 and, at least implicitly, for the 
subsequent years. This makes particularly 
challenging the assessment of countries' ability to 
pursue their fiscal objectives in the medium term. 
3.2. A SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION IN 
PUBLIC FINANCES ONGOING SINCE 2008 
On the back of the sharply worsening economic 
environment and the reversal of the buoyant tax 
elasticities recorded in the 2005-2007 period, the 
average nominal budget deficit increased in 2008 
by 1.3 percentage points of GDP in the euro area 
and 1.5 percentage points in the EU as a whole, to 
1.9% and 2.3% of GDP, respectively (see Graph 
I.3.1). This compared to a planned stabilisation 
envisaged, on average, in the previous updates in 
both the euro area and the EU27. In turn, this 
discrepancy materialised against the background of 
real GDP growth around 1½ percentage points 
weaker than in scenarios presented in the previous 
updates. With output gaps overall decreasing, 
although still largely in positive territory, the 
average structural deficit is estimated to have 
increased in 2008 by around 1 percentage point of 
GDP in both the euro area and the EU (to 2¾ and 
3% of GDP respectively). (14) This contrast with 
the overall broadly unchanged structural balances 
in the previous updates, planned against the 
background of stable and, on average, essentially 
nil output gaps. 
Looking at the outcomes for 2008 targeted in the 
2007 updates, Member States were equally split 
among those projecting a worse budget balance 
outcome in 2008 than the one estimated for 2007 
and those planning an improvement. However, the 
worsening of government balances in 2008 was 
generalised to a vast majority of Member States 
(see Graph I.3.1). Improvements were recorded 
only in Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Hungary and, to 
a lesser extent, Austria and Germany. With the 
exception of Bulgaria, in all these countries, the 
2008 budgetary position turned out better than 
targeted in the previous update. The sharpest 
deteriorations of the nominal balances in 2008 
were recorded in Ireland and Spain (7.3 and 6 
percentage points of GDP, respectively). These 
countries, as well as France, Latvia, Malta, Greece, 
Hungary and the United Kingdom presented in 
(14) In 2008, a slightly negative output gap is estimated only in 
Denmark. 
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their programmes government deficits above 3%
of GDP in 2008, while for Romania, Poland and 
Lithuania the reporting of a 2008 deficit exceeding 
the 3% of GDP threshold in the Treaty came only 
with the their first 2009 notification (see Section 
I.2).
Comparing the 2008 updates with the plans for
2008 in the 2007 updates shows that lower-than-
projected nominal GDP growth plays a substantial 
role in explaining the overall worse-than-planned
budgetary outcomes in 2008, only slightly offset
by a base effect from outturns of the budget
balances better-than-estimated in the 2007 updates 
Graph I.3.1: Government balances in 2007 and 2008 (% of GDP) 
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Graph I.3.2: Budgetary implementation in 2008
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Notes: Countries are ranked from left to right on the basis of the 2008 budget balance outturn. The figure in the square gives the difference between the 
outturn of the budget balance in 2008 and the planned budget balance in the 2007 programme update.
The Graph decomposes the difference between the 2008 outturn for the general government deficit (as a percentage of GDP) in the Commission 
services' spring 2009 forecast (which reflects the Eurostat news release No 56/2009 of 22 April 2009) with the one targeted in the 2007 updates of the 
stability programmes into a base effect, a nominal GDP growth effect and nominal revenue / expenditure growth effects: 
- The base effect reflects the part of the difference that is due to the actual outcome for 2007 as a percentage of GDP being different from what was 
estimated in the 2007 update in the programme;
- The nominal GDP growth effect represents the part of the difference that is related to current GDP growth projections for 2008 turning out higher or 
lower than anticipated in the 2007 update of the programme and therefore reducing / increasing the denominator of the expenditure ratio. 
- The effect of the change in the nominal expenditure with respect to plans captures the part of the difference related to the annual growth rate of
expenditure in 2008 turning out to be higher or lower than targeted in the 2007 update of the programme over and above the difference explained by
the difference in planned versus actual GDP growth.
- Finally, revenue surprises reflects revenue-to-GDP ratio turning out different from the ones planned in the 2007 update (i.e. an elasticity of 1 between 
revenue and GDP growths is assumed).
Source: 2008 Stability and Convergence Programmes, Commission services' spring 2009 forecast. 
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(see Graph I.3.2). In a noticeable reversal of the
previous years’ pattern, revenue elasticity
surprised, on average, on the negative side. While
on average less relevant than in previous years, the 
effect of nominal expenditure developments
differing from plans was also significant in some
Member States.  
3.3. FISCAL POLICY IN 2009-2010 REFLECTING 
DIFFERENCES IN ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE  
As the financial and economic crisis began to
intensify considerably after the summer of 2008, 
the European Commission presented in November 
2008 a European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)
to combat the economic downturn, which was 
endorsed by the European Council of December 
2008. The plan calls for an immediate and co-
ordinated effort to boost demand, suggesting a
fiscal policy response equivalent to 1.5% of EU
GDP, of which 1.2% of GDP from Member States. 
At the same time, the EERP acknowledges that not 
all Member States are in the same position. The
fiscal room for manoeuvre differs – some countries 
have more leeway than others; in particular, as
shown in Graph I.3.3, external and internal
imbalances exert more pressure on some countries
than others. In this respect, the EERP clearly 
indicates that for those Member States that are
facing significant external and internal imbalances, 
budgetary policy should essentially aim at 
correcting these imbalances. 
A cross-country comparison of the fiscal policy 
responses to falling aggregate demand, in terms of
aggregate fiscal stance, highlights significant
differences, which, at least in part appear linked to
these discrepancies and the related countries' 
perceived ability to expand without facing adverse
market reactions, as suggested by widening
spreads on sovereign debt. Increasingly, the latter 
reflect also the scale of the commitment, explicit 
or potential, towards the financial sector. 
Taking into account the size of the external and
internal imbalances at the onset of the global 
economic crisis, Member States can be allocated to 
four, very tentative, groups:
(i) Countries with external surpluses that have used 
the good times to put their public finances on a 
sound footing, notably Finland, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany
and Austria. As shown in Graph I.3.4, these 
countries plan a significant deterioration of their
budgetary position over 2009-2010, which will 
help limiting the downturn. (15) Thus, in the graph
the countries are located in the lower right
quadrant. The projections in the Commission
services' spring 2009 forecast (Graph I.3.5), based 
on an unchanged policy scenario for 2010, confirm 
a fiscal impulse to the economy for all these
Member States and highlight that it can be
expected to significantly exceed plans, in view of
the deterioration of the economic prospects with
respect to the macroeconomic scenario in the 
programmes.   
Graph I.3.3: External and government net lending in 2008 in the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast 
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(15) Also due to an early submission of the update, the
underestimation of the worsening of the government 
balance due to the economic downturn in the Stability 
Programme of the Netherlands is particularly substantial.
In the April 2009 fiscal notification, the budgetary target 
for 2009 was revised down to a deficit of 3.3% of GDP.
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Graph I.3.4: Planned change of government balance in 2010 with 
respect to 2008, according to the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes 
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Source: Stability and Convergence Programmes, Commission services' 
spring 2009 forecast. Y-axis is set on the average budget balance in the 
EU27 in 2008 in the Commission services' spring 2009 forecast.
Graph I.3.5: Projected change of government balance in 2010
with respect to 2008 in the Commission services' 
spring 2009 forecast 
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average budget balance in the EU27 in 2008. 
(ii) Countries with a budgetary surplus, but a 
significant external deficit (Cyprus), or with a
somewhat less comfortable starting budgetary
position, however still better than the EU average 
and with no (Belgium, Czech Republic) (16) or
relatively limited external imbalances (Slovenia). 
Also these Member States are implementing 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
(iii) Countries that adopted sizeable fiscal stimulus 
measures in line with the EERP, but from a
starting position of high government deficit in
2008. Some of these Member States recorded in 
2008 a government a deficit in excess of the 3% of
GDP threshold, notably the United Kingdom,
Poland, Spain and France. (17) With a deficit 
above the EU average, although still below 3% of 
GDP in 2008, Portugal is also included in this 
group.  
(iv) Countries that in view of a high government 
debt ratio and/or external deficit have planned a
restrictive or neutral budgetary stance in 2009 and 
beyond. The size and degree of imbalances
characterising Member States in this group vary 
significantly. Italy has a high government debt, 
but, because of a relatively sound financial
position of the private sector, no major external
imbalances. Greece has both a high government 
debt ratio and a high external deficit. Ireland has a
still relatively low government debt, but very high 
deficits and high contingent liabilities linked to the 
rescue packages for the financial sector. Hungary
is receiving medium-term financial assistance. 
Finally, this group includes countries with very 
different combinations of absence of fiscal room, 
limited access to finance and high external 
imbalances. 
(16) In February 2009, the Czech Republic introduced a second
package of stimulus measures that is not reflected in plans 
in the Convergence Programme.
(17) On 4 March 2009, the French Government revised the 
deficit projections with respect to the figures presented in 
the Stability Programme, to 5.6% in 2009, 5.2% in 2010, 
4.0% in 2011 and 2.9% in 2012.
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Graph I.3.6: Change in real GDP growth rate 2009 with respect 
to 2008 and change in the government balance over 
2009-2010  in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes
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Source: Stability and Convergence Programmes, Commission services. 
The different constraints to fiscal policy are 
reflected in a lack of correlation between the 
projected economic outlook in the programme and
the budgetary targets (Graph I.3.6). 
3.4. CONSOLIDATION PLANNED TO BEGIN IN 
2010 
Graph I.3.7: Changes in government net lending in the EU27 
Member States in 2010 and over the whole 2009-
2010 period
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Source: Stability and Convergence Programmes, Commission services. 
While only a few Member States target an 
improvement of the government balance in 2009,
Graph I.3.7 shows that a majority of countries 
plans a consolidation, also in nominal terms, in
2010. For countries already consolidating in 2009, 
the size of the planned consolidation for 2010
tends to be comparable to that of the previous year.  
Graph I.3.8: Estimated structural balances in the Stability and Convergence Programmes updates 
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Table I.3.1: Bank rescue packages 
% of GDP
Total 
measures
approved
Effective
capital
injections
Total 
measures
approved
Guarantees
granted
Total 
measures
approved
Effective 
asset relief 
Total
measures
approved
Effective
liquidity
interventions 
Total measures
approved
Total effective for 
all measures
EA-16 2.6 1.4 20.6 8.3 12.0 0.7 1.3 0.7 36.5 11.1
EU-27 2.6 1.5 24.7 7.8 12.0 0.5 4.3 3.0 43.6 12.8
Recapitalisation Guarantee on bankliabilities Relief of impaired asset
Liquidity and bank funding 
support Total
Source: Commission services.
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Countries reacting to a deterioration in the 
budgetary balance in 2009 plan to roughly offset
half of it in the following year. Only a small group 
of countries, generally enjoying robust starting
budgetary and external positions, envisages a
further increase in deficits in 2010, which,
however, is planned to be lower than that 
registered in 2009. 
By contrast, at unchanged policy, the Commission 
services' spring 2009 forecast projects both the 
headline and the structural deficit to continue
deteriorating in 2010, both in the euro area and in 
the EU as a whole. As for 2011, the estimated
structural balances planned in the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes show that nearly all
Member States (the only significant exceptions 
being Finland and Denmark) plan to undertake a 
structural adjustment, although, clearly, only a 
minority of Member States expects to achieve their 
medium-term objectives (MTO) by that year. 
Moreover, the discrepancy highlighted above
between plans in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and the unchanged policy forecast by 
the Commission services suggests that the gap 
relative to the MTO will be much larger.  
Generalised substantial changes to the structural 
figures can be expected not only in view of 
changes in nominal balances projections, but also 
due to the likely further downward revision of
potential output estimates in the face of rapid drop
in investments, employment and substantial 
changes in the NAIRU's estimates.  
3.5. DEBT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENTS  
In 2008, the EU and euro-area average government 
debt-to-GDP ratios increased to 61½% and 69¼%,
respectively. The debt ratio exceeded the 60%
reference value in nine Member States (Austria, 
Malta, Portugal, Germany, France, Hungary, 
Belgium, Greece, and Italy). According to the 
Stability and Convergence Programmes, the debt
ratio is planned to increase further in 2009, both in
the euro area and in the EU as whole. It would 
continue rising in 2010 and in 2011 it would
broadly stabilize in the EU as a whole, while 
remaining on an increasing path in the euro area.
Particularly high increases of the debt ratio over
2009-2011 are planned for Latvia, Ireland, Spain
and the UK (see Graph I.3.9). Debt is planned to
breach the 60% of GDP threshold in 2009/2010 in
the UK and in 2010 in Ireland. 
Planned rises in debt reflect the worsening of the
budgetary position, the projected negative real 
GDP growth and lower inflation resulting in a 
smaller snow-ball effect. Still larger increases in
debt are projected on an unchanged policy basis by
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast, which 
projects the debt ratio to reach around 84% and
79% in 2010, in the euro area and in the EU, 
respectively.  
The overall rise in the debt ratio in 2008 also
reflected a sizeable stock-flow adjustment (1.3%
for EU-27 and 3.5% for the euro area) that mostly 
resulted from capital injections as part of financial
market rescue operations and of other
accumulation of financial assets aimed at 
strengthening the financial system. In 2008, below 
the line operations were particularly sizeable in the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark,
Hungary and Belgium. Table I.3.1 presents the 
measures put in place by Member States to support 
the financial system in percent of GDP. While 
recapitalisation measures have an immediate 
impact on the debt, this is not the case of
guarantees (which represents commitments) and 
liquidity support schemes (see Section II.1). 
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Graph I.3.9: Debt ratios in the EU27 Member States in 2008 and 
developments planned over the whole 2009-2011
period 
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Source: Stability and Convergence Programmes, Commission services' 
spring 2009 forecast. 
Concerning the assessment of long-term
sustainability,(18) according to the conventional 
risk classification the significant deterioration in
the structural budgetary position occurred in 2008
entailed a downgrading of Ireland, Spain and the 
UK from medium to high risk, as well as of Latvia
and Lithuania, from low to medium risk (Graph
I.3.10). 
Graph I.3.10: Overall risk classification and the sustainability gap 
(S2 in the '2008' scenario) 
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(18) The prime indicator for all assessments is S2 calculated for
the "2008 scenario" (i.e. based on the budgetary position
2008). The S2 indicator is defined as the change in the 
current level of the structural primary balance required to
make sure that the discounted value of future structural 
primary balances (including the path of property income)
covers the current level of debt. The assessment of the
2008 updates of the stability and convergence programmes 
was still based on the 2006 ageing projections. However, in
the second half of 2009, the European Commission will 
release a report on the long-term sustainability of public
finances in the European Union based on the updated 
projections released on 29 April 2009 in 2009 Ageing
Report economic and budgetary projections for the EU-27 
Member States (2008-2060).
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Table I.3.3: Overview of the Council Opinions on the SCPs – Summary assessments and policy invitations 
BG SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme aims at maintaining a sound budgetary position throughout the period,
reflected in the planned high general government surpluses. The structural measures foreseen in response to the
economic slowdown aim at strengthening the economy's growth potential and are in line with the EERP. Subject to the
downside risks stemming from the uncertainty at the current economic juncture and its impact on revenues, the budgetary
stance would imply that the medium-term objective of 1,5% of GDP surplus would be achieved throughout the
programme period. Bulgaria faces the challenge of sustaining growth in a severe and protracted global economic
downturn. Moreover the country should implement firm policies to correct the large external deficit, including through
maintaining a tight fiscal policy and containing public sector wage growth. In addition, the country is confronted with the
need to improve the quality of public expenditure by improving administrative capacity and stepping up structural
reforms.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence, Bulgaria is invited to:
(i) continue pursuing tight fiscal policies and maintaining a sound fiscal position by restraining expenditure growth, with
a view to helping contain existing external imbalances and counteract possible revenue shortfalls;
(ii) contain public sector wage growth in order to contribute to overall wage moderation and improve competitiveness;
(iii) further strengthen the efficiency of public spending, in particular through full implementation of programme
budgeting, reinforced administrative capacity and reforming the areas of labour and product markets, education and
healthcare in order to increase productivity.
CZ SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that government deficit in the Czech Republic over recent years has been relatively low, while
the debt ratio has been below 30% of GDP, thus clearly below the 60 % reference value. The mildly expansionary fiscal
stance, including stimulus measures, appears appropriate in light of the economic downturn and in line with the EERP,
however, will affect public finances. Moreover, there are risks attached to the budgetary projections, in particular in view
of the favourable growth assumptions, the lack of concrete actions to support the planned expenditure reductions from
2009, and a track record of exceeding expenditure ceilings set in the medium-term budgetary framework. Due to a
rapidly aging population, concerns remain regarding the long-term fiscal sustainability. Overall, these risks point to the
need for medium-term fiscal consolidation and further efforts in structural reforms.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above, and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence, the Czech Republic is invited to:
(i) implement the 2009 fiscal plans, including stimulus measures, in line with the EERP and within the framework of the
SGP;
(ii) carry out significant structural consolidation in 2010 and beyond towards the MTO, and back-up the budgetary
strategy with specific measures for reducing expenditure in 2010-2011;
(iii) continue with the necessary pension and health care reforms, given the projected increase in age-related
expenditures, in order to improve the long-term sustainability of public finances.
DK SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that, at the current juncture and given the comfortable fiscal position, the overall fiscal stance is
considered adequate in view of the discretionary fiscal expansion of around 1 percentage point of GDP in 2009 and in
view of the relatively strong automatic stabilisers. The programme foresees a reduction in the general government
surplus by around 3 percentage points of GDP in 2009 and about 1,25 percentage point further in 2010. The
programme's growth assumptions are favourable. The fiscal policy aims to continue to achieve the MTO, being
consistent with the objective of long-term sustainability throughout the programme period, thus maintaining a sufficient
safety margin to the reference value. Following a period of high budgetary surpluses, benefiting from a relatively strong
fiscal framework, general government gross debt has declined to a low level.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Denmark is invited to:
(i) implement the fiscal plans for 2009, including the stimulus measures; in line with the EERP and within the framework
of the Stability and Growth Pact;
(ii) identify the required structural reform measures; notably aiming at strengthening labour supply, in order to achieve
budgetary targets in the outer years.
DE SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that benefiting from earlier consolidation and the achievement of a close-to-balance position in
2008, Germany was able to introduce a sizeable fiscal stimulus. This is welcome as it is commensurate with the scale of
the economic downturn.
Given the sharp deterioration in the global economic environment and distress in the financial sector, the budgetary
strategy is subject to downside risks. Full reversibility of the short-term measures adopted in response to the crisis is
however currently not ensured. Hence, the implementation of an enhanced medium-term budgetary framework as
currently envisaged and the strong commitment at all levels of government to adhere to it will be crucial to return to
fiscal consolidation once the crisis has abated. Given increasing public debt, ad hoc changes to the pension adjustment
formula and uncertainty as to the impact of the health-care reform, preserving the achievements made to improve long-
term sustainability is critical.
(Continued on the next page)
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POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Germany is invited to:
(i) implement the 2009 and 2010 fiscal policy as planned including stimulus measures in line with the EERP and within
the framework of the SGP, reverse the fiscal stimulus in order to support significant budgetary consolidation towards the
MTO, starting in 2011 at the latest;
(ii) to this end strengthen the institutional fiscal framework by implementing the new budgetary rule as currently
envisaged in order to underpin the necessary consolidation course after 2010;
(iii) give renewed attention to measures strengthening the long-term sustainability of public finances and ensure that the
deviation from the pension adjustment formula in 2008 is reversed as envisaged.
IE SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that, following a very sharp deterioration in 2008, the general government deficit will widen
further in 2009, to 9,5 % of GDP. The fiscal consolidation measures and the measures to support the economy can be
regarded as welcome and adequate given the high deficit and sharply increasing debt position and are in line with the
European Economic Recovery Plan. After the budgetary deterioration in 2009, the programme envisages a reduction of
the deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference value by 2013, while debt would breach the 60 % of GDP reference value
from 2010. This would take place against the background of a rapid recovery of economic activity after 2010. The
budgetary outcomes are subject to downside risks throughout the programme period, mainly due to (i) the lack of
information on the envisaged consolidation measures after 2009; and (ii) the favourable macro-economic outlook
especially in the outer years of the programme. Further risks stem from the measures in place to support the financial
sector.
There is a need to regain competitiveness through measures enhancing productivity growth and adequate wage policies.
A reduction of the headline deficit below 3 % of GDP by 2013, as envisaged in the programme, will require addressing
the significant risks to the budgetary targets and standing ready to adopt additional measures if necessary. Also with a
view to improving the long-term sustainability of public finances, the fiscal consolidation plans should be backed up with
measures.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment Ireland is invited to:
(i) limit the widening of the deficit in 2009 and specify and rigorously implement substantial annual efforts within a
broad-based fiscal consolidation programme for 2010 and beyond;
(ii) in order to limit risks to the adjustment, strengthen the binding nature of the medium-term budgetary framework as
well as closely monitor adherence to the budgetary targets throughout the year;
(iii) in view of the significant projected increase in age-related expenditure, and also of the increase in debt, albeit from a
low level, expected over the programme period, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by implementing
further pension reform measures in addition to pursuing fiscal consolidation.
EE SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that Estonia, while facing a severe economic downturn following years of above-potential
economic growth, is planning a restrictive fiscal stance from 2009 until 2011 which is an appropriate response in light of
the existing imbalances. The economic downturn is being aggravated by the global financial crisis and subdued external
demand. Weakened cost competitiveness, in particular due to the prolonged period of wage growth above that of
productivity, also hinders the return to a sustainable growth path. The general government balance deteriorated
considerably in 2008 and turned to deficit, following six years of surpluses. According to the programme the general
government is expected to be in deficit also in 2009 and 2010, with the deficit gradually declining. Taking into account
macro-economic risks and the lack of information on expenditure-based consolidation in 2010, the budgetary outcomes
are subject to downside risks, with the headline deficit possibly exceeding the 3% threshold in 2009 and 2010.
However, the risks to the budgetary outcome are mitigated by the adoption of the supplementary restrictive budget in
February 2009.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence and a smooth participation in
ERM II, Estonia is invited to:
(i) implement the consolidation of public finances in the short term, ensure keeping the general government deficit below
3 % of GDP and take necessary measures to underpin the consolidation in the medium term;
(ii) implement prudent public sector wage policies to support the adjustment of the economy and to strengthen
competitiveness;
(Continued on the next page)
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(iii) reinforce the medium-term budgetary framework, particularly by improving expenditure planning and efficiency.
EL SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme envisages reducing the budget deficit over the medium term, but falls short
to address timely and effectively the structural imbalances of the Greek economy and reverse the upward trend of public
debt. Although the consolidation strategy beyond 2009 relies on permanent expenditure restraint and increasing tax
revenues, the programme does not spell out concrete measures to back fully the planned budgetary adjustment in 2010
and 2011. Moreover, against the background of a sharp deterioration in the global economic environment, the budgetary
strategy is also subject to significant downside risks, with the growth assumptions underlying the macro-economic
scenario of the programme being favourable. Consolidation relies to some extent on the results from the fight against tax
Strengthening the fiscal consolidation path, based on permanent measures to control current primary expenditure
including public wages, would be paramount to achieve sound and sustainable public finances in Greece. Moreover, the
envisaged adjustment in the programme is only partly supported by structural policies to improve the quality of public
finances. The structural nature of the factors underlying competitiveness losses and the widening external imbalances
urgently requires the implementation of bold structural reforms. In the long term, the level of debt which remains among
the highest in the EU, coupled with the projected increase in age-related spending, will also affect negatively the long
term sustainability of public finances.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Greece is invited to:
(i) strengthen significantly the fiscal consolidation path already in 2009, through well-specified permanent measures
curbing current expenditure, including a prudent public sector wage policy, thereby contributing to a necessary reduction
in the debt-to-GDP ratio;
(ii) ensure that fiscal consolidation measures are also geared towards enhancing the quality of public finances, within the
framework of a comprehensive reform programme, in the light of the necessary adjustment of the economy, with a view
to recovering competitiveness losses and addressing the existing external imbalances;
(iii) implement swiftly the policies to reform the tax administration and further improve the functioning of the budgetary
process by increasing its transparency, spelling out the budgetary strategy within a longer time perspective and set up
mechanisms to monitor, control and improve the efficiency of primary current expenditure;
(iv) in view of the mounting level of debt and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term
sustainability of public finances, by continuing the on-going reforms in the healthcare and pension system.
Greece is also urged to improve statistical governance and the quality of its statistical data, and invited to improve
compliance with the data requirements of the code of conduct.
ES SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the sharp slowdown of economic activity and some discretionary measures led to a deficit
above 3 % of GDP in 2008, after a prolonged period in which the Spanish public finances were close to balance or in
surplus. The updated stability programme aims at a significant fiscal impulse in 2009 in line with the EERP to counteract
the continued slowdown in economic activity. This will lead to a widening of the government deficit, while the debt ratio
remains comfortably below 60 % of GDP. Improving long-term fiscal sustainability should be a priority. The favourable
macroeconomic assumptions may imply a lower contribution of economic growth to fiscal consolidation than envisaged
in the programme, while the adjustment path is not fully backed up with concrete measures. In addition, fostering the
quality of public finances is important also with a view to underpinning a smooth adjustment of the economy in the light
of the imbalances it is faced with.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Spain is invited to:
(i) implement the 2009 fiscal policy as planned in line with the EERP and within the framework of the SGP, while
avoiding a further deterioration of public finances in 2009, and carry out with determination significant structural
consolidation in 2010 and beyond, backing it up with measures;
(ii) improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by implementing further measures aimed at curbing the
increase in age-related expenditure;
(iii) ensure that fiscal consolidation measures are also geared towards enhancing the quality of the public finances as
planned in the light of the needed adjustment of existing imbalances.
FR SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the insufficient progress when economic conditions were more favourable and the
deterioration of the economic situation, especially in the last quarter of 2008, led to a deficit slightly above 3% of GDP
in 2008. In order to counteract the strong economic downturn the government adopted a recovery plan in line with the
EERP which is well targeted, temporary and timely. This temporary fiscal expansion, coupled with the strong economic
downturn will lead to a further widening of the government deficit in 2009. Thereafter, the programme foresees a
consolidation of public finances through a restrictive stance, especially in 2010.
Risks are linked, in particular, to the markedly favourable macro-economic assumptions in the programme and the
current uncertain environment, but they also reflect the non-binding character of expenditure rules. Further consolidation
efforts may therefore become necessary in the outer years as the economy strengthens. The structural reforms already
adopted are expected to contribute to increasing potential growth, improving competitiveness and sustaining the
consolidation process.
(Continued on the next page)
49 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
Table (continued) 
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, France is invited to:
(i) implement the fiscal measures in 2009 as planned, including stimulus measures in line with the EERP and within the
framework of the SGP while maintaining the objective of avoiding a further deterioration of public finances;
(ii) in light of the forecast pick-up of economic activity, make a consolidation effort in 2010 and strengthen the pace of
adjustment thereafter in order to ensure that the deficit is brought rapidly below the reference value, thereby setting the
debt-to-GDP ratio on a declining path;
(iii) effectively enforce existing expenditure rules and take further steps in order to guarantee the respect of the multi-
annual expenditure reduction targets of the general government by all sub-sectors and continue to implement measures in
the context of the General Review of Public Policies. Implement the structural reform programme, in particular as
regards the sustainability of the pension system.
IT SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that fiscal policy and the economic recovery package for 2009 are in line with the European
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) and can be regarded as adequate in view of the very high debt ratio. Reflecting the
strong economic downturn associated with the financial crisis, the headline deficit is expected to increase significantly in
2009 to above the 3 % of GDP reference value. In 2010 and 2011, the programme foresees an expenditure-based
adjustment, which would bring the deficit just below 3 % of GDP in 2011. However, the achievement of the deficit
targets throughout the programme period might be hampered as economic growth could be even lower than planned. In
addition, possible slippages in the implementation of the planned restraint in primary expenditure may materialise, even
though the improved fiscal framework enhances the conditions for fiscal discipline and spending efficiency. The debt
ratio is set to increase from 104,1 % of GDP in 2007 to over 111 % of GDP by the end of programme period. The gross
debt ratio might increase further also as a result of possible capital injections into the banking sector.
Finally, important structural weaknesses still hamper sustained productivity growth in Italy and weigh on its external
competitive position, while the current composition of social spending is not supportive of adjustment in the labour
market.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Italy is invited to:
(i) implement the planned fiscal policy for 2009 and carry out with determination the adjustment path planned over the
programme period in order to set the very high debt ratio on a steadily declining path and ensure the long-term
sustainability of public finances;
(ii) continue the progress made to improve fiscal governance and the work on a new framework for fiscal federalism that
ensures the accountability of local governments and underpins fiscal discipline;
(iii) pursue efforts to improve the quality of public finances by focussing on spending efficiency and composition, also
by reallocating social expenditure so as to create room for a more comprehensive and uniform unemployment benefit
system that ensures appropriate work incentives and effective activation policies, without compromising the fiscal
consolidation process.
CY SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that fiscal stance in 2009 will be expansionary due to the adoption of significant stimulus
measures in 2009 in line with the EERP. In the subsequent years, the fiscal balance is projected to continue worsening.
The implied fiscal loosening does not appear justified in view of the relatively good economic prospects and the
existence of a large external imbalance. Moreover, against the background of a sharp deterioration in the global
economic environment, the budgetary strategy is subject to significant downside risks, with the growth assumptions
underlying the macroeconomic scenario of the programme being favourable. In the light of the high external imbalances,
maintaining prudent policies and strengthening fiscal sustainability should be a major priority. Therefore, controlling
current expenditure and avoiding procyclicality represents a major challenge for the fiscal policy in Cyprus. In addition,
fostering the quality of public finances is important also with a view to underpinning a smooth adjustment of the
economy in the light of the imbalances it is faced with.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Cyprus is invited to:
(i) Implement the 2009 fiscal policy as planned in line with the EERP and within the framework of the SGP, while
avoiding further deterioration of public finances in 2009 compared to the target;
(ii) Reverse the projected increase of the fiscal deficit in 2010 and beyond, by limiting the increase in expenditures in
order to ensure a sound fiscal position in the medium term;
(iii) In view of the projected impact of ageing on government expenditure, strengthen the long-term sustainability of
public finances by pursuing the reform of the pension and health care systems.
(Continued on the next page)
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LV SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that Latvia, while facing a severe economic downturn following years of above potential
economic growth, is planning a restrictive fiscal stance in 2009 and until 2011, which is an adequate response to the
economic situation considering the absence of scope for fiscal manoeuvre and the need to correct economic imbalances.
The global financial crisis has amplified the shock of the reversal of Latvia's own lending and house price boom by
tightening credit availability and conditions, reinforcing the steep decline of domestic demand over the course of 2008.
The concomitant downturn on export markets has hit the relatively small tradable sector, already weakened by huge
domestic cost increases over the previous years. The headline deficit exceeded the 3 % of GDP Maastricht Treaty
Taking into account risks of lower demand and output in 2009 and lack of information underpinning the revenue-based
consolidation in 2010 and 2011, the budgetary outcome could be worse than projected in the programme.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, the commitments made in the framework of international financial assistance,
and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence and a smooth participation in ERM II,
Latvia is invited to:
(i) implement fully the planned consolidation in the supplementary budget adopted on 12 December
2008; submit to Parliament by the end of March 2009 the details of the supplementary budget; take
sufficient further measures to achieve the targeted general government deficit in 2009 and continue the
targeted fiscal consolidation thereafter;
(ii) rigorously implement public sector nominal wage reductions to facilitate the alignment of whole economy wages with 
productivity, thereby improving cost competitiveness;
(iii) strengthen fiscal governance and transparency, by improving the medium-term budgetary framework and reinforcing 
Ministry of Finance spending controls, and strengthen financial market regulation and supervision;
(iv) strengthen the supply side of the economy by wide-ranging structural reforms and by making efficient use of 
available EU structural funds.
LT SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that Lithuania is currently facing a severe contraction in domestic demand following years of
above-potential economic growth. The deepening global financial crisis and weakening external demand contribute to
aggravating the contraction of the economy. For a sustained period wage growth has exceeded productivity growth by
far, thus weakening the country's competitiveness hindering prospects of export-led economic recovery. The general
government balance deteriorated considerably in 2008 mainly reflecting an expansionary fiscal policy. The programme
targets a deficit of 2,1 % of GDP in 2009 and a gradual decline in the headline deficit thereafter to a balanced position in
2011. 
Taking into account the risks related to the macro-economic scenario and the lack of information on measures needed to
underpin fiscal consolidation after 2009, the budgetary outcomes in the programme are subject to significant downside
risks, with the headline deficit possibly exceeding the 3 % of GDP threshold in 2009 and 2010, while the debt ratio will
remain very comfortably below the 60 % of GDP reference level. The planned restrictive fiscal stance from 2009 until
2011 is an appropriate response in the light of existing imbalances. The current budgetary framework is rather weak as
regards medium-term planning and control of public finances, especially in terms of expenditure.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence and a smooth participation in
ERM II, Lithuania is invited to:
(i) implement measures needed to achieve the budgetary target in 2009 by prioritising expenditures and continue targeted
fiscal consolidation in the medium-term;
(ii) implement public sector wage restraint to facilitate the alignment of whole-economy wages with productivity and to
strengthen cost competitiveness;
(iii) strengthen fiscal governance and transparency, by enhancing the medium-term budgetary framework and reinforcing
expenditure discipline.
LU SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that, in view of the sound budgetary starting position, the measures decided in response to the
downturn and presented in the addendum to the stability programme are appropriate and should be welcomed. They are
generally in line with the principles (timely, targeted and temporary) of the European Economic Recovery Plan, even
though the cuts in income tax, which were decided before the aggravation of the crisis, are not planned to be temporary.
Due to the projected sharp economic downturn and to the measures decided in response to the downturn, the government
balance will turn into a deficit in 2009, after several years in surplus, but it will remain far from the 3 % reference value
and the medium-term objective is planned to be respected throughout the programme period. Risks to the programme's
budgetary targets seem broadly balanced.
However, concerns remain about the long-term sustainability of public finance, which will have to bear a particularly
heavy burden in the coming decades as the increase in age-related public expenditure is projected to be among the
strongest in the whole EU.
(Continued on the next page)
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POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and of the very strong increase in age-related expenditure forecast for the coming
decades, Luxembourg is invited to:
(i) implement the fiscal plans, including the stimulus measures in line with the EERP and within the framework of the
SGP;
(ii) improve the long-term sustainability of its public finances by implementing structural reform measures, in particular
in the area of pensions.
HU SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that, in spite of distinct improvements in its high imbalances, including the reduction in the
budget deficit from 9,3 % of GDP in 2006 to below 3,5 of GDP in 2008, Hungary has been particularly exposed to the
financial crisis and thus had to limit the financing need of the government rather than stimulate the economy during the
economic downturn. In this context, it adopted a policy of further fiscal adjustments and tighter deficit targets to restore
investor confidence. This strategy has been backed by international financial assistance from the EU, the IMF and the
World Bank. The programme foresees a continuation of the front-loaded consolidation strategy, with another important
adjustment in 2009 to 2,6 % of GDP, and followed by a more moderate adjustment path towards a budget deficit of 2,2
% of GDP by 2011. However, this deficit reduction path is subject to risks, especially since the macro-economic
assumptions underlying the programme have in the meantime become markedly favourable.
This risk would be substantially reduced by the corrective measures adopted and structural steps recently announced by
the Government together with the revision of the 2009 deficit target slightly upwards to 2,7-2,9 % of GDP. Moreover,
the adoption of the law on fiscal responsibility is an important step towards establishing prudent fiscal policy and, if
implemented with determination, should contribute to the durability of the fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, the
sustainability of public finances also hinges on the continuation of structural reforms, to the extent that they increase long-
term growth, help meet budgetary targets, and reduce the country's vulnerabilities.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Hungary is invited to:
(i) in view of the risks, maintain adequate buffers, take the necessary measures to bring the budget deficit below the 3 %
of GDP threshold in 2009, and ensure that adequate progress in budgetary consolidation towards the MTO is made
thereafter, thereby setting the debt-to-GDP ratio on a declining path towards the 60 % of GDP threshold;
(ii) ensure full implementation of the fiscal responsibility law, continue expenditure moderation through further
reforming of public administration, healthcare, and education systems, as announced, and strengthen financial market
regulation and supervision;
(iii) in view of the level of debt and the increase in age-related expenditure, further improve the long-term sustainability
of public finances; continue to reform the pension system after the steps already taken in 2006-2008.
MT SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that, against a backdrop of weakening economic growth and a breach of the 3 % of GDP deficit
reference value in 2008, the programme envisages a return to budgetary consolidation from 2009 onwards, brought about
by expenditure restraint and, to a lesser extent, higher revenue. This is in line with the European Economic Recovery
Plan and can be regarded as adequate given the high deficit and debt ratios and the competitiveness challenge. However,
there are risks to the achievement of the deficit and debt targets over the programme period stemming from the
favourable macro-economic scenario, the reliance on volatile revenue, the possibility of expenditure slippages and the
lack of information on the consolidation measures in the outer years.
The debt ratio, which is targeted to fall gradually over the programme period to below the 60 % of GDP reference value
but is subject to the risks mentioned above, seems to be sufficiently diminishing towards the reference value in a medium-
term perspective, although increasing slightly in the short term according to the Commission forecast, bearing in mind
the significant decline in the ratio during the period 2004-2007. Although improving in recent years, the lack of
diversification in the economic base increases Malta's exposure to external shocks, especially in the face of the current
economic downturn. Moreover, competitiveness remains vulnerable, especially if overall wages move out of line with
productivity.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Malta is invited to:
(i) resume fiscal consolidation as envisaged in the programme so as to return to a deficit-to-GDP ratio below 3 % in 2009
as planned and ensure that the general government debt ratio is reduced accordingly, by spelling out the measures
underlying the planned consolidation in the outer years towards the MTO;
(ii) strengthen the medium-term budgetary framework and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending,
including by accelerating the design and implementation of a comprehensive healthcare reform.
NL SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
(Continued on the next page)
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The overall conclusion is that the Netherlands has a sound starting budgetary position. However, due to the projected
sharp economic downturn, the government balance will again enter negative territory, after several years in surplus. The
government gross debt ratio increased significantly, as a result of measures taken to support the financial sector. There
are important downward risks to the budgetary targets in the programme from 2009 onwards, largely due to the
underlying markedly favourable economic scenario, which is already evidenced by recent data
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, the Netherlands is invited to implement the 2009 fiscal policy as planned in line with
the EERP and within the framework of the SGP, to limit the risk of a substantial further deterioration of the fiscal
balance in 2010 relative to the most recent projections, and subsequently to move towards its medium term objective
starting in 2011.
PL SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that Poland is planning an adequate fiscal stimulus, some measures of which are not temporary.
The planned measures will stimulate both aggregate demand in the short term and strengthen the supply side of the
Polish economy in a longer term. Given the optimistic GDP growth forecasts, the budgetary outcomes projected in the
programme are subject to downside risks, according to the Commission forecasts, throughout the whole period covered
by the current update. In addition, for the outer years, the planned spending restraint will have to be backed up with
specified measures, as appropriate.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence, Poland is invited to:
(i) implement the 2009 fiscal plans, including the stimulus measures in line with the EERP and the framework of the
SGP, while avoiding to breach the reference value, as targeted by the Government;
(ii) back up the consolidation strategy for 2010 and 2011 with specific deficit-reducing measures;
(iii) reinforce the budgetary framework through better control over expenditure, including the swift implementation of
the amended public finance act and performance budgeting.
PT SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme aims at a significant temporary fiscal impulse in 2009 in line with the
EERP, which represents an adequate response to the economic downturn. The programme rightly plans the resumption of
fiscal consolidation as soon as the economy recovers. Yet, in the light of the favourable macro-economic assumptions,
economic growth may underpin fiscal consolidation by less than envisaged in the programme. Progress with fiscal
consolidation is also necessary to strengthen the long-term sustainability of public finances. In addition, further
strengthening the budgetary framework can be instrumental to achieve the planned fiscal path. Finally, continue to
fostering the quality of public finances is important also to underpin a smooth adjustment of the economy in the light of
the imbalances it is faced with, notably by supporting potential GDP growth, helping improving competitiveness and
supporting the correction of the external deficit.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Portugal is invited to:
(i) implement the 2009 fiscal policy as planned in line with the EERP and within the framework of the SGP, while
avoiding a further deterioration of public finances in 2009 and carry out with determination the planned adjustment in
2010 and beyond, strengthening the pace of budgetary consolidation if cyclical conditions are better than projected;
(ii) further strengthen the budgetary framework, as envisaged, and ensure that fiscal consolidation measures continue to
be geared towards enhancing the quality of the public finances in the light of the needed adjustment of the existing
imbalances.
FI SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that public finances remain sound although the programme envisages the present high fiscal
surpluses to decline substantially. In view of the fiscal situation, the stimulus measures of the programme update and the
latest measures announced in January 2009 appear appropriate and are welcome. The stimulus package broadly complies
with the general principles of the European Economic Recovery Plan. The budgetary outcomes projected in the
programme are subject to downside risks and action geared to ensure long-term sustainability should be considered.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Finland is invited to:
(i) implement the 2009 fiscal policy as planned in line with the EERP and within the framework of the SGP;
(ii) subsequently reverse the adverse budgetary impact of the fiscal stimulus measures by returning to its medium-term
objective and implementing appropriate structural reforms in order to preserve the long-term sustainability of public
finances.
SE SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
(Continued on the next page)
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The overall conclusion is that the medium-term budgetary position is sound. Large surpluses in good times allow fiscal
policy to play an active role in the current downturn, not only by boosting demand in the short term but also by
strengthening the economy's long-term growth potential. The fiscal stance has appropriately become expansionary in
2009. However, there are short-term risks to the fiscal balance, and there is a need to strengthen the fiscal framework to
ensure that the government balance improves once the economy picks up again.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Sweden is invited to implement the planned fiscal policy, including stimulus measures,
in 2009, in line with the EERP and within the framework of the SGP, and subsequently ensure returning to the MTO.
UK SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme confirms a rapid deterioration in the United Kingdom's budgetary position,
which has strained the sustainability of UK public finances. The probably significantly weaker-than-envisaged macro-
economic context in the near term carries the risk of a higher government deficit throughout the programme period. After
the expansionary fiscal measures in 2009/2010 the programme envisages sustained fiscal tightening from 2010/2011
onwards, but there are risks to the achievement of this consolidation. These reflect the possibility of an extension of the
stimulus measures to 2010 in the absence of a significant economic recovery, weaker revenue elasticities, and risks to the
achievement of spending targets. Taking into account the probability of a worse-than-expected deterioration in the UK's
budgetary position in the near term and the heightened risks to fiscal sustainability, there is a need for a more ambitious
consolidation effort in the medium term. The debt ratio is projected to increase from 43,25 % of GDP in 2007/2008 to 65
% in 2010/2011, stabilising at close to 70 % at the end of the programme period.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, the United Kingdom is invited to:
(i) implement the fiscal plans, including the stimulus measures in line with the EERP and within the framework of the
SGP, while avoiding any further deterioration of public finances;
(ii) implement a significant budgetary consolidation in 2010/2011 and beyond, and further specify measures
underpinning the adjustment, to ensure that the deficit is rapidly brought below the reference value;
(iii) set out how the fiscal framework will be applied in the future, consistent with an improvement of the long-term
The United Kingdom is also invited to improve compliance with the data requirements of the code of conduct.
empty empty
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SUMMARY 
High-quality statistics and adequate budgetary 
indicators are essential for fiscal policy making, 
especially when the state of the economy calls for 
discretionary stabilisation. The deterioration in 
public finances due the financial crisis coupled 
with the increasing budgetary costs associated with 
ageing populations call for medium-term 
budgetary consolidation while at the same time 
supporting long-term economic growth. One 
important aspect for such a strategy is to improve 
the quality of public finances, including fiscal 
frameworks. Strong fiscal rules, medium-term 
budgetary frameworks and independent institutions 
can be instrumental to successful fiscal 
consolidations. 
Cyclically-adjusted balances are a standard 
indicator used for the assessment of fiscal policies 
but they rely on a number of simplifying 
assumptions. One assumption is that the elasticity 
of revenues with respect to their (broadly defined) 
tax bases is constant. While this is justified as a 
medium- to long-term benchmark, it ignores a 
number of factors influencing the evolution of tax 
revenues in relation to the cycle such as, asset 
price changes or discretionary policy changes 
affecting the tax system. The latter, in particular, 
implies that the estimated cyclical component of 
tax revenues can possibly include policy-led 
changes in tax revenues. To get a clearer picture on 
the cyclical nature of tax revenues it would be 
necessary to net out the impact of discretionary 
measures from the tax revenue series. These data 
could then be compared with tax projections based 
on the assumption of constant elasticities, so as to 
assess the importance of short-term variations in 
tax elasticities not directly attributable to 
government policy. Information on discretionary 
measures, however, has not been available to date 
on a consistent basis. Therefore, a first attempt has 
been made to systematically analyse the impact of 
discretionary measures on the movements in tax 
revenues by drawing on information provided by 
Member States in the context of the activities of 
the Output Gap Working Group of the Economic 
Policy Committee. The preliminary results suggest 
that not adjusting for the impact of discretionary 
measures distorts significantly the estimates of tax 
elasticities, resulting in a correspondingly incorrect 
assessment of the non-discretionary component of 
the change in tax revenues. Further systematic 
collection of information on discretionary 
measures appears warranted in order to better 
distinguish the impact of governments' actions 
from that of other factors on the measurement of 
underlying fiscal positions. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, governments 
have adopted substantial measures in support of 
the financial sector. These measures, often 
involving the purchase of financial assets or other 
complex transactions, raise a number of 
accounting issues, which are also relevant for the 
application of the EU fiscal rules. In most cases, 
notably purchases of assets, the transactions add to 
the government gross debt. In a number of cases, 
specifically guarantees, they involve an increase in 
government contingent liabilities. The majority of 
measures has no direct impact on the government 
deficit. However, the appropriate accounting 
treatment of transactions such as purchases of 
assets depends crucially on the availability of 
information on the assets' market price or fair 
value. As representative market prices may not be 
available during a financial crisis and a measure of 
fair value may only be inferred indirectly, the 
compilation of fiscal statistics may be subject to 
correspondingly greater margins of uncertainty. To 
ensure that the ESA accounting principles and 
rules are applied consistently across countries and 
identify best practice in the accounting treatment 
of complex transactions, intense discussions have 
been held amongst national statistical authorities 
with Eurostat playing a coordinating role.  
As the current financial and economic crisis puts 
unprecedented strains on Member States' public 
finances, the importance of high quality public 
finances (QPF) has moved to the fore. This means 
effectively collecting and using scarce public 
resources with a view to closing not only short-
term demand gaps but also backing the long-term 
economic growth potential and eventually moving 
to a fiscal consolidation path that ensures long-run 
sustainability. 
Progress in data provision and development of 
indicators is instrumental to a more systematic 
analysis of QPF and its comparison across 
Member States. Data on the functional 
classification of government expenditure 
(COFOG) are now available at first and, at least 
partially, second-level of detail for all Member 
States and further progress is envisaged. Moreover, 
the Commission services have started to collect a 
large set of QPF indicators that could complement 
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the qualitative country-specific information on 
QPF. The indicators seek to cover five main 
dimensions of QPF (government size; fiscal 
position and sustainability; composition, efficiency 
and effectiveness of expenditure; structure and 
efficiency of revenue systems; fiscal governance). 
These dimensions had been earlier identified by 
the Commission services as the channels through 
which public finances impact long-term economic 
growth (see Public Finances in EMU – 2008
report). 
To synthesise the information contained in 
individual indicators, first attempts have been 
made to produce composite indicators for each 
dimension (and for a number of sub-dimension 
concerning expenditure) following standard best 
practices, e.g. including checks of robustness to 
different weighting and aggregation methods used. 
The results highlight that apparently similar 
synthetic outcome indicators are associated with 
very different levels of expenditure, suggesting 
ample room for improvements in efficiency. 
However, a number of problems are inherent in the 
data and indicators. Apart from data gaps across 
countries and the general unavailability of time 
series, measuring efficiency by simply relating a 
composite measure of output to expenditure 
neglects the influence of environmental variables 
that can heavily condition the impact of public 
policies (e.g., the influence of parental education 
attainment on quality of education indicators). 
Thus, composite indicators should only be seen as 
a starting point for identifying Member States' 
main strengths and weaknesses in QPF, notably in 
relation to broadly comparable countries. 
A successful exit from the financial crisis is also 
likely to require a strengthening of national fiscal 
frameworks. Effective frameworks enhance the 
credibility of budgetary policy by offsetting deficit 
biases inherent in fiscal policy-making; they can 
also contribute to a more effective and efficient use 
of resources.  
Fiscal arrangements such as national fiscal rules, 
independent public institutions involved in the 
budget process and medium-term budgetary 
frameworks for fiscal planning have been the main 
subject of a relatively recent research stream, 
which has been triggered by the role of such 
arrangements in fiscal policy-making, as reflected 
also in the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Since the original Commission surveys on the 
topic (see Public Finances in EMU – 2006 and 
2007 reports), the number of EU Member States 
resorting to fiscal rules, independent institutions 
and medium-term budgetary frameworks has 
continued to increase. In particular between 2005 
(when the first survey was conducted) and 2008, 
seven new fiscal rules have been introduced. At 
the same time not many reforms have been 
introduced to increase the strength of the existing 
rules (measured by a composite indicator and 
reflecting also the coverage of the rule), with lack 
of independent monitoring and weak enforcement 
mechanisms remaining the main weaknesses. The 
new Member States as a group stand out for the 
greatest improvements in this area. By contrast, 
fiscal institutions remain less common in new 
Member States, which largely rely on their 
independent central banks to also monitor fiscal 
policy and the Court of Auditors for a proper use 
of public funds. Finally, progress on medium-term 
budgetary frameworks has been much slower than 
could have expected, e.g. from the intentions 
expressed in recent Stability and Convergence 
Programmes. As a result, the widespread 
weaknesses in Member States' medium-term 
budgetary frameworks identified in the 2006 
survey, notably in coordination mechanisms across 
levels of government and monitoring and 
enforcement, still continue to apply.  
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1.1. ACCOUNTING FOR BANK RESCUES 
This section summarises how government 
measures in support of the financial sector impact 
on the government accounts (in particular the 
government deficit and gross debt) compiled 
according to ESA, (19) which are relevant for the 
SGP. While the accounting implications of 
government measures in support of economic 
activity in general (like tax cuts or increases in 
spending) are trivial, specific measures in support 
of the financial sector, often involving the 
purchase of financial assets or other complex 
transactions, raise a number of complex issues. 
1.1.1. Complex rescues raise a number of 
accounting issues 
Since the adoption of the first government 
measures in support of the financial sector in the 
context of the financial turmoil (e.g., the bail outs 
of Northern Rock in the UK, in September 
2007; (20) of Roskilde Bank in Denmark, in 
August 2008; and of the Landesbanken and IKB in 
Germany), there have been intense discussions 
among Eurostat, other Commission departments, 
the ECB and the national authorities in charge of 
compiling government finance statistics. The aim 
of these discussions has been of ensuring that the 
ESA accounting principles and rules are duly 
respected and that similar transactions in different 
countries are recorded in a comparable manner. At 
this stage, it is useful to remind that, according to 
ESA, transactions are recorded according to their 
economic substance, rather than on the basis of 
formal considerations. 
The discussion has allowed to organise the 
measures in support of the financial sector along 
the following clusters – for accounting purposes: 
(19) ESA (or ESA95) stands for European System of National 
and Regional Accounts. ESA is the EU version of the UN’s 
System of National Accounts (SNA1993). The ESA rules 
are in Council Regulation (EC) N° 2223/96 (OJ L 310, 
30.11.1996, p. 1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) N° 
1392/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(OJ L 324, 10.12.2007, p. 1). 
(20) For a detailed analysis of the Northern Rock bailout and 
some accounting implications, see Kellaway and 
Shanks (2008). 
(i) purchases of equity in banks; (ii) granting of 
loans; (iii) purchase of financial assets (e.g., asset 
removal schemes for impaired securities); 
(iv) guarantees to banks’ liabilities; (v) asset 
protection schemes; (vi) exchange of asset 
schemes and (vii) deposit insurance. Most of these 
measures have been carried out by governments. 
However, in some cases, governments (on their 
own or in cooperation with the private sector) have 
created new entities for the purpose of bailing out 
banks or otherwise supporting the financial sector. 
In these cases, a crucial and often complex issue 
concerns (viii) the sectoral classification – in the 
general government sector or in the corporate 
sector – of these new entities.  
(i) Purchase of equity in banks or other financial 
institutions. This includes the purchase of new (or 
existing) shares in quoted and unquoted banks. The 
equity bought by the government can be ordinary 
shares or some sort of preferred shares. The 
purchase of equity may, or may not, give to the 
government a controlling stake. It also includes 
cases of forced transactions, whereby the 
government expropriated equity and paid (or 
pledged to pay) an appropriate indemnity to the 
former shareholders. 
Most cases of purchase of equity are recorded in 
the ESA accounts without any direct impact on the 
government deficit – in accounting jargon, these 
transactions are said to be ‘booked below the line’ 
– since the government acquired a financial asset 
of the same value of cash paid out. However, there 
is a need to book a deficit-increasing transaction 
where the government has paid for the shares more 
than their market price or fair value, or if the 
expected rate of return of the investment is deemed 
to be insufficient. In those cases, the impact on the 
deficit corresponds to the difference between the 
price paid and the market price or fair value of the 
equity. (21) 
(21) In most cases, the shares acquired by government are not 
quoted in stock exchanges. Even when the equity is quoted 
in the stock exchange, the government decision of buying 
shares and the price it is ready to pay may significantly 
distort market prices. Therefore the identification of the 
amount that has to be recorded as deficit-increasing is not 
trivial. Where there is a need to identify an expected rate of 
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In the vast majority of cases, the purchase of 
equity adds to the government gross debt – though 
the government net debt may remain unchanged, at 
least at inception – since, presumably, the 
government had to issue debt to finance the 
purchase. However, one has also observed cases 
where the government managed to finance the 
purchase of equity without issuing new debt, by 
reducing its stock of other financial assets, like 
deposits in the central bank or commercial banks, 
or of securities held by government-owned reserve 
funds. 
(ii) Granting a loan is also a financial transaction 
that has no direct and immediate impact on the 
government deficit. However, there will be a need 
to record a deficit-increasing transaction in the 
future, if for any reason – like insolvency of the 
debtor – the government has to fully or partially 
cancel the debt at a later stage. 
Typically, granting of loans implies an increase in 
government gross debt, unless the State managed 
to finance the loan without issuing debt.  
(iii) The asset removal schemes, i.e., the purchase 
by government of impaired financial assets – the 
so-called ‘toxic assets’ – previously in the banks’ 
balance sheet, is also neutral for the government 
deficit provided that the price paid by the 
government is estimated to be a fair value. 
Similarly to the purchase of banks’ equity, one 
needs to book a deficit-increasing capital transfer 
in case the price paid was in excess of the fair 
value. 
The identification of the market price or fair value 
for impaired assets in a context of financial turmoil 
is a thorny issue. Not only there is no liquid market 
for those assets, but some of them may be 
particularly difficulty to value given their 
structured nature. The EU statisticians have agreed 
a number of pragmatic rules to help them checking 
whether any transaction needs to be fully or 
partially booked as deficit-increasing. (22) In 
return and to judge whether this rate of return is sufficient, 
EU statisticians usually refer state aid-related documents. 
(22) The criteria that statisticians apply in order to check 
whether a given transaction took place at fair value refer 
notably to (i) the existence of an adequately operating 
market with smoothly evolving prices for identical or 
similar assets; (ii) some mechanism undertaken to 
practice, statisticians consider that the price paid 
corresponds to fair value, unless there is evidence 
suggesting otherwise. 
The disposal of these assets by the government at 
maturity, if not earlier, will lead to holding gains 
or losses. Those gains and losses are usually 
recorded in the revaluation account and have no 
direct impact on the government deficit. However, 
given the specific situation of uncertainty in a 
financial turmoil and the difficulty of identifying 
market prices and fair values, statisticians may 
have to impute holding losses to the government 
deficit whenever their size and nature suggests that 
the initial transaction had been carried out at a 
price in excess of fair value. 
(iv) Several governments have granted guarantees 
to banks’ liabilities (bonds or loans). A guarantee 
is a contingent liability that has no direct impact on 
the deficit and debt. In case the debtor honours its 
liability, the guarantee is never booked in the 
government finance statistics. However, in the rare 
cases the guarantee is called and the liability has to 
be taken over by the government because the 
debtor defaults, there will be an increase in both 
government deficit and debt at the time of the debt 
take over. 
Governments usually collect some fees when they 
grant guarantees. These fees are recorded as sales 
of services and reduce the government deficit. The 
recording of those fees as government revenue has 
some counter-intuitive implications for the ESA 
accounts. Since fees are recorded as sales, they 
reduce nominal government consumption, as the 
latter is measured as salaries plus purchases of 
goods and services plus depreciation less sales. 
Moreover, since real consumption is not affected 
by these transactions, the government consumption 
deflator falls. (23)   
determine a market value, such as an auction; (iii) the 
carrying value of the asset in the business accounts of the 
seller provided that those accounts have been compiled on 
suitable business accounting principles at a point in time 
reasonably close to the time of transaction; or 
(iv) independent valuations.  
(23) To avoid this unfortunate consequence on nominal 
consumption and consumption deflator, one could 
alternatively record the fees as insurance premia or as 
financial derivatives. However, these accounting options 
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(v) The accounting implications of asset protection 
schemes are quite similar to the guarantees granted 
to third parties’ liabilities. Typically an asset 
protection scheme will work as follows: against a 
fee paid to the government, the government and 
banks agree in sharing the holding gains and the 
holding losses to be recorded in the future in 
relation to a set of assets which remains in the 
banks’ balance sheet. 
At inception, there is no impact on the government 
debt and deficit (other than the fees). In case the 
asset loses value and the government has to 
indemnify the banks subsequently, one needs to 
record a deficit and debt increase. 
(vi) To contribute to the liquidity of interbank 
markets, some countries have established exchange 
of assets schemes. The aim of these scheme is to 
increase the stock of government bonds in the 
banks’ hands that they can use as collateral in 
interbank lending. An example is the special 
liquidity scheme (SLS), which was then replaced 
by a permanent discount window facility (DWF), 
in the UK. These schemes start with the 
government issuing bonds which are lent to the 
central bank. (24) The central bank then 
temporarily exchanges these bonds with 
commercial paper in the banks’ balance sheet. 
Before maturity, the bonds are exchanged again 
against commercial paper – which goes back to 
commercial banks – and the government bonds 
return to the central bank and then to the 
government. As a result, the government will not 
have to reimburse these bonds or to pay interest on 
them. 
This kind of schemes has no direct impact on the 
government deficit, other than the fees paid to the 
government. Potentially, there is some deficit-
increasing effect, if a commercial bank defaults, 
collateral in the central bank’s hands proves to be 
insufficient and the central bank has to be 
indemnified by the Treasury. 
 ( ) 
would oblige statisticians to heroically estimate the 
probability of defaults and of guarantees being called. 
(24) Note that bonds are lent to the central bank, not sold; the 
government receives no cash, other than a fee. 
 When publishing the deficit and debt data reported by 
Member States (see Eurostat News Release 56/2009 of 22 
April 2009), Eurostat indicated that the treasury bills 
provided by the UK Treasury to the Bank of England for 
use in the SLS amounted to 12.8% of GDP. 
The impact on the government gross debt of these 
schemes has been among the most heated 
discussions among statisticians. On the one hand, 
the scheme works in such a manner that the 
government does not have to reimburse or to pay 
any interest on these bonds. In essence, the scheme 
can be seen as a way of designing a government 
guarantee for interbank lending. This would 
suggest that, effectively, the scheme does not 
create government debt. On the other hand, the 
government has issued paper which was lent to the 
central bank, exchanged against commercial paper, 
used as collateral and potentially sold several times 
among commercial banks. Therefore it would be 
inappropriate that those bonds where not recorded 
anywhere in the ESA framework. At the time of 
writing this report, nothing has been recorded in 
the government debt in relation to this scheme, but 
the issue is still under discussion. (25) 
(vii) The deposit guarantee or insurance schemes
do not necessarily imply any recording in 
government accounts. In most EU countries the 
deposit insurance schemes have been classified in 
the financial corporate sector as insurance 
companies and not in government. (26) In 
particular there was no deficit or debt impact when 
the EU decided an increase in the ceiling for 
deposit protection. 27
In case a deposit entity becomes insolvent, the 
impact on government accounts depends very 
much on how the deposit protection scheme is 
organised; this differs from country to country. 
The indemnities are either directly borne by the 
State (thus increasing the government deficit and 
(25) As per the usual procedures whenever there is a doubt 
concerning the correct interpretation of ESA or its 
application to a concrete transaction, Eurostat has 
consulted the CMFB (committee on monetary, financial 
and balance-of-payment statistics; this is a consultative 
body that gathers senior statisticians from the national 
statistical offices and central banks of the whole EU). The 
CMFB opinion of 18 March 2009 on the recording in ESA 
accounts of the UK’s special liquidity scheme, and a 
background document are available at the CMFB website 
at http://www.cmfb.org. 
(26) In Sweden and the UK, the respective deposit guarantee 
schemes have been classified in central government.  
(27) On 7 October 2008, EU Finance ministers committed to 
raise the minimum level of deposit guarantees to 
EUR 50 000; this will increase to EUR 100 000 by end 
2010 in compliance with Directive 2009/14/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on deposit-
guarantee schemes (OJ L 68, 13.3.2009, p.3). 
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debt); defrayed through the sale of assets 
accumulated by the deposit insurance scheme over 
the years; distributed among other commercial 
banks; or a combination of these. 
(viii) Most support to the financial sector has been 
directly provided by the governments. However, 
there are a number of cases in relation to which 
one needs to consider the classification in 
government or in other sectors of the entities 
providing support. 
Notably, in most cases, financial defeasance 
agencies (i.e. government-established entities 
created on purpose and specialised in purchasing 
and disposing of financial assets in a financial 
crisis, often called ‘bad banks’) are classified in 
the government sector. This is the case even when 
those entities have the legal status of public 
enterprises or special purpose vehicles, and even 
when those entities are partially owned by the 
private sector. What matters to decide the 
classification of those entities is who controls the 
agency’s activities and bears most of the risks 
associated to its activity. (28) The accounting of 
transactions of ‘bad banks’ that are classified in 
government is similar to the accounting of 
transactions carried out directly by the State. 
An interesting case of an entity created on purpose 
to provide support to banks is SFEF in France. (29) 
This is an entity – legally speaking, it is a 
company – created and owned by the French State 
and some private banks. It borrows with a State 
guarantee and lends to banks against high-quality 
collateral. The French statistical authority (INSEE) 
decided that, in spite of the legal nature and 
ownership of SFEF, the latter should be classified 
in the government, given its limited autonomy and 
the fact that its activities’ risks are borne by the 
State. 
(28) In its opinion concerning statistical accounting 
consequences for government of the financial turmoil of 18 
March 2009 (available at the CMFB website at 
http://www.cmfb.org, together with a background 
document), the CMFB considered that ‘bad banks’ are 
classified in the general government sector ‘if the 
government pre-determines the body's activity and assumes 
all or a majority of the risks associated with the body's 
activities.’ 
(29) Société de financement de l’économie française. 
Another noteworthy example of an entity active in 
the context of the financial crisis and whose 
classification has been discussed by statisticians is 
AFS in Denmark. (30) 
It should also be noted that, to ensure the principle 
of economic substance, a transaction in support of 
the financial sector carried out by a public 
corporation (e.g., a government-owned bank that is 
classified in the corporate sector) for public policy 
purposes under government instructions rather 
than for commercial reasons will be recorded in 
the government accounts. (31) 
1.1.2. Conclusion 
The vast majority of government measures in 
support of banks add to the government gross debt, 
though they are neutral – at least in the short-term 
– for the government deficit. This is because the 
government acquires financial assets of the same 
value of the cash disbursed. In case the 
government ‘overpays’ for financial assets, the 
estimated ‘overpayment’ is deficit-increasing. See 
Table II.1.1 for a summary of the most likely 
impacts in government deficit and gross debt of 
measures in support of banks. 
In many cases, the support to banks consists in 
shifting risks to the government, either through the 
accumulation of assets with uncertain or volatile 
value or of contingent liabilities. Therefore, the 
cost for public finances of bank rescues will 
depend significantly on how these assets and 
contingent liabilities will be managed and will 
evolve in coming years. 
Given the ESA rules on the valuation of assets, 
liabilities and respective transactions at market 
price or fair value, the availability of data on these 
concepts is crucial to ensure the quality of 
statistics. However, during a financial turmoil, 
those concepts may not be directly observable and 
(30) Afviklingsselskabet til sikring af finansiel stabilitet A/S.  
For the time being, AFS has been classified as financial 
corporations, and not in government (see Eurostat News 
Release 56/2009 of 22 April 2009). 
(31) Technically, the transactions carried out by a unit but 
booked in the accounts of another unit are said to be 
rearranged or rerouted. This issue is also considered in the 
above-referred to CMFB opinion concerning statistical 
accounting consequences for government of the financial 
turmoil. 
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Table II.1.1: Accounting for bank rescues: a summary 
Impact on government deficit Impact on government gross debt
Purchase of shares Most likely: neutral Most likely: increase
and
Asset removal schemes But: deficit increases if payment above fair value
But: neutral if transaction financed by a reduction in financial
assets (e.g. deposits)
Most likely: neutral Most likely: increase
But: deficit increases in the future if debtor defaults But: neutral if transaction financed by a reduction in financialassets 
Most likely: neutral
But: deficit increases in the future if counterpart defaults and
collateral insufficient
Most likely: neutral Most likely: neutral
But: deficit increases in the future if guarantee is called But: debt increases in the future if guarantee is called
Most likely: neutral Most likely: neutral
But: deficit increases in the future if indemnities have to be
paid depending on the evolution of the asset prices
But: debt increases in the future if indemnities have to be
paid
Most likely: neutral Most likely: neutral
But: deficit increases in the future if banks default and
depositors have to be indemnified by government
But: debt increases in the future if banks default and 
depositors have to be indemnified by government
Exchanges of asset schemes
(e.g. UK’s Special Liquidity
Scheme) (*)
Granting of loans
Currently, no impact on the debt, but the discussion is
ongoing.
Guarantees to third parties’
liabilities (*)
Asset protection schemes (*)
Deposit insurance (**)
Note: This table refers to direct impacts on the deficit and debt; it does not deal with indirect impacts, such as differences between interest rates on
government debt and rates charged on loans, and dividends received on equity bought by government, or the indirect impact of holding losses, via 
interest paid or revenue lost. 
(*) Given fees paid to the government by banks, one may observe some deficit-reducing effects.
(**) Note that the deposit insurance schemes are usually classified outside government (though they may benefit from some kind of government 
guarantee); therefore, in case some depositors need to be indemnified, the impact in government accounts, if any, may be less than the indemnities paid
to depositors.
Source: Commission services.
Moreover, the in-depth discussion on the more 
complex transactions among Eurostat and national
statistical institutes contributes to ensure that 
government finance statistics of the different EU
countries remain comparable and appropriate for
analytical purposes. 
can only be estimated with relatively large margins 
of error. Though some deterioration in the 
accuracy of fiscal statistics during a financial
turmoil may be inevitable, the quality loss may be
minimised if statisticians exercise judgement and 
prudence and consider the best available
information when classifying and recording each 
of the government measures. 
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The analysis of short-run variations in tax revenues 
and their link to the business cycle generally 
ignores the influence of discretionary policy 
changes affecting the tax system. The latter, in 
particular, implies that the estimated cyclical 
component of tax revenues can possibly include 
policy-led changes. It would however be necessary 
to net out the impact of discretionary measures 
from the tax revenue series, so as to obtain data 
more representative of the endogenous behaviour 
of the tax system. This could, for instance, allow 
better understanding the role played by non-policy 
factors (such as, for instance, asset prices) in 
driving short-run evolutions of tax revenues. 
Information on discretionary measures, however, 
has not been available to date on a consistent basis. 
A first attempt to analyse systematically the impact 
of discretionary measures on the movements in tax 
revenues has been made by drawing on 
information provided by Member States in the 
context of the activities of the Output Gap 
Working Group of the Economic Policy 
Committee. The data collected allows a 
preliminary assessment of the relative importance 
of discretionary measures in fluctuations of tax 
revenues. The preliminary results suggest that not 
adjusting for the impact of discretionary measures 
distorts significantly the estimates of apparent tax 
elasticities, resulting in a correspondingly incorrect 
assessment of the non-discretionary component of 
the change in tax revenues. 
2.1. DISCRETIONARY MEASURES AFFECTING 
TAX REVENUES IN THE EU: HOW 
IMPORTANT ARE THEY? 
In order to derive a tractable measure of the 
cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance consistent 
both across time and countries, it is generally 
assumed that the sensitivity of tax revenues with 
respect to economic activity is constant and given 
by an estimated elasticity. (32)While representing a 
useful benchmark in the medium to long run, the 
constant tax elasticity assumption suffers from a 
number of limitations which can result in an 
(32) See in particular Girouard and André (2005) for a 
description of the OECD/European Commission method to 
estimate tax elasticities. 
incorrect assessment of the relationship between 
revenue developments and the business cycle. The 
factors that are typically put forward in this respect 
are the differences in the cyclical sensitivity of 
each broad tax category (and, more precisely, of 
their corresponding tax bases), and elements not 
directly considered in the definition of the tax 
bases such as oil or asset prices. These factors can 
also interact with the effect of tax measures taken 
by governments on a discretionary basis and may, 
by the same token, distort the picture of the 
relationship between tax revenues and economic 
activity. Specifically, the absence of tax series 
netted of discretionary measures does not allow to 
distinguish tax revenues development stemming 
from policy and/or legislative changes  (or other 
indirect policy-induced measures affecting tax 
yields) from the endogenous behaviour of taxation 
systems i.e., the development in tax revenues due 
to the sole evolution of the tax bases in absence of 
discretionary measures.  
Existing evidence suggests that discretionary 
measures play an important role in explaining 
short-run variations in apparent tax elasticities 
although the information available to date is still 
scant and limited to only few countries (see in 
particular European Commission, 2008). For 
instance, Duchene and Levy (2003) show that the 
discretionary components were often, although not 
always, the most important component behind 
estimated changes in budget balance during the 
period 1998-2004 in France. Using econometric 
analysis, Wolswijk (2007) also provides supportive 
evidence for the Netherlands on the need to net-out 
tax revenue series from discretionary measures in 
order to correctly assess short-run variations in 
apparent tax elasticities. These examples suggest 
that consistent recording of discretionary measures 
across a wider range of EU countries could be 
instrumental to a better monitoring of fiscal 
developments. 
Information on discretionary measures was 
recently collected in the context of the Output Gap 
Working Group (OGWG) of the Economic Policy 
Committee, covering a large sample of EU 
countries. Member States were invited to report on 
their estimates of the impact of discretionary 
measures for broad tax categories used in the 
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calculation of overall budgetary sensitivity to the 
business cycle. The Annex Table II.1 shows that 
the data usually start in 2000-2001 and end in 
2007-2008, although coverage varies across 
countries. In most cases data is recorded on a 
accrual basis or both in cash and accrual and using 
gross estimations (i.e. without considering their 
impact on the tax bases). The "no policy change 
scenario" used by Member States to estimate the 
impact of discretionary measures (in particular in 
relation to the treatment of price indexation 
mechanisms) appears to be rather general as it is 
defined in most cases as the projection of tax 
revenues before considering any measure affecting 
the tax system. Further details on the data on 
discretionary measures are presented in the Annex 
II.1. 
Table II.2.1 below provides summary statistics on 
the average annual shares of the discretionary 
measures in tax revenue by broad tax category. (33) 
In general, when considering the EU as a whole, 
the effect of discretionary measures tends to be 
relatively limited (3,5% for all taxes) although in 
certain cases, such as for direct taxes, the average 
effect appears to be somewhat larger (5,7%), with 
especially high values for some countries such as 
Cyprus, Bulgaria or Italy.  
(33) The disaggregation into three broad tax categories was due 
to the unavailability of disaggregated information in a 
number of countries. Broad tax grouping, considering 
together personal and corporate income taxes) was thus 
opted for in order to ensure comparability of results across 
countries. 
The data reported in Table II.2.1 also show that in 
certain cases, especially for direct taxes, 
governments took measures generally acting to 
lower direct tax revenues and increasing indirect 
tax revenues. (34) Such pattern can be observed for 
a large number of countries including Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia or Sweden. 
Discretionary measures affecting social security 
contributions, on the other hand, have experienced 
less pronounced changes, excepting few cases such 
as Romania, Cyprus and Bulgaria, which have 
experienced sizeable decreases in social security 
contributions as consequence of these measures, 
while the UK, Latvia and France have 
implemented measured acting to increase 
government revenues in this tax category. A more 
detailed investigation of the data suggests that the 
effects of discretionary measures are highly 
concentrated in time, which is also suggested by 
the large differences between average, maximum 
and minimum values reported in Table II.2.1. 
(34) While these evolutions could presumably reflect a shift 
between direct and indirect taxation, recent taxation trends 
indicate that the overall picture is more nuanced, however. 
Recent evolutions in taxation revenues in the EU suggest 
that statutory corporate tax rates have experienced a 
marked decline while implicit tax rates on consumption 
have been on the rise in the EU since the end of the 
1990s/early 2000s, see in particular European Commission 
(2008d). 
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2.2. CORRECTING THE EFFECTS OF 
DISCRETIONARY MEASURES ON TAX 
ELASTICITIES 
The size of discretionary measures can distort the
meaning of apparent tax elasticities and, by the 
same token, that of the difference between these
and the (estimated) constant elasticities used in EU 
fiscal surveillance. One should also note that 
discretionary measures can be taken in reaction to
the perceived state of the economy so that tax 
windfalls/shortfalls can either be magnified or
compensated by discretionary tax cuts/hikes. For 
instance, buoyant corporate taxes were sometimes
accompanied by corporate tax cuts in the EU 
possibly reflecting premature assessments
regarding the structural nature of such favourable 
tax revenue development (see European
Commission, 2008). More recently, the sharp 
deterioration of cyclical conditions linked to the 
financial crisis has led many EU countries to adopt
stimulus measures under the European Economic
Recovery Plan (EERP). These different elements 
would result in (policy-induced) short-run
variations in tax elasticities in response to business 
cycle developments so that differences between 
apparent and constant estimated elasticities may 
themselves have a strong policy-driven cyclical 
component. 
An immediate way to net-out the effect of 
discretionary measures would seem to simply 
subtract their annual amounts from the 
corresponding tax revenues figures. This simple 
approach, however, would not yield tax revenues 
series adjusted for the influence of discretionary
measures taken in different years since it would 
implicitly assume that taxation systems remain
unaffected. However, changes in tax laws, which
may be designed to address past fiscal imbalances 
or may be due to electoral outcomes, naturally
make tax revenues for a given year dependent of
previous years' taxation revenues. It follows that a 
correction of tax revenues series for the impact of 
discretionary measures should consider all years
where these measures have been taken. 
Considering a specific year t as the base year, the
correctly adjusted tax revenue series is the one that 
would prevail if the base year's tax structure had 
been in operation for the entire period. A simple 
approach, termed the "proportional adjustment
method", can be used to adjust tax revenues for the 
impact of discretionary measures and thus allows a
comparison of tax revenues strands across
time. (35) This approach, by adjusting for the 
dependence of tax revenues on discretionary
measures, allows the calculation of apparent tax 
(35) See in particular Barth and Hemphill (2000). 
Table II.2.1: Annual shares of discretionary measures in tax revenue levels: average 2001-2007*
Average Max. Min. Average Max. Min. Average Max. Min. Average Max. Min.
AT 5.9 9.0 -10.6 3.8 5.2 2.4 0.2 0.0 -0.5 3.1 3.7 -1.7
BE 2.5 0.3 -4.4 1.1 1.7 0.0 0.5 0.1 -1.3 1.4 0.1 -1.7
BG 12.7 -4.6 -20.3 3.7 4.4 -5.2 4.2 1.5 -15.5 5.4 1.1 -6.3
CY 22.6 -19.0 -26.2 22.4 24.7 20.1 7.4 -7.1 -7.8 19.1 2.1 0.9
CZ 5.8 0.0 -18.8 2.9 14.1 -0.6 1.2 2.0 -0.8 2.9 4.2 -3.3
DK 0.8 0.5 -2.6 1.0 0.1 -1.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
EE 8.8 -7.5 -10.8 6.2 12.8 0.1 1.9 3.6 1.1 5.3 3.8 -1.3
ES 4.2 0.0 -8.6 0.4 0.7 -1.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
FI 3.1 -2.2 -4.1 0.4 0.5 -1.6 0.7 1.3 -2.5 1.6 -0.9 -1.9
FR 2.5 2.3 -6.0 0.2 0.6 -0.1 0.4 1.3 -0.2 0.9 0.8 -1.5
IT 9.9 -5.0 -12.2 0.7 0.8 -0.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
LT 6.6 3.3 -14.2 1.9 -0.3 -5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 -5.0
LV 2.9 -1.6 -4.7 2.5 3.9 0.4 1.4 2.7 0.0 2.3 1.0 0.0
MT 1.8 2.1 -4.6 1.9 3.7 -0.8 0.1 0.0 -0.6 1.4 1.4 -1.1
PT 1.5 5.1 -3.2 2.0 4.7 -0.4 0.4 2.2 0.0 1.3 4.0 -0.2
RO 7.9 2.4 -13.5 1.3 1.7 -0.9 5.1 -5.0 -5.1 3.9 -1.7 -3.6
SE 2.7 1.3 -7.3 0.4 0.8 -0.2 0.9 0.0 -4.7 1.4 0.7 -2.9
SI 7.9 15.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.6 0.5
SK 3.0 5.3 -4.9 6.0 8.5 -7.8 3.1 2.8 -6.9 4.2 3.6 -5.1
UK 0.3 0.3 -1.0 0.6 0.0 -2.0 1.3 9.1 0.0 0.6 2.1 -0.8
Direct taxes Indirect taxes Social security contributions All taxes
Note: The average share of discretionary measures is calculated as the average of the absolute value of annual figures on discretionary measures in t 
divided by the value of tax revenues in t-1 given that the measurement of discretionary measures refers to the change in revenue between t-1 and t.
* Data concern the period referred to in the Annex Table II.1.
Source: Commission services.
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elasticities (based on annual tax revenue changes)
net of the effect of discretionary measures in a 
consistent manner (see Appendix II.2 for a more 
technical explanation).
The proportional adjustment method has been
applied using the information on discretionary
measures described above to calculate tax 
elasticities net of the effect of discretionary
measures. Graph II.2.1 and II.2.2 provide a first set 
of descriptive statistics on the correlation between 
gross and net apparent tax elasticities. Graph II.2.1
shows that in general the two series are fairly 
highly correlated although in some cases, such as 
for Bulgaria or Estonia regarding indirect taxes,
the co-movement between the two series appears 
to be weak. 
Graph II.2.1: Correlation between gross and net apparent 
elasticities 
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Note: Correlation calculated for the periods indicated in Annex Table 
II.1. Countries with less than three years of observations not reported. 
Source: Commission services.
Although apparent gross and net tax elasticities
appear to be fairly highly correlated in most cases, 
this should not obscure the differences between the
average values of the two series as shown in Graph 
II.2.2. The average level of gross tax elasticities
tend to depart in a large number of cases from that 
of the tax elasticities netted for the effects of 
discretionary measures, especially for direct taxes.
This is also the case in some countries for indirect 
taxes, while for social security contributions the 
two series appear to be more similar. 
Graph II.2.2: Differences in level between gross and net apparent 
elasticities 
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Note: Average across periods indicated in Annex Table II.1. Values 
close to zero indicate similar average values.
Source: Commission services.
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Graph II.2.3: Gross and corrected (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities: Social security contributions 
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Graphs II.2.3 to II.2.5 plot the evolution over time
of gross and net (of the effect of discretionary
measures) apparent tax elasticities for each broad 
tax category for selected countries. (36) Graph
II.2.3 plots the evolution of apparent gross and net
elasticities for social security contributions and 
constrasts this with the estimated tax elasticity
using the OECD/European Commission method.
In most cases gross and net tax series appear to be
positively correlated suggesting that discretionary
measures do not explain entirely the departure of
apparent tax elasticities from the OECD/European 
Commission benchmark. In certain years,
however, corresponding also to the occurrence of 
discretionary measures with relatively large 
impact, net and gross figures appear to depart
rather substantially. This pattern can be observed
for all countries considered in Graph II.2.3. 
Graph II.2.4 performs a similar exercise for a 
different set of countries and for direct taxes. Here
again, apparent tax elasticities appear to depart
somewhat from their OECD/European 
Commission benchmark in certain years, even
adjusting for discretionary measures, denoting
large volatility of tax elasticities in the short-run.
These results suggest that, although the effect of 
discretionary measures may appear to be relatively 
small on average, as suggested by the results
reported in Table II.2.1, their relatively high 
concentration in time entails disproportionate 
variations in apparent tax elasticities in certain 
years. In the case of Italy, discretionary measures 
appear to bias direct tax elasticity downward on a
permanent basis. 
(36) No special criteria was followed to select these countries 
and the results presented here can be considered fairly 
representative of the general results concerning differences 
between gross and net apparent elasticities. 
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Graph II.2.5 concerning indirect taxes provides 
other interesting insights. For instance in the case 
of Malta and the UK, discretionary measures do
not appear to alter significantly the value of
apparent tax elasticities. The cases of Portugal and
Austria, on the other hand, suggest that 
discretionary measures tend to have a permanent
impact on apparent tax elasticities as these appear 
to depart significantly from the gross value of tax 
elasticity for relatively long time period.  
These results suggest that, while the incidence of
discretionary measures across EU countries and 
tax categories is far from uniform, its skewed 
distribution across time tends to affect significantly
the value of apparent tax elasticities, in certain 
cases during a relatively long period of time.
Graph II.2.4: Gross and corrected (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities: Direct taxes 
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Note: Benchmark OECD/European Commission tax elasticity given by the weighted average of corporate and income taxes elasticities using gross 
operating surplus and personal income as weights, respectively. 
Source: Commission services.
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Graph II.2.5: Gross and corrected (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities: indirect taxes 
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2.3. SUMMARY AND WAY FORWARD 
This Section provides evidence for the impact of 
discretionary measures on apparent tax elasticities
in the EU for broad tax categories. The data used
was collected in the context of the activity of the 
Output Gap Working Group of the Economic
Policy Committee and concerns a large number of 
EU countries. The note applies a simple method to 
construct series net of the influence of
discretionary measures and shows that, although 
on average discretionary measures are relatively 
low compared to tax revenues levels, their 
incidence on tax elasticities (and thus tax revenue 
changes in relation to the business cycle) can be
very large and yield to significant departure
between gross and net (for the effect of
discretionary measures) tax elasticities. Although
very useful, it should be noted that such data
should be used with great care both from policy
and analytical viewpoints. Differences in the 
accounting rule followed (i.e., data expressed 
either accrual or cash) suggest that the data 
collected to date is not fully homogenous across all
EU countries although a large majority of
countries perform estimates on an accrual basis 
consistent with ESA95 standards. Differences in
subjective appreciation of what constitutes a 
discretionary measure (i.e. differences in the “no-
policy change assumption”), represent another
important limitation of the data. Despite these 
caveats, the information collected and first results 
presented here suggest that this type of information
is of primary relevance both for fiscal policy
assessment and analysis. The availability of longer
time series on discretionary measures should be 
warranted in order to analyse a number of
hypothesis regarding the behaviour of fiscal policy
in relation to the business cycle. Apparent tax 
elasticities can be largely influenced by past and 
current discretionary measures and should thus be
appropriately corrected. The calculation of tax 
elasticities net of discretionary measures would in
particular allow a better identification of the 
effects of other (non-policy) factors such as, for 
instance, asset prices variations, on underlying tax 
revenues.  
3. THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES: DATA AND 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
As the financial and economic crisis is putting 
unprecedented strains on Member States' public 
finances, assuring high quality of public finances 
(QPF) with a view to supporting long-term 
economic growth and providing a credible exit 
strategy has gained new urgency. (37) Already 
before the crisis, policy makers had increasingly 
focused on how public finances could support 
long-term economic growth in response to the 
challenges of ageing populations and tougher 
competition from increased globalisation. But as 
Member States' fiscal resources are currently being 
put under considerable stress, the importance of 
high QPF has moved to the fore. This relates 
particularly to the questions of how to best use 
scarce public resources with a view to closing not 
only short-term demand gaps but also backing the 
long-term growth potential, making Europe's 
economies more resilient to shocks and how to 
eventually put the fiscal houses back in order to 
ensure long-run sustainability. 
Systematically analysing QPF in Member States 
should draw on qualitative country-specific 
information as well as on a set of quantitative data 
and indicators. These would allow identifying 
strengths and weaknesses of QPF by putting them 
into perspective to other countries and reviewing 
developments over time. One core area in which 
significant progress on the provision of data has 
been made last year is government expenditure by 
functions of government (COFOG). This can serve 
as one important input into the complex area of 
QPF. Despite the broadness and complexity of 
QPF, the Commission services have made an 
attempt to identify a large set of relevant QPF 
indicators and summarise them into some key 
(37) Most recently, the May 2009 Ecofin Council conclusions 
highlighted the importance of quality of public finances in 
times of limited budgetary room for manoeuvre. While the 
conclusions stressed the general link of QPF and the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, it plays a specific 
role for many sector policies, such as education. For 
example, the May 2009 Education Council named 
efficiency and quality of education and training systems as 
one of the strategic challenges for European cooperation in 
education and training. 
groups. (38) This work, including the selection and 
grouping of the indicators, is based on the 
conceptual framework on QPF presented in the 
Public finances in EMU – 2008 report, in which 
also some initial ideas on the indicator work had 
been documented. 
The following two sections summarise the 
Commission services work on QPF indicators and 
data. The first part lays out the key steps so far 
undertaken by the Commission services in 
identifying relevant QPF indicators and combining 
them into a set of composite indicators. The 
construction of composite indicators follows the 
relevant guiding principles by the OECD (2005). 
Robustness checks were conducted, potential risks 
in the use of the QPF indicators highlighted and 
areas for further improvements identified. A more 
comprehensive account of the technical details can 
be found in Barrios and Schaechter (2009). The 
second part provides an overview on the progress 
on data provision on expenditure by functions on 
government (first and second-level COFOG data). 
3.2. DEVELOPING QUALITY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCES INDICATORS 
3.2.1. A framework  
Choosing QPF indicators that can also be 
summarised into composite indicators should 
follow a transparent and systematic approach 
without becoming overly mechanistic. Composite 
indicators have become a useful tool to compare 
(38) The work was motivated by the rising importance of QPF 
as well as shortcomings in analytical tools to assess QPF in 
Member States and was based on a mandate from EU 
Finance Ministers. In particular, in their conclusions from 
May 2008 the Ecofin Council "reconfirm(ed) the call for 
the EPC and the Commission to step up their efforts to 
improve the measurement and analysis of the quality of 
public finances and its impact on growth." This followed 
up on the October 2007 Ecofin Council conclusions. The 
Commission's indicator work documented here has also 
been presented to and discussed at the EPC and Working 
Group on QPF. While it was supported by the majority of 
Member States, some Member States took issues with this 
work and proposed instead to drop the indicators on the 
size of government, fiscal position and sustainability and 
follow a different, in particular more sector-specific, 
approach with the objective to developing own indicators 
for a broad range of areas. 
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and analyse complex issues across countries while 
at the same time facilitating the communication of
key messages to policy makers and the public. But
the use of composite indicators is not without
pitfalls. 
Poor construction can lead to wrong policy
messages and even well-constructed indicators
may get 'hi-jacked' to deliver over-simplistic
policy messages (see the pros and cons of
composite indicators in Box II.3.1). Therefore the 
OECD in its Handbook on constructing composite
indicators (2005) proposes ten steps in support of
building and using sound composite indicators. In
this note these steps are closely followed tough in 
a slightly different order to better reflect our 
primary aims.  
3.2.2. Step 1: Theoretical framework and 
structure of indicators 
The multi-dimensional conceptual framework
developed in the Public finances in EMU – 2008
report provides the theoretical backing for 
structuring and selecting QPF indicators. Under 
this framework QPF is defined as "all fiscal policy 
arrangements and operations that support
achieving macroeconomic goals of fiscal policy, in
particular long-term economic growth."  (39) The 
framework distinguishes five dimensions or 
channels through which public finances can impact 
long-term economic growth drawing on the
theoretical and empirical literature on the links
between public finances and long-term economic 
growth. The five QPF dimensions include: (i) the
size of government (dimension QPF 1), (ii) the 
fiscal position and sustainability (dimension 
QPF 2), (iii) the composition, efficiency and 
effectiveness of expenditure (dimension QPF 3), 
(iv) the structure and efficiency of revenue systems 
(39) It should be noted that public finances decisions clearly 
reflect many more policy objectives than economic growth,
some of which may be in conflict with the growth 
objective, at least in the short run. 
Box II.3.1: Pros and cons of composite indicators 1/
Pros Cons
• Can summarise complex or
multidimensional issues in view of
supporting decision-makers.
• Easier to interpret than trying to find a trend
in many separate indicators.
• Facilitate the task of ranking countries on
complex benchmarking exercise. 
• Can assess progress of countries over time
on complex issues. 
• Reduce the size of a set of indicators or 
include more information within the
existing size limit.
• Place issues of country performance and 
progress at the centre of the policy arena.
• Facilitate communication with the general 
public (i.e.  citizens, media, etc.) and 
promote accountability.
• May send misleading policy messages if
they are poorly constructed or
misinterpreted.
• May invite simplistic policy conclusions.
• May be misused, e.g. , to support a desired
policy, if the construction process is not
transparent and lacks sound statistical or
conceptual principles.
• The selection of indicators and weights
could be the target of political challenge.
• May disguise serious failings in some
dimensions and increase the difficulty of
identifying proper remedial action.
• May lead to inappropriate policies if
dimensions of performance that are
difficult to measure are ignored.
1/ OECD (2005) Handbook on constructing composite indicators: methodology and user guide, OECD
Statistics Working Papers 2005/3 (Paris).
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(dimension QPF 4) and (v) fiscal governance 
(dimension QPF 5). 
A set of QPF indicators has been identified for 
each of the key five QPF dimensions which, 
however, have been summarised into more than 
five composite indicators given the complexity of 
some dimensions. This includes, particularly, the 
composition, efficiency and effectiveness of 
expenditure (dimension QPF 3). 
Policy and performance indicators are needed for 
analysing QPF. Policy indicators are directly 
controlled by policy makers reflecting choices in 
each public finance dimension (e.g., the level of 
education and health spending or tax rates on 
labour and capital). Performance indicators link 
the policy choices with outcomes. Thus, they 
measure policy effectiveness (e.g., linking 
education spending with education attainment or 
the labour income tax rate with labour market 
participation).  
But defining appropriate performance indicators is 
problematic. Outcomes are often hard to measure 
and therefore have to be proxied by output 
indicators. For example, education attainment can 
be measured by the OECD PISA indicators 
(standardised test of competence of secondary-
school students) but the score may not adequately 
reflect the employability of human capital. 
Moreover, how policy choices impact outcomes 
depends on a number of other factors. Some of 
these other factors are also policy variables. For 
instance the effectiveness of education spending 
may be linked to institutional choices such as the 
freedom of schools to decide on the use of funds. 
Furthermore, some factors that shape outcomes are 
not under the control of fiscal policy, e.g. the 
effectiveness of health spending also depends on 
eating habits and life-style choices. Given these 
issues, simplification is inevitable but being at the 
same time transparent should help avoiding 
misinterpretation of the results. 
3.2.3. Step 2: Data selection 
QPF indicators should fulfil some minimum 
economic and statistical standards. These include 
relevance (economic rationale), statistical 
reliability, country and time coverage as well as 
timeliness.  
These criteria have been suggested by the OECD 
and were also used by the Working Group on 
Methodology to Assess Lisbon-related Structural 
Reforms (LIME group) for selecting a set of 
relevant indicators. (40) 
• Economic rationale: The economic rationale of 
the indicator should be straightforward so as to 
promote public understanding and debate on 
policy issues. Therefore, the variables used 
here are based on a broad literature review (see 
Part III of the Public finances in EMU – 2008
report). Nevertheless, due to the complexity of 
the links between QPF and growth the selection 
of indicators should be understood as an on-
going process that can be revised as new 
empirical findings emerge and new indicators 
are developed and become operational.  
• Statistical reliability: Indicators need to be 
statically reliable. That means they should rely 
on a sound and comparable methodology with 
few revisions over time. Preferably, each 
individual indicator should come from the 
same data source for all countries, but in some 
cases one may need to combine several data 
sources to achieve broad country coverage. For 
structural and macroeconomic indicators 
sourced from Eurostat, Eurostat's assessment is 
used; as regards other indicators (e.g. those 
from the IMF, World Bank or World Economic 
Forum) the statistical reliability is judged 
mainly based on the level of standardisation 
across time and countries and methodologies 
used.  
• Country coverage: Indicators should be 
available and comparable across most EU 
Member States. A wide geographical coverage 
is also necessary to ensure sufficient variability 
in the indicators. Moreover, having indicators 
for non-EU OECD countries could be useful as 
comparators for different QPF policy choices.  
• Timeliness: Indicators should be regularly 
updated without too great a time lag. However, 
one should bear in mind that significant 
changes for some indicators are only expected 
in the medium run given the usual policy lags.  
(40) See European Commission and Economic Policy 
Committee (2008). 
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• Time coverage: A long coverage is not needed
to compare the status quo of QPF across 
countries but it is needed to deepen the 
empirical analysis on the links between QPF
and growth and assess changes over time.  
When choosing indicators, one needs to weigh the 
various selection criteria. In principle, all selection 
criteria should be met. However in practice, there 
may be trade-offs between the economic relevance
of a variable and its statistical properties, which
requires making choices in the data selection
process. The principle that is followed here is to
give greater weight to the economic relevance than
some statistical properties, such as country
coverage, if the availability of the indicator for a 
sub-set of EU Member States (possibly combined
with data for non-EU OECD countries) enriches
the analysis for the countries in the sample and 
possibly outside the sample.  
A review of over 400 potentially relevant QPF
indicators yields that a sufficiently large number
fulfils the selection criteria. (41) However, two key
weaknesses need to be acknowledged. First, the
time coverage of data is rather poor. Consequently, 
a review of QPF over time and a more thorough 
macroeconomic analysis of the links between the 
various QPF dimensions and long-term economic 
growth using times series data is currently 
difficult. This is further complicated by the fact 
that the most recent data are in many cases only
available for 2005 or 2006. The second weakness 
is the country coverage of non-EU OECD
countries. Thus, a desirable benchmarking also 
against countries outside the EU, which could be 
useful to compare different policy approaches, 
would only be possible in selected areas. 
The calculations of composite indicators here are 
based on 81 indicators (Table II.3.1 and 
Annex II.2). These have been combined into
composite indicators for three of the five main
QPF dimensions and seven sub-composite
indicators for the particularly complex QPF 
dimension 3 (composition, efficiency and
effectiveness of expenditure). Moreover, due to the 
difficulties of capturing expenditure efficiency, the 
calculations start by using only outcome variables
for dimension QPF 3. But in a later step (described
(41) See for details Barrios and Schaechter (2009). 
in Section II.3.2.) the outcome is also related to the 
various expenditure categories. 
Table II.3.1: Number of indicators used for composite 
calculations 
Number of variables
QPF1 Size of government 1
QPF2 Fiscal position and sustainability 6
QPF3 Composition, efficiency andeffectiveness of expenditure 47
   QPF3.1     Composition expenditure 8
   QPF3.2     Education 6
   QPF3.3     Health 3
   QPF3.4     R&D 8
   QPF3.5     Public infrastructure 7
   QPF3.6     Public order and safety 8
   QPF3.7     General public services 7
QPF4 Structure and efficiency of revenue systems 21
QPF5 Fiscal governance 6
Total 81
QPF dimensions
Source: Commission services.
3.2.4. Step 3: Normalisation of data
Before combining any indicators into composite
indicators, the various variables need to be 
transferred into comparable units. (42) Specifically,
indicators have been standardised by the following
formulas: 
(1) Score x = (Indicator – average of 
indicator) / Standard deviation of indicator * 10
(2a) Average of indicator = average of EU-15
(2b) Standard deviation of indicator = standard
deviation of EU-15 
Multiplying the score by the factor ten (simply
serving as a magnifying glass), assuming that
observations are normally distributed and
assigning a maximum and minimum score to
outliers would deliver scores ranging from -30 to
+30. The corresponding ratings and probability
ranges are presented in Table II.3.2. 
(42) This normalisation procedure follows the one of the LIME
group and would therefore also allow to interchanging
variables between the two work streams.
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Table II.3.2: Distribution and classification of scores
Summary
score
Classifi-
cation of 
score
Distribution
Probability
under normal 
distribution
10<x<=30 + + "very good" σ<x-E(x) 16%
4<x<=10 + "good" 0.4σ<x-E(x)<σ 19%
- 4<x<=4 0 "average" -0.4σ<x-E(x)<0.4σ 31%
-10<x<=- 4 - "poor" -σ<x-E(x)<-0.4σ 19%
-30<=x<=-10 - - "very poor" x-E(x)<-σ 16%
Source: Commission services.
As benchmarks we have used the unweighted EU-
15 average. This is meant to abstract from the on-
going catching-up process in the new Member 
States and gives equal weights to EU-15 Member 
States' different policy choices and outcomes
allowing, for example, to review how a Member 
State compares to its peers as regards the 
efficiency of education spending independent of
the size of its economy. Other benchmarks than the 
EU-15 could be easily calculated to address 
specific research or policy interests.  
3.2.5. Step 4: Dealing with data gaps
For indicators with great economic relevance but
which are available only for a subset of countries 
and/or time points one needs to decide on how to
fill the data gaps. Here the most recent
observation, as long as it was not older than 10
years, has been used. (43) Or, in the absence of any 
recent data, the gap was filled with the score of an
indicator that was highly correlated with the 
missing one. For instance if the mortality rate was 
missing for a given country, the score on life 
expectancy, which belongs to the same QPF sub-
category, was used to fill in the missing value. 
When no comparable indicator was available, the 
EU-15, EU-27 or new Member States average was
applied. Countries most heavily affected were
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia and Romania. (44) 
(43) In practice, most lagged variables were taken from the 
years 2006 to 2004. We did not fill all the missing interim
years since for the moment we have focused only on one
data point (the latest available observations).
(44) For a description on various methods to fill data gaps see 
OECD (2005). Eventually, a first best approach would be
for Member States to provide the missing information.
3.2.6. Steps 5-6: Methodologies for creating
composite indicators
This section combines the individual indicators
into composite indicators and conducts robustness 
checks. The weighting scheme is closely linked to
the data selection process since the exclusion of 
certain variables corresponds to the assignment of 
a weight of zero. Thus, checking the robustness of
the weighting scheme and selecting the indicators
may become an iterative process.  
Of the various methods that can be used to
combine scores into composite indicators, we have
explored four methods. They differ mostly in their
weighting schemes, which is potentially important 
for the final score of the composite indicator if, for 
instance, the scores of two indicators belonging to
the same QPF category point in two different
directions. However, this risk is minor, if all
indicators provide similar information concerning
the relative performance of countries within a 
given QPF category.  
3.2.6.1. Linear unweighted average
The first option is to simply calculate the averages 
of all indicators in each QPF dimension (and sub-
dimension). A drawback with this method is that it 
assigns an equal weight, thus equal importance, to
each indicator and thus assumes that all indicators
provide the same level of information. The danger 
is that the most critical variable gets overshadowed 
by less-relevant indicators. This could for example 
be the case, when the indicator already reflects a 
number of policy decisions and outcomes. For
instance, the public debt-to-GDP ratio reflects a 
history of past fiscal positions, interest payments
and risk premiums and in many cases the size of 
government. Thus, when the debt ratio is included
in dimension QPF 2 together with other variables, 
such as the current fiscal position, one would need
to consider whether an equal weighting is 
misleading. A similar issue arises, when too many 
variables with similar information are used for a 
composite indicator.
3.2.6.2. Linear weighted average 
Given the downsides of unweighted averages,
weights could be assigned to better reflect the 
differences in importance of the selected 
indicators. The weighting scheme could be based
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on economic priors or more formally economic 
modelling. For the calculation here a very simple 
weighting scheme was chosen. Instead of giving 
equal weight to all indicators in all dimensions, 
averages for indicators with similar information 
content were constructed. For example, for 
dimension QPF 4 (structure and efficiency of 
revenue systems), for which 21 indicators were 
available, they have been sorted into five groups 
(by topic) and the unweighted average scores for 
each group were calculated. The averages of these 
five groups then enter into the overall composite 
indicator for dimension QPF 4. More complex 
weighting schemes would be possible but since the 
number of choices is ultimately infinite, instead of 
focusing on some specific weights, the random 
weights method, described below, was preferred as 
an alternative. 
3.2.6.4. Weights based on factor analysis  
3.2.6.3. Random weights method 
A third option is to calculate composite indicators 
as linear averages and allocate the weights 
randomly. Results presented below are obtained 
using a pseudo-random numbers distribution 
following the approach developed by Marsaglia 
(1997). (45) Each indicator entering a given QPF 
dimension is randomly given a weight on the 
interval [0,1], and each randomly generated 
number is then scaled-down in order for the sum of 
weights to be equal to one. This process is repeated 
100 times in the results presented below.  
The random weights methods has several 
advantages but also drawbacks. On the positive 
side, it completely abstracts from any prior 
regarding the relative importance of each variable. 
Moreover, it allows an assessment of the potential 
bias related to the choice of alternative weightings. 
In particular, the average value of the weights 
obtained from the random generation process can 
be compared with the range of possible outcomes 
(maximum and minimum scores). The drawback 
related to the use of random weights is that the 
weighting process is a black box. 
specificities. ( ) 
h may make 
the temporal analysis more difficult. 
3.2.7. tion to calculate composite 
l most 
likely be best understood. 
(45) This method has, for example, been used when 
constructing the Commission services' index on the quality 
of medium-term budgetary frameworks and fiscal rules 
presented in the 2007 and 2006 issues of the Public 
finances in EMU report. 
Factor analysis, which is a special case of principal 
component analysis, can be used to construct 
weights based on the construction of summary 
indicators. This method is usually considered for 
the construction of composite indicators when, as 
in the current case, the number of the underlying 
indicators is large. (46) When using factor analysis, 
preference is given to indicators that have low 
correlation to alternative indicators and a high 
degree of cross-country differences across all 
dimensions in order to obtain weights that are the 
most representative of a countries' 
47
The advantage of the factor analysis, or more 
generally, principal component analysis, is that it 
allows keeping all variables entering a given 
composite indicator while avoiding redundancy of 
information. The drawback of the factor analysis is 
that it is potentially sensitive to the existence of 
missing values in a given year whic
An applica
indicators 
The four alternative options described above have 
been tested in building composite indicators for 
QPF. Since each method has its merits and 
drawbacks, the final choice of a method should be 
an empirical one, where the robustness of the 
results can be contrasted by comparing results 
obtained with different methods. If no single 
method appears to have a clear advantage over the 
others, the preference should be given to the 
simplest and clearest method since it wil
The composite indicators calculated on the basis of 
three weighting methods (linear unweighted 
average, random weights and factor analysis) (48) 
(46) This is the case also of the Product Market Regulation 
index developed by the OECD, see Nicoletti et al. (2000). 
(47) For more technical details on the use of factor analysis for 
constructing composite indicators see, e.g. OECD (2005). 
(48) The composite indicators calculated on the basis of simple 
linear weighted averages can be found in Barrios and 
Schaechter (2009). As mentioned above, the approach and 
results differ only slightly from the linear unweighted 
average by grouping some sub-indicators, thus giving them 
a combined, rather than an individual weight. 
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Table II.3.3: Illustrative QPF composite indicators: alternative weighting methods 1/ 2/ 
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Country Average Average Factor Random Average Factor Random Average Factor Random Average Factor Random
BE -6.0 -2.0 -2.1 0.0 0.0 -1.7 0.0 -5.7 -11.4 -5.6 -3.4 -2.3 -3.4
BG 14.2 2.9 2.9 2.4 -14.9 -13.8 -14.9 8.0 9.5 7.3 -21.0 -21.0 -21.0
CZ 5.9 -8.1 -8.5 -3.9 -4.0 -3.0 -4.1 3.7 2.5 3.6 -2.3 -1.0 -2.2
DK -9.1 8.3 8.6 5.0 4.0 4.6 4.1 -4.4 0.1 -3.7 6.4 6.2 6.5
DE 3.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 -4.2 -8.5 -4.2 0.3 2.1 0.4
EE 21.7 7.6 7.8 1.6 -3.4 -4.4 -3.4 3.4 -1.3 2.8 -0.1 -2.5 -0.2
IE 16.8 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.5 7.8 18.8 8.3 -2.8 -8.9 -3.1
EL 4.2 -3.2 -3.2 -2.8 -7.3 -7.7 -7.4 6.0 1.7 5.5 -6.7 -14.2 -7.2
ES 12.4 0.4 0.3 1.3 -4.5 -3.8 -4.5 3.3 3.7 2.9 0.9 4.3 1.0
FR -12.7 -4.8 -4.9 -2.5 1.2 0.8 1.2 -1.7 -4.9 -2.1 -3.0 -3.5 -3.1
IT -5.3 -2.1 -2.1 -1.4 -6.7 -6.8 -6.8 2.2 -1.5 1.9 -6.5 -6.1 -6.5
CY 3.1 1.3 1.5 2.2 -1.7 -2.3 -1.8 13.1 22.1 12.4 -9.1 -18.0 -9.7
LV 13.9 1.5 1.5 -2.1 -7.1 -9.1 -7.1 -4.4 -6.1 -5.2 1.5 -12.1 0.7
LT 18.3 0.8 0.7 -2.3 -6.4 -7.6 -6.4 -0.1 -3.5 -0.7 -6.2 -6.8 -6.4
LU 14.8 -1.1 -1.3 0.6 1.6 -0.4 1.5 -0.3 3.3 -0.1 -3.4 -8.0 -3.3
HU -8.2 -7.9 -8.3 -4.1 -6.7 -8.0 -6.7 -2.6 -7.5 -3.3 -11.8 -16.5 -12.2
MT 5.7 0.6 0.5 -1.5 -4.8 -3.9 -4.7 9.5 17.1 9.1 -1.9 -0.4 -1.8
NL -0.5 -2.2 -2.3 -1.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 -3.3 -1.5 -2.8 6.9 8.9 7.1
AT -4.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 3.1 2.2 3.1 -0.2 -4.6 -0.5 -3.0 -3.2 -3.0
PL 5.9 2.3 2.3 -2.5 -9.4 -8.1 -9.5 0.5 3.9 1.0 -6.9 -6.5 -6.8
PT -0.3 -3.3 -3.5 -2.8 -3.5 -4.3 -3.4 2.7 3.7 2.0 -9.0 -11.1 -9.3
RO 15.9 -1.4 -1.5 -3.5 -12.3 -12.0 -12.4 1.5 0.6 1.0 -14.1 -14.1 -14.1
SI 4.2 -4.7 -4.9 -2.2 -1.6 -1.9 -1.6 -6.3 -5.6 -6.1 -2.3 0.0 -2.3
SK 15.9 -3.7 -3.9 -3.4 -9.4 -7.0 -9.4 7.9 7.1 7.7 -5.4 -2.9 -5.5
FI -3.4 8.0 8.3 6.7 5.3 4.8 5.2 -3.0 -2.6 -2.8 1.9 3.5 1.9
SE -12.7 8.6 8.8 5.2 3.7 4.9 3.7 -3.8 -5.2 -3.8 9.3 12.2 9.4
UK 3.5 -9.1 -9.2 -10.8 -1.1 1.8 -1.1 4.1 8.6 4.6 4.3 9.1 4.6
Average 4.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -3.0 -3.1 -3.0 1.3 1.4 1.1 -3.2 -4.2 -3.3
Std. dev. 10.0 4.7 4.9 3.5 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.1 8.3 5.0 6.6 8.6 6.7
Notes: 1/ Scores range from -30 to +30 with an EU-15 average of 0. Assuming a normal distribution a value between -10 and -30 is deemed as very
poor ('--'), between -4 and -10 as poor ('-'), between -4 and +4 as average ('0'), between +4 and +10 as good ('+') and between +10 and +30 as very
good ('++'). 
ble II.3.1 
for data available until September 2008.  
analysis. A formal comparison of the outcomes of
are shown in Table II.3.3. The indicators entering 
each QPF dimension are those listed in Ta
The results obtained for the composite indicators
are very similar independent of the method used.
For dimension QPF 1, only one variable is used to 
measure the size of government (public
expenditure-to-GDP ratio). Thus, obviously there 
is no difference across methods. For the other 
dimensions, the results from the linear weights and
random weights methods are very similar. The 
results from the factor analysis method are also in 
line with the other two methods, but deviations are 
a bit larger in particular for QPF 2 and QPF 5. This 
reflects the use of only six variables for both
dimensions, which may be too low for a factor
the three methods is undertaken in the following
section. 
The scores of the composite QPF indicators are in 
line with conventional wisdom. It should be noted,
however, that the most recent data entering the
QPF indicator calculations are from 2007 and thus
do not yet reflect the implications on public 
finances from the financial and economic crisis.
The results show that no country outperformed in
all dimensions, but some countries showed 
weaknesses in a number of areas. For example,
Hungary combined a relatively large size of
government sector, with a weak fiscal position and
sustainability, shortcomings in the composition, 
efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure and 
weak fiscal governance. Italy also showed
weaknesses in all of these areas. Countries with a
2/ The three calculation methods are linear unweighted average, factor analysis and random weights average. 
3/ The composite indicator of QPF 3 is include here only for illustrative purposes. To better grasp the complexity of the issues, one should look at the 
seven sub-indicators.
Source: Commission services.
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Table II.3.4: Illustrative QPF indicators for sub-dimension QPF 3 (composition, efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure) 
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Country Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank
BE -0.5 19 5.6 4 -1.8 13 1.6 9 0.4 8 -1.8 13 -3.4 12
BG -2.8 21 -8.3 23 -23.2 25 -13.5 27 -14.7 26 -22.2 27 -19.4 27
CZ 8.7 6 5.6 5 -5.9 19 -6.8 16 -5.4 16 -10.0 22 -14.5 23
DK 3.5 11 4.7 7 -4.8 17 1.9 8 5.2 3 4.4 6 13.1 1
DE -9.2 26 1.7 14 -0.3 9 6.3 2 5.0 4 6.3 3 0.5 7
EE 8.5 7 2.1 12 -15.4 22 -4.6 14 -3.7 14 -7.5 20 -2.9 10
IE 7.0 8 7.4 2 -0.3 10 2.6 7 -8.6 21 -4.5 17 -0.4 8
EL -13.6 27 -6.9 21 -1.1 12 -9.9 24 -7.2 19 -1.5 12 -10.9 18
ES 0.7 15 -12.6 25 2.1 3 -9.5 22 -3.3 13 -3.7 16 -5.4 13
FR 2.7 12 1.0 16 1.2 5 4.9 3 2.3 6 -0.6 11 -2.9 11
IT -1.7 20 -8.3 22 0.9 6 -7.2 18 -7.2 18 -8.5 21 -15.4 24
CY 1.3 13 3.6 10 -2.6 15 -11.8 26 -2.3 11 6.6 2 -6.9 15
LV 11.6 2 -1.2 19 -25.1 27 -9.1 19 -10.5 24 -2.1 14 -13.3 20
LT 10.1 3 1.8 13 -20.7 24 -3.7 13 -6.2 17 -11.7 23 -14.2 22
LU -3.0 22 -2.9 20 1.6 4 0.0 10 8.5 1 2.2 8 4.5 6
HU -0.2 17 0.4 17 -16.2 23 -7.0 17 -7.6 20 -3.1 15 -13.0 19
MT 0.2 16 -15.8 26 -5.0 18 -5.3 15 -10.3 22 9.3 1 -6.7 14
NL -4.0 24 4.5 8 -0.6 11 4.1 4 6.8 2 0.0 9 6.9 4
AT -3.7 23 6.6 3 0.3 8 3.4 5 3.6 5 6.2 4 5.1 5
PL 1.0 14 3.0 11 -12.2 20 -10.1 25 -13.9 25 -16.1 25 -17.4 25
PT 12.9 1 -18.4 27 2.2 2 -9.6 23 -3.0 12 -0.4 10 -8.1 17
RO 9.0 4 -9.4 24 -24.5 26 -9.3 20 -17.4 27 -16.9 26 -17.9 26
SI 8.9 5 3.7 9 -2.4 14 -3.6 12 -5.3 15 -4.8 18 -7.4 16
SK -6.5 25 1.5 15 -14.9 21 -9.4 21 -10.3 23 -12.3 24 -14.0 21
FI -0.5 18 12.6 1 0.7 7 9.3 1 -0.6 9 5.8 5 9.7 2
SE 4.1 10 5.1 6 3.2 1 2.9 6 1.2 7 2.4 7 7.1 3
UK 5.3 9 -0.2 18 -3.3 16 -0.7 11 -2.1 10 -5.8 19 -0.9 9
Average 1.8 -0.5 -6.2 -3.5 -4.0 -3.3 -5.5
Std. dev. 6.5 7.5 9.1 6.4 6.7 7.9 9.2
Notes: 1/ Scores range from -30 to +30 with an EU-15 average of 0. Assuming a normal distribution a value between -10 and -30 is deemed as very
poor  ('--'), between -4 and -10 as poor ('-'), between -4 and +4 as average ('0'), between +4 and +10 as good ('+') and between +10 and +30 as very
good ('++'). 
number of strengths in QPF are, for example, 
Luxembourg with a relatively small government
sector, low debt and strong fiscal position and
relatively efficient expenditure and revenue
systems. It has weaknesses, however, in its fiscal 
governance framework. Finland, on the other hand,
has a relatively large government and exerts some
inefficiencies in its revenue system, but it excels in 
the efficiency of certain expenditure categories and
sustainability as well as operates under a strong
fiscal governance framework. 
Given the complex nature of dimension QPF3, the 
results of seven sub-indicators are reported here.
Table II.3.4 indeed shows that most recently 
acceded Member States get high scores in the sub-
dimension QPF 3.1 (composition of expenditure) 
since for their catching-up process they have been 
using a higher share of public resources for 
growth-enhancing items than the old Member 
States. However, this is not yet fully reflected in
outcomes so that the scores for sub-dimensions
QPF 3.2-3.7 are far below the EU-15 average.
While this hints at efficiency issues, the scores do 
not include a direct relation between input and
outputs. Another look at this relation is taken in 
Section II.3.2.9. 
3.2.8. Step 7: Robustness checks
The robustness of the above results is checked in 
three ways. First, robustness is gauged regarding
the filling of missing values. Second, robustness is 
assessed regarding the choice of the weighting 
method. And third, the random weights method is
used to assess the potential variability and bias
depending on the values of the weights assigned to
each variable. 
3.2.8.1. Checking the robustness of imputing 
missing data
As regards filling of missing values, the results of
the composite indicators are relatively robust. 
Since most data gaps exist in QPF 3, the 
robustness of that dimension for imputing data is
2/ Scores were calculated using a linear unweighted average. 
Source: Commission services.
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tested by comparing the scores and rankings for 
dimension QPF 3 obtained when filling missing
values versus the alternative of simply dropping 
the corresponding variable as long as this variable 
is missing for at least one of the 27 EU countries.
The results show that in most countries filling data 
gaps has a small impact on the value of the 
composite indicator but the ranking obtained with
the two alternative methods differs by a maximum
of four positions for three countries. 
3.2.8.2. Checking the robustness of the 
weighting methods
The alternative weighting methods for calculating 
the composite indicators give very similar country
results. While Table II.3.4 above showed the score 
of the three methods, the ranking of each country
for the three alternative methods can also be
compared. It turns out to be very similar across the 
alternative weighting methods. A systematic
comparison in rankings can be done by computing
the Spearman rank correlation coefficients and 
calculating their significance level. (49) The value
of this correlation coefficient is bounded between 
0 and 1 with a higher value depicting a higher
correlation. The calculations in Table II.3.5, indeed
confirm that the ranking obtained using the three 
alternative weighting methods are very close. In 
nearly all cases the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients is above 0.85. Non-reported p-values
also show that these correlation coefficients are
highly significant. Simple correlation coefficients 
were calculated for the scores (Table II.3.5) 
showing even higher values. The only exception is 
for dimension QPF 2, where the rankings from the 
factor analysis deviate more strongly from the
other methods. This reflects the rather low number 
of variables in the composite indicator. Overall, 
one can summarise that in a few cases the absolute 
values of the scores differ somewhat depending on 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
(49) Assuming two variables X and Y are being ranked in two
alternative ways xi and yi  the Spearman correlation 
coefficient compares A and B's ranking results by 
calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient on ranks. 
Assuming that n is the number of comparable values of the 
two variables, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
formula is 
( ) ( )2222 ∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑
−−
−
=
iiii
iiii
yynxxn
yxyxnρ
 see 
Kendall, M.G. and J.D. Gibbons, 1990, Rank correlation 
methods (Oxford University Press).
the weighting method used, but the relative 
countries' performance is very similar 
independently of the three weighting methods. 
Table II.3.5: Robustness test for using alternative weighting 
methods: correlation coefficients of results 
QPF2. Fiscal position and sustainability Average Factor Random Average Factor Random
Average 1 1
Factor 0.783 1 1.000 1
Random 0.998 0.786 1 0.854 0.853 1
QPF3. Composition, efficiency and 
effectiveness of expenditure Average Factor Random Average Factor Random
Average 1 1
Factor 0.959 1 0.972 1
Random 0.998 0.9634 1 1.000 0.972 1
QPF4. Structure and efficiency of
revenue systems Average Factor Random Average Factor Random
Average 1 1
Factor 0.863 1 0.886 1
Random 0.994 0.895 1 0.996 0.909 1
QPF5. Fiscal governance Average Factor Random Average Factor Random
Average 1 1
Factor 0.858 1 0.882 1
Random 0.998 0.876 1 0.999 0.895 1
Spearman ranking correlation 
coefficient (using country
rankings)
Simple correlation coefficient 
(using country scores)
Source: Commission services.
3.2.8.3. Using the variance of the random 
weights results for a robustness check  
Finally, the use of random weights provides 
information on the potential variability of the QPF 
composite indicators depending on the values of
the weights assigned to each variable. Graph II.3.1
illustrates this variability by plotting for each 
country the range (i.e., minimum and maximum
values) of the scores obtained by using random
weights together with the average value of the 
composite indicator for the dimensions QPF 2-
QPF 5. The variability of the composite indicators 
is by far the lowest for QPF 3 and QPF 4. (50) This 
result is not entirely surprising given the very large 
number of variables entering these two 
dimensions. If very few variables enter a given 
composite indicator and if these variables provide 
very different scores, changing the weights for
each variable can significantly influence the final 
value of the composite indicator. The case of the 
QPF 2 composite indicator illustrates this point
quite well and shows that, for instance, for
countries such as Romania, Latvia or Lithuania, 
the differences in scores can be very wide 
depending on the values given to each variable
entering this QPF dimension given that all three 
(50) The composite indicator for dimension QPF 3 is only
included for illustrative purposes. To better grasp the 
complexity of the issues, one should look at the seven sub-
indicators.
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Graph II.3.1: Range of composite indicators using the random weights method 
countries get a high score for their low level of
debt but a low score for their fiscal positions. 
Independently of the QPF dimension, the recently 
acceded Member States usually tend to display a
higher variability in their QPF composite 
indicators than the EU-15. This is due to more sub-
indicators pointing in different directions for 
recently acceded Member States. The finding 
would indicate that the QPF indicators are also less 
precise for these countries.  
3.2.9. Back to public spending: a closer look at
the efficiency and effectiveness of 
expenditure 
To go beyond the mere use of outcome variables
for dimension QPF 3 and get a better grasp of
spending efficiency, we propose the following
illustration. The above calculation of composite
indicators for dimensions QPF 3.2-3.7 focused
entirely on outcome variables without putting them 
in relation to monetary or technical inputs. Ideally, 
one would use efficiency scores for each spending
category using a range of parametric and non-
parametric methods. However, since those scores 
are currently available only for a few spending
items, at this stage simplifications are needed. (51) 
Thus, we propose to assess countries performance
relative to the best performing countries and 
recalculate the composite indicators for a selection 
of QPF dimensions. The selected dimensions are
education (QPF 3.2), health (QPF 3.3), R&D and
innovation (QPF 3.4) and public infrastructure
(QPF 3.5). We focus on these four categories since 
they are most directly linked to growth. There is a 
also likely to be a more direct link between public 
spending in these areas and policy outcome which 
is less clear-cut for the other two sub-dimensions. 
A country's relative performance is assessed 
against the benchmark of the five best performers. 
In particular, the average public spending-to-GDP
(51) For R&D spending, work is underway by the Commission 
services (see Cincera et al., 2009). For education spending,
see e.g. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) and Sutherland et al. 
(2007) but those studies do not cover all 27 Member States.
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ratios is calculated for those five countries that 
have achieved the highest composite indicator 
scores for the selected dimensions. This is to 
assess whether the other countries achieve their 
results with a more economical or higher use of 
resources than those five countries. Thus, each 
individual country's spending-to-GDP ratio is put 
in relation to the five best performers' spending 
ratio. If the ratio is bigger than one, the country 
spends more; it is less than one, the country spends 
less. Thus, those countries that spend more but 
achieve far worse outcomes, can be considered 
inefficient. However, in addition, to the already 
mentioned problems in adequately capturing the 
effectiveness of public spending, one needs to be 
aware here that recent spending initiative may only 
pay off in future years, so outliers should be 
carefully assessed. (52) 
The exemplary results for education are plotted in 
Graph II.3.2. There appears to be an overall 
positive relationship between the quality of 
education policies (measured by the composite 
indicator of QPF 3.2) and public spending in 
education. However, some countries (in the upper 
right quadrant) pay a high price to achieve their 
outcomes. For example, Denmark, Sweden and 
Slovenia use relatively many resources but have 
achieved worse education outcomes than Finland 
who has spent less. Most problematic, however, 
are countries in the lower right quadrant. In this 
case, Portugal and Malta have spent not only more 
than some of the best performers but have 
achieved far below average outcomes in education. 
Thus, this signals an inefficiency problem. (53)  
(52) In particular, to measure progress made by education and 
training systems the Education Council has agreed on an 
updated set of benchmarks. They cover the whole life-long 
learning perspective, from participation in early childhood 
education, the basic skills of 15-year olds and early 
education leavers, through tertiary level attainment and the 
participation of adults in life-long learning. Some but not 
all of these aspects have been captured by the indicators 
used for the calculations in this section.  
(53) This finding for Portugal seems to contradict several 
efficiency studies, which find its education spending to be 
among the most efficient countries (see e.g. Afonso and St. 
Aubyn, 2006 and Sutherland et al., 2007). This may be 
explained by the fact that the latter have used technical 
inputs (e.g. student-teacher ratios) rather than monetary 
inputs and correct for external factors (such as per capita 
income and parental education attainment). Moreover, a 
greater range of output indicators to reflect the quality of 
education policies is used in the present study. 
Graph II.3.2: Illustrative composite indicator in education and 
public spending in education 
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph II.3.3 shows the results for health spending 
for which inefficiencies seem to be lower than for 
education spending. However, the stronger 
positive relation between the level of spending and 
performance indicates that in particular for the 
countries in the lower left quadrant there is room 
to improve the health situation by allocating more 
resources to this sector. 
Graph II.3.3: Illustrative composite indicator in health and public 
spending in health 
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Source: Commission services. 
Overall, the broad positive link between outcome 
and input variables in the illustrations justifies a 
simplification but large deviations for individual 
countries point to the need for more detailed 
analysis. Therefore, efficiency scores from other 
studies and/ or the type of analysis provided above 
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can provide useful additional information to assess 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the individual 
spending components. 
3.2.10. Steps 9 and 10: How to use the QPF 
indicators 
Composite indicators on QPF can be a powerful 
communication tool but can also easily be 
misinterpreted. Therefore, one should be careful on 
how to present and disseminate QPF composite 
indicators, for what policy issues to apply them 
and with what information to supplement them. In 
particular, one needs to be transparent about their 
construction and be able to decompose them into 
their underlying values. 
The main purpose for the Commission services 
work is to use QPF composite indicators as an 
internal rough compass for identifying a country's 
strengths and weaknesses in QPF compared to its 
peers and possibly over time. This would then be 
followed up by a thorough review of the identified 
priority areas and possibly their interrelations with 
other policy areas. Thus, it should be clear that 
QPF indicators can only be one of several 
analytical tools to review QPF-related issues.  
3.3. PROGRESS ON PROVIDING DATA ON 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BY 
FUNCTION (COFOG DATA) 
3.3.1. Mandate and motivation  
In May 2008 the ECOFIN Council confirmed 
earlier requests, addressed to Member States and to 
Eurostat, in order to further step up their efforts in 
the provision and dissemination of detailed data on 
government expenditure by function 
(COFOG) (54), in the context of the analysis of the 
quality of public finances. While taking note of the 
progress achieved with the delivery of COFOG II 
level figures, and in order to allow further analysis 
of past trends in the composition of public 
expenditure, the Council concluded that the 
remaining gaps need to be filled in as soon as 
possible, and best efforts must be pursued to make 
(54) Classification of the Functions of Government–for its 
detailed breakdown see: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=4
data publicly available on the basis of the results of 
the end-2008 data transmission. This request has 
been further reinforced in the ECOFIN conclusions 
of November 2008 in the context of the update of 
the EFC Status Report on information 
requirements. 
3.3.2. Some methodological aspects 
COFOG classifies government expenditure 
purposes into ten main categories (divisions–seen 
as broad objectives of government, and known as 
the COFOG I level breakdown). These divisions 
are further broken down into "groups" (COFOG II 
level) and in some cases even into more detailed 
"classes" (COFOG III). COFOG data are an 
integral part of the ESA95 Transmission 
Programme. The transmission of COFOG I level 
breakdown is compulsory for the years 1995-
onwards and takes place twelve months after the 
end of the reference period. Information on a more 
detailed COFOG II level is provided on a 
voluntary basis. 
Being compiled under the ESA95 (European 
System of Accounts) framework, the COFOG 
dataset follows all of the methodological 
guidelines set in ESA95 (55) and the conventions 
adopted in the working groups of national 
accountants. In particular, the general government 
sector according to ESA95 is not equivalent to the 
public sector, since the public sector also includes 
all public corporations. This can affect the inter-
country comparability of spending on a particular 
COFOG group since in some Member States 
public universities, hospitals or transport 
companies can be included as part of general 
government, whereas in others they are classified 
as public corporations. From this it can be inferred 
that users should be aware of the various 
administrative arrangements in place in countries 
before undertaking detailed analysis and cross-
country comparisons. From the practical point of 
view, disaggregating the data into COFOG II level 
statistics may also create some practical 
compilation problems affecting data quality. It 
should also be stressed that for some Member 
States the compilation of back series for historical 
(55) http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/ 
esa95-new.htm
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years is very difficult because of the lack of source 
information. 
ranking were health (6.6% and 6.5% of GDP) and 
education (5.1% and 4.8% of GDP). Spending on 
economic affairs was close to 4% of GDP (3.8% in 
both, EU27 and euro area) and slightly less 
primary expenditure was dedicated to general 
public services (3.5% in EU27 and 3.7% in the 
euro area). Less than 2% of GDP was spent on 
average on each of the further COFOG functions, 
i.e. public order and safety, defence, recreation, 
culture and religion, housing and community 
amenities, and environmental protection 
(Graph II.3.4).  
COFOG has several links with other international 
statistics and classifications. (56) In particular, 
since COFOG systematises the purposes of all the 
government activities and it interrelates with many 
more specialized statistical domains, e.g. R&D 
statistics, environmental accounts, health accounts, 
the European System of Integrated Social 
Protection Statistics (ESSPROS), and the 
International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED) and UOE data collection for education. 
3.3.3. Data availability 
COFOG I level data are available in Eurostat 
databases. As COFOG II level data are requested 
on a voluntary basis, Eurostat proceeds to publish 
this breakdown, if considered of sufficient quality, 
for those countries that agreed with their 
publication or did not explicitly opposed. While, at 
the end of 2006, no data was publicly 
disseminated, currently Eurostat has released 
COFOG II level data for over twenty countries 
(some of them flagged as "provisional"). (57) 
Data presented in this section come from the latest 
transmission of ESA95 table 11 (COFOG dataset) 
at the end-December 2008, for those countries 
which transmitted data and did not object to their 
publication. For Ireland, Slovenia and Romania the 
full COFOG II level structure is not available. For 
most countries 2007 data are provisional. 
3.3.4. The major spending categories 
In 2007 on average (weighted by countries' GDP) 
the government primary expenditure (58) devoted 
to social protection in EU27 and euro area 
amounted to 18.0% and 18.7% of GDP, 
respectively. The next COFOG functions in 
(56) This is further developed in the Manual of sources and 
methods on COFOG statistics, which can be found at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1073,
46587259&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&p_product_
code=KS-RA-07-022
(57) The data are available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=0,113
6173,0_45570701&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
(58) Primary expenditure is defined as total expenditure of 
general government excluding payable property income, 
that consists mostly from interest paid by government. 
Looking at particular countries (Graph II.3.5), 
social protection is the most important COFOG 
spending purpose for all of them, ranging in 2007 
from close to or over 22% of GDP in France, 
Denmark and Sweden to 10% or below for Ireland, 
Cyprus, Romania, Estonia, and Latvia (with the 
lowest level of 8.4% of GDP). (59) For more than 
half of the Member States and Norway the next 
spending purpose in importance would be health.  
From the structure of government expenditure 
according to COFOG purpose (COFOG II level 
data) it appears that COFOG categories exceeding 
3% of national GDP, in any of the Member 
States (60) are old age, hospital services, public 
debt transactions, family and children, sickness 
and disability, executive and legislative organs, 
transport, pre-primary and primary education, 
secondary education and general services. These 
groups are concentrated in five COFOG divisions: 
three of them relating to social protection and 
general public services, two of them to education, 
and one to health and economic affairs.  
The most important COFOG group in all Member 
States is old age, ranging in 2007 from 12.7% of 
GDP in Greece to 2.9% in Ireland. Only Norway 
devotes more of its government expenditure to a 
different purpose (sickness and disability; 5.9% of 
GDP), whereas its spending on old age amounted 
in 2007 to 4.9% of GDP.  
(59) For inter-country comparisons it should be considered that 
in some countries social benefits are paid and reported 
gross of income tax that can inflate the social protection 
related spending. 
(60) Ireland and Romania, which both delivered partial datasets, 
have not reported so far any COFOG group exceeding 3% 
of GDP. In the Slovenian partial dataset only expenditure 
on 'old age' exceeds 3% of GDP. 
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Graph II.3.4: Structure of the EU's and euro area's government expenditure by COFOG I function, 2007 
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Graph II.3.5: Structure of government expenditure by countries, 2007 
Old age is in general the only COFOG group for 
which expenditure exceeds 3% of GDP in Bulgaria 
(ignoring one-off transactions), Germany, and 
Lithuania.  
The next sections present a detailed breakdown of
the three most important COFOG divisions in most
countries (social protection, education and health). 
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Graph II.3.6: COFOG II level breakdown of 2007 government expenditure on social protection 
Social protection, being the largest expenditure at
COFOG first level purpose, integrates three 
categories indicated before as main COFOG 
groups. As it can be observed from Graph II.3.6, in
eleven Member States (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Austria, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia) expenditure on old age 
constitutes over 50% of all spending on social 
protection (for Bulgaria the share being almost
75%, and for Italy and Greece above 67%). 
The detailed structure of the expenditure on
education in 2007 shows a concentration on three 
education levels (Graph II.3.7): pre-primary and 
primary education, secondary education, and
tertiary education. 
Graph II.3.8 shows the detailed structure of health
spending. In 18 countries hospital services exceed
two fifths of the total division expenditure, with
the United Kingdom reporting a share over 90%. 
Seven Member States report expenditure on
outpatient services over 30% (Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden).
Portugal and Greece spend over 30% of their 
government health expenditure on medical 
products, appliances and equipment. Over 50% of
health spending for Cyprus has been assigned to
the category 'not-elsewhere classified'.
3.3.5. Conclusions
To conclude, the availability of COFOG detailed
data has very substantially increased in recent
years. Notwithstanding the methodological and 
practical difficulties, they provide a relevant input 
for the analysis of the quality of public finances. 
With the help of the countries represented in the 
Task Force on COFOG, significant progress has 
also been achieved in the comparability with other
related statistics, analysis of country practices, and 
on methodological issues which have been
collected in the manual referred above. Eurostat 
reported to the EPC Working Group on Quality of
Public Finances and to the EPC in March 2009,
and the progress was acknowledged positively by
both groups. It is expected that countries will
further transmit more detailed information in next
transmissions, in order to promote their use for
institutional users, international organisations, and
the public in general. Over the medium term,
COFOG data could possibly also be extended to
the regional level as indicated in a recent technical
assistance study. 
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Graph II.3.7: COFOG II level breakdown of 2007 government expenditure on education 
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Graph II.3.8: COFOG II level breakdown of 2007 government expenditure on health
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The elements that form domestic fiscal 
frameworks have been drawing growing attention 
from economists and policy-makers over the last 
years.  Fiscal arrangements such as national fiscal 
rules, independent public institutions involved in 
the budget process and medium-term budgetary 
frameworks for fiscal planning have been the main 
subject of a relatively recent research stream, 
which has been triggered by the increasing resort 
to these elements in the fiscal policy making. 
For instance, the report on the SGP reform 
endorsed by the European Council in March 2005 
states that "national budgetary rules should be 
complementary to the Member States' 
commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact"
and that "national institutions could play a more 
prominent role in budgetary surveillance to 
strengthen national ownership, enhance 
enforcement through national public opinion and 
complement the economic and policy analysis at 
EU level".
Against this background, the Commission 
launched at the end of 2005 two comprehensive 
surveys on national fiscal rules and independent 
public institutions in the EU member States over 
the period 1990-2005. The results and the analysis 
of these surveys were published in the Public 
finances in EMU – 2006 report. (61) Subsequently, 
a third survey on the existing domestic 
medium-term budgetary frameworks in the EU 
was also conducted by the Commission in 2006. 
Similarly, the main analytical results were 
published in the Public finances in EMU – 2007
report. (62) 
This section provides the main results of the 
updates of these three surveys carried out in 2008 
in the context of the Working Group on the 
Quality of Public Finances (WGQPF) attached to 
the Economic and Policy Committee (EPC). These 
(61) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ 
publication423_en.pdf 
(62) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ 
publication338_en.pdf 
updates follow the mandate by the May 2008 
ECOFIN council and attempt to complement the 
heterogeneous reporting on these issues included 
in the SCPs. The content and the structure of the 
questionnaires remained broadly unchanged in 
order to have comparable data and information. 
4.2. NUMERICAL FISCAL RULES IN EU 
COUNTRIES 
Like in the previous survey, the 2008 questionnaire 
followed the definition proposed by Kopits and 
Symansky (1998), which states that a fiscal rule is 
"a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed 
in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal 
performance". (63) In turn, the indices 
encapsulating the strength and coverage of 
domestic fiscal rules over the period 1990-2008, 
which were firstly computed on the basis of the 
former survey, were now recalculated using the 
new data set. While Box II.4.1 describes the 
findings of the 2005 survey, the next two sub-
sections provide the main descriptive results of the 
new sample as well as the changes in the index 
values based on this updating.   
4.2.1. Main descriptive results based on the 
2008 questionnaire    
The 2008 update confirms the previously observed 
tendency for a growing use of fiscal rules in the 
EU countries. Whilst fiscal rules in place grew 
from 16 in 1990 to 61 in 2005, this figure further 
increased to 67 in 2008. (64) (65) Since the previous 
survey, five countries, three of which from the new 
Member States, have implemented seven new 
fiscal rules (BG, FR, LT, HU and PT). In the same 
(63) Kopits, G. and S. Symansky (1998).  
(64) The total number of rules in 2005 departs slightly from the 
figure published in the 2006 Public Finances Report. This 
is due to the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the 
survey, which were not previously considered, and some 
adjustments in the sample stemming from more accurate 
information provided by some countries (e.g., rules 
reported in the 2005 survey which were not yet in force).  
(65) Rules applied to more than one government tier they are 
accounted according to the number of sub-sectors 
concerned (e.g., a balanced budget rule for regional and 
local governments would represent two rules), the sum of 
fiscal rules in 2008 would amount to 76 (70 in 2005). 
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period, one country reported to have abolished one
rule (FI) whereas three Member
States remained in 2008 without fiscal rules (CY, 
EL and MT). Box II.4.2 gives further details on the 
new fiscal rules.  
Similarly to the 2005 survey, a growing number of
fiscal rules applied to the general and central 
governments have been introduced over the most
recent years, which contrasts with the prevailing 
situation in 1990 with a majority of rules covering
regional and local government sub-sectors. In
relative terms, rules applied to the general and 
central government accounted for 25% in 1990 
compared to nearly 50% in 2008 (see 
Graph II.4.1).
More than one third of the existing fiscal rules in 
the EU countries are budget balance rules 
(including golden rules) while expenditure and 
debt rules represent about one quarter in both
cases. By contrast, revenue rules account for less
than 10 percent. In line with the 2005 results, most
of budget balance and debt rules are applied to
regional and local governments. This departs from
the central government and social security 
sub-sectors, which resort more often to
expenditure rules (see Graph II.4.2).
Box II.4.1: Key findings in the 2005 survey on national fiscal rules
The 2005 survey found that fiscal rules had become a wide-spread policy tool across Member States. In
2005, 61 national fiscal rules were in force, up from less than 20 in 1990.  At the central government level, 
which represented nearly 25% over the total sample, rules targeted mostly public expenditure. In contrast, at
regional and local levels, fiscal rules typically capped the budget balance or the debt level (close to 50% 
over the total number of rules). Fiscal rules at the local level also generally exhibited some strong design
features compared to other government layers. In particular, many were enshrined in law or the constitution
and included an automatic correction mechanism if violated. However, in terms of coverage local fiscal rules
naturally accounted only for a small share of the general government sector. By contrast, a significant
number of rules applied to the general and central government are based on political agreements and the
only cost for non-compliance is reputational.
A number of weaknesses in the design of the rules were also identified. In particular, only few rules included
independent monitoring and pre-defined enforcement mechanisms (generally rules for sub-national
governments). On top of that, media visibility, which could serve as an informal enforcement device, was
rather limited in most cases. The scant resort to revenue rules, which can pre-define how excess revenues 
should be allocated, was another weakness since they are the most direct tool to keep the spending of
windfall revenues in good times into check. A more extensive use of these rules could have helped address
pro-cyclicality and the deficit bias.  
On average, fiscal rules were stronger in the old than the recently-acceded Member States but variations
across countries were large. Among the old Member States, the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands
and the Scandinavian countries stood out with a particularly strong set of rules. Estonia, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia and the Czech Republic had, among the new Member States, the strongest rules in place. Three
countries, Cyprus, Greece and Malta, did not rely at all on fiscal rules.  
Empirical analysis showed a positive link between the quality of national numerical fiscal rules and fiscal
discipline in the EU countries. In particular, it suggested that an increase in the share of government finances
covered by numerical fiscal rules leads, ceteris paribus, to an improvement in the budget balance.  The
analysis also found that the influence of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes depends on the rules'
characteristics. Strong rules, enshrined in law or constitution and supported by pre-defined enforcement
mechanisms, seem, on average, to have had more influence on fiscal discipline than weak rules.
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Graph II.4.1: Fiscal rules in the EU Member States by sub-sector 
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Graph II.4.2: Fiscal rules in the EU Member States by type of rule
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Fiscal rules currently in place show a large 
diversity in terms of target definition (see 
Table II.4.1). More than one third of budget 
balance rules target a balanced budget and only a 
few of them are defined on a structural basis. 
Nearly fifty percent of debt rules, mostly applied 
to territorial governments, establish debt limits
according to the repayment capacity (i.e., the ratio
between debt service and revenues). Expenditure
rules are evenly distributed between those setting
up spending ceilings and those targeting 
expenditure growth rates. While ceilings are 
generally defined on a nominal basis, the number
of targeted growth rates in nominal and real terms
is similar in both cases. Finally, two thirds of 
revenue rules oblige fiscal authorities to pre-define
the allocation of windfalls revenues. 
Other characteristics of the existing fiscal rules 
have hardly changed between 2005 and 2008. For
instance, most of fiscal rules continue to lack an
independent monitoring and the poor enforcement
mechanisms in case of non-compliance remain in
place. Overall, the main results of the 2005 survey 
described in Box II.4.1. still apply.  
4.2.2. Changes in the index of strength of fiscal
rules in the EU Member States 
The indices that capture the strength and the 
coverage of fiscal rules, which were firstly
computed on the basis of the 2005 survey, have
now been recalculated using the information of the
updated questionnaire. This has been done 
following the methodology outlined in the Public 
finances in EMU – 2006 report, which is briefly
summarised in Box II.4.3.
While the number of fiscal rules has increased (see
previous section), not many reforms to strengthen
the existing rules were implemented. Thus, the 
fiscal rules index shows an improvement mostly in
those countries that adopted new rules. This holds
particularly for some recently acceded Member 
States (BG, LT and to a lesser extent HU). France's
new rules also raised its fiscal rule index while the
new Portuguese rule left the country below the EU
average since the new rule only applies at the 
regional level. Finland's index fell because a debt
rule applied to the central government was
abolished. In all other Member States, the reforms
were generally very minor or related to aspects not
covered under the fiscal rules index. (66) As a 
result, the overall index for the EU-27 only
improved slightly between 2005 and 2008 (see 
Graph II.4.4).
Overall, the positive relationship between the 
fiscal rule index and budgetary outcomes found in
the previous survey still apply on the basis of the 
updating. Thus, those EU Member States with the
highest index values show on average better
budgetary outcomes. This is reflected in Graph 
II.4.3, in which the country groups scoring higher 
in the fiscal rule index also tend to register higher
primary cyclically-adjusted balance figures over 
the most recent years.  
(66) Sweden's slight decline in its fiscal rules index between
2005 and 2008 is due to some changes in authorities' 
reporting on their existing rules, including on the legal 
basis and media visibility.
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Box II.4.2: Main features of the new fiscal rules over the period 2005-2008
Two new budget balance rules were in place in 2008 (HU and PT). In Hungary, the rule requires since 2007
that the general government primary budget balance be in surplus. As for Portugal, the state budget law
defines annual net indebtedness limits for regional governments. In Poland, a political agreement entered
into force in 2006 to cap the nominal central budget deficit at PLN 30 bln aiming at its gradual reduction as
a percentage of GDP. However, this rule was abolished in 2008 and the government announced recently the
tightening of the current debt rule.  
An indication that countries are becoming increasingly aware of the problem of pro-cyclical fiscal policy is
reflected in the adoption of two new revenue rules. In France, the government has to define ex ante how
possible revenue surpluses (compared to plans) will be allocated. This rule had already been approved at the
time of the 2005 survey but only entered into force in 2006, so that it is presented only now in terms of the
fiscal rules index. In Lithuania, the deficit of the approved state budget shall be reduced by excess revenue
of the current year. Nevertheless, even with these additions, revenue rules are so far only in place in six 
countries (DK, FI, FR, LT, LV, NL), and not all of them pre-established the allocation of
higher-than-anticipated revenues to deficit and debt reduction.
New expenditure rules entered into force in Bulgaria and Lithuania. The limit for the general government in 
Bulgaria is to maintain an expenditure-to-GDP ratio of less than 40%. With a ratio of 37.8% in 2007, the
limit was not yet binding. Lithuania links the expenditure ceiling to revenues. Specifically, it requires that if
the arithmetic average of the general government operating balance, i.e. the general government balance, for
the previous five years was negative, then the annual growth rate of the planned state budget appropriations
may not exceed ½ of the average growth rate of the state budget revenue of the past five years.
France's new debt rule, adopted in 2005 and in force since 2008, applies to the social security. The rule 
pursues to keep unchanged the terms of "social debt" repayment. Therefore, any debt increase in the social 
security sub-sector should be matched by a revenue increase in order to avoid any term repayment
extension. 
Table II.4.1: Target definitions by type of rule
Golden rules Balanced budget rules Nominal ceiling
Ceiling as a % 
GDP
Rules in structural
terms Total
5 10 7 1 3 2
Debt ceiling in
nominal terms
Debt ceiling as a 
% of GDP
Debt ceiling 
related to 
repaiment 
capacity
Other   Total
5 3 8 2 1
Nominal 
expenditure ceiling
Real expenditure 
Ceiling
Expenditure 
growth rate 
(nominal)
Expenditure 
growth rate 
(reall)
Other   Total
5 2 4 3 3 1
Tax burden as a 
% GDP
Rule related to tax
rates      
Allocation of extra
revenues Other   Total
0 1 4 1 6
Budget Balance 
Rules
Debt Rules
Expenditure 
Rules
Revenue rules
6
8
7
Source: Commission services.
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While the EU on average saw some improvements,
the reported reforms appear to be more important 
in some of the new Member States allowing them
to slightly overtake the euro area as group in terms 
of the fiscal rule index (see Graph II.4.4). The
calculated index, however, also has some caveats
that need to be recalled in light of such
comparisons. It is based on self-reporting and may 
not yet reflect the actual experience with a fiscal 
rule when it has just entered into force.  
Moreover, the index cannot always capture how
binding a rule is. For example, Bulgaria's debt rule 
foresees a ceiling of 60% of GDP which is far 
away from the current debt stock of about 18% of
GDP in 2007. This is also the case for other new 
Member States' fiscal rules such as Latvia and 
Poland. (67) All in all, direct comparisons of the 
index between individual Member States or
between groups of EU countries must be 
interpreted cautiously.  
(67) On top of that, some of these fiscal rules implemented in 
some of the new Member States are very often applied to
the whole of the general government sector or to the central 
government plus the social security sub-sector (i.e., a very
large coverage), which further increases the score of the
fiscal rule index. Finally, the gradual incorporation of some
Member States with no fiscal rules in the euro area pulls
down the average index value for this group of countries .
Box II.4.3: Criteria used to calculate the index of strength of fiscal rules
A fiscal rule is considered strong if it is likely to be respected and may significantly influence the conduct of
fiscal policy. Following the methodology applied in the Public finances in EMU – 2006 report, the 
measurement of the strength of fiscal rules is based on five criteria:
(i) The statutory base of the rule: A rule enshrined in the constitution or in law is considered stronger than
a rule based on a simple political agreement or commitment.  
(ii) The nature of the body in charge of monitoring the respect of the rule: When the monitoring is
carried out by an independent body that may send an early warning in case a risk of non-compliance is
identified, the probability that rule is respected can be expected to be higher. 
(iii) The nature of the body in charge of enforcement of the rule: Like in the previous criterion, the resort
to a non-partisan institution to ensure that appropriate measures will be adopted in case of non-compliance is
considered to promote the respect of the rule.
(iv) Enforcement mechanisms of the rule: The existence of automatic correction mechanisms and the 
possibility to impose them in case of deviation from the rule can be expected to foster compliance.
(v) Media visibility of the rule: The effectiveness of fiscal rules is considered to be higher when they may 
benefit from a large media visibility and non-compliance is likely to cause a public debate.  
Since there is no theoretical prior on how to weigh the criteria, they were aggregated using 10,000 random
weights with the median of the index reported here. This measurement of 'strength' of fiscal rules was
combined with a measurement of the 'coverage' by weighting the rule with the percentage share of the
general government finances covered by the rule. The index was standardised so that the average over the
sample (1990-2008) is zero and the standard deviation is one (see the 2006 Public Finances in EMU for
further details). 
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Graph II.4.3: Fiscal rule index and average primary cyclically-adjusted balance in the EU-27 in the period 2000-2008
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Graph II.4.4: Development of the fiscal rule index in the EU 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
S
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d
fis
ca
l i
nd
ex
 s
co
re
 EU-27
EU-15
Euro area
EU-12 (RAMS)
Source: Commission services.
The evolution of the index reflects in some cases
the reform efforts implemented at the end of the 
1990s with a view to joining the first bunch of
countries adopting the single currency. In
particular, this was the case of France and Italy. By 
contrast, Spain embarked upon a major fiscal 
framework reform after joining the euro and
Germany did not introduce any significant change
over the last twenty years (see Graph II.4.5).
Graph II.4.5: Development of the fiscal rule index in selected EU 
Member States 
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Finally, in line with the results based on the 2005
dataset, statistical and econometric exercises 
suggest the existence of a link between numerical 
fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes. (68) Table
II.4.2 reports the results of the econometric 
(68) See Public Finances in EMU 2006.
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analysis linking the fiscal rule index and budgetary
outcomes measured by the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB) in the EU27 Member 
States. The coefficient reflecting the influence of 
the fiscal rule index on the CAPB is positive and 
significant, which indicates that an increase in the 
value of the index (i.e. a larger coverage and/or
stronger features of fiscal rules) leads, ceteris 
paribus, to lower deficits or higher surpluses.
Table II.4.2: Influence of fiscal rules on the primary CAB
(EU-27, 1990-2008) 
-0.058 (-1.1)
0.54 (9.6)***
0.04 (3.6)***
0.48 (-2.7)**
Lagged CAPB
Lagged debt ratio
Fiscal rules index
Explanatory
variables:
Cyclically-adjusted primary
balance (CAPB)
Dependent variable:
Lagged output gap
(1)Estimation method: OLS with time and country-fixed effects.
Heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for 27 clusters standard errors.
The "t" values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, 
respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Coefficients 
for fixed-effects are not reported. 
Source: Commission services.
4.3. INDEPENDENT FISCAL INSTITUTIONS 
The 2008 update keeps the definition of 
independent public bodies in the field of fiscal
policy unchanged with respect the previous survey. 
Thus, national fiscal agencies are defined as 
independent public bodies, other than the central
bank, government or parliament that prepare
macroeconomic forecasts for the budget, monitor 
fiscal performance and/or advise the government 
on fiscal policy matters. These institutions are 
primarily financed by public funds and are 
functionally independent vis-à-vis fiscal 
authorities. Courts of Auditors are included in the 
survey if their activities go beyond the accounting 
control and cover any of the tasks mentioned 
above. Similarly to fiscal rules, the 2008 
questionnaire to update the previous survey was
kept largely unchanged in order to have
comparable and homogenous information. 
4.3.1. Main results of the 2008 survey 
As expected, the main results of the 2008 update 
provided no major changes compared to the 
previous survey (see Box II.4.4 for a brief
overview of the prevailing situation in 2005). 
In 2008, 27 independent bodies were implemented
in 17 EU Member States. Only two countries set 
up two new bodies (SE and PT) while only minor 
changes to the existing institutions were introduced
in DK and DE. 
In most new Member States however, independent
fiscal institutions are still the exception. An 
attempt to explain why fiscal institutions have so
far been less popular in new Member States,
despite their rapid catching up in other aspects of
fiscal frameworks, has not yet been elaborated. A 
plausible hypothesis can be raised in this respect. 
The long history of fiscal institutions in most of 
old Member States and the few recent reforms and 
additions suggest that the introduction of these 
independent bodies usually takes more time than
the implementation of other institutional
arrangements such as fiscal rules or medium-term 
budgetary frameworks. Actually, establishing
fiscal institutions requires sufficient financial and
human resources and capabilities, in contrast to 
mostly legal changes needed for building up other 
aspects of the fiscal frameworks. Particularly, 
some of the small new Member States may have 
preferred to concentrate their human resources for 
monitoring fiscal policy making in the central 
bank, ministries of finance and academia leaving 
them thin-spread to add fiscal councils.  
Whether in the future Member States will increase 
their reliance on these independent bodies will
likely be impacted by the experiences in the old 
Member States and outside the EU as well as by
country-specific circumstances, including resource
constraints. 
4.3.2. Main recent initiatives related to
independent institutions in the EU
Member States.
Sweden established a new fiscal institution with
the aim to provide an independent evaluation of
Swedish fiscal policy. The newly created Fiscal 
Policy Council, which took office on 1st August 
2007, supplements the already existing fiscal 
institution (the National Institute of Economic
Research) that prepares non-binding 
macroeconomic forecasts for the budget. 
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The creation of the Fiscal Policy Council, 
consisting of eight academics and policy experts, 
was mostly motivated by the desire to increase the 
transparency of fiscal policy making, thereby 
ensuring confidence in the fiscal policy 
framework. This is to be achieved by assessing 
whether the fiscal policy objectives, including 
long-run sustainability, the budget target, the 
expenditure ceiling and the consistency of fiscal 
policy with the cycle, are met. Additional tasks are 
to examine the clarity of government proposals 
and to review the economic forecasts and models 
used to generate them. To achieve these objectives, 
the Council prepares an annual report to the 
government and participates in the public policy 
debate. 
Portugal created a special unit to support the 
parliament's budget committee, assess public 
finances and make them more transparent. The 
Unidade Técnica de Apoio Orçamental (UTA) 
started operations in November 2006 with 
responsibilities of assessing the macroeconomic 
scenarios underlying the budget as well as the 
budget itself. Moreover, it monitors the 
implementation of the budget (on a quarterly basis) 
and the SCP and analyses the budgetary impacts of 
legislative initiatives under discussions. It 
produces various reports for the respective tasks. 
Finally, two countries (Denmark and Germany) 
brought minor reforms of their fiscal institutions 
over the period 2005-2008, however, without 
implications for the institutions' functions. 
Denmark merged the Danish Economic Council 
and the Environmental Assessment Institute DK 
into the Danish Economic Councils. Germany's 
Council of Economic Advisers (SVR) has been 
charged to annually produce an additional report 
on selected topics to be decided jointly by the 
government and the council, which could include 
fiscal issues. 
4.4. MEDIUM–TERM BUDGETARY 
FRAMEWORKS 
In line with the surveys on fiscal rules and 
institutions, the 2008 questionnaire on 
medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) 
hardly changed compared to the 2006 version, and 
the definition of MTBFs adopted in 2008 was the 
same as the previous survey. Finally, the approach 
used to compute an index measuring the quality of 
domestic budgetary frameworks remained also 
unchanged. 
While the next two sub-sections describe the main 
changes identified in the 2008 update and the 
recalculation of the quality index, Box II.4.5 
Box II.4.4: Key findings in the 2005 survey on independent fiscal institutions
In 2005, 25 independent public bodies were implemented across 17 EU Member States, of which 13 
belonged to the former EU-15. Those countries having more than one independent institution were DE (4), 
AT (3) and ES and FR (2). The new Member States reporting the implementation of such an institution were 
EE, LT, HU and SI.  
Overall, 19 institutions released analyses of budgetary developments while 15 issued normative 
recommendations related to the conduct of fiscal policy. Institutions providing macroeconomic and fiscal 
forecasts amounted to fifteen. However, among the latter only four Member States (BE, NL, AT and SI) 
relied on independent fiscal institutions to provide the macro forecasts for the budget preparation and 
medium-term fiscal planning. Finally, nine institutions carried out these three tasks simultaneously.  
According to the survey, these institutions often look back on a long history which may partly explain that 
they are far more common among old Member States. In new Member States the role of fiscal institutions is 
often played by central banks, which are not covered under the definition used here. In general, these 
institutions enjoyed a high reputation and functional independence. Finally, the quality of their work is 
perceived to be above standards.   
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provides the most important findings based on the 
2006 data. (69) 
revisions (see Graph II.4.6). Only France seems to 
have made some progress related to the required 
coordination among government layers when 
setting budgetary targets. However, since both 
Bulgaria and Romania operate with some 
coordination mechanisms, the overall picture on 
this particular aspect appears more favourable than 
in the 2006 survey results.  
Regarding the implementation of a regular 
monitoring, France and Latvia reported to have 
implemented new procedures to better oversee 
budgetary developments. In contrast, no additional 
corrective mechanisms in case of non-compliance 
have been put in place since 2006.  
4.4.1. Main descriptive results of the 2008 
survey  
Overall, medium-term budgetary frameworks 
(MTBFs) are those policy instruments that allow 
extending the horizon for fiscal policy making 
beyond the annual budgetary calendar. Although in 
all Member States the adoption of the annual 
budget is the key step in which crucial decisions 
on fiscal policy are taken, most fiscal policy 
measures have budgetary implications that go well 
beyond the yearly budgetary cycle. As a result, a 
single-year budgetary perspective provides a poor 
basis for a sound fiscal policy management. This is 
the main reason justifying that a majority of EU 
countries have currently adopted an MTBF for 
fiscal planning.  
Barring five Member States (EL, CY, HU, LU and 
PT), all EU countries declared to have an MTBF in 
place in 2008. (70) This figure did not change 
compared to the 2006 survey, and no major 
revisions of the existing frameworks have been 
implemented either over the last three years. In 
general, changes have been small and limited to a 
few countries. Actually, only France has adopted 
some significant reforms. The main change in the 
last survey is the larger coverage of the sample, 
which now includes Bulgaria and Romania. 
As a result, the time horizon and the institutional 
coverage of domestic MTBFs have remained 
largely unchanged. Most of medium-term 
frameworks continue to cover a three or four-year 
period while the whole of the general government 
is still by far the most common institutional sector 
targeted.  
Likewise, the 2008 survey also showed limited 
progress in the area of institutional coordination, 
monitoring, corrective mechanisms and target 
(69) See the 2007 Public finances in EMU report or a 
comprehensive analysis of the 2006 survey.  
(70) Cyprus reported not to have a domestic MTBF in place. 
However, the 2007 Stability Programme of Cyprus 
announced the introduction of a MTBF from 2007 onwards 
with the objective to better controlling public sector 
employment growth and containing other current 
expenditures.  
Finally, most domestic MTBFs remain rolling and 
flexible frameworks (i.e., every year the time 
horizon is extended one additional year while 
targets for the remaining years can be revised). 
This includes also the MTBFs of Bulgaria and 
Romania. In this respect, the reform of the existing 
framework in France might be an exception. 
Although fiscal targets are not legally binding, 
according to the information provided by French 
authorities the reformed MTBF implies to set a 
fixed path for fiscal targets, which should not be 
revised during the time horizon of the framework 
unless major changes in the underlying 
macroeconomic assumptions materialise. (71) 
Overall, reform efforts as regards MTBFs have 
been slow. The revisions implemented since 2006 
were, in most cases, relatively minor and contrast 
with the intentions of implementing new MTBFs 
or reforming the existing ones as expressed by a 
number of countries in their recent SCPs. As a 
result weaknesses in MTBFs are still broad based. 
(71) Specifically, with the expenditure targets being defined in 
real terms, significant deviations from the projected 
inflation developments would entail revisions of the 
nominal spending figures. However, since these targets are 
not legally binding, only the magnitude and frequency of 
the target revisions over the next years will allow assessing 
their constraining character.  
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4.4.2. Main changes in the quality index of
domestic MTBFs 
The index that encapsulates the main features of 
the existing medium-term frameworks in the EU
countries was firstly calculated on the basis of the 
2006 survey. This section shows the new values of
this index according to the new survey conducted
in 2008. This updating was done following the 
methodology outlined in the 2007 Public finances 
in EMU report, which is briefly summarised in
Box II.4.6. (72)  
(72) In particular, when one country did not operate a domestic 
MTBF, the strength of its SCP in terms of multi-annual 
budgeting was taken into account to compute the index.
However, while SCPs can be considered a specific type of 
an MTBF, they are not viewed to be totally on an equal
footing with domestic MTBFs. Thus, for the calculation of 
the MTBF index, which measures the strength of Member 
States MTBFs, those countries that only use SCPs were
given a lower rating in one of the dimensions considered 
for the index.
As the previous section stressed, no new MTBFs
were implemented since 2006 and the reforms to
the existing ones were generally rather minor
except for the case of France. Consequently the 
country-specific values of the quality index of
medium-term frameworks remained unchanged for
almost all Member States. Only the index of 
France and to a lesser extent the one of Latvia 
reflected the improvements introduced since 2006.
This is shown in Graph II.4.7. (73) 
(73) An unchanged index, however, does not necessarily imply 
that no changes occurred at all. For instance, Italy has 
recently improved its MTBF by including a detailed
breakdown of revenues and expenditure components that 
allows identifying the fiscal strategy adopted to achieve 
fiscal targets. This may potentially improve the conduct 
and the monitoring of fiscal policy over the medium term.
However, the breakdown of budgetary aggregates is not
considered into the five dimensions of our MTBF index 
and, therefore, this change has no impact in its calculation. 
In cases where reforms have not entered into force, such as 
for Austria or Poland, they have also not yet been included
in the index.
Box II.4.5: Key findings in the 2006 survey
According to the 2006 survey, a majority of MTBFs covered the whole of the general government sector or
a large part of it (e.g. central government plus social security) and had a three or four-year horizon. In most
of them, every year the time horizon was extended one additional year with the option to revise budgetary 
plans for the remaining years (i.e., rolling and flexible MTBFs). Setting a fixed path for budgetary 
aggregates (e.g., public expenditure) was the exception practiced only in FI, SE and NL, and to a lesser
extent in DK and the UK. In general, the level of detail provided by the budgetary projections was rather
poor. In a large majority of cases, medium term budgetary projections only covered the main budgetary
aggregates (i.e., budget balance and debt figures and total revenue and expenditure developments), while 
there was hardly any indication on the composition of government spending and receipts. A few countries 
can, however, be considered outstanding exceptions in this respect (e.g., SI, SE and the UK). 
Most of domestic MTBFs exhibited a large number of weaknesses. In particular, scant monitoring and a lack
of pre-defined correction mechanisms in case of non-compliance emerged as the main shortcomings.
Specifically, MTBFs were not formally monitored in nearly 50% of EU countries whereas corrective
measures that take force when targets are missed hardly existed. In the same vein, in only about half of EU
Member States the medium-term frameworks and the annual budget preparation appeared relatively well
linked while in the remaining countries this link was not clear or seemed weak. In general, the media had 
only shown a meagre interest in covering governments' compliance with their multiannual fiscal plans,
which entail modest reputational costs. Finally, in a number of countries a lack of coordination among
government tiers to ensure the respect of fiscal targets included in the MTBFs came out as a major drawback
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Graph II.4.6: Coordination, monitoring, corrective mechanisms and target revisions in domestic MTBFs 
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Box II.4.6: Criteria used to calculate the quality index of domestic MTBFs
Similarly to fiscal rules, the information provided by the surveys were summarised into a composite index to
assess the quality of MTBFs. The index originally developed in 2006 has now been reviewed and updated in
the light of the 2008 questionnaire. Like the fiscal rules index, it is based on information reported by
Member States, which only enter the index calculation when the specific aspects of the MTBF were already 
in force in July 2008. The index captures the quality of MTBFs through five criteria: (1) 
(i) Existence of a domestic MTFB.
(ii) Connectedness between the multi-annual budgetary targets and the preparation of the annual budget.
(iii) Involvement of national parliaments in the preparation of the medium-term budgetary plans.
(iv) Existence of coordination mechanisms between general government layers prior to setting the medium-
term budgetary targets. 
(v) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of multi-annual budgetary targets. 
(1) See the 2007 Public finances in EMU report for further details.
97 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
Graph II.4.7: MTBF index scores and ranking in the EU27 
Finally, although those countries with stronger 
MTBFs not necessarily also have strong fiscal 
rules, on average there is a positive relation
between the quality of both fiscal arrangements as 
Graph II.4.8 shows.
Graph II.4.8: Quality of medium-term budgetary frameworks and 
fiscal rules, 2008
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4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the first surveys on fiscal frameworks 
conducted in 2005 and 2006, the number of EU 
Member States resorting to fiscal rules, 
independent institutions and MTBF has 
continuously increased.  
The main changes experienced between 2005 and
2008 refer to fiscal rules. While few countries 
reformed existing rules, five countries, three of 
which are new Member States, introduced seven 
new fiscal rules. The use of revenue rules, which 
are particularly suited to deal with cyclicality of
fiscal policy, remains scarce but the entering into 
force of revenue rules in France and Lithuania is a
promising development. Another remarkable trend
is the rising importance of fiscal rules that cover 
central and general governments. At the same
time, budget balance rules continue to be by far the 
most popular type of rules in the EU. On the
downside, scant independent monitoring and weak
enforcement mechanisms remain the main
shortcomings of current fiscal rules. 
Fiscal institutions continue to be wide-spread in
the EU-15 but are less common in new Member 
States. The creation of two new independent fiscal
institutions in Sweden and Portugal was motivated 
by the need and desire to raise the transparency on 
fiscal policy making and thereby ensure the trust in 
medium-term policy decisions. While these 
institutions are responsible for assessing the 
underlying macroeconomic assumptions for the
budget as well as monitor its execution and the 
adherence to medium-term budgetary plans, they 
do not provide binding macroeconomic forecasts 
for the budget. Actually, the use of fiscal council's
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macroeconomic forecasts for the budget 
preparation is only effective in Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Slovenia. No new fiscal 
institutions have been formed in the new Member 
States, which largely rely on their independent 
central banks to also monitor fiscal policy and the 
Court of Auditors for a proper use of public funds. 
Progress on MTBFs has been much slower than 
expected when judging the intentions for reforms 
expressed in recent SCPs. While several countries 
had foreseen framework reforms, only France 
adopted some significant changes.  
This explains why the quality index of domestic 
MTBF has remained unchanged in almost all EU 
Member States. As a result, the broad-based 
weaknesses in Member States' MTBFs identified 
in the 2006 survey still apply in 2008. These 
include poor monitoring mechanisms and lack of 
predefined measures in case budgetary 
developments depart from medium-term budgetary 
objectives. 
ANNEX II 
MORE DETAILS ON DISCRETIONARY MEASURES AND QUALITY OF 
PUBLIC FINANCE INDICATORS 
AII.1. NOTES ON THE DATA COLLECTED IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF THE OUTPUT GAP 
WORKING GROUP OF THE ECONOMIC 
POLICY COMMITTEE 
In the framework of the Output Gap Working 
Group (OGWG) of the Economic Policy 
Committee a questionnaire was sent to the 
Member States inquiring into the estimated impact 
of discretionary fiscal measures on tax receipts. 
Annex table AII.1 summarises the information 
received on the availability of these estimates 
across EU countries for each broad tax category, 
the institutions in charge of elaborating these 
estimates and availability of data. Estimates on 
discretionary measures were made systematically 
available in nearly all EU countries and were in 
most cases the responsibility of ministries of 
finances. (74) In some cases data on measures 
concerning social security contribution is compiled 
by ministries of employment and social affairs 
(e.g., Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Portugal and Slovakia) and by other ministries 
(e.g., ministry for health). In other countries, the 
data are complemented by data produced by other 
institutions (e.g. external research institutes in 
Germany and the National Central Bank in 
Belgium). In some countries with largely 
decentralised public spending, regional 
governments also compile data on the impact of 
discretionary measures (Belgium, Germany).  
(74) In some countries such estimates are not made regularly 
such as in Bulgaria, Hungary, Luxembourg. 
Estimates are usually made public (although not 
yet in the case of Romania) and are either reported 
in ministry of finances publications or reported as 
part of legislative bills. In certain cases not all 
detailed information is made public (Bulgaria, 
Malta) nor is the information regularly published 
(Hungary and Romania). Furthermore, the data is 
recorded in fourteen out of twenty one cases on 
accrual or both accrual and cash basis, thus 
consistent with the ESA95 definition. Six countries 
only compile estimates on a cash basis only: 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Romania. Estimates are usually made ex-ante in 
gross terms (i.e., without considering the impact of 
discretionary measures on tax bases) and only in 
few specific cases ex-post revisions are 
undertaken. The fact that the estimates provided by 
the Member States are in gross terms is only of 
minor importance given that the focus is on short-
run variations of tax elasticities. Finally the 
information collected provides indication of the 
"no-policy change scenario" and, in particular, the 
consideration of price indexation mechanisms 
whenever relevant in building these scenarios. The 
"no-policy change scenario" definition used is as a 
matter of fact fairly general being defined in most 
cases as if no changes were undertaken in the tax 
system including often country-specific issues 
related to indexation mechanisms and country-
specificities. 
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AII.2. PROPORTIONAL ADJUSTMENT 
METHOD (75) 
Assume the following strand of tax revenues 
corresponding to a given (unspecified) tax 
category: 
T1,T2,…Tt 
where t is the current year. Let the estimated tax 
revenue impact of discretionary measures in the 
years in which they occurred be 
dm1,dm2,…dmt
and assume that the adjusted (for the impact of 
discretionary measures) series of tax revenues are 
equal to: 
A1,A2,…At 
(75) Adapted from Barth and Hemphill (2000).
Ideally tax revenues A1-At should only reflect the 
effect of (endogenous) evolution of tax bases in 
order to derive correct measures of tax elasticities
reflecting the sensitivity of tax revenues to the tax 
bases. (76) In order to compare tax revenues across
the years one would like to abstract from changes
in tax structures, i.e., discretionary measures. 
Considering a specific year (t) as the base year, 
one would thus like to obtain tax revenues series as 
if this specific year's tax structure had been in 
operation for the entire period. Since this specific 
year is taken as the base, one can thus write that: 
At = Tt
(76) This is assuming that tax bases currently used are perfect 
proxies of the true tax bases. In practice this assumption
can be severely challenged however, see Section II.2.1. 
Annex table AII.1: Data collected on discretionary measures affecting tax elasticities 
Indirect taxes Direct taxes Social securitycontribution Cash and/or accrual
Net and/or
gross
Austria 2000-08 2000-08 2000-08 Cash and accrual Gross and net
Belgium 2001-07 2001-07 2004-08 Cash and accrual Gross
Bulgaria 2004-08 2004-08 2004-08 Cash Gross
Cyprus 2002-04 2002-04 2002-04 Cash Gross
Czech Republic 1995-08 1995-08 1995-08 Cash and accrual Gross
Denmark 2001-07 2001-07 N/A Cash Gross and net
Estonia 2006-09 2006-09 06-09 Cash Gross and net
Spain 1999-08 1999-08 N/A Cash and accrual Gross and net
Finland 2001-08 2001-08 01-08 Cash Gross
France 2001-07 2001-07 2001-07 Accrual Gross
Germany N/A N/A N/A Cash and accrual Gross and net
Italy 2001-07 2001-07 N/A Cash and accrual Gross
Lithuania 2001-07 2001-07 2001-07 Cash and accrual Gross and net
Latvia 2002-07 2002-07 2002-07 Cash Gross and net
Malta 2001-07 2001-07 2001-07 Accrual Gross
Netherlands Since 1991 Since 1991 Since 1991 Cash and accrual Gross and net
Portugal 2002-08 2002-08 2002-08 Cash and accrual Gross
Romania 2005-07 2005-07 2005-07 Cash Gross
Sweden 2000-09 2000-09 2000-09 Accrual Gross and net
Slovenia 2003-07 2003-07 2003-07 N/A Gross
Slovakia 2004-09 2004-09 2004-09 Accrual Net
UK 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 Accrual Net
Time periods covered Accounting
Note: Information based on replies by Member States to questionnaire sent in June 2008. No information was received for non-listed countries 
including Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland. Luxembourg does not compile data on discretionary measures affecting tax elasticities.
Source: Commission services based on replies provided by Member States.
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Tax revenue values for years 1 to t-1 must then be 
corrected in order for these to be comparable to the 
tax revenue in year t. Under the proportional 
adjustment assumption, the series of adjusted 
revenues can be written as: 
In year t-2, the adjusted tax revenue should equally 
be written as: 
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LIST OF INDICATORS USED FOR THE ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATION OF QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
COMPOSITE INDICATORS 
Dimension Variable Description Unit Original datasource
QPF1 Government expenditure Total expenditure; general government; ESA 1995 and former definition -  spring 2008 economic forecast - UUTG - UUTGF % GDP AMECO
QPF2 Cylically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB)
Structural balance of general government excluding interest - adjustment based
on potential GDP - excessive deficit procedure - spring 2008 economic forecast -
UBLGBPS
% GDP AMECO
QPF2 Structural balance Structural balance of general government - Adjustment based on potential GDP -Excessive deficit procedure - pring 2008 economic forecast - UBLGAPS % GDP AMECO
QPF2 Deviation of structural balance fromMTO Distance of the 2007 structural fiscal balance from the country-specific MTO % GDP
Commission
services
QPF2 Government debt General government consolidated gross debt - Excessive deficit procedure - ESA 1995 and former definition (linked series) - UDGGL % GDP AMECO
QPF2 S1 2007 scenario
S1 = gap to the debt-stabilising primary balance + additional adjustment required 
to reach a debt target of 60% in 2050 + additional adjustment required to finance
the increase in public expenditure up to 2050.
% GDP Commissionservices
QPF2 S1 programme scenario Sustainability indicator S1 under the 2007 SCP scenario % GDP Commissionservices
QPF3.1 Public investment Gross fixed capital formation; general government - ESA 1995 and formerdefinition merged - UIGGO - UIGGOF % GDP AMECO
QPF3.1 Public investment-to-publicconsumption
Gross fixed capital formation-to-Final consumption expenditure of general
government % AMECO
QPF3.1 Productive' spending (Definition 1) Public spending on transportation, R&D and education % GDP Eurostat and OECD
QPF3.1 Productive' spending (Definition 1) Public spending on transportation, R&D and education
% primary
government
spending
Eurostat and OECD
QPF3.1 Productive' spending (Definition 2) Public spending on transportation, R&D, education and health % GDP Eurostat and OECD
QPF3.1 Productive' spending (Definition 2) Public spending on transportation, R&D, education and health
% primary
government
spending
Eurostat and OECD
QPF3.1 Productive' spending (Definition 3) Public spending on transportation, R&D, education, health, public order and safety, and environmental protection % GDP Eurostat and OECD
QPF3.1 Productive' spending (Definition 3) Public spending on transportation, R&D, education, health, public order and safety, and environmental protection
% primary
government
spending
Eurostat and OECD
QPF3.2 PISA PISA total score
The mean
performance of
OECD students is
set at 500 for the 
surveys.
OECD
QPF3.2 Edcuation attainment Percentage of the population aged 25 to 64 having completed at least uppersecondary education
% of the pop. aged
25-64 Eurostat
QPF3.2 Youth education attainment Youth educational attainment % of the pop. aged20-24 Eurostat
QPF3.2 Early school leavers Early school leavers: % of the population aged 18-24 with at most lowersecondary education and not in further education or training
% of the pop. aged
18-24 Eurostat
QPF3.2 Quality of educational system
Quality of the educational system: the educational system in the country (1 = does
not meet thte needs of a competitive economy, 7 = meets the needs of a
competitive economy)
Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.2 Quality of educational system The educational system (0 = does not meet the needs of a competitive economy,10 = meets the needs of a competitive economy) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.3 Life expectancy
The mean number of years that a newborn child can expect to live if subjected
throughout his life to the current mortality conditions (age specific probabilities of
dying).
Number of years Eurostat and OECD
QPF3.3 Mortality rate The ratio of the number of deaths during the year to the number of inhabitants.
Number of deaths
of 100 000
inhabitants
Eurostat
QPF3.3 Infant mortality Ratio of the number of deaths of children under one year of age during the year to the number of live births in that year.
Deaths of children
under one year of
age per 1000 live 
births
Eurostat
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(table continued)
Dimension Variable Description Unit Original datasource
QPF3.4 Patents granted to residents
Number of patents granted to residents per 1000 000 population ("resident" filing 
refers to an application filed with the Office of or acting for the State in which the 
first named applicant in the application concerned has residence).
Per 1000 000
inhabitants WIPO
QPF3.4 Triadic patents Patents that at the same time are filed at the EPO and the Japanese Patent office (JPO) and granted by the USPTO.
Triadic patents per
million inhabitants Eurostat
QPF3.4 Patent applications Total number of patent applications by milliard EUR of total R&D expenditure(GERD). Patent applications to the EPO by priority year at the national level.
Relative to gross 
domestic 
expenditure on R&D 
(GERD)
Eurostat
QPF3.4 Technological readiness
Index based on 8 subindices: (1) availability of latest technologies, (2) firm-level 
technology absorption, (3) laws relating to ICT, (4) FDI and technology transfer,
(5) mobile telephone subscribers - hard data, (6) internet users - hard data, (7)
personal computers - hard data, (8) broadband internet subscribers - hard data.
Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.4 Innovation index
Index based on 8 subindices: (1) capacity for innovation, (2) quality of scientific
research institutions, (3) company spending on R&D, (4) University- industry
research collaboration, (5) government procurement of advanced technology
products, (6) availability of scientists and engineers, (7) utility patents - hard data 
and (1.2) intellectual property protection.
Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.4 Basic research index Basic research (0 = does not enhance long-term economic development, 10 =does enhance long-term economic development) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.4 Science graduates
New tertiary graduates in a calendar year from both public and private institutions
completing graduate and post graduate studies compared to an age group that
corresponds to the typical graduation age in most countries.
Tertiary graduates
in science and 
technology per 1
000 of pop. aged 20-
29 years.
Eurostat
QPF3.4 Science in schools Science in schools (0 = is not sufficiently emphasized, 10 = is sufficientlyemphasized) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.5 Length of motorways Length of motorways per 1000 km (scaled by country size) Per 1000 km Eurostat & CIA
QPF3.5 Length of railways Length of railway tracks per 1000 km (scaled by country size) Per 1000 km Eurostat & CIA
QPF3.5 Fixed lines and mobile subscriptions Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers Units per 100 people World Bank
QPF3.5 Internet users Ratio of Internet users (ie. with access to the worldwide network) in thepopulation
Users per 1000 
people
IUT, WTD Report
and database, and 
World Bank.
QPF3.5 Energy infrastructure Energy infrastructure (0 = is not adequate and efficient, 10 = is adequate and efficient) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.5 Index on maintenance and development
Maintenance and development of infrastructure (0 = are not adequately planned 
and financed, 10 = are adequately planned and financed) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.5 Infrastructure index
Index based on 8 subindices: (1) quality of overall infrastructure, (2) quality of
roads, (3) quality of railroad infrastructure, (4) quality of port infrastructure, (5)
quality of air transport infrastructure, (6) available seat kilometers - hard data, (7)
quality of electricity supply and (8) telephone lines - hard data.
Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.6 Persons convicted Persons convicted in percentage of offenses (total criminal offences) % total offenses
European 
Sourcebook of
Crime and Criminal
Justice
QPF3.6 Burden of crime Percentage of respondents victimised once or more in the year preceding the survey.
% of respondents
victimised EU ICS 2005
QPF3.6 Business cost of crime
The incidence of common crime and violence (e.g. street muggings, firms being 
looted) ( 1 = imposes significant costs on businesses, 7 = does not impose 
significant costs on businesses)
Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.6 Fairness of justice Justice is (0 = not fairly administered, 10 = fairly administered) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.6 Organised crime
Organised crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) in your country (1 =
imposes significant costs on businesses, 7 = does not impose significant costs on 
businesses)
Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.6 Reliability of police services Police services (1 = cannot be relied upon to protect businesses from criminals, 7= can be relied upon to protect businesses from criminals) Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.6 Personal security and private property Personal security and private property (0 = are not adequately protected, 10 = areadequately protected) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.6 Persons killed or injured in road trafficaccidents Persons killed or injured in road traffic accidents per 10.000 vehicles WHO & UNECE
QPF3.6 Police satisfaction Percentage of respondents satisfied with police controlling crime in local area. % of respondentssatisfied. EU ICS 2005
QPF3.7 Bribing and corruption index Bribing and corruption (0 = exist, 10 = do not exist) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.7 Corruption perception index The TI CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption asthe abuse of public office for private gain. Score 0-10
Transparency
International
QPF3.7 Corruption impact on parliament Impact of corruption on parliament/legislature (1: not at all corrupt; 5: extremelycorrupt) Score 1-5
Transparency
International
QPF3.7 Public trust of politicians Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians is (1 = very low, 7 = very high) Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.7 Diversion of public funds Diversion of public funds to companies, individuals or groups due to corruption (1= is common, 7 = never occurs) Score 1-7 WEF
QPF3.7 Bureaucracy index Bureaucracy (0 = hinders business activity, 10 = does not hinder business activity) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF3.7 Wastefulness of public spending index Public spending in the country (1 = is wasteful, 7 = provides necessary goods and services not provided by the market) Score 1-7 WEF
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(table continued)
Dimension Variable Description Unit Original datasource
QPF4a Share of indirect taxes Share of indirect taxes in total general government revenues % of total revenue Eurostat, AMECOand OECD
QPF4a Share of consumption taxes Share of consumption taxes in total general government revenues % of total revenue Eurostat, AMECOand OECD
QPF4b Inactivity trap (average wage)
Marginal effective tax rate of a single worker when moving from social assistance 
to work at a wage level equivalent to the wage of the average production worker
(manufacturing sector)
% of average wage
European 
Commission and
OECD
QPF4b All-in average personal income taxand SSC rates (average wage)
All-in average personal income tax and SSC rates (single person at 100% of the 
average wage) % OECD
QPF4b All-in marginal personal income taxand SSC rates (average wage)
All-in marginal personal income tax and SSC rates (single person at 100% of the
average wage) % OECD
QPF4b Average tax wedge on average wage earners (average wage)
Average tax wedge on average wage earners (single person without children, at 
100% of average wage) % of average wage OECD
QPF4b Net replacement rates (average wage) Net replacement rates for unemployed single persons without children, at 100% ofaverage wage % of average wage
European 
Commission and
OECD
QPF4b Marginal tax wedge on average wage earners
Marginal tax wedge on average wage earners (single person without children, at
100% of average wage) % of average wage OECD
QPF4c Inactivity trap (low wage)
Marginal effective tax rate of a single worker when moving from social assistance 
to work at a wage level equivalent to 67% of the wage of the average production 
worker (manufacturing sector)
% of low wage (67%
of average wage)
European 
Commission and
OECD
QPF4c All-in average personal income taxand SSC rates (low wage)
All-in average personal income tax and SSC rates (single person at 67% of the 
average wage) % OECD
QPF4c Low wage trap Low wage trap: Tax rate on low wage earners (67%), single person withoutchildren % gross earnings Eurostat
QPF4c Net replacement rates (low wage) Net replacement rates for unemployed single persons without children, at 67% ofaverage wage % of average wage
European 
Commission and
OECD
QPF4c Average tax wedge on low wage earners
Average tax wedge on low wage earners (single person without children, at 67%
of average wage) % of average wage OECD
QPF4c Marginal tax wedge on low wageearners
Marginal tax wedge on low wage earners (single person without children, at 67%
of average wage) % of average wage OECD
QPF4c Unemployment trap (low wage) Tax rate on low wage earners (67 % of average wage) % Eurostat
QPF4d Corporate income tax rate
Combined central government and sub-central government (corporate income tax
rate.  Where a progressive (as opposed to flat) rate structure applies, the top
marginal rate is shown.
% OECD
QPF4d Capital tax-to-labour tax rate Total tax on capital-to-total tax on labour % Eurostat
QPF4d Profit tax-to-income tax ratio Taxes on the income or profits of corporations-to-tax on individual or household income % Eurostat
QPF4e Number of tax payments
Number of payments for corporate income tax, value added tax or sales tax and 
labour taxes, including payroll taxes and social contributions based on a case 
study company representative for the country.
Numbers per year World Bank
QPF4e Hours per tax payments
Time to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) corporate income tax, value added tax
or sales tax and labour taxes, including payroll taxes and social contributions
based on a case study company representative for the country.
Hours per year World Bank
QPF4e Tax evasion (IMD survey) Tax evasion (0 = hampers business activity, 10 = does not hamper businessactivity) Score 0-10 IMD
QPF5 Fiscal rules index Coverage and strength of total fiscal rules
Standardarised 
distribution - t-
distribution; mean =
0, st.dev. = 1
ECFIN
QPF5 Expenditure rules index Coverage and strength of expenditure rules
Standardarised 
distribution - t-
distribution; mean =
0, st.dev. = 1
ECFIN
QPF5 MTBF index
Index measures the quality of institutions for medium-term budgetary planning 
based on five components: existence of a national MTBF; connectedness
between multiannual targets and the annual budget; involvement of the national
Parliament; existence of coordination mechanisms; monitoring and enforcement.
Score 0-2 ECFIN
QPF5 Budgetary procedures index
Overall index consisting of seven different dimensions of the budgetary
processes: transparency; multi-annual planning horizon; centralisation of the 
budget process; the use of top-down budgeting techniques; prudent economic
assumptions and reserves; performance budgeting; numerical fiscal rules.
Standardarised 
distribution - t-
distribution; mean =
0, st.dev. = 1
ECFIN
QPF5 Public procurement transparency
 Indicator that estimates the amount of procurement for which calls for competition 
have been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities and the 
TED database, as a percentage of the total value of public procurement.
% of the total value 
of public
procurement.
Eurostat, DG
MARKT
QPF5 Tranparency of government policy Transparency of government policy is (0 = poor, 10 = satisfactory) Score 0-10 IMD
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SUMMARY 
What can be learned from the past for fiscal 
implications of today's financial crises? This 
question is at the heart of this section and is 
tackled by analysing empirically the fiscal costs 
and their determinants for 49 crises episodes with a 
focus on five case studies (Finland, Japan, Korea, 
Norway and Sweden). Even though those episodes 
were contained nationally or regionally, some 
transfers can nevertheless be made to today's 
global financial and economic crisis. What are the 
key findings and policy lessons? 
Past financial crises have generally been very 
costly. Net direct fiscal outlays to rehabilitate the 
banking system averaged 13% of GDP but were 
much higher, over 50% of GDP, in some emerging 
market economies. These figures already account 
for the value recovered (until six years after the 
crisis broke out) from assets acquired by the public 
sector. Recovery rates were low at only 20% on 
average with few notable exceptions, such as 
Sweden. Increases in public debt ratios, the most 
comprehensive measure to capture fiscal 
implications from financial crises, went far beyond 
the direct costs attributable to tackling the financial 
sector problems and jumped on average by 20% of 
GDP during the crisis. Most of the ratcheting up of 
debt ratios occurred in the first two crisis years and 
was rooted in the expenditure side, including 
substantially higher interest payments for some 
emerging market economies. The process of rising 
debt ratios proved difficult to reverse. Even a 
decade after the start of the crisis, most 
governments ran public debt-to-GDP ratios above 
pre-crisis levels. 
Which factors have contributed to the level of 
direct fiscal costs, i.e. outlays from rescuing and 
rehabilitating the financial sector? Lower direct 
fiscal costs and higher recovery rates were 
achieved notably, taking into account of the 
severity of the crisis, when the bank resolution 
strategy was implement swiftly, was transparent 
and received broad political support, backed by 
strong public institutions and legal frameworks, 
consistent in terms of fair and uniform treatment of 
market participants, and included a clear exit 
strategy. Within this broad framework, 
econometric regressions show that some individual 
measures have been associated with higher 
recovery ratios. This includes recapitalisation and 
liquidity support, presumably reflecting that they 
were extended to viable institutions that recovered 
after the crisis. Moreover, the regression results 
show that the use of asset management companies 
was linked to significantly higher recovery rates 
only when the government effectiveness, i.e. the 
quality of public services, the legal and judicial 
system, was strong.  
Beyond the costs from rescuing banking systems, 
what has determined the overall fiscal costs of 
financial crises? To test whether one can take the 
statistical evidence that public debt ratios jumped 
far beyond the cost from crisis-related rescue 
measures at face value, an econometric analysis 
was carried out. It explicitly accounts also for 
other determinants of changes in public debt ratios, 
including the growth effect of the economy, 
evaluation effects and pre-crisis debt levels. The 
econometric evidence shows that when accounting 
for these factors, the largest part of the increase in 
public debt can indeed be attributed to the financial 
crises, with only a small fraction taking place 
irrespective of the crisis outburst. These 
implications from financial crises for the overall 
public finances were closely associated with the 
impact on the real economy.  
Econometric analysis also shows that output gaps 
declined substantially during crises and that debt 
ratios increased substantially due to additional 
crisis-related budgetary outlays ensuing from the 
operation of automatic stabilisers. To some extent, 
increased discretionary fiscal stimulus to counter 
the economic downturns also added to the 
budgetary deterioration. However, the country case 
studies indicate that this was quite limited, since 
countries' fiscal space was frequently constrained 
due to rapidly weakening confidence in the public 
sector. In the few cases of relatively large 
expansionary fiscal activism, such as Sweden and 
Japan, there are many indications that the success 
of policies was rather limited. In the case of 
Sweden this was largely rooted in Ricardian 
consumers and in the case of Japan in the 
protracted restructuring of the financial system and 
inefficiencies in the fiscal stimulus packages and 
their delivery.  
Against this background, what implications is the 
current financial crisis expected to have on EU 
Member States' public finances? There are 
considerable risks that rehabilitating the EU's 
banking system would require substantial public 
outlays. So far, public resources of about 44% of 
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GDP have been approved in support of the banking 
system of which, however, most are guarantees 
that may not be called upon. The amount of capital 
injections has been rather small so far (about 2½% 
of GDP) when compared with the IMF estimates 
for impaired assets of EUR 0.9 trillion. Assuming 
that capital injections were to be doubled (broadly 
in line with the upper-end estimates by the IMF for 
capital requirements in the EU) and applying to 
this and the total approved bank support measures 
conservative recovery rates in line with past crises 
would bring the estimates for net direct fiscal costs 
to 16½% of GDP across the EU, with much higher 
estimates for individual Member States. The 
estimated average bank rescue costs for the EU lie 
somewhat above those of past systemic crises.  
The global nature of the current crisis has added to 
the risk factors for higher direct fiscal costs and 
reduced the policy options. This includes first the 
much larger sizes of banking systems in the EU 
today, than in past crises and consequently the 
larger size of impaired assets and recapitalisation 
needs. Second, recovery values of today's impaired 
assets may be much lower than of those in the past 
due to several factors. The complicated nature and 
high leverage of many financial assets may make 
them much more difficult to manage, unwind and 
recover than during past crisis when assets 
included predominantly real estate and other loans. 
Moreover, a protracted slowdown of the economy, 
compared to many V-shaped output developments 
in earlier crisis supported by sharp real 
depreciations of the currencies, is a risk factor to 
achieving higher recovery values. Also, the lesser 
availability of foreign and more generally private 
investors, given the global nature of the crisis, may 
suppress recovery values. And finally, the 
protracted implementation of a comprehensive 
strategy across Europe for the resolution of the 
banking system, the use of regulatory forbearance 
may add to the fiscal bill. In contrast to these risks 
factors, today's crisis includes only few aspects 
that allow a more optimistic view on containing 
fiscal implications. This regards foremost the 
generally stronger legal and judicial systems and 
the greater transparency and uniform applications 
of national bank resolution policies than in the 
past, even though in the EU significant differences 
in institutional strengths remain. Those could 
impact recovery rates. 
And what are the lessons for the effectiveness of 
fiscal support of the economy beyond the 
resolution of the banking system? The likelihood 
for success of both policies is intertwined. 
Experience shows that without a resolute clean-up 
of bank balance sheets, the impact of fiscal policy 
can be muted as long as uncertainty and constraints 
to providing loans and stimulate private demand 
prevail. In practice, however, the adoption of the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) could 
not have awaited further progress in bank 
resolution as this may have risked negative 
feedback loops.  
Other lessons on the effectiveness of fiscal support 
in the EU pertain primarily to the coordination and 
design of policies, their differentiation across 
Member States and the return to consolidation 
paths. Automatic stabilisers in the EU are sizable 
and letting them play fully can provide a 
significant contribution to buffering the economic 
impact of the crisis despite sharp deteriorations of 
public finances in countries with sufficient fiscal 
space. Discretionary measures are particularly 
effective if coordinated (as done under the EERP 
and by the G-20) and targeted to credit and 
liquidity-constrained households, in particular 
when monetary policy is getting less effective. 
These arguments are supported by the Commission 
services model simulations which show higher 
multipliers for both cases. Moreover, the support 
of public investment has the strongest long-term 
effect since it can close not only short-term 
demand gaps but can also strengthen the long-term 
growth potential. However, limits in absorption 
capacities could render this instrument eventually 
less effective.  
However, the application of these broad principles 
for fiscal support of the economy needs to be 
differentiated across Member States, in particular 
with a view to maintaining long-term 
sustainability. Depending on the degree of fiscal 
space and macroeconomic imbalances, embarking 
on credible adjustment paths (exit strategies) with 
a view to ensuring debt sustainability and 
regaining market confidence may need to take 
precedence. This applies particularly to those 
countries exceptionally hard hit by the crisis and 
those with already high public debt levels where a 
slowdown in nominal GDP growth below nominal 
interest rates would ratchet up debt ratios. The 
expected sharp increases in public expenditure-to-
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GDP ratios, in line with past crises episodes, in 
addition to long-term pressures on many Member 
States' public finances from rising age-related 
spending will require tough choices in the 
consolidation/exit strategies.  
Strong fiscal frameworks, i.e. national fiscal rules 
and institutions, can provide the needed credibility 
and commitment to putting the fiscal houses back 
in order in such difficult circumstances.  
This is supported by past experiences which find 
that strong fiscal frameworks have been associated 
with successful fiscal consolidations. Exit 
strategies for EU Member States would thus 
benefit strongly from commitments to improving 
and/or adhering to existing fiscal rules and 
frameworks. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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The current financial crisis provides challenges of 
an unprecedented scale for public finances. 
Governments need to rehabilitate their banking 
systems and stabilise their economies while at the 
same time containing the strain on public finances 
with a view to keep them sustainable. So far policy 
makers in the EU and worldwide have deployed a 
wide range of instruments to restore the confidence 
in and rebuild the health of their financial systems. 
These comprise capital injections into banks, 
purchases of troubled assets as well as guarantees 
for depositors, some creditors and for newly issued 
debt instruments. Many of these measures have 
budgetary implications for public resources. 
However, it is too early to tally up the bill since the 
crisis is still unfolding and the ultimate costs will 
also greatly depend on future recovery values of 
public assets in banks and the degree to which 
public guarantees will be called upon. Both are 
intrinsically linked to the economic developments 
which are in turn the other channel that determines 
how greatly the crisis will impact public finances.  
For the current crisis, this chapter attempts to draw 
lessons as regards the role and risks for public 
finances by reviewing past financial crises.  
Section III.2 summarises concepts to measure and 
analyse the fiscal costs of systemic banking crises, 
including not only the direct costs linked to 
rehabilitating the banking system, but also the 
budgetary implications from output shortfalls and 
fiscal stimulus operations. Section III.3 provides 
empirical evidence on the costliness of past 
financial crises and its determinants by reviewing 
the literature and performing statistical and 
regression analysis. Section III.4 takes a closer 
look at five crisis episodes in OECD countries 
allowing to explore in more detail the crisis 
responses and fiscal implications. Based on the 
empirical evidence and country experiences broad 
policy lessons from handling past financial crises 
are being drawn in Section III.5. The last two 
sections attempt to transfer these findings to the 
current crisis while accounting at the same time for 
the global scale of today's crisis. Section III.6 
highlights similarities and differences to past crises 
as well as summarises and assesses crisis-related 
measures taken so far by EU Member States. 
Section III.7 concludes with some policy 
considerations for handling the crisis going 
forward. 
2. KEY CONCEPTS FOR ANALYSING FINANCIAL CRISES AND 
THEIR FISCAL COSTS 
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2.1. BANKING CRISES 
For the empirical analysis, what is considered to be 
a banking crisis needs to be defined and criteria 
established to measure their length. This study 
follows the definition by Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) for systemic banking crises (77) as episodes 
during which a country's corporate and financial 
sectors face great difficulties repaying contracts on 
time, experience a large number of defaults, non-
performing loans increase sharply and most of the 
banking system capital is exhausted. The situation 
may be accompanied by falling assets prices, 
sharply rising real interest rates and a reversal of 
capital inflows. Thus, financial crises in this 
definition do not include banking stress limited to 
individual banks. However, banking crises may 
have coincided with and have been aggravated by 
episodes of currency and sovereign debt crises. 
Since Laeven and Valencia only define the starting 
points of banking crises but not their length, this 
study uses for the latter the information provided 
in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b). (78) In case of 
missing or conflicting information in those 
sources, the end of the crisis was determined as the 
year when domestic credit growth bottomed out 
(see Annex Table III.1). (79) 
Financial crises occurred mostly in developing and 
emerging market economies, but the countries 
constituting today's EU-27 and the OECD were 
also hit. Laeven and Valencia (2008) report 122 
systemic banking crises episodes between 1970 
and 2007, excluding the on-going crises. Of these, 
22 crises occurred in today's EU-27 and the OECD 
and lasted on average 4½ years. For the ensuing 
(77) The terms "financial crisis" and "banking crisis" are used 
interchangeably here. 
(78) Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) in turn draw on a number of 
previous studies to determine the length of the crises, 
including, among others, Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
(79) In absence of additional indications, the end of the banking 
crisis episode corresponds to the year in which the private 
credit-to-GDP ratio recovers. Since it often happens that 
the credit-to-GDP ratio starts falling only some years after 
the crisis has started, a credit ratio increasing after the start 
of the crisis does not imply classifying the episode as 
lasting one year only, except if the credit-to-GDP ratio 
grows continuously for at least three years without 
interruption. 
empirical analysis of this study, the focus is on a 
subset of 49 crises episodes, including the ones in 
EU (13 episodes) and OECD countries 
(9 episodes) as well as those other crises episodes 
for which detailed information on crises 
containment and crises resolution policies is 
available in the Laeven and Valencia database 
(27 episodes) (see Annex Table III.1 for more 
details). These comprise a number of emerging 
market economies, including e.g. the Asian crises 
countries, Argentina, Brazil and Russia. Their 
economic structures differed strongly from the EU-
15, but bear many resemblances to the new 
Member States. Moreover, as regards the handling 
of their financial crises they serve as useful 
experiences for decisions to be made today. (80) 
The sample does not include the current financial 
crisis. 
2.2. FISCAL COSTS 
Fiscal implications of financial crises are 
frequently captured by the concept of direct fiscal 
costs that arise from rescue measures for the 
financial sector. These are in principle permanent 
changes in a government's net worth due to fiscal 
measures that are addressed directly at the 
financial system. They comprise mainly capital 
injections, purchases of troubled bank assets, pay-
outs to depositors, payments when guarantees are 
called and subsidies. Some of these outlays may be 
recovered over time, e.g. through the sales of 
acquired equity and other assets in banks, so that 
the direct net fiscal costs could, in the long run, be 
substantially lower than the gross costs. Overall, 
the concept of direct net fiscal costs reflects the 
permanent increase in public debt (or the 
cumulative increase of fiscal deficits) where 
budget transfers are used to support the financial 
sector (see Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003). (81) In 
(80) A final reason for choosing a relatively wide sample is to 
allow for meaningful econometric analysis. 
(81) While direct fiscal costs show up immediately in a higher 
debt stock, not all measures impact the budget balance. In 
particular, as laid out in detail in Part II.1, government 
transactions, such as the injection of capital into banks and 
the purchase of troubled assets are recorded "below the 
line". Thus, they impact the public financial accounts and 
the level of gross debt but not the budget balance since the 
government acquires assets that are assumed, in principle, 
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practice however, the literature may have 
overestimated net fiscal costs somewhat since the 
assumed cut-off rate for recovery values in some 
studies (e.g., five years after the crisis has started) 
may exclude in some cases periods of further 
recovery in fiscal costs. Moreover, gross outlays 
are typically based on budgeted figures rather than 
actual transactions (e.g., Laeven and Valencia, 
2008). (82) Ideally outlays and recovery values 
should be discounted to reflect their time pattern 
and opportunity costs. For practical reasons, 
including insufficient information about the cash 
flows, this is generally not done in the literature, 
to generate an income stream equal to the acquisition costs 
(purchase price plus financing costs). Should this income 
stream eventually turn out to be lower than the 
government's costs to acquire it, this would ceteris paribus 
be reflected in worse budgetary positions since the 
government's consumption based on the expected returns 
would be higher than the actual returns from its investment. 
(82) This explains for example the large differences in the 
estimates for fiscal costs in Japan. While in previous 
studies they were estimated at 24% of GDP (e.g., Caprio et 
al. 2005), they have been revised downwards to 14% by 
Laeven and Valencia (2008). Spilimbergo et al. (2008) put 
the gross fiscal costs at only 9% of GDP when drawing on 
information from the Japan Deposit Insurance Corporation 
indicating, with hindsight, how much of the available funds 
were actually used. 
however. Thus, direct fiscal costs are often 
calculated as the sum of the annual costs, 
measured in percent of annual GDP (see e.g., 
Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003), which is the 
concept followed in the rest of the paper. 
An often neglected, but potentially large part of 
fiscal costs, are indirect (Graph III.2.1) (83): Public 
finances may deteriorate substantially through the 
impact of financial crises on economic activity. On 
the one hand, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio is 
bound to rise from additional outlays on 
unemployment benefits during economic 
slowdowns and, more importantly, by the fact that 
the largest part of public spending (e.g., pensions 
and public wages) is pre-determined at least in the 
short run. On the other hand, revenues are closely 
linked with the economic activity and asset prices 
developments. Reflecting sharp drops in profits 
and asset prices as well as changes in the 
composition of economic activity, the nominal 
revenue shortfalls may go far beyond the "normal" 
(83) The distinction made here is similar to the one by 
Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002). Most other studies 
typically differentiate only between direct fiscal costs and 
economic (output) costs of financial crises. 
Graph III.2.1: Types of fiscal costs from financial crises 
Economic costs 
= foregone output grow th
Fiscal costs
Purchase of troubled assets
Recapitalisation
Pay-out to depositors
Shortfalls from guarantees
Other
- Asset sales, asset returns andother repayments
Direct net costs
Revenue effect from 
elasticity and 
composition changes
Expenditure effect 
from drop in output 
(automatic stablisers) 
Fiscal stimulus effect (from 
discretionary revenue and 
expenditure measures)
Direct gross costs
= measures addressed tow ard the
financial sector
Indirect costs 1/
= automatic stabilisers and measures 
addressed tow ard the non-financial sector
Liquidity support
Market efffects (e.g., via 
interest and exchange 
rates)
Notes: 1/ Measured in percent of GDP. 
Source: Commission services. 
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automatic stabiliser effect cycle and thus lead to a 
drop in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. In addition, 
governments may take discretionary fiscal 
stimulus measures, thereby adding to fiscal costs 
even though some of the costs can be recovered 
through the stimulus effect on the economy.  
A final channel that may add to indirect fiscal 
costs implications are impacts from market 
reactions, such as higher interest rate premiums, 
that need to be paid because of a deteriorated fiscal 
position, or exchange rate effects. The sum of all 
direct and indirect costs of banking crises is 
reflected in changes in the level of debt following 
the crisis. 
3. FISCAL COSTS OF FINANCIAL CRISES: THE EVIDENCE 
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In this study, several approaches to capturing and 
understanding fiscal costs from financial crises are 
pursued. The first approach looks at direct fiscal 
costs from bank rescue operations and their 
determinants. The second approach assesses 
developments in general and primary balances 
during the crisis, thereby including economic 
developments. The third and final approach is the 
most comprehensive and assesses the development 
of public debt-to-GDP ratios. In addition to the 
development of government balances, public debt 
also includes below the line operations and 
valuation effects, including from exchange rate 
developments. 
3.1. DIRECT FISCAL COSTS AND THEIR 
DETERMINANTS 
3.1.1. The size of direct fiscal costs: some 
statistical evidence 
Direct fiscal costs have been substantial in many 
systemic financial crises. Measures aimed at 
rehabilitating their banking systems have cost 
governments on average 13% of GDP when 
accounting for recovery values (Table III.3.1). 
However, some countries paid a multiple of this 
bill (Graph III.3.1). At about 11% of GDP, on 
average, systemic banking crises have been only 
slightly less expensive in today's EU and OECD 
countries than in other parts of the world (Annex 
Table III.1). The Asian financial crisis and some 
prominent crisis episodes in emerging markets 
(such as Argentina, Mexico and Turkey) stand out 
for a "fiscal price tag" of more than double this.  
Across all crises episodes, only little of the initial 
gross outlays were recovered (18%). Notable 
exceptions across EU and OECD countries are 
Norway and Sweden. 
While measures adopted to contain and rehabilitate 
the banking sectors have differed across countries, 
some measures have been more common than 
others (Table III.3.2 and Annex Table III.2). In the 
crisis containment phase about one third of 
countries issued blanket guarantees on deposits 
(and in most cases other liabilities) and over three 
quarters provided liquidity support. (84) Hardly any 
country resorted to freezing deposits or 
establishing bank holidays to buy extra time. In the 
crises resolution phase many countries applied 
regulatory forbearance (85) (68%) to provide banks 
some time to recover and most intervened on a 
large scale to ultimately to resolve the crises 
(90%). Such interventions included in most cases 
recapitalisations (71%), bank closures (71%), 
mergers (60%) and nationalisations (58%). These 
measures, as well as the use of bank restructuring 
agencies and asset management companies were 
more common across crises episodes in the EU and 
non EU-OECD countries than in the rest of the 
world. In a third of all countries did depositors 
have to bear losses; among OECD and EU 
countries this only included the crisis episodes in 
the Baltic countries in the 1990s. Overall, while 
many countries relied on a combination of policies 
these policy mixes have been rather diverse. 
Simple correlation coefficients across the measures 
are relatively low (Annex Table III.3) with the use 
of bank restructuring agencies, regulatory 
forbearance, nationalisations and mergers being 
the most common combination. 
(84) Whether liquidity support was provided was derived by 
Laeven and Valencia from the monetary authorities' 
balance sheet. If the ratio of claims by monetary authorities 
on deposit money banks (IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) line 12E) to total deposits was at least 5% 
and had at least doubled with respect to the previous year 
during the period t to t+3, than it was considered as 
liquidity support. 
(85) Regulatory forbearance includes the suspension or less than 
full application of prudential regulations (e.g. for loan 
classification or loan loss provisioning) and, for example, 
the permission for banks to continue operations despite 
being technically insolvent (see Laeven and Valencia, 
2008). 
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Using the data on net fiscal costs, a few policy
measures seem to emerge as having been 
associated with higher costs. Table III.3.2 
compares the simple averages of net fiscal costs
when specific crises measures where used and 
when not. One needs to caution, however, about
over-interpreting such bilateral correlations, since 
they do not account for the severity of the crisis 
and other factors. Keeping this in mind, the data
seem to indicate that all policy responses implied 
sizeable positive net fiscal costs that were higher 
than when the measures were not used (last two 
rows of the table). Particularly blanket guarantees
and liquidity support in the crisis containment
phase seems to have added to the government bill 
(net direct fiscal costs averaged 17.4% and 13.5% 
of GDP when both policies were used compared to
9.6% and 7.4% of GDP when they were not used). 
Similarly, resorting to bank resolution through 
closures, nationalisations, mergers or sales to
foreigner was associated with higher net direct
fiscal costs than across crises episodes where such
measures were not, or did not have, to be taken. 
For EU and OECD countries, in contrast to 
episodes in the rest of the world, the data seem to
indicate also a particular costliness of using a 
deposit insurance system. Moreover, asset 
management companies generally do not appear to
have operated very efficiently. (86) At first sight,
(86) Laeven and Valencia (2008) also point out the potential 
inefficiencies in the use of bank restructuring agencies and 
this seems particularly to have been a problem in
the EU and OECD countries (with the remarkable
exception of Sweden; see Section III.4.3 for more
details). However, the data need to be interpreted 
with caution since only Norway and Latvia did not
resort to the use of AMCs (thus, the average net 
fiscal costs for EU and OECD countries without 
AMCs in Table III.3.2 is based only on those two 
observations). Causes for these inefficiencies are
explored later in this study and are found to relate, 
in addition to the depth of the crisis, to the 
institutional strength of governments. 
The argument that bigger bank rescue operations
have helped to contain the impact on the real
economy is not supported empirically.
Econometric studies by Honohan and Klingebiel
(2003) and Claessens et al. (2005) cannot find a
trade-off between direct fiscal costs from resolving 
the banking system and output losses). (87) In fact, 
higher fiscal outlays may have rather contributed 
to the delay of economic recovery (a finding also
supported by Boyd et al. 2005). This is also
reflected in a simple bi-variate plot between both 
variables (Graph III.3.2).
asset management companies. This is explored in more
detail in Klingebiel (2000). 
(87) Data for output losses are from Laeven and Valencia 
(2008). See Box III.3.1 and Annex III.1 for details on 
measuring output costs. 
Table III.3.1: Direct fiscal costs of banking crises 1/ 
Crisis length
(years)
Total gross
fiscal cost 2/
(% of GDP)
Total net 
fiscal cost 3/
(% of GDP)
Recovery
ratio
(% of gross 
fiscal cost)
Gross 
recapitalisation 
(% of GDP)
Net
recapitalisation 
4/
(% of GDP)
Recovery ratio 
from capital
injections 
(% of capital
injections)
Output loss 
(level 
estimate) 5/
(% of trend 
GDP)
EU-27 6/ 4.2 6.6 5.5 23.9 2.8 2.4 12.1 18.4
EU-15 7/ 4.0 7.3 5.6 53.9 5.2 4.2 19.7 44.9
OECD 3.9 11.4 11.8 29.7 8.5 7.9 20.1 20.2
OECD and EU 4.2 9.7 9.8 23.5 6.7 6.0 17.4 17.3
Other than EU and OECD 4.3 18.2 14.5 16.8 8.4 6.0 19.7 20.2
Big 5 industrial country-crises 8/ 4.2 7.7 6.4 46.6 4.9 3.9 29.3 26.8
Big 8 emerging market-crises 9/ 5.8 27.8 23.4 16.7 16.2 15.7 13.2 39.8
TOTAL 4.3 14.8 13.0 17.8 7.8 6.0 20.0 19.3
Notes: 1/ Based on 49 crises episodes. Country data are shown in Annex Table III.1.
2/ Gross fiscal costs are government outlays during the crisis. 
3/ Gross fiscal costs minus recovery values during period t to t+5, where t is the first year of the crisis. Fewer data are available for net than for gross 
fiscal costs; thus, country group averages between gross and net are not fully comparable. 
4/ Gross capital injections minus recovery during period t to t+5, where t is the first year of the crisis.
5/ Calculated as the cumulative deviation (from t to t+3) of real GDP level from trend real GDP level before the crisis. The level estimates shown here
are higher. 
6/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden.
7/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden, but no fiscal costs are available for Spain.
8/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and Spain.
9/ Includes crisis episodes in Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand and Turkey (2000). 
Source:  Calculations based on the database from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
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It indicates that instead of a trade-off that there is 
rather a weak positive correlation between both
variables. In contrast to earlier econometric 
studies, the graph uses net fiscal costs, i.e. it 
accounts for the recovery values that a swifter 
economic turnaround may have supported. Again,
these findings need to be treated with caution as
the direction of causality is not clear. The severity 
of the economic crisis, as reflected in the output 
losses, may have also impacted on the degree to 
which governments had to intervene in the banking
sector. 
Graph III.3.2: Net fiscal costs and output costs of financial crises 
(1970-2007) 
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Notes: Net fiscal costs are government outlays during the crisis minus
recovery values during period t to t+5, where t is the first year of the 
crisis. Gross fiscal costs are used for Spain, Hungary, Israel, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and Turkey (1982).  For the United States, net fiscal
costs are from Spilimbergo et al. (2008).  Output losses are calculated as
the cumulative deviation (from t to t+3) of real GDP level from average 
trend real GDP before the crisis. 
Source: Data from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
Graph III.3.1: Gross and net fiscal costs from systemic banking crises (1970-2007) 1/
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No data on recovery values are available for Spain, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey (1982). For the US net fiscal costs are 
from Spilimbergo et al. (2008).
2/ For Japan, revised Laeeven and Valencia data on gross fiscal costs are 14% of GDP while they were previously estimated at 24% of GDP (e.g., 
Caprio et al. 2005). Spilimbergo et al. (2008) put the gross costs at only 9.1% of GDP of which 4.7% of GDP were recovered until 2008 (in contrast to
the shorter recovery period assumed (until 2002) in the Laeven and Valencia database).
Source: Data from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
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3.1.2. The determinants of direct fiscal costs:
some econometric evidence 
The broad picture derived from the purely
descriptive analysis is confirmed by earlier 
econometric studies on what has determined the 
level of direct fiscal costs. In their seminal papers,
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) and Claessens,
Klingebiel and Laeven (2005) regress gross direct
fiscal costs on a set of crises resolution and other 
explanatory variables, including variables to
capture the depth of the crises (real interest rates 
and changes in equity prices). (88) Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003) conclude, based on their
estimates for 40 banking crises episodes, that 
"unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended
liquidity support, repeated recapitalisation, debtor 
bail-outs and regulatory forbearance all tend to add 
significantly and sizeably to costs." (89) Claessens, 
(88) The estimations are based on the database on banking
crises in the paper from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and
later updated by Caprio et al. (2005).
(89) Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) distinguish between fewer 
crises measures than the ones listed in Table III.3.2. They 
focus on blanket guarantees, extensive liquidity support,
repeated recapitalisation, public debt relief for borrowers
and two types of forbearance ((i) if insolvent banks were
Klingebiel and Laeven (2005) confirm that "the
size of fiscal costs is related to the extent to which
countries adopt accommodative policies, in
particular explicit government guarantees on
financial institutions' liabilities and forbearance". 
Furthermore, they find that the development level
or quality of institutions was associated with lower 
fiscal outlays. (90)  
However, a few problems are inherent to these
studies. First, they use gross rather than net direct
fiscal outlays as cost measures since those data
were available over a wider set of countries.
Second, the crises episodes do not focus entirely 
on systemic crises but also include some individual
bank failures (e.g., in Australia, 1989-92 and
France 1994-95). 
Third, policy measures are included as 0-1 
variables, thus they do not allow differentiating the 
specific characteristics and the timing of each 
policy measures by country. 
permitted to continue operating and (ii) if other prudential
regulations were suspended or not fully applied). 
(90) They measure the development of institutions through three 
variables (i) a quality of institutions index (from Kaufmann 
et al., 1999), (ii) a corruption measure (from La Porta et al., 
1998) and a judicial efficiency index (from La Porta et al.,
1998). 
Table III.3.2: Crisis measures and direct fiscal costs 1/ 
Deposit
freeze
Bank 
holiday
Blanket
guaran-tee 
2/
Liquidity
support 3/
For-
bearance 
4/
Overall
large-scale 
govt. inter-
vention
Bank 
closures
Nationa-
lisations Mergers
Sales to
forei-gners
Bank
restruc-
turing 
agency
Asset
manage-
ment 
company
Recapital-
isation
Deposit
insur-ance
Losses 
imposed 
on deposi-
tors
Frequency of measures (% of crises episode in which the policy measure was used)
EU and OECD 5/ 0.0 0.0 50.0 66.7 66.7 100.0 66.7 83.3 72.7 66.7 70.0 75.0 83.3 66.7 25.0
Other countries 19.2 15.4 19.2 80.8 69.2 84.6 73.1 46.2 53.8 50.0 44.0 53.8 65.4 42.3 38.5
Total 13.2 10.5 28.9 76.3 68.4 89.5 71.1 57.9 59.5 54.5 51.4 60.5 71.1 50.0 34.2
Net direct fiscal costs (% of GDP) 5/
EU and OECD countries
 With measure na na 16.2 12.4 10.7 10.4 10.2 11.6 13.1 17.6 10.4 11.5 11.9 14.6 2.5
 Without measure 10.4 10.4 4.6 6.4 9.9 na 8.4 4.4 6.6 2.5 11.8 1.8 2.9 1.9 12.4
Other countries
 With measure 8.5 10.7 21.5 13.9 13.9 14.5 14.8 17.0 15.3 18.5 12.4 14.2 12.5 12.3 13.0
 Without measure 14.1 13.5 11.0 7.6 11.1 5.3 7.8 9.7 9.9 6.9 12.1 10.5 14.0 13.6 13.1
Total
 With measure 8.5 10.7 17.4 13.5 12.9 13.0 13.4 13.9 14.5 18.2 11.6 13.5 12.3 13.3 11.2
 Without measure 12.8 12.4 9.6 7.1 10.7 5.3 8.8 9.0 9.3 5.6 12.6 10.3 12.0 11.2 13.1
Resolution phase
Large-scale government intervention
Containment phase
Notes: 1/ Includes only measures to restore the confidence and health of the banking sector. Fiscal stimulus measures are not considered here. Based 
on 49 crises episodes.
2/ Whether liquidity support was provided was derived by Laeven and Valencia from the monetary authorities' balance sheet. If the ratio of claims by
monetary authorities on deposit money banks to total deposits was at least 5% and had at least doubled with respect to the previous year during the 
period t to t+3, than it was considered as liquidity support. 
3/ Regulatory forbearance includes the suspension or less than full application of prudential regulations (e.g. for loan classification or loan loss 
provisioning) and, e.g. the permission for banks to continue operations despite being technically insolvent (see Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
4/ Indicates whether or not there was large-scale government intervention in banks, such as nationalisations, closures, mergers, sales and 
recapitalisations of large banks during the years t to t+3. 
5/ For several new Member States no net fiscal costs are available. 
Source: Calculations based on data by Laeven and Valencia (2008).
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Fourth, the regression estimates only partly 
account for the severity of the crises which may 
have impacted the policy choice and fiscal costs. 
And finally and most importantly, one needs to be 
cautious in drawing conclusions on the efficiency 
and usefulness of crises resolution measures 
without knowing the counterfactual, i.e. what 
would have happened if those measures had not 
been employed.  
Thus, an alternative approach to identify factors 
that impact the costs of bank rescue measures is to 
analyse the determinants of recovery rates. 
Recovery rates are defined here as the amount 
recovered between the start of the crisis and t+5 in 
percent of gross fiscal outlays. Data are again from 
the Laeven and Valencia (2008) database. In 
regression estimates using these recovery rates as 
dependent variable the IMF (2008a) finds four 
factors of significance. First, advanced economies 
(measured by per capita GDP) had higher recovery 
rates while, second, transition economies 
(measured by a dummy) had lower rates. Third, 
when countries experienced a simultaneous 
banking and exchange rate crisis, the recovery 
values were significantly lower. This may largely 
reflects the inability of foreign currency-debtors 
(often without foreign-currency income) to repay 
their debt. And fourth, fiscal space has mattered 
for recovery rates. Countries with a stronger fiscal 
balance at the outset of the crisis, which the 
authors interpret as a proxy for the quality of 
public management, had higher recovery rates. 
Gross fiscal costs, one measure for the depth of the 
crisis, and possibly the amount of impaired assets 
that the public sector had to deal with, were not 
significantly linked to recovery rates.  
In the regression analysis on the determinants of 
recovery rates undertaken in this study, the 
strength of institutions and the use of certain bank 
resolution policies are found to also play an 
important role. Estimations results, using the 
recovery rates reported by Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) for 32 crises episodes (see Annex 
Table III.3.1) are reported in Table III.3.3. Given 
the limited number of observations the significance 
of each potential determinant is first investigated 
separately. The main findings are: 
The result displayed in Column (1) suggests that 
the fiscal recovery rate is positively and 
significantly correlated with the level of GDP per 
capita. This result, in line with the IMF findings, 
Box III.3.1: How to measures output costs?
Alternative methods to estimate output losses have been used in the literature. One widespread method 
calculates output losses as the difference between trend growth before the crisis and actual GDP until a few 
years after the crisis or until the time when annual output growth returned to its trend. An alternative method 
sums up the deviations in the levels, rather than growth rates, of actual GDP from its trend during the crisis 
and put them in relation to the initial GDP level (e.g. Hoggarth et al., 2001, Boyd et al., 2005 and Laeven 
and Valencia, 2008). The authors using this method argue that the growth rate method underestimates the 
output losses because it does not recognise the reduction in the output level in the previous years (see for 
more details on the two approaches Annex III.1). 
The latest banking crisis database from Laeven and Valencia (2008) uses the level method, but the approach 
is prone to two sources of overestimation. First, it assumes that output losses related to financial crises are 
cumulative. Put differently, this approach assumes that the output loss during the crisis is never fully 
recovered and that, after the crisis, (i.e.  when output growth resumes) output starts growing from lower 
levels, ignoring potential post-crisis catching-up processes. One important reason for the existence of a post-
crisis catching-up could be that during severe crises old capital may be scrapped and replaced by new capital 
vintages which may echoed over long-run growth paths (see e.g. Boucekkine et al., 1997). A second source 
for overestimating the output loss is the use of a pre-crisis trend used (by Laeven and Valencia, 2008). This 
approach does not capture the potential structural adjustments triggered by the crisis.  
An alternative method is therefore to capture output losses through regression analysis. This approach is 
explained and applied in Box III.3.2. 
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could in fact reflect the fact that richer countries 
also have stronger institutions and governance to
tackle the challenges raised by financial crises.  
Column (2) uses in addition as explanatory 
variable a measure of institutional quality. The 
index from the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators measures government 
effectiveness with a higher value indicating higher 
effectiveness. (91) The coefficient estimated for
this indicator is positive and significant while the 
level of GDP per capita does not appear to matter 
anymore, reflecting the earlier interpretation that 
GDP per capita can be viewed here as a proxy for
the quality of institutions here. Overall, the quality 
of the institutional setting tends to favour policy 
resolution strategies yielding higher recovery rates. 
As an indicator of fiscal space at the outset of the
crisis or a proxy for the quality of managing public 
resources, the average budget balance over the 
three pre-crises years in Column (3) is used. Like
the first two variables it is positively linked to 
recovery rates.
Columns (4) and (5) explore whether the use of
asset management companies have impacted
(91) To check the robustness of the findings, alternatively the
Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International
is used, which yielded results similar to those reported 
here. 
recovery rates. Column (4) includes a dummy 
variable taking a value equal to one when a
country has set up asset management companies to
deal with impaired assets and zero otherwise. 
Column (5) also attempts to account for the 
institutional setting that may have influenced the 
functioning of asset management companies. (92) It
therefore includes a dummy variable that was
created by splitting countries in two groups
depending on whether their government
effectiveness indicator was higher or lower than
the sample average. This dummy variable was then 
interacted with the variable indicating whether a 
country had set up an asset management company. 
Estimation results show that the use of asset
management companies per se has, but not
significantly, increased recovery rates. However,
when they operated in a strong institutional
environment they were associated with
significantly higher recovery rates.
Whether the use of other bank resolutions policies 
has impacted recovery rates is also tested. Only 
recapitalisations and liquidity support are found to
be associated with greater shares in recovering
initial fiscal outlays (Columns (6) and (7)). Other 
measures, with data taken from the Laeven and 
(92) See Section 4 for a brief review on country experiences
with asset management companies, which indicates that
strong legal and judicial systems are pre-conditions for
their successful operation. 
Table III.3.3: The determinants of the fiscal recovery rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log (GDP per capita in PPP terms) 0.106** 0.01
(0.045) (0.050)
Government effectiveness 0.169*** 0.146**
(0.052) (0.054)
Asset management company 0.051 -0.041
(0.088) (0.094)
Budgetary balance (average  t-3 to t-1; % of GDP) 2.374** 0.561
(1.092) (1.114)
Recapitalisation 0.185* 0.030
(0.094) (0.090)
Liquidity support 0.217** 0.192**
(0.887) (0.078)
Government effectiveness (X) asset management 0.224**
(0.106)
Constant -0.733* 0.899 0.23*** 0.148** 0.148** 0.040 0.022 -0.001
(0.386) (0.425) (0.045) (0.069) (0.065) (0.081) (0.075) (0.092)
Number of observations 38 38 34 36 36 36 36 32
R- uared 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.47
Notes: 1/ Dependent variable is the recovery rate defined as =(gross fiscal cost - net fiscal cost) / gross fiscal cost, with the gross and net fiscal costs 
taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
2/ Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Commission services.
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Valencia database, such as blanket guarantees,
regulatory forbearance, mergers and bank closures, 
were not significant in the regression. Even though 
these results need to be interpreted with caution, it 
is not surprising to find that the injection of public
capital and liquidity are linked to higher recovery 
rates. Both are policy tools with the most direct 
potential return for the public and could reflect the 
choice to support of viable financial
institutions. (93)
In Column (8) the significant variables from
Columns (1) to (7) are considered together in order 
to check the robustness of the results. Results 
should be considered with caution, however, given
the low number of observations and potential 
multi-collinearity between some of the explanatory 
variables. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
government effectiveness indicator stands out as 
one of the most important factors favouring higher
fiscal recovery rates. This result suggests that the
fiscal implications of bank rescue operations have
differed across countries depending on the quality 
of the institutional settings. Among the various
financial crisis policy action variables, the use of
liquidity support appears to be the most robust in
light of controlling for other potential
determinants.
3.2. COMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATES OF FISCAL 
COSTS 
More comprehensive approaches for assessing the
impact of banking crises on public finances look at
the evolution of budget balances and debt. Direct
fiscal costs exclude the additional impact of
financial crises on public finance that is not
directly linked to crisis containment and resolution
measures. Tracking the budget balance after the
inception of crises, however, permits to obtain a 
more comprehensive measure of public finance
developments. But below-the-line operations are 
excluded in the budget balance. Since such
operations can be substantial during crises, notably
due to additional measures carried out by the 
government to support the banking sector (below-
(93) Whether the occurrence of a currency crisis and the level of
the output loss (as an indicator for the depth of the crisis) 
have impacted the recovery rate was also explored, but
neither of these variables displayed significant coefficients. 
the-line direct fiscal costs), the development in the
debt-to-GDP ratio is the most comprehensive 
measure of the fiscal implications of the crisis. It 
also includes below-the-line operations among in
the stock-flow adjustment. 
3.2.1. Changes in public balance and debt-
ratios: statistical evidence 
On average, crises countries ran annual budget
deficits of about 4% of GDP for the length of the 
crisis (4-5 years) (Table III.3.4). Except for those
countries where large and unsustainable fiscal 
positions contributed to the outbreak of the crisis
(e.g., Russia), this meant a significant deterioration
of about 2% of GDP per year compared to pre-
crises times. During the big industrial crises
episodes the slumps in budgetary positions were
sharpest at 5 percentage points on average with the 
largest deteriorations in Finland and Sweden. The
latter figures indicate that severe banking crises
have had significant fiscal implications even when
the net direct bail-out costs of the banking system
were limited. In most cases, fiscal positions started
to improve somewhat after the third crisis year, 
partly due to the recovery of output and partly due 
to fiscal consolidation efforts, but balances
remained firmly negative and higher than pre-
crises ratios (Graph III.3.3). Thus, crises 
experiences show that it may take quite long to
overcome the shock to general fiscal positions. 
Table III.3.4: General government balances during banking crises 
(% of GDP) 1/ 
Average 
balance 
(t-3 to t-1)
Balance 
in t-1
Average 
balance 
(t to t+2)
Average 
balance 
(t to end of
crisis)
EU-27 2/ -0.8 -1.2 -3.2 -3.1
EU-15 3/ 2.8 2.9 -4.2 -4.6
OECD -1.4 -2.5 -4.9 -5.0
OECD and EU -1.9 -2.3 -4.0 -4.1
Other than EU and OECD -1.9 -2.2 -3.7 -3.9
Big 5 industrial country-crises 4/ 1.2 1.2 -3.8 -4.3
Big 8 emerging market-crises 5/ -1.0 -1.6 -3.8 -3.6
TOTAL -1.9 -2.3 -3.9 -4.0
General government balance 
(% of GDP)
Before crisis During crisis
Notes: 1/ Based on 49 crises episodes as shown in Annex Table III.1. 
Unweighted averages.  t = start of crisis.
2/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. For new Member States data 
from 1991.
3/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden.
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and 
Spain. 
5/ Includes crisis episodes in Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand and Turkey (2000). 
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and
AMECO. 
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Graph III.3.3: General government balances during banking crises 
(% of GDP) 1/ 
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EU-27 2/
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Big 5 industrial country-crises 4/
Big 8 emerging market-crises 5/
TOTAL
Notes: 1/ Based on 49 crises episodes as shown in Annex Table III.1. 
Unweighted averages.  t = start of crisis.
2/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. For new Member States data 
from 1991.
3/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden.
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and 
Spain. 
5/ Includes crisis episodes in Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand and Turkey (2000). 
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and
AMECO. 
Most of the deterioration in the general balances 
came through the expenditure side. While across 
all crises episodes the increase in the expenditure-
to-GDP ratio was only 1.1% of GDP (94) 
(Table III.3.5), it was much higher for the big five 
industrial countries crises episodes (Finland, 
Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden) averaging
more than 6% of GDP.
(94) An alternative method is to compare the average
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the three pre-crisis years and 
the average post crisis ratio (for three years or the full crisis 
duration). The increase is then found to be higher at 2¾-3% 
of GDP reflecting the jump in ratios in t or t+1 and the only 
gradual reduction over time. 
This reflects on the one hand the larger
government sectors and more extensive social 
security systems in those countries ("the numerator 
effect"), but on the other hand also the sharp drop 
in output ("the denominator effect"). Revenue 
ratios were on average less affected by the crises 
(Table III.3.5) even though the Nordic and Asian
crisis countries experienced significant
deteriorations due to sharp drops in tax elasticities
(Graph III.3.4; see also Box I.1.3 in Part I.1). (95) 
For many emerging market countries much of the
expenditure deterioration was driven by higher
interest payments. Thus, despite large general
budget deficits, on average countries in the sample
used here ran small primary surpluses during the
crises episodes (Graph III.3.5 and Table III.3.6). 
This was mostly the case for emerging market 
economies, which either faced fiscal constraints or 
pursued a relatively tight fiscal stance to regain
confidence in the currency and economy. For 
example, Argentina's interest expenses jumped 
from less then 3% of GDP on average before the
2000 crisis to more than 8% of GDP after the 
crisis; other prominent examples are Mexico and
Turkey. (96) In contrast, in industrial countries and
EU transition economies the primary balances not
only worsened by 2% of GDP during the crisis, but 
also turned into a small deficit (Graph III.3.6). 
(95) For more country-specific details, see the case studies in 
Section III.4. 
(96) On the other hand, some of the Asian crises countries (e.g.,
Malaysia and Korea) did not experience sharp increases in
interest payments given their relatively tight fiscal policies 
and low levels of debt. Detailed data on Korea, the
Philippines and Thailand are however not available. Thus,
comparing the data on the general budget balances for the 
"Big-8 emerging market crises" (Table III.3.4) with the 
primary budget balance for the same country group
(Table III.3.6) is difficult. 
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Identifying how much of the change in the primary 
balance was driven by discretionary measures and 
how much by economic developments is difficult. 
The use of cyclically-adjusted primary balances 
can be problematic in times of crisis as neither tax
elasticities can assumed to be constant nor the 
output gaps easily determined. Subject to these 
caveats Table III.3.7 shows a breakdown of the
changes in the primary balances into the "normal"
automatic stabilisers effects and other effects. The 
cyclical component (automatic stabiliser effect) 
was calculated as the product of the average
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the three pre-crisis 
years (serving as a proxy for the budget sensitivity
to output changes) and the output gap. (97) The
(97) The output gap was calculated as the deviation of real GDP
from its trend using a Hodrick-Prescott filter for 1970-2007 
(and from 1995 for transition economies) (see Box III.3.2
for details). Using a long sample, also including post crisis 
years, is preferable to calculating a pre-crisis trend since
the latter may be biased due to a pre-crisis overheating 
period and a later permanent downward adjustment in 
Table III.3.5: Implications of crises for general government expenditure and revenue ratios (% of GDP) 1/
t-1 End of crisis
Change
(t-1 to end of
crisis)
t-1 End of crisis
Change
(t-1 to end of 
crisis)
A B C=B-A D E F=E-
EU-27 2/ 42.7 43.8 1.1 41.0 40.1 -0.9
EU-15 3/ 42.4 51.7 9.4 45.4 45.9 0.6
OECD 38.7 41.0 2.3 36.4 35.8 -0.6
OECD and EU 36.4 38.3 1.9 33.8 34.1 0.3
Other than EU and OECD 27.3 27.9 0.6 25.2 25.6 0.4
Big 5 industrial country-crises 4/ 42.2 48.5 6.3 43.5 43.1 -0.3
Big 8 emerging market-crises 5/ 23.2 25.9 2.7 21.3 22.6 1.4
TOTAL 32.5 33.5 1.1 30.1 30.4 0.3
Expenditure Revenue
General government expenditure 
and revenue
(% of GDP)
D
Notes: 1/ Based on 49 crises episodes as shown in Annex Table III.1. Unweighted averages.  t = start of crisis. 
2/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden. For new Member States data from 1991.
3/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden.
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and Spain.
5/ Includes crisis episodes in Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand and Turkey (2000). 
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and AMECO. 
Graph III.3.4: Change in general government expenditure and revenue during banking crises (% of GDP) 1/ 
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Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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calculation seems to indicate that the biggest share
in the deterioration of the primary balance in
emerging markets resulted from output effects and
stimulus measures were rather contained. For EU
and OECD countries the calculations seem to
indicate the opposite. However, one should caution 
about attributing the large share in "other factors" 
to discretionary measures. They also include direct 
crisis implications through falls in tax elasticities
and changes in the composition of tax bases. Most
importantly, expenditure plans consistent with pre-
crisis GDP growth rates would result in a 
deterioration of the cyclically-adjusted primary
balances, as the protracted slowdown associated 
with the crisis is reflected in a downward revision
of potential output. In some countries, also 
unemployment-related spending surged much
more than under a "standard" average budget
elasticity.  
Table III.3.6: Primary general government balances during 
banking crises (% of GDP) 1/ 
Average 
balance 
(t-3 to t-1)
Average 
balance
(t-1)
Average 
balance
(t to t+2)
Average 
balance 
(t to end of
crisis)
EU-27 2/ 1.9 2.7 -0.7 -0.9
EU-15 3/ 5.1 5.0 -1.4 -1.6
OECD 2.7 2.5 -0.1 -0.4
OECD and EU 2.0 2.1 0.2 -0.2
Other than EU and OECD 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5
Big 5 industrial country-crises 4/ 4.0 3.9 -0.8 -1.2
Big 8 emerging market-crises 5/ 2.7 3.4 2.8 2.8
TOTAL 6/ 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.2
Primary general government
balance
(% of GDP)
Before crisis During crisis
Table III.3.6: Average primary gen. budget balance before and after crisis
Notes: 1/ Based on 49 crises episodes as shown in Annex Table III.1. 
Unweighted averages.  t = start of crisis.
2/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. For new Member States data 
from 1991.
3/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden.
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and 
Spain. 
5/ Includes crisis episodes in Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand and Turkey (2000). 
6/ Fewer data are available than for general govt. balances causing some
deviations.
Sources: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics 
and AMECO. 
potential output. When calculating Table III.3.7 using the 
budget elasticities for OECD countries from Girouard and 
André (2005), the results are similar to the ones shown 
here. 
The most comprehensive indicator for measuring 
the impact of financial crises on public finances 
are changes in gross public debt-to-GDP ratios.
Across all crises episodes for which data are 
available, the increase was 18% of GDP from the
year before the crisis to the end of the crisis. 
Country differences were significant, ranging from 
an increase of more than 40% of GDP in Finland, 
Indonesia and Japan to small drops in debt ratios in
a few countries (Latvia and Ecuador). On average,
the increases in debt ratios were remarkably 
similar for industrial and emerging market 
countries. Moreover, none of the country groups 
managed to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio down to
its pre-crisis level even eight years after the 
financial sector ran into systemic problems
indicating that financial crises typically have long-
lasting fiscal implications (Graph III.3.7). 
Graph III.3.5: Selected crises episodes: Developments in primary 
general government balances (% of GDP) 1/ 
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Big 8 emerging market-crises 5/
TOTAL 6/
Notes: 1/ Based on 49 crises episodes as shown in Annex Table III.1. 
Unweighted averages.  t = start of crisis.
2/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. For new Member States data 
from 1991.
3/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden.
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and 
Spain. 
5/ Includes crisis episodes in Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand and Turkey (2000). 
6/ Fewer data are available than for general govt. balances causing some
deviations.
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and
AMECO.  
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Graph III.3.6: Selected crises episodes: Primary general 
government balances during crisis (% of GDP) /1
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Notes: 1/ Average primary balance during crisis. 
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and
AMECO 
Graph III.3.7: Gross public debt in crises episodes (% of GDP) 1/ 
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Notes: 1/ Unweighted country averages. t = start of the crisis.  
2/ Includes crisis episodes in Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. For new
Member States data only from 1991.
3/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden.
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and 
Spain. 
5/ In principle includes Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico
(1994), Turkey (2000), Philippines and Thailand. But data for the last
three are missing. 
6/ Excludes Nicaragua which in 2003 (t+4) received a public debt relief.
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and
AMECO. 
Table III.3.7: Breakdown of changes in primary budgetary balance /1 
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
EU-27 4/ -0.1 -0.4 0.2 -1.5 -1.5 -1.6 -1.7 -1.9 -1.4
EU-15 5/ -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -2.0 -4.0 -0.3 -3.0 -4.6 -0.8
OECD 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 -1.9 0.0 -0.5 -1.7 -0.9 -0.9
OECD and EU 0.2 -0.6 0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -0.5 -1.1 -0.8 -0.4
Other than EU and OECD -0.6 -0.7 0.6 -0.4 1.3 1.2 -1.0 0.6 1.8
Big 5 industrial country-crises 6/ -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1.7 -2.9 -0.3 -2.1 -3.4 -0.8
Big 8 emerging market-crises 7/ 0.4 -2.1 0.5 -1.4 3.0 -1.2 -1.0 0.9 -0.6
TOTAL -0.1 -0.6 0.3 -0.9 0.6 0.5 -1.1 0.0 0.8
Other effects 3/ Total change in primary balanceAutomatic stabilisation 2/
Notes: 1/ Unweighted country averages. t = start of the crisis.  
2/ Calculated as the change in the output gap multiplied by the expenditure-to-GDP ratio (used as a proxy of the semi-elasticities of the budget
balance). 
3/ Calculated as the residual of the total change in the primary balance and the effect from automatic stabilisers. 
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden.
For new Member States data only from 1991.
5/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden.
6/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan and Spain.
7/ In principle includes Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Turkey (2000), Philippines and Thailand. But data for the last three are 
missing.
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and AMECO. 
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Changes in the public-debt ratio reflect not only 
changes in fiscal balances but also macroeconomic 
developments. The variation in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio can be broken down into the change in the 
primary deficit and the "snow-ball effect" from 
interest expenditure, real GDP growth and 
inflation. Moreover, the debt ratio is affected by 
adjustments in the stock of debt, which can include 
"below the line" operations (e.g., through 
interventions in the financial sector) and valuation 
effects (e.g., from exchange rate variations).  
Column G in Table III.3.8 gives an estimate of the 
stock-flow adjustment (calculated as the residual). 
This figure should in principle include the below-
the-line operations from restructuring the banking 
system. A comparison with the bottom-up 
estimates of gross fiscal outlays based on the 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) database indicate that 
the latter are dwarfed in some case by other stock-
flow adjustments. These include mostly valuation 
effects from sharp exchange rate depreciations on 
foreign currency-denominated debt. (100) However, 
where those occurred they were largely cancelled 
out through high inflation (either from the pass-
through effect or loose monetary policy).  
Table III.3.8 attempts to compare the role that 
these different factors have played in past crises 
episodes. Most striking is that a number of 
countries have inflated away large parts of their 
debt. This included mostly emerging market and 
transition economies. (98) Remarkable also is that 
of the countries hit by the Asian crises only 
Indonesia resorted to this policy. (99) It also had a 
much slower real economic recovery and a much 
more drawn-out and costly bank restructuring 
process than the other four Asian crises countries.  
(98) Spain during its 1970s banking crisis also conducted an 
inflationary policy (the change in the GDP deflator 
averaged 18% per annum during 1977-80) but the snow-
ball effect on debt was rather limited given the low public 
debt-to-GDP ratio. 
(99) The Philippines and Thailand are not shown in the table 
here due to lack of data on primary balances, but their 
average inflation rates during the crisis were much lower 
than in Indonesia at annually 6.5% and 2.7% respectively 
(measured as the change in the GDP deflator). 
(100) For example, for Turkey the stock-flow adjustment was 
massive. This reflects that about one third of public debt 
was denominated in foreign currency and the Turkish lira 
lost 50% of its value against the U.S. dollar in 2001 
resulting in the public debt-to-GDP ratio jumping in one 
year by 35% of GDP. In contrast, in Malaysia public 
external debt was as low as 5% of GDP before the crisis, so 
that the 30% depreciation of the ringgit in 1998 had only a 
relatively small impact on the debt ratio. 
127 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
Table III.3.8: Change in gross public debt during crises episodes 1/ 
interest
exp.
growth 
effect
inflation 
effect
Gross direct 
fiscal costs
A B C=D+E+F D E F G=A-B-C H
Colombia (1998) 26.9 9.9 2.5 -2.9 6.3 1.4 -10.6 10.3 6.3
Croatia (1998) 26.7 12.6 12.8 0.1 5.3 -1.5 -3.7 -0.4 6.9
Czech Republic (1996) 12.5 0.6 2.6 -0.3 2.1 -0.4 -1.9 -1.7 6.8
Ecuador (1998) 6.2 -1.4 -14.5 24.4 23.6 -0.1 0.9 -11.3 21.7
Finland (1991) 14.0 43.8 7.3 10.1 12.9 1.3 -4.1 26.3 12.8
Hungary (1991) 66.3 18.0 4.2 -72.3 31.6 6.3 -110.2 86.1 10.0
Indonesia (1997) 7/ 35.0 42.0 -10.1 -113.1 22.4 -0.4 -135.1 165.2 56.8
Jamaica (1996)          90.9 12.5 -45.7 17.6 70.1 -3.0 -49.6 40.6 43.9
Japan (1997)         100.5 51.2 19.0 27.6 20.0 -3.8 11.4 38.6 14.0
Korea (1997) 8/ 5.9 10.7 -15.0 16.0 18.7 -4.1 1.4 9.7 31.2
Latvia (1995) 9/          14.7 -0.5 4.4 0.7 4.8 -0.2 -4.0 -5.6 3.0
Malaysia (1997) 35.2 7.9 -0.9 6.9 15.1 -7.5 -0.7 2.0 16.4
Mexico (1994) 25.0 22.9 -8.7 -8.8 26.1 -1.8 -33.1 40.4 19.3
Nicaragua (2000)   191.3 6.4 -1.6 -64.8 14.4 -35.5 -43.7 72.8 13.6
Norway (1991) 28.9 11.3 -6.7 8.4 9.7 -3.1 1.7 9.6 2.7
Slovak Republic (1998) 33.8 9.6 12.6 1.6 15.5 -6.0 -8.0 -4.5 …
Spain (1977) 11.8 4.6 4.9 -8.3 1.6 -0.9 -9.0 8.1 5.6
Sweden (1991) 50.1 22.0 7.4 11.0 21.8 -0.4 -10.4 3.5 3.6
Turkey (2000) 48.8 18.6 -29.0 -34.2 71.2 -6.5 -98.8 81.7 32.0
Ukraine (1998) 29.9 17.1 -1.6 -21.2 8.0 -1.9 -27.3 39.9 0.0
United States (1988) 58.5 7.0 -4.2 11.3 20.2 -5.6 -3.3 0.0 3.7
Uruguay (2002) 39.1 77.3 -6.8 -31.8 19.3 -13.6 -37.5 115.9 20.0
EU-27 3/ 31.5 9.0 6.0 -11.3 12.9 -0.3 -23.9 14.3 5.8
EU-15 4/ 25.3 23.5 6.5 4.3 12.1 0.0 -7.9 12.6 7.3
OECD 47.7 22.1 -4.8 2.4 28.6 -3.6 -20.4 34.1 20.0
OECD and EU 38.0 18.4 -0.5 -2.9 19.3 -1.9 -20.3 24.8 12.9
Other than EU and OECD 33.6 15.7 1.0 -2.7 17.1 -1.5 -15.8 20.9 11.1
Big 5 industrial country-crises 5/ 53.5 20.5 -7.3 -20.5 20.5 -6.9 -34.1 48.3 20.6
Big 8 emerging market-crises 6/ 41.1 26.6 6.4 9.8 13.2 -1.4 -2.1 17.2 7.7
TOTAL 43.3 18.4 -3.0 -10.1 20.0 -4.0 -26.2 33.1 15.7
Memo-randum
item:Primary
balance
Snow-ball effect
Stock-flow
adjustmentTotal
Of which:(In % of GDP)
Public debt 
before the 
crisis (t-1)
Change in public
debt-to-GDP ratio 
(t-1 to end of 
crisis)
Contributions to change in the ratio between t-1 and end of crisis 2/
Notes: 1/ Unweighted country averages. t is the year when the crisis began.
2/ The change in the gross public debt ratio can be decomposed as follows: 
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where t is a time subscript; D, PD, Y and SF are the stock of government debt, the primary deficit, nominal GDP and the stock-flow adjustment
respectively, and i and y represent the average cost of debt and nominal GDP growth.
3/ Includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Slovak Republic and Sweden. 
4/ Includes only Finland, Spain and Sweden.
5/ Includes Finland, Sweden, Norway, Japan and Spain.
6/ In principle includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Turkey (2000), Argentina (2001), Philippines and Thailand. But data for the last 
three are lacking. 
7/ Debt data for Indonesia estimated from IMF staff report. 
8/ Interest expenditure for Korea estimated as average of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
9/ For Latvia initial debt stock is in t not t-1.
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and AMECO. 
3.2.2. Comprehensive measures of fiscal costs 
of financial crises: econometric 
evidence 
Econometric analysis helps to isolate debt changes
fully attributable to banking crises. Looking at the 
evolution of debt following crises provides 
information on the overall fiscal cost. However, a 
rigorous assessment needs to control for debt
developments that, although taking place after the
crisis, are independent or only indirectly related to 
it. Carrying out such analysis requires estimating
debt development determinants via regression
analysis. Equation (1) tests whether the annual
change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio was
impacted by the occurrence of financial crisis in
addition to changes in the debt ratio of the 
previous year, the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
and the output gap. The idea is that fiscal balances 
exhibit a degree of inertia, and that fiscal 
authorities follow a debt-stabilisation motive
(hence, debt is an explanatory factor) and an
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output-stabilisation motive (the output gap features 
among the explanatory variables). (101) These are 
standard determinants used in fiscal reaction 
functions, which have become a common tool to 
assess the determinants of budgetary outcomes 
(e.g., Gali and Perotti, 2003). To obtain a variable 
that reflects choices by fiscal authorities rather 
than mechanical changes in the denominator of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, debt ratios are purged from the 
effect of nominal growth. (102) Results are 
displayed in Table III.3.9. 
The analysis confirms that in financial crisis years, 
public debt accelerated significantly on top of what 
would have been explained by standard 
determinants. Table III.3.9 displays the results, 
which are in line with expectations. The positive 
impact of the lagged change in debt reflects the 
persistence of budgetary outcomes; the negative 
sign of the output gap indicates that output falling 
below potential leads to a deteriorating budgetary 
position, notably due to the operation of automatic 
stabilisers; the lagged debt stock tends to reduce 
the growth in debt in line with the debt-
stabilisation motive of fiscal authorities.  
(101) The output gap coefficient reflects both the operation of 
automatic stabilisers and discretionary changes in primary 
balances. 
(102) The change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio here has been 
adjusted for a proxy of the snow-ball effect equal to 
t
t
t
t
y
y
Y
D
+
−
−
1
*
1
1  with yt being the nominal GDP growth rate. 
This expression does not take into account interest rate 
levels given that no comprehensive data was available for 
interest payment across the sample of countries considered 
here. The adjusted change in the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
roughly equivalent to the change in the general balance 
plus the stock-flow adjustment or the change in gross 
public debt (see equation in footnote 2/ of Table III.3.8). 
The coefficient of the financial crisis dummy 
variable measures the average additional debt 
increase due to the presence of a banking crisis. 
Results in column (1) indicate that for EU and 
OECD countries, the impact effect of banking 
crises on the gross public debt was 1.7% of GDP 
per annum, while the long-term effect was about 
4% of GDP. (103) This additional change in debt is 
interpreted as the joint combination of direct fiscal 
costs to deal with the crisis, the discretionary 
crisis-driven stimulus, higher interest expenditure 
and the budgetary deterioration associated with 
reduction in potential output. (104)  
The bulk of the effect of the financial crisis on debt 
variation takes place during the first two years. To 
analyse in what crisis years the impact is strongest, 
Column (2) adds dummy variables for each 
financial crisis year from t to t+5. The results show 
that most of the additional debt increase happens 
over the first two years of the crises, a result very 
much in line with the evidence provided in 
Graph III.3.7 and also reported in Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008c).  
)1/( 14 ββ −
)1/( 1β−
(103) The long-term effect being obtained as  (see 
equation (1)), i.e., the impact effect is multiplied by the 
average duration of the adjustment of the change in debt to 
the banking crisis shock, 1 . 
(104) As it is customary in the estimation of fiscal reaction 
functions, the empirical specification controls for the 
output gap but not for potential output, the idea being that 
expenditure ratios adjust to changes in potential output. 
During banking crises, however, changes in potential could 
be substantial. In light of inertia in nominal expenditure to 
adjust to changing potential, budgetary deteriorations could 
follow. 
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Results concerning emerging economies are more 
difficult to obtain because of data limitations.
Estimations presented in Column (3) of
Table III.3.9 for a sample of emerging 
economies (105) seem to indicate that the impact of 
the financial crisis on the change in debt is higher 
than for EU and OECD countries. Results indicate 
that on average the increase in public debt-to-GDP 
ratio is equal to 5 percentage points for this 
country group. However, this difference in results 
to EU-OECD countries may largely be influenced
by the sample size and the specific countries
considered. (106) Column (4) of Table III.3.9 
shows that in the case of emerging economies, the 
bulk of the impact of the financial crisis is also, as
he crisis.  
(105) These countries are Albania, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Hong
Kong, Rep. of China, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, Uruguay.
(106) A Wald test of the difference in coefficients for the
financial crisis variable between the group of industrialised 
countries considered in Column (1) and (2) and the group
of emerging economies considered in Column (3) was 
performed suggesting that the difference in coefficients
estimated for these two country groups was not significant. 
in the case of developed countries, very much
focused at the beginning of t
Additional fiscal costs of financial crises 
materialise via output losses. The analysis so far 
neglects the fact that part of the deterioration in the 
output gap itself is due to the crisis. However, as 
shown in Annex III.1, crisis-related output losses 
have been estimated to be substantial. Regression
analysis on the impact of financial crises on output
can determine the significance of the crises and try
to circumvent some of the caveats linked to the 
determination of output losses using deviations
from trend values. The estimation results indicate 
that banking crises led to a substantial increase in
debt by reducing output below potential (see
Box III.3.2). 
Table III.3.9: The impact of financial crises on public debt 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔDebt (t-1) 0.590*** 0.597*** 0.459*** 0.444***
(0.057) (0.055) (0.027) (0.027)
Debt (t-1) -0.011* -0.009 -0.070** -0.042
(0.007) (0.008) (0.032) (0.031)
Output gap, t -0.262*** -0.281*** -0.323 -0.284
(0.068) (0.071) (0.362) (0.319)
Financial crisis (for all years of crisis) 1.700*** 5.01***
(0.551) (2.291)
Financial crisis, t 2.841*** 11.12
(0.848) (7.503)
Financial crisis, t+1 4.051** 14.206**
(2.034) (6.984)
Financial crisis, t+2 -0.755 -1.848
(1.112) (2.709)
Financial crisis, t+3 0.768 3.973
(1.106) (2.478)
Financial crisis, t+4 0.098 -1.640
(1.247) (2.077)
Financial crisis, t+5 1.089 -1.804
(0.788) (2.929)
Constant 1.822*** 1.812*** 9.133** 7.141***
(0.494) (0.488) (2.129) (1.989)
Number of observations 702 702 285 285
R-s uared 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.72
EU and OECD countries 1/ 2/ Emerging market countries  1/ 2/ 3/
Notes: 1/ The dependent variable is the change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio adjusted for a proxy of the snow-ball effect (calculated as the nominal
GDP growth rate times the public debt-to-GDP ratio in t-1; see footnote (22)). The adjusted change in the debt ratio is roughly equivalent to the change
in the general balance plus the stock-flow adjustment (see equation in footnote 2/ of Table III.3.8). 
2/ Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
3/ Countries covered include Albania, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay.
Source: Commission services.
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Box III.3.2: Econometric estimation of the impact of a financial crisis on the output gap
An econometric analysis can substantiate the findings on the costliness, in terms of output losses, of
financial crises. Simple descriptive statistics, such as the average output loss during crisis episodes, may be
biased by not accounting for normal cyclical output fluctuations. Moreover, the output losses based on the
level estimates may be upward biased because they are based on the assumption that the output loss during
the crisis is never fully recovered and because they use the pre-crisis output trend as the benchmark. The
impact of banking crises on potential output, however, manifests itself very gradually and possibly over a
long time horizon. This in turn poses difficulties for estimating by how much banking crises affect public
finances via changes in potential output and how much goes into the actual output level. The present
exercise thus considers the impact of financial crises on the output gap using as explanatory variable a
country-specific dummy equal to one for each year that a country suffers from a financial crisis. These
estimates are thus confined to the duration of financial crises. (1) Moreover, the output gap is regressed on 
its lagged values, reflecting the persistent nature of output fluctuations as shown in equation (1): 
tititititi crisisFinancialgapOuputgapOuputgapOuput ,,32,21,10, εωωωω ++++= −− (2)
with itiit λμε +=
The regression variables can be described as follows. The Financial crisisi,t variable takes the value one for 
financial crises. εi,t is the error term which can be decomposed into two components: (i) a country-specific
effect μi which reflects country-specific features mentioned above and that may affect the output gap and is
assumed to be time invariant and (ii) an error term λi,t that is assumed to display i.i.d. properties and thus
reflect pure random shocks to the output gap value. (2) The output gap is taken from the ECFIN-Ameco
database or the OECD Economic Outlook when available. Both use production function approaches. Since
these data only cover EU and OECD countries, for the analysis here an alternative measure of the output gap
is calculated for all countries based on real GDP data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database
when considering emerging market economies. (3) A Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to decompose real GDP
into a trend and a cyclical component for the whole sample; thus using all available information, also after
the occurrence of a crisis.
The estimation results (Table 1) confirm the toll that financial crises have taken on real output, in particular
for industrial countries. Column (1) provides the results of the estimation for OECD and EU countries. The
first two lagged values of the output gap display significant coefficients reflecting the persistent nature of
output gap fluctuations. The coefficient of the financial crisis dummy variable is significant and displays the
expected negative sign. This coefficient indicates that, on average, the output gap decline can be as high as
1% of potential GDP per year during a systemic financial crisis, while the full impact is about double (the
full impact being obtained by dividing the short-term impact coefficient by one minus the sum of the
autoregression coefficients). When considering also emerging market countries in Column (2), the basic
findings are confirmed but the influence of systemic financial crisis is found to be slightly smaller at 0.8%
(1) Although it is beyond the scope of the analysis to provide a quantification of the impact of financial crises on potential
growth over the long run, the estimates needs to be considered as lower bounds, since the cumulated impact of
potential output deterioration may be non-negligible.
(2) Country and time-fixed effects were included in the regression using dummy variables. The test of null hypothesis
concerning the coefficients estimated on the time-fixed effects was also always rejected while the null hypothesis on
the coefficients concerning the country-fixed effects could not be rejected. Therefore, country dummies were not
included in the regression. The existence of panel unit root test on the output gap was also tested using the approach
described in Im et al. (2003). Independently of the specification used, the null of panel unit root for the output gap was
always rejected. 
(3) The output gap approaches based on the production function approach and the trend calculations provided rather
similar estimates with an average correlation coefficient of 0.64.
(Continued on the next page)
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Econometric estimates permit to simulate public 
debt developments resulting purely from the crisis.
Existing analyses simply look at debt changes after
crises to assess the overall public finance impact of 
banking crises. A more rigorous assessment can be 
obtained from the previous regressions analysis in
that it permits to simulate public debt 
developments due to the crisis isolating the 
remaining determinants of debt changes. For that
purpose, the estimated direct impact of crises on 
changes in public debt (Table III.3.9, column 1) is
combined with the estimated indirect impact via
the deterioration in the output gap (Box III.3.2,
Table 1) to obtain a measure of the average 
additional change in debt attributable to the crisis 
(see Annex III.2 for further details). The average 
developments in the public debt-to-GDP ratio
attributable to banking crises can thus be simulated
and compared with actual ones. Graph III.3.8 
reports results for OECD and EU countries that 
have experienced long enough financial crises (i.e., 
here of a duration of at least four years, a
minimum length necessary for a meaningful
comparison of debt projections with actual debt
levels after the outbreak of crises). 
Results suggest that the largest part of the increase 
in public debt-to-GDP ratio that materialised after 
the start of banking crises was indeed caused by 
the crisis itself. Graph III.3.8 is based on actual 
and projected data for Finland, Sweden, the US
and Japan up to 5 years from the start of the crisis. 
Box (continued) 
annually of potential GDP. (1) The difference is however not statistically significant as confirmed in 
Columns (3) to (4) which include interaction dummies between the occurrence of a financial crisis and
country groups (industrialised and emerging economies). The results suggest that there is no statistically
significant difference in the impact of financial crisis on output gap between these different two country
groups. (2) 
Table 1: The impact of financial crises on output
OECD and EU countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output gap (t-1) 0.882*** 0.471*** 0.473*** 0.472***
(0.048) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Output gap (t-2) -0.295*** -0.386*** -0.386*** -0.386***
(0.044) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Financial cr isis -1.042*** -0.771*** -0.616** -0.776**
(0.267) (0.209) (0.271) (0.340)
Financial cr isis & currency crisis
Financial cr isis, differential effect for developing economies -0.162
(0.384)
Financial cr isis, differential effect for non-EU economies 0.097
(0.406)
Constant 1.215*** -0.178 -0.108 -0.095
(0.468) (0.854) (0.379) (0.378)
Number of observations 909 2205 2205 2205
R-squared 0.68 0.38 0.37 0.37
Source:  Commission services.
Notes: 1/ Output gap is the dependent variable. Regressions include crisis and non-crisis countries. Sample period is 1970-2007.
2/ Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant  at 10%; ** s ignificant  at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All countries
(1) To test whether the difference is due to the different features of OECD/EU-countries and other countries or due to data
availability (on output gap), regressions were performed on exactly the same sample of countries using alternatively
the production function and the HP methods to calculate the output gap. Results did not appear to be very different in
both cases suggesting that the differences between estimations in (1) and (3) are essentially due to the sample of
countries considered.
(2) It was also tested whether twin crises–i.e. currency and financial crises–have increased output losses. When including
a currency crisis dummy, the estimates suggest that, while the occurrence of a currency crisis deteriorated the output
gap, this effect is not statistically significant. The crisis dummy was taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and
defined as periods with a nominal currency depreciation of at least 30% (against the U.S. dollar) that is also at least a
10% increase in the rate of depreciation to the previous year. The surprising lack of significance may, however, be
attributed to the fact of multi-collinearity between the financial crisis dummy and the one for twin crises since more
than half of financial crises used in the sample here coincided with currency crises. In the empirical literature currency
crises are associated with significant short-term output losses.
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The projections show that the public debt-to-GDP
ratio would increase by 5.3 percentage points per
year. For the sample of EU and OECD countries
this would imply an estimated increase of the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio from 53% of GDP, i.e.
the initial average debt level for countries in this 
sample when they experienced a financial crisis, to 
about 74% in t+4, i.e. about 21 percentage points 
rise. Actual debt developments showed a bigger 
increase of about 30% of GDP during the first four 
years for these four countries. This indicates that
the estimated impact of the financial crises on the 
debt level in these countries explains
approximately 70% of the debt increase during the
whole duration of the crisis.  
It must be noted however that the estimates here
are based on annual average figures which may 
underestimate the overall increase in debt due to
the crisis given that the bulk of this increase took 
place the first two years of a financial crisis as
shown in Table III.3.9 while the projections
reported in Graph III.3.8 assume that this increase
is linear starting from the initial debt level. The 
annual average change in debt can be further
decomposed into the direct impact of the crisis on
debt and the impact via the output gap
deterioration (details are presented in Annex III.2). 
Results show that approximately two-thirds of the
debt increase linked to the financial crisis impinges 
on the direct debt effect, i.e. debt outlays linked to
the deterioration of budgetary balance plus stock 
flow adjustments, while one-third is linked to the 
effect of the output gap deterioration. 
Graph III.3.8: Debt projections during a financial crisis for EU-
OECD countries
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Notes: 1/ See text and Annex III.2 for the technical details of the 
simulations.
Source: Commission services.
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A more detailed look at five crises episodes 
substantiates the above findings on the fiscal 
implications from financial crisis. We focus here 
on the Nordic crises countries (Finland, Norway, 
Sweden) and the cases of Japan and Korea because 
they are particularly instructive for today's EU-27. 
Experience in these countries shows that the 
interplay of the crisis resolution costs with the 
fiscal deterioration caused by the output losses 
were massive. (107) This may lead countries to 
quickly hit their fiscal space constraints and 
complicate restoring confidence in the economy. 
From the crises experience it also follows that 
fiscal stimulus measures loose part of their 
effectiveness when employed before the banking 
system has been resolved. However, since deciding 
on and implementing a banking resolution strategy 
has in practice often proved politically more trying 
than agreeing on fiscal policy support for the 
economy, both approaches have been applied in 
parallel. While this has partly contributed to 
softening the economic consequences of financial 
crises, this has also raised the crises' fiscal costs.  
4.1. JAPAN 
The prime example is Japan. The health of the 
banking system had deteriorated steadily since the 
bursting of the real estate price and stock market 
bubble in 1990. As it was not forcefully addressed 
by the authorities it turned into a full-blown crisis 
in 1997 when several large financial institutions 
failed. While a comprehensive financial sector 
restructuring responses followed, including capital 
injections and mergers, and lending resumed by 
2000, it took until end-2005, thus 15 years after the 
first distress in the system had emerged before the 
Bank of Japan considered the crisis resolved. (108) 
Against the backdrop of the lingering problems in 
the financial sector, fiscal stimulus measures in 
(107) The brief cases presented here focus predominantly on the 
fiscal policy responses to the crisis. More details on 
country-specific approaches resolving the banking systems 
can be found in Section III.5.1. 
(108) Banks had achieved the target set by the government in the 
“Program for Financial Revival” of halving the non-
performing loans ratio from its level at the end of March 
2002. Moreover, the blanket deposit guarantee was 
removed in April 2005 (Bank of Japan, Annual Review 
2006).  
Japan were apparently not very successful in re-
starting economic growth. The Japanese 
government launched a series of fiscal packages 
starting from 1992, which included various tax 
cuts (with an ill-timed and temporary reversal in 
1997) and expenditure programmes, including for 
public works (Table III.4.1). Overall the stimulus 
amounted to about 27% of GDP between 1992-
2000 while real GDP growth averaged just 
1%. (109) On top of the sizeable discretionary 
measures, the Japanese government's delayed 
action in restructuring the banking system also 
resulted in one the highest restructuring bills 
among all crises episodes in today's EU and OECD 
countries since 1970. At 14% of (net of recovery 
values) this was surpassed only by the Korean, 
Mexican and Turkish banking crises.(110) In 
combination with the faltering economy this led 
gross public debt to surge from 69% of GDP in 
1990 to over 180% in 2008, the highest rate in the 
industrial world today. When accounting for 
Japan's large stock of financial assets however, its 
debt position is less precarious.  
The role of fiscal policy for Japan's recovery has 
been widely analysed. Most work concludes that 
fiscal policy was not very effective as reflected in 
rather low short-term and long-term multipliers 
(e.g., Ihori et al., 2003, Ihori and Nakamoto, 2005, 
OECD, 2000, Bayoumi, 2000). In this context, 
studies find that Japanese consumers were 
relatively Ricardian, i.e. increased their savings 
rates in anticipation of future tax increases, 
explaining the difficulty to jump start 
consumption. The ineffectiveness has in part been 
attributed to the erratic path of fiscal policy (e.g. 
the large fiscal package in 1995 that initiated a 
recovery was quickly reversed by the strong fiscal 
contraction in 1997; see e.g., Bayoumi, 2000). On 
the other hand, a few economists have challenged 
(109) Japan's fiscal packages are summarised for example in 
OECD (2000) and IMF (2000, 2001).  
(110) Laeven and Valencia (2008) estimate the net direct fiscal 
costs at 13.9% of GDP while Spilimbergo et al. (2008) 
estimate them to be much lower at 5.3% of GDP. The 
former use recovery values until t+5, the latter until 2008 
(thus, t+11). This indicates that over the long run, Japan 
managed to recoup much of its initial fiscal outlays for the 
banking sector. However, to put the net outlays into 
perspective to other crisis episodes, we need comparable 
data using a consistent methodology. Thus, we use for all 
countries the Laeven and Valencia figures on net direct 
fiscal costs. 
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this view and argued that Japanese fiscal policy 
had indeed significant expansionary effects (as 
reflected in positive long-term multipliers) and
hence contributed to avoiding an even bigger
economic slump. They also argue that the surge in 
public debt was mostly due to the recession-caused 
slowdown in revenue growth (e.g., Kuttner and 
Posen, 2001, 2002). 
Graph III.4.1: Japan – Key fiscal variables during the crisis 
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Table III.4.1: Japan – Fiscal packages, 1992-93 (% of GDP, 
project cost basis) 
General
public
works
Building
and 
equipment
Public
works by 
local govts.
Total
28.8.1992 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.0 0.9
13.4.1993 2.7 0.8 0.2 0.5 1.6 0.0 1.1
16.9.1993 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.9
08.2.1994 3.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.2 1.0
14.4.1995 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7
20.9.1995 2.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.3 0.0 1.3
24.4.1998 3.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 1.5 0.9 0.9
16.11.1998 4.7 1.1 0.4 0.0 1.6 1.2 1.9
11.11.1999 3.6 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.4 0.0 2.3
19.10.2000 2.2 0.5 na 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.2
16.11.2001 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
01.2.2002 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0
30.1.2003 0.7 0.3 na 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.2
Total 28.2 7.0 1.7 2.2 12.5 3.3 12.4
Total
Social infrastructure investment
Tax cuts Other
Source: OECD Economic Survey, Japan, February 2004.
4.2. KOREA 
The 1997 Korean experience included policies and 
outcomes which contrast the Japanese experience. 
Korea focused on the resolution of the financial 
sector and resorted only to small discretionary
fiscal stimulus measures. Its relatively small 
budget deterioration of 4% of GDP (1998
compared to 1996) given the sharp downturn of the
economy (-6.7 % GDP growth in 1998, 
Graph III.4.2) was only to a small extent driven by
additional spending on the social safety (estimated
at about 1½% of GDP; see Chopra et al., 2001). 
The economy rebounded quickly thereafter helped
by the sharp depreciation of the currency and the
budget returned into a surplus position only two
years after the crisis. While the conditionality of
the IMF-supported programme to Korea had
initially foreseen a pro-cyclical tightening to 
restore confidence in the currency, the 
conditionality was later adjusted when the GDP 
slump during the crisis turned out much sharper 
than expected. This gave greater room for 
automatic stabilisers and an extension of the small
social safety (Ghosh et al., 2002, Lane et al., 
1999). Nevertheless, fiscal policy remained very
cautious and the deterioration of budget balances 
limited. This approach is generally perceived to
have served Korea well to swiftly overcome its
crisis in light of the immense banking resolution
cost of 23% of GDP that it had to shoulder 
(Spilimbergo et al., 2008). 
Graph III.4.2: Korea – Key fiscal variables during the crisis 
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Korea, 2002. 
4.3. SWEDEN 
Sweden is typically considered the poster child of
resolving a banking crisis. The banking crisis first
emerged in 1990 when the economy went into 
recession and the asset price bubble burst. It 
developed into a systemic crisis in autumn 1992
when Sweden also had to abandon its peg to the 
ECU. As detailed in Section III.5.1 the government
quickly and comprehensively restructured the
banking system which allowed the initial fiscal 
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outlays of 3.6 % of GDP to be nearly fully
recovered. Nevertheless, the output loss was huge
(30% of trend GDP level as estimated by Laeven
and Valencia, 2008) and therefore during the 
crisis, fiscal policy was initially intended to mend
the sharp GDP drop (Graph III.4.3). This included 
not only letting automatic stabilisers work but
adding a discretionary fiscal stimulus estimated at 
about 4% of GDP over three years, mostly through 
tax cuts (2.4 % of GDP). Consequently, the budget 
balance deteriorated rapidly from a surplus of
4.0% of GDP in 1990 to a deficit of 7.3 % in 1992
while public debt surged from 42% of GDP to
62 % (Table III.4.2). Since these runaway deficits
were perceived not to be sustainable, they were 
followed by a fiscal consolidation package which 
started with expenditure cuts already in 1993, 
although the overall fiscal stimulus was still
somewhat expansionary. Nevertheless, just
through the impact of the worsening economy the 
headline deficit widened another 4 % of GDP from
1992 to 1993 (the primary balance deteriorated by
3½% of GDP). The automatic worsening occurred 
not only on the expenditure side where social 
spending soared by 4% of GDP but also on the
revenue side where receipts plummeted by 4% of 
GDP (excluding tax cut effects) reflecting the
sharp drop of tax elasticities due to, among other 
factors, the burst of the real estate bubble (see 
Box I.1.3 for more details on the development of
tax elasticities during crises). 
However, there is no consensus on whether the
Swedish expansionary fiscal policy has helped
smoothening or rather aggravated output losses.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) argue that budgetary 
policies in 1991-93 may have had non-Keynesian
effects, i.e. private agents perceived the large fiscal 
deterioration as permanent, thus expecting a future
increase in the tax burden, and therefore reduced
consumption and investment. Other authors (Agell,
1996 and Barrot, 1995) however, interpret the 
change in consumption rather as an adjustment to
the high unemployment environment (with the
unemployment rate jumping from 1.6 % in 1990 to 
8.2 % in 1993).
Graph III.4.3: Sweden - Key fiscal variables during the crisis 1/ 
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Table III.4.2: Sweden - Key fiscal indicators (% of GDP) 1/ 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
General government balance 5.1 4.0 -1.1 -7.3 -11.3 -9.4 -7.1
Primary government balance 10.2 8.8 3.8 -2.2 -5.6 -3.2 -0.7
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 8.3 7.5 4.2 -0.5 -2.3 -1.1 0.5
Gross public debt 43.6 42.0 50.1 63.3 69.9 72.4 72.1
Public expenditure 57.1 58.1 59.2 64.7 66.7 63.6 61.0
o/w: Interest 5.1 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.7 6.2 6.5
 Public consumption 26.2 27.4 28.1 29.2 28.8 27.8 26.6
 Social benefits 18.9 19.1 20.1 22.2 23.2 22.9 21.3
 Public investment 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.8
Total revenue 62.3 62.1 58.2 57.4 55.4 54.2 53.9
o/w: Direct taxes 13.3 13.5 12.6 11.8 11.2 11.6 12.4
 Indirect taxes 15.4 16.4 16.8 15.4 14.4 13.6 13.1
 Social security contributions 14.5 14.9 14.6 13.9 13.2 13.1 13.4
Discretionary policy
 Based on cyclically adjusted data 1.2 -0.8 -3.3 -4.6 -1.8 1.2 1.6
 Measures as reported by MoF 2/ … … -2.8 -1.0 -0.1 … …
 Expenditure … … 1.5 0.7 -0.7 … …
 Revenue … … -1.3 -0.3 -0.8 … …
Notes: 1/ Data are based on former definition since ESA 95 data are 
only available since 1993. 
2/ Data reported by Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002).  
Source: Commission services and Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002). 
4.4. FINLAND 
Compared to Sweden, Finland hit its fiscal space 
limits much earlier and is an example that fiscal 
consolidation may need to accompany the 
resolution of a financial crisis. Finland's root
causes of the crisis were similar to those in 
Sweden but the crisis impacted the economy much 
harder as the build-up of imbalances had been
larger and the downturn was exacerbated by the
loss of trade with the Soviet Union. The collapse 
of real activity translated instantly into a sharp 
deterioration of the fiscal balance (from 1990-
1993, the headline government balance worsened
by 14% of GDP) and a near quadrupling of the
debt ratio in three years (Graph III.4.4). Since this 
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development undermined confidence (reflected in
pressure on the exchange rate and spreads) the
government early on reacted to the worsening
budget balance and the sustainability concerns
with consolidation policies. The government which 
took office in 1991 implemented an austerity 
package that comprised annual budget savings of
6% of GDP over four years, compared with the 
initially projected expenditure levels. Most
immediate spending cuts came in education and 
health (the former was cut by 7% in real terms
during 1992-94; the latter dropped by 12% from
1991-1994) as well as public investment (the
public investment-to-GDP ratio fell by 1 % of
GDP) (OECD Economic Surveys). (111) At the 
same, time tax reforms helped to stabilize and even
add 3% to the revenue-to-GDP ratio during the
crisis, which stands in sharp contrast to Sweden 
(Table III.4.3). Nevertheless, the consolidation
measures were dwarfed by the continuing
deterioration of the deficit from automatic
stabilisers on the expenditure side. (112)  
Finland's fiscal austerity package has generally
been viewed as the appropriate response to the 
crisis despite the sharp output losses. (113) A 
temporary fiscal stimulus may not have helped to
dampen the output costs since econometric studies
on consumption behaviour indicate that Finnish
consumers were Ricardian (Brunila, 1996). The
need for a more cautious fiscal policy was also 
driven by the much more costly resolution of the 
banking crises than in Sweden which amounted to 
11% of GDP. The higher direct fiscal costs are 
largely explained by the higher imbalances in
Finland's banking system while the Finnish crisis
resolution featured some of the same "best
practices" as Sweden's, such as broad political
support and the use of an efficient bank
restructuring agency and asset management 
(111) Over the medium term however, education and training 
provision were increased significantly contributing to the 
adjustment of the economy and its strong economic 
performance. 
(112) The sharp drop of tax elasticities during the crises in
Finland and Sweden is illustrated in the note by Barrios
"The short and medium-term evolution of tax elasticities in 
the EU" (ECFIN/C2/D6; 5 January 2009). 
(113) For example, in "Three assessments of Finland's economic 
crisis and economic policy" published in 1993 by the Bank 
of Finland, two authors (Bordes and Currie) supported the 
government's fiscal adjustment measures while one
(Söderström) cautioned that fiscal consolidation should
await a recovery in output and employment.  
companies. However, the use of regulatory
forbearance in Finland, in contrast to Sweden, may 
have drawn out the crisis resolution and added to
the bill. 
Graph III.4.4: Finland – Key fiscal variables during the crisis 
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Table III.4.3: Finland – Key fiscal indicators (% of GDP) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
General government balance 6.8 5.4 -1.0 -5.5 -8.3 -6.7 -6.2
Primary government balance 8.2 6.7 0.9 -2.9 -3.9 -2.6 -2.2
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 4.8 4.1 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.4 -0.3
Gross public debt 14.4 14.0 22.2 40.0 55.3 57.8 56.7
Public expenditure 44.4 47.9 56.7 62.3 64.7 63.9 61.6
o/w: Interest 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.5 4.5 5.0 5.1
 Public consumption 20.0 21.7 24.7 25.3 24.2 23.5 22.8
 Social benefits 13.3 14.6 18.2 22.2 23.7 23.7 21.9
 Public investment 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.5 2.8 3.0 2.7
Total revenue 51.2 53.3 55.8 56.8 56.4 57.1 55.4
o/w: Direct taxes 16.6 17.3 17.4 16.5 15.6 17.2 17.3
 Indirect taxes 13.2 13.4 12.9 12.3 12.2 12.9 12.9
 Social security contributions 11.3 12.6 13.4 14.4 14.9 15.8 14.7
Discretionary policy
(Based on cyclically adjusted data) -0.2 -0.7 -2.0 -1.6 -0.3 0.3 -0.7
Source: European Commission, Ameco.
4.5. NORWAY 
In contrast to the other two Nordic crises countries, 
Norway had greater fiscal space during the crisis
which it used for fiscal stimulus. Problems
emerged in Norwegian banks already from 1987 
when the sharp drop in oil prices slowed the 
economy and the asset price bubble burst. While
the government intervened in some small banks, 
risks continued to build up in the rest of the sector
and resulted 1991 in a systemic crisis, when the 
largest three banks ran into trouble. At that time
the government intervened promptly and
137 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
138 
comprehensively,(114) so that over time it fully
recovered its initial fiscal outlays. The containment
of direct fiscal costs was helped by the much 
weaker real output losses during the Norwegian 
crisis since the economy recovered during the
crisis supported by rising oil prices and the early
depreciation of the currency in 1986. With rather 
low gross public debt (29% of GDP) and a 
significant net financial asset position (40% of
GDP) at the outset of the crisis the government
was in a position to pursue active countercyclical
fiscal policy (Graph III.4.5). Norway's cyclically-
adjusted primary fiscal deficit widened by 4½% of
GDP between 1989 and 1992 (Table III.4.4). After 
a minor fiscal tightening in 1993, the Norwegian 
government embarked on a consolidation
programme with the brunt of expenditure restraint
to be borne by transfers to households (OECD,
1995). The adjustment was, however, much more 
modest than the efforts by Sweden and Finland 
given the relatively large fiscal space and the much 
better economic performance.
Table III.4.4: Norway – Key fiscal indicators (% of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
General government balance 1.8 2.2 0.1 -1.9 -1.4 0.3 3.2
Primary government balance 5.3 5.7 3.3 1.4 1.9 3.3 6.0
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 1/ -3.4 -5.1 -7.7 -9.5 -9.1 -7.2 -5.5
Gross public debt 32.3 28.9 27.3 31.9 40.2 37.3 34.2
Public expenditure 51.4 53.3 54.5 55.7 54.6 53.7 50.9
o/w: Interest 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.8
 Public consumption 20.7 21.2 21.8 22.7 22.5 22.2 21.6
 Social benefits 15.1 15.5 16.0 16.6 16.5 16.0 15.4
 Public investment 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.2
Total revenue 53.2 55.5 54.6 53.9 53.2 54.0 54.2
o/w: Direct taxes 15.1 15.8 15.2 14.7 14.9 15.6 16.1
 Indirect taxes 15.4 15.1 15.4 15.5 15.8 16.3 16.0
 Social security contributions 11.0 10.9 10.8 11.0 10.1 10.1 9.8
Discretionary policy
(Based on cyclically adjusted data) -0.7 -1.7 -2.6 -1.8 0.3 1.9 1.7
Notes: 1/ OECD data. 
Source: European Commission Ameco, OECD Economic Outlook and 
IMF International Financial Statistics.
Graph III.4.5: Norway – Key fiscal variables during the crisis 
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(114) A few principles of the bank resolution strategy deviated
from that of Finland and Sweden. In particular, Norway did 
neither issue a blanket guarantee nor install an asset 
management company (see e.g. Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 
1998). Moreover, Norway's ownership in banks after the 
crises was higher and it took more time to divest (at a 
profit). 
5. GENERAL LESSONS FROM HANDLING BANKING CRISES 
FOR FISCAL COSTS 
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Drawing on the statistical, econometric and 
country-specific experiences allows deriving some 
broad conclusions as regards fiscal costs from 
banking crises and their determinants. These 
lessons refer to the fiscal implications of 
government interventions in the financial sector as 
well as the broader fiscal consequences from 
economic developments. To what degree these 
lessons are useful for the current financial and 
economic crisis, will be discussed in Section III.6, 
since the past experiences were with individual 
country or regional crisis episodes rather than of a 
global nature. 
5.1. BANK RESCUE OPERATIONS AND DIRECT 
FISCAL COSTS 
While there is no cook-book recipe for what 
constitutes good crisis resolution policies, some 
general principles of good practices have 
emerged. (115) They comprise two building blocks. 
First, strong governance elements are key to allow 
for a quick, comprehensive, transparent and 
consistent response. And second, the strategy 
needs to include specific policies for the three 
phases of a banking crisis: containment, resolution 
and exit. Delays in all three phases can be costly. 
Stepping in late to contain the crisis may aggravate 
liquidity problems; letting insolvent banks operate 
for too long before resolving or restructuring them 
may amass additional costs due to moral hazard; 
and lacking a clear strategy on how to withdraw 
public support after the crisis may distort 
competition and investment in the banking system 
and thus prolong the negative consequences of 
financial crises. In addition, policies also need to 
be compatible with the infrastructure, capacity and 
authority of the agency in charge of banking 
resolution as well as the macroeconomic 
constraints. 
A crucial factor to applying a resolution strategy 
resolutely is strong governance, including political 
(115) The following section draws largely on findings by the 
IMF and World Bank in dealing with systemic banking 
crises. For more details, see for example, Hoelscher and 
Quintyn (2003), Frydl and Quintyn (2000), Lindgren et al. 
(1999), Ingves and Hoelscher (2005), and Rojas-Suares and 
Weisbrod (1996). 
will and broad political support. The cases of all 
three Nordic countries are good examples. In 
Sweden all main political parties agreed on a 
framework of crisis resolution which was 
promoted by sharing information with the 
opposition and having it represented in the newly 
created Bank Support Authority that managed the 
crisis (Ingves and Lind, 1996, 2008; Andersson 
and Viotti, 1999 and Jonung, 2009). In contrast, 
one reason why the Bulgarian crisis resolution 
turned into one of the most expensive among 
transition economies is the lack of political will 
and commitment to restructure banks in the early 
1990s. This changed only with the introduction of 
the currency board after the currency crisis in 1997 
(see Bonin and Wachtel, 2004). Similar arguments 
have been made for the high crisis resolutions 
costs in other transition and emerging market 
economies.  
Moreover, transparency and consistency play an 
important role to regain confidence. This includes 
transparency on the authorities' resolution strategy 
and banks' financial situation. Again Sweden's 
policies provide examples. The Swedish 
authorities explained to the banks and the public 
how to determine which banks to save 
(Heikenstein, 1998). In this process, they forced 
banks to value their assets conservatively and 
correct the picture of their financial situation. The 
transparency on the financial system and the 
resolution strategy helped Swedish banks restore 
credit lines from abroad after senior officials had 
met with foreign bankers. In contrast, in 1997 
crises in the Philippines and Indonesia the IMF and 
World Bank raised concerns about the 
transparency of the bank restructuring process 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999, 2000). Both 
countries achieved only relatively low recovery 
rates, also when compared to Korea and Thailand.  
In addition to strong governance, the specific 
measures taken in the three crises phases matter for 
the costliness of crises responses. In the crisis 
containment phase restoring confidence is the first 
order. Liquidity support and blanket guarantees are 
the main options to stop depositor and creditor 
runs when other measures, such as access to higher 
credit lines from foreign banks and political 
statements fail to keep panic at bay. At the same 
European Commission 
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time the above empirical evidence suggested they 
were also among the most expensive measures 
even though liquidity support seems to have 
fostered recovery rates. Thus, in the absence of 
alternatives can policymakers still impact how 
bank rescue operations become? Experience 
suggests that it is not the use of blanket guarantees 
and liquidity support per se that is costly, but how 
also how the resolution and exit phases are dealt 
with, as shown below.  
The aim of the resolution phase is to restore the 
profitability and solvency of the banking system. 
In principle it consists of three components, 
according to Hoelscher and Quintyn (2003): 
The first part is to identify which banks are viable 
but undercapitalized and which are non-viable and 
insolvent. As long as the financial crisis unfolds 
and impacts also the real economy such an 
assessment is very challenging and may need to be 
revised over time as more banks are found to be in 
trouble. Therefore, applying rather strict evaluation 
criteria in a systemic crisis may give the authorities 
early on a conservative picture of the potential 
needs for intervention. This was the case, for 
example in Norway and Sweden, while, in 
contrast, in Japan recognizing the extent of losses 
on non-performing assets and therefore the size of 
the undercapitalization of the banking system was 
delayed for nearly a decade as loose loan 
classification standards resulted de facto in an 
extended period of regulatory forbearance. (116) 
This contributed to the rather high fiscal costs for 
resolving the Japanese banking crisis. A similar 
argument on delaying the diagnosis and resolution 
has been made for the US Savings and Loan crisis. 
When problems emerged in the 1980s regulations 
(such as capital requirements and accounting 
standards) were loosened merely postponing the 
ultimate clean-up of the thrift industry 
(Spilimbergo et al., 2008). For that crisis overall 
net fiscal costs were contained at about 2½% of 
GDP but recovery rates of initial fiscal outlays 
were rather low at about one third. 
(116) For banking crises in transition economies, the Bulgarian 
case is exemplary for how postponing the decisions to 
resolve banks can increase fiscal costs (Enoch et al., 
2002b). 
The second component of the resolution phase is to 
intervene (liquidate or merge) in those banks 
identified as insolvent and recapitalize and 
restructure the viable banks (through private and/or 
public funds). To keep fiscal costs low, private 
contributions should be sought first but may not be 
available in a systemic crisis. While many 
technical options are available for this process and 
their pros and cons should be weighted on a 
country-by-country basis, the resolution process 
should follow the principle of equal and fair 
treatment, particularly as regards burden sharing, 
with shareholders typically to cover losses to the 
fullest extent possible. Thus, restructuring policies 
should be applied to all banks on a uniform 
basis. (117) Indonesia's bank restructuring went 
through an intense stop-and-go process in part 
because of problems to build consensus on how to 
treat well-connected banks and the IMF-supported 
program was held up pending a satisfactory 
resolution of the private bank recapitalisation 
scheme. This is considered to have immensely 
added to overall fiscal costs (Enoch et al., 2002a). 
A third component of the crisis resolution phase is 
the management of nonperforming assets. This is 
not only intrinsically linked to the amount of 
capital needed to re-establish solvency, but also to 
assure liquidity and medium-term viability. Banks 
can either manage those assets themselves or sell 
them to private or public asset managers. This can 
involve separating a bank into a good and bad 
bank, with the bad bank having to be sufficiently 
funded through private or public capital. In a 
systemic crisis, it is likely that much (most) 
funding needs to be provided by the public sector. 
Bad bank assets may then be bundled into a 
centralised public asset management company 
(AMC) that specialises on restructuring and 
recovering debt or disposing of assets. While the 
use of AMCs is advocated strongly by some also 
in the current crisis (e.g., Gros, 2009; Hall and 
Woodward, 2009; Sachs, 2009; Strauss-Kahn, 
2009), (118) experience shows that it is not a 
(117) For more details on options of bank restructuring see, for 
example, Enoch et al. (2002a) and Dziobek (1998). 
(118) Arguments in favour of asset management companies 
include the division of labour between rebuilding a bank 
and managing impaired assets, facilitating the market to 
value banks by separating the bad assets, strengthening of 
credit discipline by separating the bad loans from the credit 
officers who initiated them, economies of scale in the 
management of bad assets as well as enhanced bargaining 
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panacea (Table III.5.1). (119) It worked well, for 
example in Sweden which was, however, helped 
by the fact that it had to handle mostly a portfolio 
of real estate rather than a more complicated 
financial portfolio structure (Woo, 2002). Also, the 
Korean AMC operated efficiently and resolved 
two thirds of its non-performing assets within four 
years after the crisis and recovered all of its 
outlays by 2008 (Myung-Bak, 2009). On the other 
hand, progress in Mexico (1994), Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand was much slower 
(Becker, 2004). This was linked to the late set-up 
of the ACM in Thailand (four years after the 
outbreak of the crisis) and deficiencies in the legal 
and judicial framework in the other 
aforementioned countries as well as the transfer of 
politically connected loans that were difficult to 
resolve (Calomiris et al., 2005). This conclusion is 
corroborated by econometric estimates 
(Section III.3) which find that higher recovery 
rates are associated with the use of asset 
management companies only in the case of 
efficient governments (as proxied by the World 
Bank government effectiveness indicator and the 
Transparency International corruption perception 
index). Another difficulty for operating AMCs was 
the sheer size of their portfolios, which in the 
Asian crisis countries ranged between 15% and 
40% of GDP compared to about 9% of GDP in 
Sweden and Finland (Giorgianni, 2001). Norway, 
on the other hand, achieved a high recovery rate by 
letting banks manage their problematic assets. 
Thus, a decision on the usefulness of an asset 
management company would need to be made on a 
country-by-country basis. (120)  
power through collecting multiple claims on debtors and 
special powers for government AMCs to expedite loan 
resolutions (Woo, 2002 and Klingebiel, 2000). However, 
they are also associated with disadvantages, such as 
weakening the knowledge base about the loan and the 
credit discipline by separating them from the originating 
bank, difficulty in pricing the transferred assets, political 
interference (in the valuation and management of assets), 
the lack of expertise in running an asset management 
company and the costs implied in operating it, including 
through hiring of external experts (Woo, 2002 and Bergo, 
2003). 
(119) See Klingebiel (2000), Woo (2002) and Ingves et al. (2004) 
for a review of AMCs in the resolution of banking crises 
and Ingves and Lind (1997) for the functioning of the 
Swedish AMC. 
(120) Bank restructuring and corporate debt restructuring are 
closely linked if distress in the corporate sector was either a 
cause or consequence of the crisis. Successful corporate 
Since all government intervention in the crisis 
should be temporary, in the exit phase, it should be 
unwound in a coherent and transparent manner. 
The exit strategy should be an inherent part of a 
governments' overall crisis management 
framework and communicated early to help guide 
decisions by depositors and private investors. This 
includes the (partial) withdrawal of guarantees as a 
first step. In practice they were withdrawn on 
average after 4¼ years. The exit phase also 
includes disposing acquired assets as well as 
reducing and ultimately full withdrawing liquidity 
support. The timing for selling nationalized banks 
should consider not only the expected net direct 
return but also implicit costs from government 
intervention, such as reduced competition in the 
financial sector. But decisions have often also 
reflected political considerations. Norway, for 
example, which intervened in its largest three 
banks accounting for more than half of total 
banking assets, sold the first two banks within four 
and nine years while maintaining a 34% share in 
the third until today to avoid that the banking 
system was fully foreign-owned (Bergo, 2003, 
Sandal, 2004 and Vale, 2004).  
In summary, a few lessons can be drawn on the 
link between handling systemic crises and their 
direct fiscal expenses. How costly the crisis 
management process becomes for the government 
depends ultimately on the depth of the crisis and 
how accurately and quickly bank losses are 
assessed and acted upon by the government. 
Experience and econometric estimates have shown 
that not fully realising bank losses upfront, thus 
allowing for regulatory forbearance, may buy 
banks some time but also postpones the needed 
clean-up of the banking sector and ultimately 
increases the fiscal costs of financial crises. 
Government intervention may then become more 
expensive since moral hazard may induce banks to 
take on extra risks and borrowers to strategically 
default. Acting resolutely requires broad-based 
political support and a transparent and consistent 
crisis resolution strategy with clear objectives 
(including for the end of government 
interventions) and a timeline, which, however, 
debt restructuring would contribute to higher recovery 
values of banks' assets. For a discussion on the methods 
(out-of-court processes, including through asset 
management companies, versus a bankruptcy regime) see 
for example Stone (2000) and Woo (2002). 
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may need to be adjusted flexibly as the crisis 
unfolds. Within this broad framework, individual
measures, such as recapitalisation, liquidity 
support and the use of asset management
companies, when combined with high government
effectiveness, have been associated in econometric
regressions with higher recovery rates.  
5.2. BROAD PRINCIPLES ON THE ROLE OF 
FISCAL POLICY SUPPORT 
As for bank resolution practices, history provides 
some broad lessons on the role that fiscal policy
can play during recessions. These relate to three 
questions: (i) what has been the greatest source of 
fiscal support in past recessions, (ii) under what
conditions have discretionary measures been
successful and (iii) which type of discretionary 
stimulus has had the greatest effect. The following 
provides brief responses to these questions based 
on the literature as recently summarised by the 
IMF, European Commission and OECD. (121) 
These findings draw largely on experiences with 
(121) For recent IMF work see Spilimbergo et al. (2008), IMF 
(2008a), European Commission (2008c) and OECD 
(2009a).
fiscal stimulus measures during cyclical downturns
rather than recessions accompanied by financial
crises, however. Thus, the latter pose even greater 
requirements for fiscal policy to have the intended
effects. In particular, as the Japanese experience
has shown, as long as the underlying banking
sector problem is not resolved, the fiscal stimulus 
effect is likely to be muted. This point, which has 
recently been stressed as an issue handling the 
current crisis, (122) will be picked up again in
Section III.6. 
In past economic downturns more countercyclical 
support has been provided by automatic stabilisers 
than by discretionary measures. This conclusion is
drawn by the IMF (2008a) when analysing a set of
41 advanced and emerging market economies
between 1992 and 2007. (123) While the IMF
analysis does not account specifically for financial
crises episodes, its finding is broadly corroborated
by the crises country data analysed in the previous
(122) For example, Blanchard (2009) and Spilimbergo et al. 
(2008). 
(123) Deroose, Larch and Schaechter (2008) in their analysis on 
fiscal policy in the euro area also highlight the importance
of automatic stabilisers and show that in some years their 
stabilising effect has even overcompensated for a pro-
cyclical discretionary stance. 
Table III.5.1: Experience with "bad banks" (Asset Management Companies) during banking crises 1/ 
Crisis episode
Centra-
lised
De-centra-
lised
Rapid 
disposal
Restruc-
turing
Gross 
fiscal costs
Net fiscal 
costs
Recovery
rate (%)
OECD countries
Czech Republic (1996) X X 6.8 5.8 14.7 .. ..
Finland (1991) X X 12.8 11.1 13.3 N Y
Japan (1997) 2/ X 14.0 13.8 1.4 N N
Korea (1997) X X X 31.2 23.2 25.6 Y Y
Mexico (1994) X X X 19.3 18.0 6.7 Y N
Spain (1977) X X .. .. .. N Y
Sweden (1991) X X 3.6 0.2 94.4 N Y
United States (1988) X X 3.7 .. .. N
Other
Ghana (1982) X X 6.0 6.0 0.0 N N
Indonesia (1997) X X 56.8 52.3 7.9 Y N
Malaysia (1997) X X X 16.4 5.1 68.9 .. Y
Philippines (1981) X X .. .. .. Y N
Philippines (1997) X 13.2 13.2 0.0 Y N
Thailand (1997) X X 43.8 34.8 20.5 Y N
Lithuania (1995) X X 3.1 2.9 6.5 .. N
Type of asset management company Direct fiscal costs (% of GDP) Transferred 
assets bigger
than 10% of
GDP?
Generally
considered a 
success?
Y
Notes: 1/ Start of systemic crises in brackets. Other countries using AMCs include Bulgaria (1996), Columbia (1982, 1998), Croatia (1998),  Estonia 
(1992), Dominican Republic (2003), Ecuador (1998), Jamaica (1996), Nicaragua (2000), Russia (1998) and Vietnam (1997).
2/ Spilimbergo (2008) put the gross fiscal costs for Japan at 9.1% of GDP and net fiscal costs at 4.3% of GDP considering a recovery period until 
2007. 
Source: Data from Laeven and Valencia (2008), other information from Klingebiel (2000), Enoch at al. (2002a) and IMF country reports.
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sections. From Table III.3.7, it followed that in 
emerging market countries during crisis episodes 
the majority of the budgetary deterioration was 
driven by the output effect. For industrial countries 
the data were at first sight in the opposite direction. 
However, when considering the sharp economic 
downturns during these episodes, accounting for 
the methodological problems when estimating the 
changes in the cyclically-adjusted balances and 
considering the country-specific bottom-up 
information on fiscal measures, one can conclude 
that discretionary policy has not been the pre-
dominant factor driving the development of 
budgetary balances. For example, for Sweden the 
Ministry of Finance estimates the fiscal measures 
carried out between 1991-93 at 3.9% of GDP, (124) 
while the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance adds up to a 9.9% of GDP. This signals the 
potential huge size of overestimating the 
discretionary effects from a top-down approach. 
Moreover, discretionary fiscal policy has rarely 
exhibited the intended counter-cyclical effect. It 
has typically been found to have been pro-cyclical 
over the business cycle in developing and 
emerging market economies (e.g., Manasse, 2006) 
and largely pro-cyclical in good times in industrial 
countries (e.g., Alesina and Tabellini, 2005 and 
Turrini, 2008). Explanations for pro-cyclicality 
include difficulties in timely and correctly 
identifying the cyclical position, implementation 
lags and political economy arguments that create a 
deficit bias in good times. This argument is, 
however, less relevant for a protracted economic 
downturn.  
Based on these findings a number of factors have 
emerged that should be in place for counter-
cyclical fiscal stimulus to be successful in terms of 
output smoothing. The first set of criteria includes 
the well-known "three Ts" (i) timely so as to 
quickly support economic activity in the period of 
falling private demand, (ii) temporary so as to 
avoid a permanent deterioration in budgetary 
positions and that consumers behave in a Ricardian 
way by reacting to higher budget deficits with 
higher private savings and (iii) targeted so as to 
(124) Based on data by Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002); see 
Table III.4.2. 
maximise the stabilisation impact in light of 
limited budgetary resources. (125)  
Empirical estimates (regression and model based) 
provide some indication on the "pecking order" of 
fiscal policy instruments with regard to their 
impact of real GDP growth, but the uncertainty 
range is broad and varies across countries. (126) 
Nevertheless, on average, short-run multipliers 
have been found to be largest for public 
expenditure with no significant difference for 
public investment and consumption (e.g. Roeger 
and int' Veld, 2009 and Freedman et al., 2009). 
The Commission services simulations with the 
QUEST model put short-term multipliers, in 
normal (non-crisis) times, for both a temporary 
increase in public investment and public 
consumption at around 1.0 and 0.9 for the EU. 
Short-term multipliers for government transfers are 
much lower, however, at about 0.3. Tax cuts have 
generally been associated with lower short-term 
multipliers, due to leakages into higher private 
savings. Commission model simulations put the 
short-term multipliers at around 0.3 for a 
temporary reduction in labour taxes and 0.5 for a 
drop in consumption taxes. 
In addition to these general principles, the 
following six issues matter, which are particularly 
relevant for a protracted global economic crisis.  
First, fiscal policy is more effective if 
accommodated by monetary policy. Model 
simulations show that when nominal interest rates 
are kept unchanged for one year, and real interest 
rates are allowed to fall, fiscal multipliers tend to 
be even higher. In the QUEST model the 
multiplier for a government consumption shock 
rises to 1.4 (from 1.0) and for a labour tax 
reduction to 0.7 (from 0.3) (Roeger and in 't Veld 
(2009). 
Second, when the effectiveness of monetary policy 
is limited due to a high share of credit-constrained 
households, such as during the current crisis, fiscal 
policy becomes particularly powerful. Using the 
European Commission's QUEST model, Roeger 
and in't Veld (2009) show that a 1% of GDP global 
(125) See for example European Commission (2008c). 
(126) For a recent survey on multiplier estimates, see OECD 
(2009). 
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fiscal impulse through a reduction in labour taxes 
for one year raises GDP in the EU by 0.5% in a 
model with credit-constrained households 
compared to 0.3% in a model without (and also 
raises the multiplier for a government consumption 
shock slightly from 0.94 to 0.99). 
Third, fiscal policy stimulus is less effective in 
open economies as a large share of demand falls 
on imported goods. This is the reason why in the 
current crisis the European Commission called for 
a coordinated approach.  
Fourth, in the current crisis the uncertainty about 
which fiscal policy measures are most promising is 
higher than usual. This goes beyond the even 
under "normal times" broad range and ranking of 
multipliers. First attempts to model some of the 
current crisis aspects, such as the higher share of 
credit-constrained households, tend to confirm 
however the preference for targeted expenditure-
based over revenue-based stimulus measures 
(Roeger and in't Veld, 2009). Nevertheless, others 
assess the uncertainty as significant and therefore 
propose the use of a wide range of stimulus 
measures as a way of risk diversification (IMF, 
2009). This may call for the use of a wide range of 
stimulus measures as a way of risk diversification 
(IMF, 2009). However, with such an approach one 
clearly faces a potential trade-off between 
"wasting public resources" by not choosing the 
most effective measure and not doing enough to 
stimulate the economy resulting in negative 
feedback loops.  
Fifth, the size of fiscal multipliers not only varies 
by instrument but also with the degree of market 
rigidities, with lower rigidities implying lower 
multipliers (e.g., Galí et al., 2007; Furlanetto and 
Seneca, 2009).  
Last but not least, to achieve an impact with fiscal 
stimulus measures countries need to have 
sufficiently large fiscal space as measured in 
medium-term market access for public 
financing. (127) When fiscal space is missing 
however, also fiscal consolidation need not 
necessarily be contractionary as it contributes to 
restoring confidence and ensuring long-term 
sustainability. (128) Event and regression analysis 
by the IMF (2008a) indicates that in countries with 
high debt levels fiscal stimulus in downturns has 
had negative impacts on output reflecting the 
concerns about sustainability. A recent study by 
the IMF (2009b) indicates that "fiscal policy 
stimulus in economies that have low levels of 
public debt has a higher impact on the strength of 
the recovery relative to economies that have higher 
levels of public debt." The estimated threshold 
debt level is about 60% of GDP but with a very 
wide uncertainty margin. (129) 
(127) Assessing whether market access for public financing may 
be endangered can be based on a range of factors beyond 
sovereign bond spreads. These include the public debt-to-
GDP ratio, indicators on long-term debt sustainability 
contingent liabilities in the financial sector, potential 
medium-term tax shortfalls, the current account balance 
and non-discretionary spending. 
(128) That fiscal consolidation can be expansionary was first 
argued by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and evidenced for 
the cases of Denmark (1983-86) and Ireland (1987-89). 
Similarly, the authors argued that expansionary fiscal 
policy during Sweden's financial crises had non-Keynesian 
effects. More work has since been conducted (see for a 
review Hemming et al., 2002) with unclear findings on 
whether the size, the composition or both matter for fiscal 
consolidations to be expansionary. Fiscal space, however, 
seems to consistently matter. Despite many caveats raised 
by critiques of these studies, such as selection bias of 
countries analysed, endogeneity problems (rapid growth 
recovery may have brought about the fiscal consolidation 
rather than vice versa) and the lack of consistently 
accounting for exchange rate effects, experiences seems to 
suggest that under certain circumstances fiscal tightening 
need not always be contractionary. 
(129) The 90% confidence interval around the public debt-to-
GDP ratio, when the impact of fiscal policy could worsen 
economic recovery, ranges from about 15-130% of GDP.  
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What can be learnt from the past from today's 
crisis for EU Member States' potential fiscal costs? 
The first part of this section summarises the policy 
responses in the EU, including the banking 
resolution measures and fiscal stimulus packages. 
The second part compares the characteristics of 
today's crisis with those of the past, discusses 
whether and which policy lessons from the past 
could be transferred to today's situation and 
provides a preliminary outlook on the risks for 
public finances in the EU. 
6.1. WHAT HAVE SO FAR BEEN THE POLICY 
RESPONSES BY EU MEMBER STATES? 
6.1.1. Measures to stabilise the financial system 
In October 2008, the EU heads of states and 
governments agreed to implement national rescue 
packages for the EU banking sector, which aimed 
at safeguarding financial stability, restoring the 
normal functioning of wholesale credit markets 
and underpinning the supply of credit to the real 
economy. They agreed to implement a co-
ordinated rescue plan for the EU banking sector, 
comprising a set of broadly similar but separate 
national plans. While the national plans are 
consistent in terms of their menu of main 
components (i.e., measures relating to 
recapitalisation, asset exchanges/purchases and 
lending guarantees), the more detailed design and 
implementation of national plans was left to 
individual Member States. For example, features 
of the rescue plans can vary along the following 
dimensions: (i) coverage of the schemes both in 
terms of financial instruments/markets and 
institutions considered, (ii) eligibility criteria for 
both the financial instruments/markets and 
institutions to access the schemes, (iii) mechanism 
for the implementation of the scheme; e.g. creation 
of a special vehicle, form of the capital injection 
etc, and (iv) pricing aspects, conditionality and exit 
strategy. 
State guarantees and liquidity support were the 
most widespread measures in the first phase. In 
addition, EU Member States have announced 
increases in the minimum level of deposit 
guarantees (Deposit Guarantee Schemes). Quickly, 
EU governments moved into capital injection 
operations. Beginning 2009, and in view of a 
slowdown in credit to the real economy, asset 
relief interventions have been seen as an additional 
component to the existing rescue packages 
announced by EU Member States. Indeed, by 
removing the high uncertainty related to asset 
valuations through direct relief measures, it is 
expected that confidence in the banking sector can 
be restored and normal bank lending to the real 
economy will resume.  
As of mid-May 2009, 23 schemes have been 
approved: eleven guarantee schemes, five 
recapitalisation schemes, five schemes combining 
several measures and one fund for the acquisition 
of financial assets and one liquidity scheme (see 
Table III.6.1). Finland, Ireland, Latvia and the 
Netherlands have notified to the Commission 
guarantee schemes only while France, Denmark, 
Italy, Portugal and Sweden notified guarantee 
schemes in the first place and shortly thereafter 
also recapitalisation schemes. Slovenia added a 
liquidity support scheme as a complement of its 
guarantee. Another group of Member States which 
includes Austria, Germany, Hungary, Greece, and 
the United Kingdom opted for designing schemes 
combining several measures from the start 
(guarantee, recapitalization, other forms of equity 
interventions, etc). Finally, Spain notified first a 
fund for the acquisition of financial assets. In 
addition to the general schemes, several Member 
States have adopted ad hoc individual 
interventions in favour of certain financial 
institutions. 
More recently, Member States have announced 
impaired asset relief measures. Belgium, the 
Netherlands, France and Denmark have taken 
measures on an ad hoc basis. The United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Germany have announced a 
national scheme although their specific design 
varies across countries. 
Since the beginning of May, the Commission also 
started the process of extending existing schemes 
(after the first six month period of approval). 
In aggregate figures, about EUR 310 billion has 
been committed (as approved by the Commission) 
European Commission 
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for re-capitalisation of banks. Of this amount, 
about EUR 170 billion has been injected. This 
amounts to about 2.6% and 1.5% of EU GDP 
respectively. More than EUR 2,900 billion has 
been committed to guarantees on bank borrowing, 
of which about EUR 920 billion is reported as 
having been allocated. (130) This amounts to about 
24.7% and 7.8% of EU GDP respectively 
(Table III.6.1). 
These EU-wide figures conceal considerable 
differences among Member States. These 
differences reflect a range of factors, including (a) 
the relative size of banking sectors, (b) the relative 
reliance of banks on wholesale funding, (c) policy 
preferences and (d) differences in timing of 
implementation.  
The role of the European Commission during the 
financial crisis has not only been to support 
financial stability by giving legal certainty to the 
measures taken by EU Member States in rapid 
circumstances. It has also been to contribute to 
maintaining a level playing field and ensure that 
national measures would not simply export 
problems to other Member States. The 
Commission has adopted three major guidance 
documents on measures taken in response to the 
financial crisis: Banking Communication of 13 
October 2008, Recapitalisation Communication of 
5 December 2008 and the Communication on the 
treatment of impaired assets of 25 February 2009. 
These Communications explain how stat aid rules 
will be applied in the exceptional circumstances of 
the current crisis.  
(130) Figures on guarantees effectively granted are very 
provisional because of a lack of reporting by Member 
States. 
As of mid-May 2009, the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the financial support measures 
against their three main objectives, i.e. to 
safeguard stability in the banking sector, to restore 
the normal functioning of wholesale credit markets 
and to underpin lending to the real economy, is not 
straightforward. Many factors are at play in the 
evolution of the EU financial sector, making it 
difficult to isolate the impact of the measures from 
other factors. Moreover, the implementation of the 
measures in many Member States has been spread 
over time. Nevertheless, a first tentative 
assessment of the effectiveness of the support 
measures would indicate that the measures have 
averted a meltdown in the EU banking sector. 
Overall, the situation in financial markets has 
eased somewhat in the first quarter of 2009. There 
are encouraging signs of improvement in 
interbank, money and corporate bond market 
developments, although the high level of risk 
premiums in many financial markets cautions 
about the operating environment of the financial 
institutions. The latter is likely to remain 
challenging, in particular in respect of credit losses 
linked to the loan portfolio of the banks due to the 
negative growth development in 2008/09. 
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6.1.2. Measures to foster the economic 
recovery 
By end-April 2009, EU fiscal governments had
adopted fiscal stimulus packages amounting to
1.8% for 2009 and 2010. (131) They are part of the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)
endorsed in December 2008 by the European
Council (see for more details Part I.1). The 1.8% 
of GDP measures have been estimated as a 
bottom-up calculation of announced discretionary
measures with a budgetary impact (Table III.6.2). 
They are relatively evenly split up between
revenue and expenditure measures. (132) Across 
Member States, there are some who have not 
(131) The estimates for 2010 include permanent measures taking
effect in 2009 plus the net effect of measures taking effect 
in 2010. 
(132) Extra-budgetary measures with an immediate impact on
debt amount to about 0.3% of GDP for 2009-10. This 
includes, for example capital injections into state-owned 
banks for the purpose of increasing the lending to the 
private sector (though not part of bank rehabilitation 
measures). Guarantees to the private sector, other than the 
financial sector, are estimated at 0.2% for the same period. 
They impact the budget balance and debt only when they 
are called. 
resorted at all to stimulus packages given their 
limited fiscal space and market pressures, while a 
few others plan to implement stimulus measures
amounting to more than 3% of GDP (see for more 
details Part I.1 of this report).  
Table III.6.2: Fiscal stimulus measures in the EU (2009-10) (% of 
GDP) 
EU-27 Euro area
Total 2009 1.1 1.1
2010 0.7 0.8
Revenue 2009 0.6 0.5
2010 0.4 0.5
Expenditure 2009 0.5 0.5
2010 0.3 0.3
Public investment 2009 0.3 0.3
2010 0.1 0.0
Notes: 1/ Figures for 2010 include permanent measures taking effect in 
2009 plus measures taking effect in 2010.
2/ Weighted country averages. 
Source: Commission services.
While the policy packages broadly follow the three 
"Ts" principles, in some areas they could have
been strengthened. As regards the timeliness, there 
were initially concerns that under the projected 
growth path the impact could take effect relatively
late in the cycle. But with the materialisation of the 
downward risks to the projections this is now no
Table III.6.1: EU public interventions in the banking sector as of end-March 2009 (in % of GDP) 1/ 
Austria 5.0 1.7 27.3 5.1 0.4 0.4 27.3 1.5 60.1 8.7 100%
Belgium 4.2 5.7 70.8 16.3 5.7 5.0 NA NR 74.6 35.3 100 000
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 000
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
Denmark 6.1 0.3 253.0 NR 0.0 0.0 NA NR 243.8 0.5 100%
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
Finland 0.0 0.0 27.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.7 0.0 50 000
France 1.2 0.8 16.6 3.1 2.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 20.2 4.2 70 000
Germany 4.2 1.6 18.6 7.3 3.6 0.4 0.0 NR 26.4 6.3 100%
Greece 2.0 0.0 6.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.7 11.4 2.2 100%
Hungary 1.1 0.1 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.1 100%
Ireland 5.1 2.1 225.2 225.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 230.3 227.3 100%
Italy 1.3 0.0 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 ca. 103 000
Latvia 1.4 0.0 10.9 2.8 0.0 0.0 10.9 6.1 23.1 8.9 50 000
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 000
Luxembourg 6.9 7.9 12.4 NR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.3 18.5 100 000
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 000
The Netherlands 7.9 7.9 34.3 5.7 0.0 4.9 0.0 5.8 42.2 24.4 100 000
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
Portugal 2.4 0.0 12.5 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.9 3.0 100 000
Romania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100%
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 32.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.8 0.0 100%
Spain 0.0 0.0 9.3 2.8 0.0 0.0 2.8 1.8 12.1 4.6 100 000
Sweden 1.6 0.2 48.5 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 50.2 8.9 50 000
United-Kingdom 3.5 2.6 21.7 9.5 0.0 0.0 25.1 18.7 50.3 30.8 ca. 57 000
Total EU 2.6 1.5 24.7 7.8 12.0 0.5 4.3 3.0 43.6 12.8
Total euro area 2.6 1.4 20.6 8.3 12.0 0.7 1.3 0.7 36.5 11.1
Effective 
asset relief
Desposit
guarantee 
scheme 
(in € unless
otherwise 
indicated)
Total for all 
approved
measures
Total effective 
for all 
measures
Liquidity and bank
funding support
Effective
liquidity
interventions
Relief of impaired asset
Total
approved
measures
Total
approved 
measures
Effective
capital
injections
Guarantees
granted
Capital injections Guarantees on bankliabilities
Total
approved 
measures
Total
approved
measures
Notes: NA - Not available indicates that the amount is not available in the state aid decision.
NR - Not reported indicates that the amount was not reported by the Member State in its reply to the EFC questionnaire.  
1/ Data, as of 8 May 2009, are provisional. Ratios are based on projected 2009 GDP figures from the Commission services' spring 2009 forecast. 
Source: Commission services.
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longer an issue. As regards the targets of measures, 
to a large extent in EU Member States they have
been geared toward mitigating factors that are 
constraining private consumption and investment
through decreases in income and wealth, credit 
constraints and uncertainty. As regards the 
temporariness, it is assured for the majority of
measures (e.g., those regarding higher public
investment and revenue measures for which the
date of policy reversal has been announced).
However, there remains a risk that especially some
of the revenue measures, accounting for 1% of 
GDP, become entrenched.
In addition to the discretionary measures, 
automatic stabilisers are projected to support the 
economy by another 3.2% of GDP. This would
worsen the general government balance in the EU
and the euro area by about 5% of GDP between 
2010 and 2008 (Table III.6.3 and Graph III.6.1), 
based on a projected decline in real GDP by 4% in 
2009 and a stagnation of -0.1% in 2010 (European
Commission, spring forecast 2009). Thus, roughly 
one third of the deterioration in the fiscal balance 
is due to discretionary measures and the rest
largely due to automatic stabilisers (over the short 
term interest payments are expected to increase 
only slightly for the euro area). In addition to
budgetary measures, EU governments have taken a
number of non-budgetary measures (not directly
targeted at the financial sector) with the aim to
support the economy. They include guarantees for 
the private sector to facilitate access to bank loans 
(which may have eventual budgetary
consequences, however), accelerated 
reimbursement of VAT and measures to support
export companies. 
Graph III.6.1: EU Member States – Key fiscal indicators 
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Table III.6.3: EU Member States – Key fiscal indicators 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Change2007-2010
General government balance -0.8 -2.3 -6.0 -7.3 -6.5
   Public expenditure 45.7 46.8 50.1 51.1 5.4
   Total revenue 44.9 44.5 44.1 43.8 -1.1
Primary government balance 1.9 0.4 -3.2 -4.3 -6.2
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.6 -0.5 -1.8 -2.5 -3.1
Gross public debt 58.7 61.5 72.6 79.4 20.7
Memorandum items:
Real GDP growth (% change) 2.9 1.0 -4.0 -0.1 -3.0
Output p (% of potentail output) 2.6 2.0 -2.9 -3.7 -6.3
(In % of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
Source: Commission services' spring forecast, May 2009.
6.2. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT 
CRISIS: HOW DOES IT COMPARE TO PAST 
CRISES? 
Some similarities of today's crisis with earlier 
financial crises are notable. Among economists a
consensus seems to emerge on the many parallels
including the root causes of the crisis. (133) These 
include the build-up of a bubble in asset prices
(housing and equity) fuelled by an insufficiently
managed financial liberalisation. While financial
liberalisation took a different form in today's crisis 
than in the past, the impacts were very similar. In
contrast to capital account liberalisation or 
loosening of banking regulations, in the run-up to
today's crisis financial innovation occurred through 
the complex bundling and spreading of debt. But
(133) See, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008 a,b,c), Bordo 
(2008) and International Monetary Fund (2009b). 
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both types of financial liberalisation resulted in a 
build-up of excessive risk.  
But past crises experience does not necessarily link 
globalisation with more costly financial crises. On 
the one hand, closer financial and real integration 
appears to be associated with a greater prevalence 
of financial crises (Box III.6.1). There is an 
increasing literature on the potential spillover 
effects of banking and equity market turmoil, in a 
world of more closely integrated good, services 
and capital markets (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
2000; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). In fact, 
with tighter global economic and financial 
integration, financial crises have become more 
frequent (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a). This 
has also implied higher fiscal losses for the world 
as a whole. On the other hand, however, the fiscal 
costs for individual countries to rehabilitate their 
banking systems do not seem to have significantly 
increased with greater globalisation (Box III.6.1).  
However, the global nature and severity of today's 
crisis is unprecedented. Never have financial 
markets been so closely integrated at the outbreak 
of a crisis and, except for the Great Depression, the 
shockwave has never emanated from the largest 
world economy. By end-2008, more than two 
thirds of the world's largest economies (measured 
in per cent of world GDP) were experiencing a 
systemic banking crisis, as reflected in the issuance 
of blanket guarantees, the injection of public 
capital into their banking systems and IMF-
supported programs (see Section III.6.1 for more 
details on the rehabilitation measures taken in the 
EU Member States). At the same time, the 
economic outlook for the advanced economies has 
been the bleakest since World War II 
(Graph III.6.2). (134)  
(134) While some parallels to the Great Depression can be 
drawn, the current crisis distinguishes itself from that 
period particularly as regards the monetary and fiscal 
policy stimulus and the better macroeconomic starting 
positions (IMF, 2009b). 
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Box III.6.1: Financial crises in the global economy
One major striking aspect of the current financial crisis is its global and fast-spreading nature. Contagion has
already been experienced in the past (often coupled with currency crises) and was found to be linked to more
closely integrated goods, services and capital markets (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000 and van
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). However, the diffusion of the current financial crisis to countries that 
initially looked relatively immune from the US subprime mortgage market failures has taken place at an
unprecedented pace (e.g. Frank et al., 2008). This may partly be explained by the large degree of financial
integration. In fact, with tighter global economic and financial integration, the spreading of financial crises
has become more prevalent. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) provide descriptive evidence on this, by plotting a
measure of the frequency of financial crises against a measure of international capital flows since the 19th
century and observe that the two variables are highly correlated. However, part of the apparent correlation is
driven by the two world wars during which capital flows collapsed and financial crises were not accounted
for. In order to check whether the relationship between globalisation and financial crises holds
independently of major shocks through wars, it may be more appropriate to consider a shorter time span. 
This is done in Graph 1 below, which suggests that the pace of economic and financial integration and the
share of countries in crisis have been correlated over the period 1973-2004. The measure of global financial 
integration makes use of the data provided by Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2007a) and combines information
on capital, FDI and trade flows across countries.
Graph 1: Number of countries in financial crisis and pace of global financial integration (1973-2004)
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Has globalisation also been associated with more costly banking crises in terms of the fiscal outlays for
rehabilitating the banking sector? (1) This question can be considered from two angles. On the one hand, a
greater share of countries in financial crisis could raise the fiscal cost for the world economy. On the other
hand, the question arises as to whether global spillovers have led to higher fiscal costs for countries
considered individually. A simple bi-variate analysis indicates while the overall costs for the global
economy have increased as crises have become more frequent (not shown here), the average net direct fiscal
(1) Indeed, some authors have argued that the growing integration of the world economy may lead governments to
increase their size in order to hedge against global systemic shocks to protect their citizens against the adverse
consequences of these shocks (see in particular Rodrik, 1998 and Alesina and Spolaore, 2003).
(Continued on the next page)
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The global nature of the crisis is limiting today's 
response options compared to those available in 
other crises episodes. The limitations relate to the 
real and the financial sector. An export-led
recovery is compromised, at least in the short run, 
as the world economy is in a slump, unlike in 
previous local and regional crises episodes 
(Graph III.6.2). Related to that, the exchange rate 
is generally not available as an adjustment tool
(and is excluded by definition within the euro 
area). This could, on the one hand, complicate the
recovery process which in previous crises has
frequently been helped by a boost of external
competitiveness through a real depreciation or a 
strong world economy (Graph III.6.3 and
Table III.6.4). On the other hand, the denomination 
of public debt in national currency for euro-area 
countries acts as a stabilising factor compared to
countries indebted to a large extent in foreign
currency which entails the risk of debt explosion in
case of sharp depreciation of national currencies. 
The international dimension of the crisis also
reduces the potential involvement of private 
foreign investors in contributing to the
rehabilitation of the banking system. In the past, in
more than half of financial crises impaired assets 
were sold to foreigners (see Annex Table III.2).
During the current crisis, initially sovereign wealth
funds had taken on this role with a first round of
capital injections but foreign investment has 
petered out as the crisis has spread around the 
world. Both of these limitations in policy 
responses flag that today's financial crisis could 
imply a bigger burden on public finances, directly
through the bank restructuring efforts and 
indirectly through the economic slump and its
impact on the budget. 
Box (continued) 
costs for each individual country have not been closely linked to the pace of financial integration and the 
number of crises (Graph 2). The same relation holds broadly for output costs.
The evidence provided here suggest that: (i) increased globalisation has gone hand in hand with a greater
prevalence of systemic financial crises, but (ii) this was not associated with significantly higher output cost
or fiscal losses experienced on average by a country in crisis.
Graph 2: Number of countries in financial crisis and net direct fiscal costs and output losses
(1973-2004)
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Sources: Calculations based on Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2007) and Laeven and Valencia (2008).
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Graph III.6.2: World real GDP growth during major banking 
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Graph III.6.3: Real effective exchange rate during banking crises 
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Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics. 
6.3. HOW MUCH CAN PAST CRISES REALLY 
TELL US ABOUT POLICY RESPONSES AND 
IMPLICATIONS ON PUBLIC FINANCES? 
While transferring experiences with past crises to
today's developments in the EU is far from
evident, it is however not impossible to draw some
lessons. In particular, as regards the potential fiscal
outlays for rehabilitating the banking system some
transfers from past experiences can be made. The
global nature of the crisis may impinge on these
considerations but should not render them invalid.
On the other hand, it is much more difficult to
draw lessons on the indirect fiscal costs of the 
current crisis and the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus measures. Both arguments are developed
below.  
6.3.1. Lessons for direct fiscal costs in
rehabilitating the banking system
Rehabilitating the EU's banking system could
require substantial public outlays. So far, public 
resources of about 44% of GDP have been
approved by EU governments for the support of
banking systems of which 13% of GDP have been
put in use (Table III.6.1). In a benign scenario
(shown in Table III.6.5) much of those outlays 
may either be recovered or not even materialise as
more than half of them are guarantees. However, 
in a more adverse scenario net direct fiscal costs 
could easily add up to about 16½% of GDP. This 
higher cost estimate is derived by assuming that
capital injections would be doubled from the 
currently approved amount of 2.6% of GDP, which 
appears rather small in comparison to the 
estimated impaired assets of about EUR 0.9 trillion 
(according to the IMF, 2009c) in Europe. (135) 
Moreover, the scenario calculation uses the already
approved amounts for other public bank
interventions (including guarantees) and applies to
this the lower end of a range of recovery rates in
line with past crises (see second column in 
Table III.6.5). (136) This upper bound estimate for 
net direct fiscal costs (16½% of GDP) is somewhat
higher than the average bank rescue costs from 
past systemic crises (13% of GDP) and those in 
EU and OECD countries (10% of GDP). (137)  
(135) The IMF (2009c) estimated capital requirements for the 
euro area and Eastern Europe to range between about 4%
and 7% of GDP at end-2008.  
(136) There is less evidence to assess potential loss rates on 
central bank liquidity support and government guarantees. 
Thus, the same rates are assumed here as used in IMF
scenario calculations (International Monetary Fund, 2009). 
(137) In individual EU Member States these costs may be a 
multiple of the EU average. See Table III.6.1 for the 
country-specific commitments as of end-March 2009. 
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Several factors may contribute to the upper bound, 
or even higher direct fiscal costs, materialising. 
This includes first the much larger sizes of banking
systems in the EU today than in past crises and
consequently the larger amount of impaired assets
and recapitalisation needs. For example, banking
system assets in the three Nordic countries before
the 1991 crisis amounted to about 90% of GDP,
while in the euro area in 2008 the ratio was more 
than triple that at about 340% of GDP, to which
also a much larger share of off-balance sheet items
needs to be added.  
Table III.6.5: Risk scenarios for direct fiscal costs 2/ 
Based on 
effective 
measures
Based on
approved 
measures
A Recapitalisation
  A.1 As of 8 May 2009 1.5% 2.6%
 A.1.1     Loss rate (80%) 1.2% 2.1%
  A.2 Assuming a doubling of recapitalisation needs 3.0% 5.2%
 A.2.1     Loss rate (80%) 2.4% 4.2%
B Liquidity and bank funding support 3.0% 4.3%
  B.1     Loss rate (10%) 0.3% 0.4%
  B.2     Loss rate (30%) 0.9% 1.3%
C Govt. guarantees on bank liabilities and relief ofimpaired assets 1/ 8.3% 36.7%
  C.1     Loss rate (15%) 1.2% 5.5%
  C.2     Loss rate (30%) 2.5% 11.0%
TOTAL net fiscal costs
   Lower bound (=A.1.1+B.1+C.1) 2.7% 8.0%
   Higher bound (=A.2.1+B.2+C.2) 5.8% 16.5%
(% of GDP)
Notes: 1/ Includes blanket guarantees (AT, ES, IE, NL) but not the 
potential shortfalls of deposit insurance schemes nor government 
guarantees where amounts have not been specified (e.g. BG, IT, PL, 
UK). See for more details Table III.6.1. 
Source: Commission services.
Second, recovery values of today's impaired assets
may be much lower than of those in the past. This
may be due to the complicated nature and high
leverage of many financial assets, which make 
them difficult to manage, unwind and recover 
underlying values. (138) Moreover, a protracted 
slowdown of the economy, compared to many V-
shaped output developments in earlier crises, is a 
risk factor to achieving higher recovery values. 
Japan may be a useful example in that respect
where most of the 50% recovery rate was achieved 
only from 2002 onwards, i.e. five years after what
is considered the starting date of its systemic crisis 
and more than a decade after the start of the
financial sector problems. (139) Also, the lesser 
availability of foreign and more generally private 
investors, given the global nature of the crisis, may 
suppress recovery values.  
And finally, direct fiscal costs may be substantial 
since some of the weaknesses risk to be repeated 
today. This includes in particular protracting the
resolution of the banking system through 
regulatory forbearance, insufficient
recapitalisations, off-loading of impaired assets 
and liquidation of banks as needed. While even in
the Nordic "success stories" of handling banking
(138) See for example Coval et al. (2009) who provide an 
illustration that structured finance products have a higher
exposure to systemic risks than traditional corporate
securities and that their ratings are extremely fragile to 
modest imprecision in evaluating underlying risks. 
(139) As indicated in Annex Table III.1, Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) estimate the net direct fiscal costs at 13.9% of GDP 
and a recovery ratio of practically zero until end 2001. 
However, when considering data for Japan until 2008, the 
recovery ratio is estimated at 52% (4.7% of GDP recovery 
and gross fiscal outlays of 9.1% of GDP) using most 
recently available information (see Spilimbergo et al.,
2008). 
Table III.6.4: External stimulus factors to recover from the crisis 1/ 
3-year average 
change before 
crisis (t-3 to t-1)
3-year average
change after crisis 
(t to t+2)
3-year average
change before 
crisis (t-3 to t-1)
3-year average 
change after crisis 
(t to t+2)
3-year average 
change before 
crisis (t-3 to t-1)
3-year average 
change after crisis
(t to t+2)
EU-27 2/ 9.2 -0.6 -2.5 0.4 5.6 7.3
EU-15 3/ 4.5 -8.5 -1.1 2.9 1.9 7.7
OECD 3.7 -1.1 0.1 1.5 8.3 10.1
OECD and EU 5.9 -1.3 -1.3 0.9 7.9 8.9
Other than EU and OECD 3.6 -1.2 0.4 1.4 8.2 6.1
Big 5 industrial country-crises 4/ 1.8 -4.3 0.2 1.4 4.0 6.4
Big 8 emerging market-crises 5/ 3.7 -6.5 0.7 4.3 10.8 7.6
TOTAL 4.4 -1.4 -0.3 1.4 7.9 8.0
Real effective exchange rate
(% change)
Export-to-GDP ratio 6/
(percentage point change)
Real export growth 6/
(% change)
Notes: 1/ Based on 49 crises episodes as shown in Annex Table III.1. Unweighted country averages. t = start of the crisis. 
2/ Includes crisis episodes in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and
Sweden. For new Member States data from 1991.
3/ Includes crises episodes in Finland and Sweden. No data for Spain available. 
4/ Includes crisis episodes in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Japan. No data for Spain available. 
5/ Includes Argentina (2001), Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand and Turkey (2000). 
Source:  Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics.
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crises such comprehensive approaches were put 
into place only over one year into the crisis 
(though shortly after announcing blanket 
guarantees), time is becoming of the essence for 
tackling outstanding banking sector issues in the 
EU and on a global nature.  
On the other hand, a few aspects today also bode 
well for containing direct fiscal costs when 
compared to previous crisis. These cost limiting 
factors include the generally stronger legal and 
judicial systems, greater transparency and uniform 
applications of national bank resolution policies. 
The lack of these factors contributed to higher 
costs of bank rescue operations in many past crises 
episodes in transition and emerging market 
economies. It should be noted, however, that 
significant differences in institutional strengths 
remain across EU Member States which could 
have a bearing on recovery rates. On balance, the 
risks for the higher bound estimates of direct fiscal 
costs to materialise are significant.  
Thus, what is needed to resolve the current crisis 
and eventually contain the direct fiscal costs is a 
commitment to a resolute, swift and coherent 
strategy for restoring the EU banking sector to 
viability in the near term, while allowing the 
process of adjustment to extend over a sufficiently 
long, but clearly specified, period of years. The 
strategy needs to include revaluing balance sheets, 
recognising the large losses amassed and cleaning 
up the financial sector balance sheets through 
capital injections and/or resolution of impaired 
assets. Whether asset management companies can 
facilitate this process would need to assessed on a 
country-by-country basis. The resolution process 
may require high upfront costs for the public but a 
drawn-out process is likely to stalk the economy 
and be even costlier in terms of output costs and 
implications for the public sector. Moreover swift 
action is needed also from a political perspective to 
sustain popular consent to public intervention in 
the banking sector. Popular disaffection with 
public support for the banks will inevitably find a 
counterpart in demands for tighter and tighter 
regulation of the sector and could result in the 
worst of all worlds – a structurally weak banking 
sector relying of public support on a durable basis 
and unable to return to profitability because of an 
excessively heavy regulatory burden. 
6.3.2. Lessons for indirect fiscal costs from 
banking crises 
During past crises, public finances deteriorated 
also for reasons independent of direct fiscal costs. 
Statistical analysis indicates that government 
balances deteriorated on average by 2% of GDP 
for the length of the crisis and public debt-to-GDP 
ratios surged by about 20% of GDP. This increase 
in debt ratios following crises episodes was only 
about one third higher than the cumulative direct 
fiscal cost of the crisis, which indicates that in 
some cases the debt build-up from budget deficits 
was substantially reduced via inflation. 
Nevertheless, overall, as a result of the operation 
of automatic stabilisers and, to a lesser extent, 
discretionary expansionary measures, public debt 
increased over and above that associated with 
measures to contain and resolve banking crises. 
The econometric analysis carried out in this report 
indicates that most of the increase in debt 
following crisis periods can be attributed to the 
effect of the crisis itself, while only a minor part 
would have taken place irrespective of the 
emergence of problems in the financial sector. 
Evidence from past crises could to some extent 
provide indications for the prospects of EU public 
finances in the current juncture. The current path 
projected for EU budget balances (see 
Table III.6.3) is very similar to that observed on 
average during past crises periods. The projected 
fiscal deficits of about 6-6½% of GDP for the euro 
area and EU-27 during 2009-10, combined with 
the debt-creating bank rescue measures already 
undertaken, would raise the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio by 18 percentage points for the euro area and 
about 21 percentage points for the EU between 
end-2007 and end-2010. This would be similar to 
the average increases in earlier crises episodes. 
Deviating from these average developments, some 
EU Member States face deteriorations of public 
finances that are reminiscent to some of the most 
severe fiscal implications that systemic banking 
crises have had in the past. This includes Ireland, 
Latvia and the United Kingdom for whom jumps 
in public debt-to-GDP ratios of between 35-55 
percentage points are projected over three years 
after the outbreak of the crisis. These examples 
indicate how quickly the costs of the current crisis 
have amassed in some Member States. Moreover, 
there are substantial upward risks for higher fiscal 
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costs if the economic recovery is more protracted 
than currently foreseen. (140)  
The global nature of today's crisis complicates the 
assessment on the role that fiscal policy can and 
should play. In the past, discretionary fiscal policy 
has typically played only a subordinated role in 
overcoming banking crises as most countries 
affected were small and open economies (except 
Japan) and benefitted from a sharp depreciation of 
their real effective exchange rates that facilitated 
the economies to adjust and recover. Discretionary 
fiscal expansion frequently aimed at supporting the 
most vulnerable in the economies through social 
policy measures. The above-mentioned principles 
for active fiscal policy during cyclical downturns 
or crises (timely, temporary, targeted (in particular 
toward credit/liquidity-constrained economic 
agents) and with sufficient fiscal space) continue 
to apply, but they should be modified and 
supplemented in view of the specific features of 
the current crisis. The "timely" criterion no longer 
simply refers to the appropriate intervention point 
in terms of the business cycle position but also as 
regards the situation of the financial system. On 
the one hand, particularly the Japanese experience 
has indicated that the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus measures can be impacted if the stability 
and health of the financial system has not yet been 
restored. Without that condition in place it would 
be difficult to stimulate private demand since 
uncertainties and constraints to loan provisions 
prevail. On the other hand, in light of the 
heightened risks for a more protracted economic 
slump and apparent difficulties in achieving 
political consensus on potentially expensive and 
interventions in the EU banking systems, a sharp 
divide in sequencing policy responses into bank 
restructuring measures first and economic recovery 
second is neither realistic nor desirable. Rather, 
economic stimulus measures need to go hand-in-
hand with the bank resolution for which efforts 
need to be stepped up. 
(140) For example, Ruscher and Wolf (2009) point to four risk 
factors for a prolonged recession: (i) the requirement for 
large balance sheet adjustments in the financial sector, (ii) 
the need for deleveraging in the non-financial private 
sector (households and corporates), (iii) a downward shift 
in potential output and increase in risk premiums and (iv) 
the need for adjusting global imbalances. 
Three lessons can be drawn for EU Member States' 
fiscal support during the current crisis. They regard 
coordination, differentiation and the size of policy 
responses.  
Coordination: The global dimension of today's 
crisis requires a global coordinated fiscal policy 
response to avoid negative spill-over effects and 
maximise the fiscal policy impact. Model 
simulations by the European Commission and the 
IMF clearly demonstrate that fiscal multipliers are 
significantly larger under coordinated action as 
leakages are contained. Using the QUEST model, 
Roeger and in't Veld (2008) show that the 
multipliers for the EU for a 1% of GDP increase in 
public consumption would increase from 1.2 in 
case of the EU acting alone to 1.4 under a global 
expansion. The IMF estimates the increase in 
multipliers to be even bigger (increasing from 1.5 
to 2.4 for the euro area in case of a global stimulus 
with monetary accommodation). (141) The need for 
a coordinated policy response is reflected for the 
EU in the European Economic Recovery 
Programme; at a global level the G-20 heads of 
governments have committed themselves to put the 
announced packages quickly into action. 
Differentiation: Despite the need for a global 
stimulus, the participation and contribution by 
individual EU Member States should be 
differentiated by their fiscal space and 
macroeconomic starting position. This is to avoid 
that active fiscal policies jeopardizes long-run 
sustainability of their public finances which is a 
corner stone of the Stability and Growth Pact. This 
need for differentiation is reflected in the EERP. 
As the financial and economic crisis has hit some 
EU Member States particularly hard and others 
need to tackle the crisis from unfavourable starting 
positions (including e.g., high public debt levels 
and/or large current account deficits), financial 
markets are requesting significantly higher risk 
premiums on sovereign bonds for some Member 
(141) The simulations of the European Commission and the IMF 
are however not fully comparable, since the IMF estimate 
is the cumulative effect of an ex post deficit (i.e., after 
accounting for the growth impact from the stimulus) of 1% 
of GDP in the first year and 0.5% of GDP in the second 
year. The first-year multiplier alone from the 1% of GDP 
stimulus is about 1.3 for the euro area. Both simulations 
assume an accommodative monetary policy. 
155 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
156 
States (see Graph III.6.4). (142) Even though the
overall level of interest rates has fallen
substantially to before crisis levels, the increase in
spreads can be very costly and counteract fiscal 
stimulus policies. This applies particularly to high-
debt countries but low-debt countries can also be
affected if the sovereign risk premiums are
correlated with private sector risk premiums. 
Model simulation by the Commission services
show that a 100 basis points increase in both
(private and public) risk premiums lasting for two
years (and then gradually fading out) would lower 
real GDP by 1.5%. Thus, Member States need to
carefully manage their fiscal space. 
Size: The size of the needed fiscal stimulus
depends very much on the above mentioned
factors (uncertainties about the size of the 
economic downturn; coordination of measures;
fiscal space; state of the banking sector; country-
specific factors, such as the share of credit-
constrained households and market rigidities 
markets). For the EU, the Commission services
estimate that the 1.8% discretionary fiscal
packages planned under the EERP for 2009-10
would lead to a growth stimulus of slightly less
than 1% of GDP in 2009 and about ⅓% of GDP in 
2010 (see European Commission, January 2009 
Interim Forecast). Whether additional fiscal 
stimulus measures would have the same effect is
uncertain. However, one can expect the effects not
to be linear but rather assume that the marginal
effectiveness of measures decreases in light of 
limited absorption capacities, in particular for 
public investment.  
Graph III.6.4: Sovereign bond spreads of selected EU Member 
States 1/ 
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Source: Bloomberg and Eurostat.
(142) Empirical work surveyed and undertaken by the OECD 
(2009b) shows that sovereign bond spreads are largely 
driven by (i) the debt service ratio, encompassing the 
countries' ability to raise their taxes from a given volume of
GDP, (ii) the fiscal track record, (iii) expected future
deficits, and (iv) the degree of risk aversion. 
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Past financial crises have put considerable strains 
on public finances through several channels: 
Direct fiscal costs from bank rescue measures were 
contained when supported by some policy factors. 
Overall direct fiscal outlays to rehabilitate the 
banking system averaged 13% of GDP in the past 
but was massive in some cases (over 50% of GDP 
in some emerging market economies). At the same 
time, recovery rates, i.e. the compensation for 
initial fiscal outlays over time, were rather small at 
on average 20%. Lower direct fiscal costs and 
higher recovery rates were achieved notably, 
taking into account of the severity of the crisis, 
when the bank resolution strategy was 
implemented swiftly, was transparent and received 
broad political support, supported by strong public 
institutions and legal frameworks, consistent in 
terms of fair and uniform treatment of market 
participants, and included a clear exit strategy. 
Apart from these broad principles the choices on 
how to intervene in financial institutions and deal 
with impaired assets has differed, reflecting 
country specificities, and with varying degrees of 
success. For example, the use of asset management 
companies with the aims to restructure and recover 
impaired assets as well as to dispose of publicly 
acquired assets by the public has been mixed. In 
particular, econometric evidence shows that strong 
legal and judicial frameworks have emerged as 
factors associated with higher recovery rates. 
Debt increased following crises also for reasons 
non-related with measures to tackle the problems 
of the financial sectors. Government balances 
deteriorated on average by 2% of GDP resulting in 
deficits of 4% of GDP per annum during the crisis. 
This deterioration of fiscal positions contributed to 
the jump in public debt-to-GDP ratios by about 
20% of GDP. This overall increase in nominal debt 
was above the amount attributable to direct fiscal 
costs. Econometric evidence shows that the largest 
part of this increase in debt can indeed be 
attributed to the financial crises, with only a small 
fraction taking place irrespective of the crisis 
outburst. The overall fiscal implications from 
financial crises were closely associated with the 
impact on the real economy. On average, financial 
crises have hit real economies hard. Output gaps 
declined by about 1% of potential GDP per annum 
during the crises. As a result, debt ratios increased 
substantially due to additional crisis-related 
budgetary outlays ensuing from the operation of 
automatic stabilisers. To some extent, increased 
discretionary fiscal stimulus to counter the 
economic downturns also added to the budgetary 
deterioration. However, the country case studies 
indicate that this was quite limited, since countries' 
fiscal space was frequently constrained due to 
rapidly weakening confidence in the public sector. 
In the few cases of relatively large expansionary 
fiscal activism, such as Sweden and Japan, there 
are many indications that the success of policies 
was rather limited. In the case of Sweden this was 
largely rooted in Ricardian consumers and in the 
case of Japan also in the protracted restructuring of 
the financial system and inefficiencies in the fiscal 
stimulus packages and their delivery. While most 
of the crisis costs occurred during the first two 
crisis years, the fiscal implications often proved 
difficult to reverse. Even eight years after the 
crises most countries had not yet reached their pre-
crisis debt ratios. 
The global nature of the current crisis provides 
some unprecedented challenges for public finances 
and has limited the policy response options. This 
includes the much larger sizes of banking systems 
in the EU today, than in past crises and 
consequently the larger size of impaired assets and 
recapitalisation needs. Recovery values of today's 
impaired assets may be much lower than in the 
past due the complicated nature and high leverage 
of many financial assets. Moreover, a quick 
export-led recovery of the real economy based on a 
sharp adjustment of the real exchange rate, a 
typical phenomenon of past crises, is not an option 
for the EU as a whole. Thus, a greater burden falls 
on fiscal and monetary policy support. And lastly, 
the lesser availability of foreign and more 
generally private investors, given the global nature 
of the crisis, may suppress recovery values.  
How could the current crisis be tackled without 
excessively straining public finances in the EU? 
Even though today's crisis is unprecedented and 
the risks are high that it will have immense fiscal 
implications, one can still draw some lessons from 
past experiences: 
A resolute and swift strategy is needed to resolve 
the banking system. After the crisis has been 
successfully contained through liquidity support 
and blanket guarantees, more needs to be done to 
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restore the health of the financial system. This 
resolution phase may require high upfront costs for 
the public but a drawn-out process is likely to stalk 
the economy and be even costlier in terms of 
output costs and implications for the public sector. 
Whether specific instruments, such as asset 
management companies, can facilitate this process 
would need to assessed on a country-by-country 
basis. Importantly, also a coordinated exit strategy 
needs to be prepared in the EU. This includes the 
timing for disposing publicly-acquired assets and 
lifting blanket guarantees with a view to ultimately 
withdrawing the role of the public sector and limit 
market distortions within Member States and the 
single market. Such a swift and coherent strategy 
is also needed against rising popular disaffection 
with public support for the banks that could find its 
counterpart in demands for an overregulation of 
the sector and could result in the worst of all 
worlds – a structurally weak banking sector relying 
on public support on a durable basis and unable to 
return to profitability because of an excessively 
heavy regulatory burden. 
The effectiveness of fiscal support hinges on a 
number of factors in addition to the resolution 
strategy of the banking sector. Automatic 
stabilisers in the EU are sizable and letting them 
play fully can provide a significant contribution to 
buffering the economic impact of the crisis despite 
the fiscal implications. Discretionary measures are 
particularly effective if coordinated (within the EU 
and globally) and targeted to credit and liquidity-
constrained households, in particular when 
monetary policy is getting less effective. In 
principle, support of public investment has not 
only short-term demand effects but can also 
strengthen the long-term growth options. However, 
limits in absorption capacities could render this 
instrument less effective.  
The application of these broad principles for fiscal 
support of the economy needs to be differentiated 
across Member States, however, in particular with 
a view to maintaining long-term sustainability. 
Depending on the degree of fiscal space and 
macroeconomic imbalances, embarking on 
credible adjustment paths and regaining market 
confidence may need to take precedence. For the 
EU that applies to two groups of countries: those 
that started with relatively low debt levels but were 
exceptionally hard hit by the crisis and those that 
entered the crisis with already high public debt 
levels so that a slowdown in nominal GDP growth 
below nominal interest rates would ratchet up debt 
ratios. Countries across both groups face additional 
long-term pressures on their public finances 
through rising age-related spending.  
As a consequence, EU Member States need to 
develop exit strategies from the fiscal crisis policy 
support provided now. This goes beyond the exit 
strategies from the public involvement in the 
banking sector and needs to focus on the 
consolidation of public finances once economic 
conditions are improving or, in the absence of 
fiscal space, already today. Strong fiscal 
frameworks, i.e. national fiscal rules and 
institutions, should play a useful role in putting the 
fiscal houses back in order after the crisis and 
ensuring long-term sustainability. They have been 
instrumental for the adjustment paths after the 
financial crises in Finland and Sweden and 
generally found to be associated with successful 
fiscal consolidations (see Part II.2.3 and e.g., 
European Commission, 2007; Larch and Turrini, 
2008). 
ANNEX III 
MORE DETAILS ON FISCAL COSTS OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
ANNEX III.1.  OUTPUT COSTS OF FINANCIAL 
CRISIS  
In the literature, two main methods to calculate 
output losses can be distinguished. The widespread 
IMF method (proposed in 1998) calculates output 
losses as the difference between trend growth
before the crisis and actual GDP until four years 
after the crisis or until the time when annual output 
growth returned to its trend. The number of years 
and the method that underlie the pre-crisis trend 
calculations differ in the literature.143 An 
alternative method sums up the differences in the 
levels, rather than growth rates, of actual GDP 
from its trend during the crisis (e.g., Hoggarth et 
al., 2001, Boyd et al., 2005 and Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008). The authors using the level 
method argue that the growth method 
underestimates the output losses because it does 
not recognise the reduction in the output level in 
the previous years.144 The latest banking crisis 
143  The IMF (1998) and Caprio et al. (2005) use a three-year 
pre-crisis average of GDP as trend growth. Others, such as 
Bordo et al. (2001) and Jonung and Hagberg (2005) use a 
five-year trend. Schwierz (2004) uses the trend of three 
complete business cycles for Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
144 See for an explanation and a mathematical comparison of 
the two methods Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) and 
Hoggarth et al. (2002). The authors show that measuring 
output losses in levels rather than growth rates yields (i) a 
lower estimate of losses for crises lasting only one year, (ii) 
a higher estimate for crises lasting longer than two years 
and (iii) about the same estimate for crises lasting exactly 
two years. As an illustration assume that during a three-
year financial crisis the output growth is zero while trend 
growth before the crisis started at t was 3%, then the output 
loss estimates using the growth would yield 9.0% while the 
level method would put the loss at 13.7%. As shown in the 
chart below, the growth rate calculation measures output 
costs only as the sum of the white rectangles, while the 
level calculation measures the loss as the red triangle (1.5% 
in t; 4.5% in t+1 (=1.5% +3%) and 8% in t+2 
(=1.5%+3%+3.2%)). 
GDP
100
103.0
106.1
109.3
Yeart-1 t+1 t+2t
3%
3%
3%
database from Laeven and Valencia (2008) uses 
the level method. Since in the present study their 
data on fiscal costs and crisis resolution policies 
are used extensively, the study also resorts to their 
level estimates for output losses.  
Even though it is difficult to fully replicate the 
level method figures from Laeven and Valencia, 
the below example illustrates broadly the 
differences to the growth method. The bottom right 
hand cells in Annex table AIII.1 compare three 
exemplary calculations (Finland, Sweden and 
Thailand) for the level output losses with those 
from Laeven and Valencia. Annex table AIII.ll 
figures yield substantially higher output losses than 
for the growth method which is shown in the upper 
part of the table. The difference between the 
calculations here and Laeven and Valencia may 
result from the different assumptions about the 
pre-crisis trend growth. For the illustration purpose 
here, a simple 10-year average is taken in contrast 
to the Hodrick-Prescott filter used by Laeven and 
Valencia.  
Output losses following financial crises have been 
substantial. Nearly 20% of average trend level 
GDP has been lost in the 49 crisis episodes 
between 1970 and 2007 (based on the descriptive 
statistics from Laeven and Valencia, 2008). While 
the impact on the real economy has varied 
substantially across crisis episodes, it appears that 
industrial and emerging markets were equally hard 
hit (Annex graph III.1). Even countries that are 
considered to have handled the resolution of their 
banking systems decisively, such as Finland and 
Sweden, suffered output losses of 59% and 31% of 
average trend level GDP. Jonung and Hagberg 
(2005) estimate that the loss for Finland was the 
highest of any peace-time crisis since the 1870s. 
However, one should not forget that additional 
shocks, such as the breakdown of the trade with 
the Soviet Union for Finland, also contributed 
substantially to the real economy effects. 
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Annex table AIII.1: Fiscal costs in systemic banking crises (1970-2007) 1/
Country Crises dates 2/
Total gross
fiscal cost 3/
(% of GDP)
Total net fiscal
cost 4/
(% of GDP)
Recovery ratio
(% of gross
fiscal cost)
Gross
recapitalization
cost
(% of GDP)
Net
recapitalization
cost 5/
(% of GDP)
Recovery ratio
from capital
injections
(% of capital
injections)
Output loss
(level estimate) 
6/
(% of trend GDP)
EU countries 6.6 5.5 23.9 2.8 2.4 12.1 18.4
Bulgaria 1996–99 14.0 13.9 … 2.3 2.3 0.0 1.3
Czech Republic 1996–97 6.8 5.8 14.7 1.0 1.0 0.0 …
Estonia 1992–95 1.9 1.6 14.2 1.3 1.0 21.4 …
Finland 1991–94 12.8 11.1 13.4 8.6 6.9 19.9 59.1
Hungary 1991–95 10.0 … … … … … …
Latvia 1995–99 3.0 3.0 0.0 … … … …
Lithuania 1995–97 3.1 2.9 6.5 1.7 1.5 11.9 …
Poland 1992–95 3.5 … … … … … …
Romania 1990–99 0.6 … … … … … …
Slovak Republic 1998–2000 … … … … … … 0.0
Slovenia 1992–94 14.6 … … … … … 1.0
Spain 1977–80 5.6 … … … … … …
Sweden 1991–94 3.6 0.2 94.4 1.9 1.5 19.5 30.6
Non-EU OECD countries 15.1 14.8 23.0 11.4 11.5 25.4 16.6
Japan 7/ 1997–2002 14.0 13.9 0.6 6.6 6.5 1.4 17.6
Korea 1997–2002 31.2 23.2 25.6 19.3 15.8 18.1 50.1
Mexico 1981–82 … … … … … … 51.3
Mexico 1994–97 19.3 18.0 6.7 3.8 … … 4.2
Norway 1991–93 2.7 0.6 77.8 2.6 0.6 76.6 0.0
Turkey 1982–85 2.5 … … … … … 0.0
Turkey 2000–03 32.0 30.7 4.1 24.5 23.2 5.3 5.4
United States 1988–91 3.7 2.4 … … … … 4.1
Other countries 18.2 14.5 16.8 8.4 6.0 19.7 20.2
Argentina 1980–82 55.1 55.1 0.0 … … … 10.8
Argentina 1989–90 6.0 6.0 0.0 … … … 10.7
Argentina 1995–97 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 7.1
Argentina 2001–05 9.6 9.6 0.0 9.6 9.6 0.0 42.7
Bolivia 1994–97 6.0 3.4 44.0 0.9 0.0 100.0 0.0
Brazil 1990 0.0 0.0 … … … … 12.2
Brazil 1994–96 13.2 10.2 22.7 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0
Chile 1981–87 42.9 16.8 60.8 34.3 6.5 81.2 92.4
Columbia 1982–87 5.0 5.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 0.0 15.1
Columbia 1998–99 6.3 2.5 59.6 4.3 2.7 36.6 33.5
Ivory Coast 1988–91 25.0 25.0 0.0 4.3 2.7 36.6 0.0
Croatia 1998–2000 6.9 6.9 0.0 3.2 3.2 0.0 0.0
Dominican Republic 2003–04 22.0 20.8 5.5 … … … 15.5
Ecuador 1998–2001 21.7 16.3 25.1 1.9 1.6 15.8 6.5
Ghana 1982–89 6.0 6.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 0.0 15.8
Indonesia 1997–2002 56.8 52.3 7.9 37.3 37.3 0.0 67.9
Israel 1977–80 30.0 … … … … … 0.0
Jamaica 1996–2000 43.9 39.0 11.3 13.9 9.0 35.6 30.1
Malaysia 1997–2002 16.4 5.1 68.9 16.4 5.1 68.9 50.0
Nicaragua 2000–07 13.6 12.6 7.6 … … … 0.0
Paraguay 1995–99 12.9 10.0 22.5 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0
Philippines 1997–2005 13.2 13.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Russia 1998–2000 6.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0
Thailand 1997–2002 43.8 34.8 20.5 18.8 18.8 0.0 97.7
Ukraine 1998–2000 0.0 0.0 … … … … 0.0
Uruguay 2002–05 20.0 10.8 45.8 6.2 5.0 18.8 28.8
Venezuela 1994–95 15.0 12.5 16.7 5.6 5.6 0.0 9.6
Vietnam 1997–99 10.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 19.7
Average all countries 14.8 13.0 17.8 7.8 6.0 20.0 19.3
Notes: 1/ For the econometric work we also use the following crises episodes (except for the work on direct fiscal costs since no information on bank
resolution policies is available for these countries
1/ Laeven and Valenca list another 65 banking crisis episodes during 1970-2007 mostly for developing economies. This are not used for the analysis 
here.
2/ Since Laeven and Valencia only define the starting points of the crises but not their length, we use for the latter the information provided by
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). In case of missing or conflicting information in those sources, the end of the 
crisis was determined as the year when domestic credit bottomed out. 
3/ Gross fiscal costs are government outlays during the crisis. 
4/ Gross fiscal costs minus recovery values during period t to t+5, where t is the first year of the crisis. 
5/ Gross capital injections minus recovery during period t to t+5, where t is the first year of the crisis.
6/ Calculated as the cumulative deviation (from t to t+3) of real GDP level from trend real GDP level before the crisis. The level estimates shown here
are higher than output losses based on growth rates. For many transition economies no sufficient data were avialable to calculate the pre-crisis trend.
7/ For Japan, revised Laeeven and Valencia data on gross fiscal costs are 14% of GDP compared to previous estimates of 24% of GDP (e.g., Caprio et
al. 2005). Spilimbergo et al. (2008) put the  gross costs at only 9.1% of GDP of which 4.7% of GDP were recovered until 2008 (in contrast to the 
shorter recovery period assumed (until 2002) in the Laeven and Valencia database).
Source: Data from Laeven and Valencia (2008) "Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database", IMF Working Paper 08/224 and Commission services. 
Part III 
The Fiscal Costs of Financial Crises: Past Evidence and Implications for Today's Crisis 
Annex table AIII.2: Crisis containment and resolution policies (1970-2007)
Deposit
freeze
Bank
holiday
Blanket
guarantee 
1/
Liquidity
support 2/
For-
bearance 
3/
Overall 
large-scale 
govt. inter-
vention 4/
Bank
closures
Nationa-
lisations Mergers
Sales to
foreigners
Bank
restruc-
turing
agency
Asset
manage-
ment
company
Recapital-
isation
Deposit
insurance
Losses
imposed
on
depositors
EU countries
Bulgaria 1996-99 N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y … Y Y Y N
Czech Republic 1996-97 N N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Estonia 1992-95 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y
Finland 1991-94 N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y … Y Y Y Y N
Hungary 1991-95 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Latvia 1995-99 N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N Y
Lithuania 1995-97 N N N N Y Y Y Y N N … Y N N Y
Poland 1992-95 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Romania 1990-99 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Slovak Republic 1998-2000 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Slovenia 1992-94 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Spain 1977-80 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Sweden 1991-94 N N Y Y N Y N Y … … Y Y Y N N
Non-EU OECD countries
Japan 6/ 1997-2002 N N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Korea 1997-2002 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Mexico 1981-82 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Mexico 1994-97 N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N
Norway 1991-93 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y … Y N Y Y N
Turkey 1982-85 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Turkey 2000-03 N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
United States 1988-91 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Other countries
Argentina 1980-82 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y N
Argentina 1989-90 Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N N N N Y Y
Argentina 1995-97 N N N N N N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N
Argentina 2001-05 Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y
Bolivia 1994-97 N N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Brazil 1990 Y N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N
Brazil 1994-96 N N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y N N
Chile 1981-87 N N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y N Y
Columbia 1982-87 N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N Y N N
Columbia 1998-99 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
Ivory Coast 1988-91 N N N Y Y Y Y N N … … Y Y N Y
Croatia 1998-2000 N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Dominican Rep. 2003-04 N N N Y Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N
Ecuador 1998-2001 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
Ghana 1982-89 N N N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y N N
Indonesia 1997-2002 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Israel 1977-80 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Jamaica 1996-2000 N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
Malaysia 1997-2002 N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N
Nicaragua 2000-07 N N Y Y N Y N N N N N Y N N N
Paraguay 1995-99 N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y N N Y N N
Philippines 1997-2005 N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N
Russia 1998-2000 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y
Thailand 1997-2002 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Ukraine 1998-2000 N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y N N Y Y
Uruguay 2002-05 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N
Venezuela 1994-95 N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y
Vietnam 1997-99 N N N N Y Y Y N Y … N Y Y N N
0.0 0.0 50.0 66.7 66.7 100.0 66.7 83.3 72.7 66.7 70.0 75.0 83.3 66.7 25.0
19.2 15.4 19.2 80.8 69.2 84.6 73.1 46.2 53.8 50.0 44.0 53.8 65.4 42.3 38.5
13.2 10.5 28.9 76.3 68.4 89.5 71.1 57.9 59.5 54.5 51.4 60.5 71.1 50.0 34.2
% of total number of incidents
(other countries
% of total number of incidents (EU
and OECD)
% of total number of incidents (all
countries)
Country Crisis dates
Containment phase Resolution phase
Large-scale govt. intervention
Notes: 1/ On deposits and possibly other liabilities. 
2/ Whether liquidity support was provided was derived by Laeven and Valencia from the monetary authorities' balance sheet. If the ratio of claims by
monetary authorities on deposit money banks to total deposits was at least 5% and had at least doubled with respect to the previous year during the 
period t to t+3, than it was considered as liquidity support. 
3/ Regulatory forbearance includes the suspension or less than full application of prudential regulations (e.g. for loan classification or loan loss 
provisioning) and, e.g. the permission for banks to continue operations despite being technically insolvent (see Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
4/ Indicates whether or not there was large-scale government intervention in banks, such as nationalisations, closures, mergers, sales and 
recapitalisations of large banks during the years t to t+3. 
5/ Gross fiscal costs minus recovery values during period t to t+5, where t is the first year of the crisis. 
6/ For Japan, revised Laeeven and Valencia data on gross fiscal costs are 14% of GDP compared to previous estimates of 24% of GDP (e.g., Caprio et
al. 2005). Spilimbergo et al. (2008) put the  gross costs at only 9.1% of GDP of which 4.7% of GDP were recovered until 2008 (in contrast to the 
shorter recovery period assumed (until 2002) in the Laeven and Valencia database).
Since they account for information that became available only after t+5, we report the Laeven and Valencia data here to maintain the consistency in 
methodology with other crises episodes.  
Source: Data from Laeven and Valencia (2008) "Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database", IMF Working Paper 08/224. 
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Existing analysis show that output losses following 
financial crises are often not fully recovered.
Although after an initial collapse in economic
activity following banking crises growth
accelerates, often at high pace, this acceleration in 
growth during the recovery may not be sufficient
to restore the level of economic activity prevailing
before the start of the crisis or may be short-lived, 
with growth stabilising at rates below the trend 
observed before the crisis. Recent analysis shows
that on average the recovery of growth rates after 
crisis periods is not sufficient to bring back past 
trend growth on a sustainable basis. Cerra and
Saxena (2008) estimate impulse-response
functions of GDP growth rates after banking crises 
shocks and find that, on average, across alternative
groups of countries, growth rates tend to converge 
to levels below the pre-crisis period. 
Existing analysis show that output losses following 
financial crises are often not fully recovered.
Although after an initial collapse in economic
activity following banking crises growth
accelerates, often at high pace, this acceleration in 
growth during the recovery may not be sufficient
to restore the level of economic activity prevailing
before the start of the crisis or may be short-lived, 
with growth stabilising at rates below the trend 
observed before the crisis. Recent analysis shows
that on average the recovery of growth rates after 
Annex table AIII.3: Correlation among different crises resolution measures (1970-2007)
Blanket 
guar-
antee 2/
Liquidity
support 3/
Regulatory
for-
bearance 4/
Bank
closures
Nationa-
lisations Mergers
Sales to
for-
eigners
Bank
restruc-
turing 
agency
Asset
manage-
ment
company
Recapital-
isation
Deposit
insurance
Losses 
imposed on 
depositors
Blanket guarantee 1 0.22 -0.07 0.22 -0.36 0.43 0.38 0.15 0.41 0.40 0.28 0.06
Liquidity support 1 0.15 0.21 -0.08 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.15 -0.07 0.05 -0.06
Forbearance 1 0.07 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.38 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.25
Bank closures 1 -0.07 0.24 0.26 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.17 0.34
Nationalisations 1 0.28 0.08 0.54 0.29 0.28 0.32 -0.06
Mergers 1 0.32 0.37 0.22 0.43 0.19 -0.08
Sales to foreigners 1 0.10 0.08 0.39 0.21 -0.32
Bank restructuring agency 1 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.17
Asset management company 1 0.32 -0.16 -0.10
Recapitalisation 1 0.06 -0.27
Deposit insurance 1 -0.17
Losses imposed on depositors? 1
Notes: 1/ Based on 39 crises episodes with information on crisis resolution policies reported in Appendix Table 2. 
2/ Whether liquidity support was provided was derived by Laeven and Valencia from the monetary authorities' balance sheet. If the ratio of claims by
monetary authorities on deposit  money banks to total deposits was at least 5% and had at least doubled with respect to the previous year during the 
period t to t+3, than it was considered as liquidity support. 
3/ Regulatory forbearance includes the suspension or less than full application of prudential regulations (e.g. for loan classification or loan loss 
provisioning) and, e.g. the  permission for banks to continue operations despite being technically insolvent (see Laeven and Valencia, 2008).
4/ Indicates whether or not there was large-scale government intervention in banks, such as nationalisations, closures, mergers, sales and 
recapitalisations of large banks during the years t to t+3.  
Source: Calculations based on data from Laeven and Velencia (2008).
Annex Table AIII.4: Exemplary calculations of output costs using the growth and level methods 
GDP with 
trend growth 
(t-1=100)
Actual GDP 
after crisis 
(t-1=100)
Output loss Caprio etal. (2005)
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+3 t+3 t to t+3
t until trend 
growth is
reached
A B A-B
Finland 3.0 -6.2 -3.7 -0.9 3.6 112.7 92.6 20.1 21.0
Sweden 2.1 -1.1 -1.2 -2.0 3.9 108.8 99.6 9.2 11.0
Thailand 9.5 -1.4 -10.5 4.4 4.8 143.9 96.6 47.3 40.0
Total GDP 
with trend 
growth
Total actual 
GDP Output loss
Laeven/
Valencia
(2008)
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t to t+3 t to t+3 t to t+3 t to t+3
A B (A-B)/(A/4)
Finland 3.0 93.8 90.3 89.4 92.6 418.6 366.1 50.2 59.1
Sweden 2.1 98.9 97.8 95.8 99.6 412.9 392.1 20.2 30.6
Thailand 9.5 98.6 88.3 92.2 96.6 460.8 375.6 73.9 97.7
Growth
method
Level 
method
Real GDP growth rate during crises
Actual real GDP level during crises (t-1=100)
Trend growth 
(10-year pre-
crisis average)
Trend growth 
(10-year pre-
crisis average)
Source: Commission services.
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crisis periods is not sufficient to bring back past 
trend growth on a sustainable basis. Cerra and
Saxena (2008) estimate impulse-response
functions of GDP growth rates after banking crises 
shocks and find that, on average, across alternative
groups of countries, growth rates tend to converge 
to levels below the pre-crisis period.Caution is 
needed in interpreting output developments
following financial crises. There are strong reasons 
to expect that systemic banking crises cause a 
reduction in the amount of available credit, thus
depressing investment, consumption and output.
Consistently, the data indicate that credit to the 
private sector tends to fall following financial
crises. However, it cannot be excluded that part of 
the output loss that is observed during financial
crises episodes is the cause rather than the 
consequence of financial sector distress. More 
generally, the burst of asset bubbles is the 
concomitant cause of reduced economic activity 
and losses in the banking and financial sector.
Some research has attempted to tackle the issue of
reverse causation in estimating the impact of 
banking crises on output. Dell' Ariccia, 
Detragiache and Rajan (2006) use the
methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) to assess the contribution of financial
development to growth potential to analyse the 
banking crises implications on output. Exploiting 
data variation both across countries and sectors, it
is shown that the sectors that undergo the strongest
contractions during banking crisis periods are 
those more exposed to external finance. This
evidence corroborates the hypothesis that output
losses are the result, rather than the cause of
reduced availability of credit. 
ANNEX III.2.  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
BANKING CRISES ON GOVERNMENT DEBT 
The evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio in
Graph III.3.8 was constructed as 
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where D is the stock of debt, Y is nominal GDP, y
is nominal growth, d is the estimated average value 
of the sum of the budget deficit plus stock flow
adjustment during crises, and where the snow ball
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1  is taken from actual historical
data. 
As for d, it is computed as  
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Annex graph III.1: Output losses of systemic banking crises (1970-2007) 
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This decomposition is subject to a number of 
caveats, however. First such decomposition 
includes the stock flow adjustment as explained 
above.  Second, the benchmark used is the average 
length of the crisis (approximately 5 years) 
assuming that for each year of a financial crisis the 
increase in debt due to the crisis (and the split into 
direct and indirect effect) remains constant. The 
reality might be rather different, however. In 
particular, results reported in Section III.3.2 show 
that the bulk of the impact of financial crises on 
public debt took place in the first two years. This 
means that the impact of a financial crisis on debt 
via the output loss could be more important 
considering cases when a crisis lasts more than 
five years. Third, the calculation also assumes that 
nominal GDP growth stays constant during a crisis 
period (while in reality for the sample countries 
nominal GDP grew by 2.5% over the crisis period) 
while it could be expected that the deterioration in 
GDP growth is more pronounced at the beginning 
of the crisis. Relaxing these assumptions (and 
assuming that, e.g., 80% of the crisis impact takes 
place during the first two years and nominal GDP 
growth is -2% and 0% in the first and second year 
of a financial crisis and 2.5% for the rest of the 
crisis period) would yield an increase in the public 
debt-to GDP ratio by 28 percentage points (instead 
of 21% of GDP as reported in Section III.3.2). 
More generally, the relative importance of the 
direct and indirect (via the deterioration in the 
output gap) impact of financial crises on changes 
in debt levels can vary substantially depending on 
country-specific circumstances, especially as 
regards the length of a financial crisis.  
where the coefficients in formula are those in the 
regression equations (2) and (3). The first term on 
the right hand side of equation (i) is the long term 
impact of additional negative output gap due to the 
crisis (the additional loss of output compared with 
trend being equal to equal to ( 21
3
1 ωω
ω
−−
), while 
the second term in (i) is the direct impact of the 
crisis on the change deterioration in debt. 
Hence, the simulation consists of starting from the 
historical value of debt 
1
1
−
−
t
t
Y
D  before the crisis and 
replacing the subsequent actual values of the sum 
of the deficit and stock flow adjustment with d, the 
predicted average impact of the crisis from the 
regression analysis. 
Equation (i) could also be used to compare the 
relative importance of the direct impact of a 
financial crisis on the change in debt with the 
indirect impact via the deterioration in the output 
gap. Using actual data for the sample of OECD 
countries considered in Section III.3.2, the d term 
in equation (i) was equal to 6%. A simple 
calculation based on (i) shows that approximately 
2 percentage points of the increase in debt was due 
to indirect effect via the output gap (i.e. 
corresponding to the first term on the right hand 
side of equation (i)) while 4 percentage came from 
the direct impact on change in debt (i.e., 
corresponding to the second term of the right hand 
side of equation (i)). 
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SUMMARY 
As evidenced in Part III, past experiences show 
that systemic financial crises can have particularly 
distressing effects for public finances through 
direct fiscal costs (related to public support of the 
banking sector) and indirectly through severe 
output loss. The current financial crisis is no less 
challenging for European economies. This crisis 
has, in particular, drastically reversed the 
favourable economic conditions that prevailed 
until 2008, entailing a fast and sizeable 
deterioration of fiscal positions in most EU 
countries, threatening in turn the sustainability of 
public finances over the medium term in some. 
This chapter analyses the role played by the recent 
episodes of asset prices and credit booms and busts 
on EU countries' public finances. It analyses in 
particular the conditions under which active fiscal 
stimulus might (or might not) help smoothing the 
potential economic costs of a bust. 
Credit markets and asset price evolutions played a 
key role through buoyant tax revenues and 
catching up public expenditure during the booms, 
followed by large tax revenue shortfalls. Section 
IV.1 presents some key macro-financial and 
economic developments in the run-up to the 
financial crisis illustrating the credit and property 
boom and its characteristics. It shows large 
differences across Member States.  
Section IV.2 analyses the impact of property price 
evolutions on public finances during the boom 
period. It presents recent public finance 
developments in the EU, linking them to the 
building-up of asset price and credit booms using 
VAR analysis. Impulse-response functions were 
constructed checking to what extent the fiscal 
variables react to house price variations over a 
time horizon of 10 years after the shock. 
Government revenues tend to react more swiftly - 
and in a more pronounced way - to a positive 
shock in house prices than government 
expenditure. In most cases government 
expenditures catch up with government revenues 
suggesting that the potential improvements in the 
budget balance are only temporary. The VAR 
model is also used to analyse the link between 
variables that may fuel the interaction between 
house prices and fiscal variables, illustrating the 
mechanisms at play. Results indicate that the credit 
channel is by far the most influential variable in 
transmitting house price fluctuations to total 
government revenues. It also indicates important 
differences across countries. Further econometric 
analysis of the determinants of tax revenue 
surprises suggests that the effects of internal and 
external imbalances on public finances are strongly 
interconnected. However, the most important 
determinant of revenue windfalls appears to be 
expectations that are not validated by subsequent 
business cycle developments. Illustrative 
simulations using the Commission services' 
QUEST III model with credit constrained 
households indicate that prudent fiscal policy 
during good times can help containing the output 
drop following a boom, especially in countries that 
have limited fiscal space preventing 
countercyclical policies or requiring procyclical 
tightening during the bust. 
Section IV.3 looks at the consequences of the bust 
in property prices for public finances by analysing 
the effects of fiscal constraints for different 
degrees of fiscal space. It shows that the increase 
in government debt-to-GDP ratios can be very 
substantial as deficits mount and output drops. In 
some Member States, buoyant domestic demand, 
accompanying the credit expansion and property 
price appreciation, has led to appreciating real 
exchange rates, growing current account deficits 
and net foreign liabilities. As the financial crisis 
set in and global risk aversion increased, these 
features influenced financial market perception of 
Member States prospective fiscal space, and thus 
their capacity to finance expansionary fiscal 
policies. The ability to conduct active fiscal 
policies aimed to cushion the negative impact of 
the financial crisis may therefore be limited by 
adverse financial market reactions. Simulations 
with the Commission services' model QUEST III 
indicate how in countries with small fiscal space 
the benefits of a fiscal stimulus in the short run 
may be nullified by movements in risk premia. 
While financial market reactions to fiscal policy 
and expectations of fiscal space developments 
cannot be accurately forecast, these simulations 
highlight the need to differentiate fiscal policy 
across Member States according to their fiscal 
space and the market spreads on sovereign, 
corporate and financial sector bonds. 
Section IV.4 provides a summary of the results and 
proposes future work in particular related to the 
medium-term effects of building-up and 
unwinding imbalances on budgetary developments 
and the role that fiscal policy can play in this 
context. 
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1.1. BOOMS, BUSTS AND PUBLIC FINANCES 
As evidenced in Part III, past experiences show
that systemic financial crises can have particularly 
distressing effects for public finances through 
direct fiscal costs (related to public support of the 
banking sector) and indirectly through severe
output loss. The current financial crisis is no less
challenging for European economies. This crisis 
has, in particular, drastically reversed the
favourable economic conditions that prevailed 
until 2007, entailing a fast and sizeable 
deterioration of fiscal positions in most EU 
countries, threatening in turn the sustainability of
public finances over the medium term in some. 
Credit markets and asset prices evolutions have 
played (and still play) a key role in this context 
through buoyant tax revenues and public 
expenditure during the booms, followed by large 
tax revenue shortfalls and public expenditure 
increases linked to automatic stabilisers. 
Importantly in this regard, the features of the 
expansionary period that preceded the current 
financial turmoil have direct consequences on the
ability of EU countries to run counter-cyclical
fiscal policies during today's crisis. In particular, 
dynamic internal demand favoured by the credit
expansion and property prices appreciation has led
many countries to experience growing current
account deficits and net foreign liabilities. These
features became especially influential for the 
(negative) perception of financial markets on their
prospective fiscal space, i.e. capacity of these 
countries to finance expansionary fiscal policies. 
Countries with reduced fiscal space are therefore
perceived as being less able to finance stimulus 
measures without running large public deficits. 
Before analysing more closely the links between 
the boom, busts and public finances, the following 
section provides an overall picture on the 
macroeconomic conditions describing the situation 
of EU countries at the onset of the financial crisis
with special attention to credit expansion and 
house prices evolutions. 
1.2. CREDIT, PROPERTY PRICES AND 
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE EU  
Property prices boomed and credit expansion 
accelerated over the past decade in the European 
Union as in most of the world economies. Graph 
IV.1.1 shows in particular that mortgage debt
played a key role in the transmission of credit 
expansion to property prices increases. The strong 
growth in household debt and particularly
mortgage lending went hand in hand with the 
increase in house prices. In contrast, other types of 
loans, including consumption credit were rather
stable. 
Graph IV.1.1: House prices, mortgage loans and other credits in 
selected EU countries 
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The evidence regarding credit and property prices
in the EU had also broader macroeconomic 
implications. Table IV.1.1 provides a broad picture
of some of the macroeconomic variables most 
directly affected by the recent credit and property 
booms in the EU during the last decades. Columns 
(1) and (2) show that the recently acceded Member 
States and a number of other countries (in 
particular, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Luxembourg 
and Finland) experienced high average growth
rates. In some Member States, the favourable 
economic performance was boosted by buoyant
domestic demand, especially construction
investment. In contrast, Germany and Denmark
experienced low rates of economic growth
compared to other EU countries. In Portugal, high
growth rates were followed by a period of low
growth. 
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High GDP growth rates coincided with rapid credit 
expansion between 1998 and 2007. Households 
and non-financial corporations’ loans drove most 
of the very fast increase in total credit to the 
economy. In particular mortgage debt surged from 
34% of GDP in 1998 to 49% of GDP in 2007. 
Germany was the sole exception to this EU trend 
with a shrinking mortgage-to-GDP ratio 
characterising its adjustment to the post-
reunification expansionary phase. In some 
countries, the expansion of mortgage credits was 
of a spectacular magnitude: Ireland (+49 
percentage points); the Netherlands (+39 pp); 
Spain (+38 pp); the UK (+36); and Greece (+24 
pp). In the Netherlands and the UK the increases 
came on top of relatively high initial levels, while 
in Ireland, Greece and Spain, the increase may at 
least partly have been due to catching-up. In the 
recently acceded Member States the increases were 
no less exceptional, although starting from much 
lower mortgage indebtedness levels, due in many 
cases to incipient mortgage markets in 1998. The 
most notable cases are: Cyprus (+41 pp); Latvia 
(+33 pp), Estonia (+33 pp), Malta (+30 pp) and 
Lithuania (+17 pp). Together with the rapid credit 
and mortgage expansions, the construction sector 
boomed in some countries (see Column (3)), most 
notably in Spain and Ireland, and also in a number 
of other countries such as Latvia, Estonia or 
Slovenia. 
The developments coincided with strong and 
persistent appreciations of the real exchange rate 
(REER) in the booming economies. The exchange 
rate appreciation was particularly pronounced in 
the Baltic countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia (see Column (5) in Table IV.1.1). 
Some EU15 countries also experienced strong 
(albeit relatively lower) REER appreciation, in 
particular Ireland, Portugal, Denmark, Spain and 
Italy. Together with dynamic domestic demand, 
the REER appreciation led to a substantial 
deterioration of current account positions in some 
of these countries, in particular euro area Member 
States such as Spain, Ireland and Portugal and also 
some non-euro area counties (or countries not yet 
members of the euro area in 2007) such as 
Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania and Latvia. 
In general these countries experienced a strong 
deterioration in their net foreign assets position 
(see Column (7) in Table IV.1.1), with the notable 
exception of Ireland thanks to sustained direct 
investment flows during the period under scrutiny. 
Some of the recently acceded Member States also 
experienced a large increase of their current 
account deficit (in particular Bulgaria, Lithuania 
and Cyprus). On the other hand other countries 
experienced growing current account surplus and 
large increases in their net foreign assets positions, 
most notably Germany, Netherlands, Austria, 
Denmark and Sweden. Graph IV.1.1 illustrate the 
correlation between increasing (mortgage) debt 
and current account deterioration, showing that 
this relation holds especially for EU15 countries 
and less so for the recently acceded Member 
States. 
More generally, this preliminary evidence suggests 
that the deterioration of external position appears 
to be directly correlated with the rise in private 
indebtedness and mortgage debt in particular. This 
coincides with findings by Langedijk and Roeger 
(2007), who find that the absence of an exchange 
risk premium in EMU allows an increase in capital 
mobility resulting in a lower correlation between 
domestic savings and investment. According to 
these authors, increased capital mobility seems to 
have been an important driving force behind the 
current account dynamics in the EU. Due to the 
reduction of risk premia, investment – and 
especially housing investment - responds strongly 
to exogenous shocks. This leaves countries that 
have benefited most from reduction in risk premia 
(such as Spain, Ireland and Greece) vulnerable to 
adverse risk premium shocks. Evidence on the 
relationship between mortgage debt and current 
account imbalances appears to be less clear in the 
recently acceded Member States. The relatively 
less developed mortgage markets in this latter 
group of countries, coupled with the prevalence of 
higher interest rates explain in part why the global 
credit expansion had a limited bearing on 
macroeconomic conditions and, in particular 
changes in current account.  
Assessing countries that experiences boom-bust 
episodes in asset prices in the past twenty years, 
Martin, Schuknecht and Vansteenkiste (2007) 
distinguish between industrialised countries that 
experienced external adjustment via real effective 
exchange rate depreciation during busts and those 
that relied on an internal adjustment process and 
experienced no exchange rate depreciation but 
corrected real wage and tradable/non-tradable 
sector imbalances via domestic price adjustments. 
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Table IV.1.1: Key macroeconomic developments before the financial crisis: 1998-2007
(1) Real
GDP growth
rate
(2) Real internal 
demand growth 
rate
av. 1998-
2007 av. 1998-2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007
AT 2.5 1.8 -1.5 3.3 8.6 6.7 13.7 23.9 -16.5 -12.9
BE 2.3 2.2 5.1 2.4 5.6 5.9 26.5 36.8 32.9 28.1
BG 5.1 8.0 -0.2 -22.5 4.6 6.2 0.4 9.9 -10.7 -115.8
CY 4.0 4.6 -6.3 -11.7 9.3 9.9 3.6 44.8 -- --
CZ 3.6 2.8 -2.1 -1.5 8.4 8.5 3.7 11.9 -21.2 -29.9
DE 1.6 1.0 -0.7 7.6 7.5 5.6 51.9 47.7 -2.9 16.1
DK 2.0 2.4 -0.9 0.7 5.5 6.6 75.0 92.8 -25.1 -4.4
EE 7.1 7.7 -9.8 -18.3 7.2 11.6 3.7 36.3 -36.9 -75.1
EL 4.1 4.4 -3.5 -14.0 8.5 8.4 6.3 30.2 -33.4 -103.4
ES 3.8 4.8 -1.1 -10.1 10.1 13.1 23.9 61.6 -30.2 -79.7
FI 3.6 3.1 5.7 4.0 6.2 7.4 21.5 34.3 -73.5 -29.1
FR 2.3 2.7 2.3 -2.8 5.6 6.9 20.0 34.9 8.6 -1.3
HU 4.1 4.4 -9.1 -6.2 5.6 8.5 2.1 12.4 -75.5 -98.7
IE 6.8 6.3 0.9 -5.4 7.7 13.3 26.5 75.3 -15.4 -10.1
IT 1.5 1.8 1.9 -1.8 5.7 7.8 7.8 19.8 -2.7 -1.8
LT 6.6 7.8 -11.6 -15.1 7.8 11.1 0.9 17.5 -22.8 -57.5
LU 5.3 4.0 9.2 9.8 10.9 11.0 23.3 38.5 -- --
LV 7.8 9.7 -9.6 -22.5 5.9 11.2 0.7 33.7 -20.0 -60.0
MT 2.6 2.2 -6.0 -6.1 6.5 6.1 8.0 37.6 -- --
NL 2.6 2.4 2.5 9.8 5.9 5.7 60.8 100.0 -18.4 39.5
PL 4.2 4.0 -3.8 -5.1 7.4 7.9 1.5 11.7 -25.4 -45.8
PT 2.0 2.2 -7.3 -9.7 10.0 10.1 36.9 62.1 -30.0 -92.2
RO 3.9 6.6 -7.3 -13.5 4.5 10.4 1.5 3.5 -8.8 -64.3
SE 3.2 2.7 4.4 9.0 4.6 6.0 44.5 57.0 -35.2 -1.9
SI 4.4 4.1 -1.1 -4.0 6.8 8.4 0.3 8.0 -4.5 -22.2
SK 4.9 3.8 -9.4 -5.1 6.8 7.8 3.9 11.9 -14.4 -46.0
UK 2.9 3.4 -0.4 -2.9 4.6 4.3 50.6 86.3 -- --
EA-12 2.2 2.3 0.8 -0.7 7.4 7.4 36.1 48.5 -- --
RAMS 4.3 4.6 -5.0 -7.5 6.4 7.4 2.0 12.3 -- --
EU-27 2.5 2.6 0.4 -1.2 6.6 6.9 34.0 48.9 -- --
(7) Net foreign assets*
(4) Employment in 
construction 
sector
(3) Current
account balance*
(5) Real effrective 
exchange rate   
(100 in 1998)
(6) Mortgage debt*
2007
90.2
99.2
108.5
107.1
147.0
83.9
107.8
139.5
103.5
109.6
95.8
99.9
141.6
111.3
105.9
133.2
99.2
143.1
102.2
106.1
95.1
108.2
177.8
--
--
--
93.7
98.1
138.6
105.4
* Percent of GDP
Source: Commission services and European Mortgage Federation
They find that the difference between internal and
external adjustment is correlated with the degree of 
macroeconomic imbalances and balance sheet 
problems. Internal adjustment seems more 
prevalent when financial vulnerabilities, excess 
demand and competitiveness loss remain relatively
contained in the boom. In the bust, internal
adjusters experience more protracted but less deep
downturns than external adjusters as imbalances 
unwind more slowly. 
Graph IV.1.2: Annual average change in current accounts and 
mortgage debt (1998-2007) 
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This section provides an overview of 
developments in public finances in the EU, linking 
them to the building-up of asset price and credit 
booms. Existing studies suggest that assets prices 
may affect fiscal balances via direct taxations on 
property and capital transactions and also 
indirectly via wealth effects and indirect taxes 
linked to consumption. Asset prices developments 
-and in particular house prices- may have 
distressing effects on fiscal balances when going 
from boom to bust. (145) Recent EU experience 
suggests the building up of large internal and 
external imbalances has had significant effects on 
public finances and that both are also closely 
linked and equally disrupting.  
2.1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC 
FINANCES 
From 2003 to 2007 tax revenue growth was 
exceptionally high in most EU countries, often 
largely exceeding government forecasts. (146) 
Average real revenue growth was 2.3% per year in 
the euro area, 4.2% in the UK and 3.7% in Sweden 
during this period (see Graph IV.2.1.). (147) Real 
expenditure growth was much less pronounced on 
average in the euro area at 1.4% per year over the 
same period and in Sweden at 1.7% while in the 
UK expenditure kept rising at 4.4%, i.e. even 
higher than UK revenue growth rate. The 
magnitude of tax revenues and expenditure growth 
rates was much larger in the RAMS with, in some 
years, double-digits figures. 
(145) See for instance Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002). 
(146) See in particular European Commission (2008a), 'Public 
finance report in EMU-2008', Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs and Morris, R. and L. 
Schuknecht (2007), 'Structural balances and revenue 
windfalls - The role of asset prices revisited', ECB Working 
Paper n°737. 
(147) GDP deflated using GDP deflator. 
A substantial part of government revenue 
evolutions during this period was unexpected (i.e., 
corresponded to revenue windfalls) and in most 
cases was linked to business cycle developments. 
The current financial crisis put a halt to these large 
revenue windfalls.  
Graph IV.2.2 provides evidence on this by 
measuring unexpected changes in total tax 
revenues using the information contained in the 
Stability and Convergence Programmes. (148)  
Government revenue windfalls have been quite 
large until recently, reaching a maximum of 0.9% 
of GDP in 2006 for the euro area, 0.8% of GDP in 
1999 for non-euro area EU15 countries and 1.3% 
of GDP in 2007 for the recently acceded Member 
States. Since 2007, however, the situation has been 
reversed rather substantially in most countries, 
with governments experiencing large revenue 
shortfalls of an even greater magnitude in 
percentage of GDP than the windfalls that 
prevailed in the earlier period. The negative 
evolution in 2008 has been especially important 
for the recently acceded Member States (in 
particular Estonia with -13% of GDP and Latvia   
with -10%) and the UK (-2.1%). Detailed figures 
suggest that in the euro-area Ireland (-6.6% of 
GDP), Luxembourg (-4.9%) and Greece (-3.7%) 
were particularly affected. 
(148) Using the information contained in the SCPs, revenue 
windfalls/shortfalls can be defined as the deviation of the 
ex post government revenues in year t from what was 
previously foreseen for that year in t-1. Given that the SCP 
typically concern periods running from year t to year t+3 
and are submitted between November in year t-1 and 
January in year t, it can reasonably be assumed that the 
differences between ex post figures and planned 
developments in government revenues for the first year of 
the programme are good proxies for revenue 
windfalls/shortfalls (see Barrios and Rizza, 2008). The 
revenue windfall/shortfalls defined that way thus 
correspond to the unexpected variation in government 
revenues. An alternative approach, used by the Europan 
Central Bank, defines revenue windfalls as unexplained 
residuals in revenue changes (see in particular Kremer et 
al., 2006). 
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The following sections analyse the extent to which
these revenues developments were linked to the
building up of macroeconomic imbalances
documented in Section IV.1 by considering 
successively external and internal imbalances and, 
later on, their interconnection through simulation
analysis. 
Graph IV.2.2: Tax revenue windfalls/shortfalls in the EU, 1999-
2008 (% GDP) 
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2.2. HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC 
FINANCES 
2.2.1. The direct impact of house prices on tax
revenues in the EU
The evidence for the EU shows that domestic asset 
price developments (in particular housing) have in
some EU Member Stats contributed to the large
revenue windfall/shortfalls. (149) Large asset prices
fluctuations can have sizeable effects on fiscal 
policy through two distinct channels: a direct one, 
whereby taxes related to asset transactions boost 
tax revenues during periods when both transactions
and prices are particularly dynamic; and an
indirect one, when asset prices booms result in 
large wealth effects, either real or perceived, and 
hence to higher consumption and investment. The 
two effects differ in implications and timing.
The direct impact of asset prices on tax revenues is
usually relatively limited in time and size although 
(149) See Hilbers et al. (2008). 
Graph IV.2.1: Government revenues and expenditure growth in selected EU countries, 1999-2010 
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172 
Part IV
Public Finance in Booms and Busts 
during some periods it may lead to significant
changes in tax revenues. For instance, property 
taxes during the period 2000-2007 increased
substantially in Ireland, Spain and the UK in the 
wake of booming housing markets. Graph IV.2.3
shows the level of property tax revenues in a 
number of EU countries for 1999 and 2007.
Importantly, cross-country differences emerge.
The UK, Luxembourg and France traditionally 
have the highest amounts of revenues related to
property taxes. By contrast, property tax revenues 
are low in most recently acceded Member States 
(RAMS), as well as Finland and Germany. In the
case of Germany, in particular, long-lasting 
stagnation in house prices and relatively few 
property transactions have contributed to low tax
revenues related to housing over the past decade. 
Graph IV.2.4: Property transaction taxes in 1999 and 2007 (% of 
GDP) 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
HU PL CZ DE AT SE FI DK PT FR NL EL LU UK BE IT ES IE
1999
2007
Source: OECD and Commission services.
Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom have
benefited particularly from booming housing
markets and corresponding increases in prices  as 
illustrated in Graph IV.2.5.  
Graph IV.2.3: Property taxes in 1999 and 2007 (% of GDP)
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Graphs IV.2.4 highlights the rising importance of
property taxes in the total government revenues of 
some countries by considering taxes on
transactions (i.e., sales and purchases) in 
properties. 
Taxes on property transactions rose from 0.9% to
1.9% of GDP between 1999 and 2007 for Ireland,
from 0.9% to 1.7% for Spain and from 0.6% to 1%
for the United Kingdom. Italy and Belgium had
also relatively high levels of tax revenues related 
to transactions in the housing market although 
these countries started from already high levels of
property taxes in 1999. 
Graph IV.2.5: Taxes on transactions in property in 1999 and 2007
(% of GDP) 
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Evidence regarding the indirect effects of house
prices evolution on consumption, in particular, is
less clear-cut. One reason for this may be due to
the fact that housing assets differ from other types 
of assets as they also provide services to the 
owner, i.e. housing services. As a consequence
price variations affect both financial wealth of
households but also the price of consuming 
housing services such that the net effect of house 
price variations on consumption depends on
redistribution between renters and owners, (see 
Buiter, 2008 and Campbell and Cocco, 2005).
More generally, house prices are usually assumed
to affect consumption through the wealth channel 
or through the collateral channel, with house price 
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changes affecting household borrowing constraint. 
Regarding the latter effect, in particular, evidence 
presented above ssuggests that the fast increase in 
house price and positive anticipations regarding 
house price evolutions favoured greater household 
indebtedness. The evidence of the positive wealth 
effects of house price increases is less clear-cut. 
Overall, both consumption and savings have been 
rather stable since 1995 with saving experiencing a 
slight increase since 2005 (see in particular 
European Commission, 2008b). 
2.2.2. The direct and indirect effect of house 
prices on government finances: 
evidence from a VAR analysis 
This section presents country-specific analysis 
assessing the extent to which house price bubbles 
may have affected government revenues and, by 
the same token, the fiscal balance. A vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) is estimated to assess 
the direct and indirect reaction of governments' 
finances to changes in house prices. The VAR 
estimations are run for a number of EU countries 
considered individually: Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. These countries 
were selected on the basis of data availability 
during the period 1975-2007. 
The variables, retained in the VARs were 
considered in the following order: a dummy 
variable for EMU, government expenditure, 
government revenue, nominal GDP growth rate, 
the real effective exchange rate (REER), total 
credit to the economy, equity prices and house 
prices. (150) The ordering of the variables used in 
the VAR reflects assumptions regarding the extent 
of the endogeneity. The ordering used here follows 
the one used by Bayoumi (2001), who performed a 
similar exercise for Japan. (151) Several alternative 
(150) Government expenditure and revenues, house prices, 
equity prices, REER and total credit  are expressed in log. 
The REER is calculated using unit labour costs. 
(151) Dicky-Fuller tests were used to check for the existence of a 
unit root for all the variables. Accordingly, the (log) level 
value was retained for the two fiscal variables and first 
differences were used for the real effective exchange rate, 
property prices, equity prices and credit to the private 
sector. A Cholesky decomposition was used to 
orthogonalize the error used in the ordering of the 
variables. The number of lags was set after testing the most 
appropriate lag structure using a battery of testing 
procedures: the final prediction error, the Aikake 
orderings were tried out without changing 
substantially the results reported here.  
The first result of interest concerns the reaction of 
government expenditure and revenues to house 
price changes. Impulse response functions were 
constructed in order to check to what extent the 
fiscal variables react to house prices variations 
over a time horizon of 10 years after the shock (of 
1 percentage point) given to house price. Graph 
IV.2.6 provides detailed results by country. 
In six out of ten cases, government revenues and 
expenditure tend to react significantly to changes 
in house prices. For Finland for instance, 
government revenue level increase peaks at 2.5 
percentage points three years after a shock of 1 
percentage point to house prices and stabilises 
somewhat below 1 percentage point during the rest 
of the period. A similar increase is observed for the 
Netherlands, where the increase in government 
revenues extends beyond the ten-year span. 
Ireland, the UK and to some extent Spain and 
France are also shown to experience sizeable 
increases in both government revenues and 
expenditures.  
Government revenues tend to react more swiftly 
than government expenditure and in a more 
pronounced way to a positive shock in house 
prices. In most cases a house price shock gives rise 
to a government revenue increase which stays 
higher than the corresponding government 
expenditure increase for about two or three years 
as in the cases of Spain, Ireland, the UK and 
Finland. Asset price appreciations lead to direct 
extra government revenues through taxes on 
transactions in the housing market and indirect 
effects linked to increases in consumption. In most 
cases government expenditures catch-up with 
government revenues suggesting that the potential 
improvements in the budget balance due to house 
information criterion, the Schwarz's Bayesian information 
criterion, the Hannan and the Quinn information criterion 
together with a Likelihood-ratio test for all the full VARs. 
In most cases one lag was the preferred structure such that 
this was used across all countries for consistency. The data 
are taken from the following sources: GDP growth rate, 
governments' revenue, governments' expenditure and real 
effective exchange rates (European Commission, DG 
Ecfin, Ameco), property and equity prices (Bank for 
International Settlements) and credit to the private sector 
(Reuters). 
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price appreciation are only temporary. In the case 
of Finland the results suggest that with the increase 
in house prices, government expenditure
eventually increased more than government 
revenues in the medium run leading to a
deterioration of government budget balance.
Graph IV.2.6: Impulse-response function: government revenues and expenditure vs house price changes 
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Notes: Time indicated in years. Shock given to house prices equal to 1%.
Source: Commission services 
The VAR models can also be used to analyse the
link between variables that may fuel the interaction 
between house prices and fiscal variables and thus 
possibly illustrate the mechanisms at play. 
Specifically, these interactions can be illustrated 
by exogenising one of the variables that may play 
a role in explaining the effect of the impulse 
variable (i.e. house price) on the response variables 
(i.e. government revenues and expenditure). The 
change in the shape of the impulse-response
functions would in turn indicate whether the 
exogeneised variable plays a role in transmitting
house price shocks to fiscal variables.  
A number of potential candidates stand out when
accounting for the link between house prices and 
fiscal variables. The first one is the credit channel
as suggested by Bayoumi (2004). Increased 
collateral prices render access to credit easier for 
credit- constrained households and companies 
(such as SMEs). House price evolutions may thus
have important implications for consumption,
investment, GDP growth rate and hence
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government revenues. Positive anticipations 
regarding future prices may give rise to bubbles 
which would eventually trigger severe corrections 
once anticipations are revised downward.  
The advent of EMU may have also played a role in 
the relationship between house prices and 
government revenues with the elimination of 
exchange risk premia and the ensuing de-linking of 
investment from domestic savings. A number of 
EU countries have also experienced marked 
appreciation of the real exchange rate reflecting 
higher domestic inflation and more dynamic 
demand, influencing indirectly the link between 
asset price evolution and fiscal variables. These 
different hypotheses were tested by considering 
consecutively the level of total credit, the dummy 
variable for the advent of the EMU and the real 
exchange rate.  
Results indicate that the credit channel is by far the 
most influential variable while EMU and the real 
exchange rate played only a minor role. The 
importance of the credit channel in transmitting 
house price fluctuations to total government 
revenues is illustrated in Graph IV.2.7 which 
reports the results of an impulse of one percentage 
point in house prices on the level of government 
revenues by country with the credit channel taken 
exogenous. The cases of the Netherlands and 
Ireland are particularly telling as the simulation of 
a one percentage point shock to house prices has 
no apparent effect on the level of government 
revenues once the credit channel is accounted for. 
In the cases of Spain and France the response of 
government revenues is also substantially reduced 
after controlling for the level of credit in the 
economy. While in the UK and Finland these 
changes are also observed, they remain less 
pronounced as the response of government 
revenues still remains high even after controlling 
for the level of credit suggesting that in these 
countries other factors were at play explaining the 
incidence of house price shocks on government 
revenues. 
2.3. A CLOSER LOOK AT TAX REVENUE 
WINDFALLS/SHORTFALLS 
A more complete analysis of the link between 
imbalances and fiscal outcomes can be performed 
using regression analysis. Box IV.2.1 provides an 
econometric analysis of the determinants of 
governments' revenue surprises for the euro area 
countries following the approach described in 
Barrios and Rizza (2008) and considering together 
both internal and external imbalances. According 
to the results depicted in Box IV.2.1, the main 
determinants of revenue windfalls/shortfalls are 
growth surprises, i.e. errors made by governments 
in their assessment of the cyclical position. 
Changes in the trade balance also appear to have a 
significant impact on government revenue 
windfalls/shortfalls on average. The estimation 
results also suggest that a deterioration of trade 
balance ceteris paribus yields also extra-tax 
revenues. EU countries with dynamic internal 
demand experienced strong revenue growth and 
sharp deterioration of their external trade balance 
as evidenced already in Section IV.1. House prices 
developments appear also to play a significant role 
in only some countries, in particular Ireland, Spain 
and the UK where their impact is found to be 
remarkably high. 
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In countries with buoyant housing markets during 
the 2000s, the rising in house prices was 
accompanied by growth exceeding expectations so
that it is difficult to disentangle the separate effect 
of these two variables on government revenues. 
Countries that have experienced large revenue
windfalls and house prices increases seem to have
also benefited from especially dynamic internal 
demand, thus favouring the emergence of large 
current account deficits.  
A recent study by the European Commission 
(2009) in particular suggests that house price 
increases in the EU, and especially so in the euro 
area, have gone hand in hand with dynamic 
demand and shifting of labour to non-tradable
sectors, in particular the construction sector. This 
supply side effect may have been favoured by a
structural feature of some EU economies, where 
building constraints were high before the 
emergence of the housing bubble (see in particular
Bover and Jimeno, 2007).
Graph IV.2.7: Impulse-response function: government revenues vs house price changes with credit exogenous 
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Notes: Time indicated in years. Shock given to house prices equal to 1%.
Source: Commission services 
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House price increases would have thus favoured 
the emergence of large current account deficits in 
certain EU countries both through a demand and a 
supply-side effect. With the sharp contraction in 
economic activity foreseen in 2009, the burst of 
housing price bubble and fast declining oil and 
asset prices in particular, suggest that the recent 
occurrence of government revenues shortfalls 
evidenced in Graph IV.2.2 may thus be long-
lasting and be directly affected by the adjustment 
process of countries where internal demand and 
Box IV.2.1: Determinants of revenue windfalls/shortfalls in the EU
This box presents a panel analysis of the determinants of revenue windfalls/shortfalls for the euro area countries during 
the period 1999-2007 following the approach of Barrios and Rizza (2008). These determinants include growth surprises, a 
composition effect measuring the influence of differences in growth between the different tax bases and GDP, two 
indicators on asset prices annual changes (equity and house prices), oil prices annual variation and the annual change in 
the trade balance. Annex IV provides more details on the construction of these variables and statistical sources used. The 
following equation is estimated econometrically. The revenue/shortfall variable is defined as in Section IV. 2.1. The 
effects of these determinants are shown in the table below which sums up the estimation results using a fixed effects 
estimation technique in order to control for non-observed country-specific effects. 
                 Table 1: The determinants of governments' revenues windfalls/shortfalls in the EU 
(i ) (i i ) ( i ii ) ( i v )
(1 ) g ro w th  su rp ri s e  i n  %  p o in t 0 .7 2 2 * * * 0 .8 4 9 * * * 0 . 6 1 8 * * * 0 . 6 6 1 * * *
(0 .1 3 6 ) (0 .2 3 5 ) -0 .1 6 6 -0 .1 4 9
(2 ) C o m p o si t io n  e f fe c t s -0 .3 8 7
(0 .8 0 6 )
(3 ) c h a n g e  in  ( ex p o rt -  im p o rt ) /g d p - 0 .4 9 6 * * - 0 .3 7 5 * * *
( 0 .1 8 9 ) ( 0 .1 7 3 )
(4 ) c h a n g e  b r en t_ eu ro 1 .6 8 1 * 1 .7 3 4 * *
( 0 .9 2 2 ) ( 0 .9 1 3 )
(5 ) c h a n g e  in  h o u s in g  p r i ce s 4 .6 7 4 0 .7 4 9
( 5 .7 2 7 ) ( 5 .2 2 5 )
(6 ) c h a n g e  in  eq u i ty  p ri ce s 1 .7 3 3 0 .9 5 9
( 1 .1 6 4 ) ( 1 .0 6 1 )
(5 ) c h a n g e  in  h o u s in g  p r i ce s *  b o o m in g  
co u n t r i es
2 8 .3 2 9 * * *
-6 .4 8 6
C o n s ta n t 0 .9 3 8 * * * 0 . 6 7 3 * * -0 .1 2 3 -0 .9 7 2 *
(0 .2 3 3 ) (0 .2 5 8 ) ( 0 .5 2 1 ) ( 0 .5 0 7 )
O b s er v a t io n s 1 5 4 1 2 6 9 2 9 2
N u m b er  o f g r o u p ( co u n tr y ) 2 5 2 1 1 1 1 1
R - sq u a re d 0 .1 8 0 .2 1 0 .4 7 0 . 3 1
F  t es t  f o r  f ix ed  e ff ec ts 1 .7 5 1 . 4 1 .3 9 3 .4
p - v a lu e  fo r F -t e st
H 0 :  α i  =  0
*  s ig n if i ca n t  a t  1 0 % ; * *  s ig n i f i ca n t  a t  5 % ;  * * *  sig n i fi c a n t a t  1 %
[ 0 .0 2 ] [ 0 .1 5 ] [ 0 .2 0 ] [ 0 . 0 0 ]
The first column of the table provides the results of the estimation using only the growth surprise as an explanatory 
variable. This variable appears to be positively related to the revenue windfalls and is highly statistically significant. 
Column (ii) adds the composition effect calculated as indicated in Annex IV. This variable does not appear to display a 
significant coefficient, however. Column (iii) adds instead annual changes in trade balance, oil prices, housing prices and 
equity prices. Given that they are only available for few European countries, most notably EU15 countries, the sample is 
much reduced. The trade and oil variables display the expected coefficient and are both statistically significant. The result 
concerning residential and equity prices appears rather puzzling at first glance given that recent revenues 
windfalls/shortfalls have often been associated with booming tax revenues related to asset prices.  Two remarks must be 
made with regard to this result. First, the length of the panel (i.e. 1999-2007) might be insufficient to properly capture the 
impact of house price changes on government revenues. Second, the estimates provided above represent only an average 
effect across countries. In fact, detailed inspection of the evolution of asset prices reveals that, during the period 
considered, Ireland, Spain and the UK experienced particularly sharp price increases. One way to test whether these 
evolutions had any significant impact on revenue windfalls for the countries in question is to interact a dummy variable 
for the three countries with the evolution of asset prices. The results of estimating this new variable are displayed in 
Column (iv). The coefficient obtained on the interaction between the country dummy (equal to 1 for IE, ES and UK) and 
the asset price is very high and statistically significant, indicating that for these three countries the recent boom in asset 
prices had a positive influence on windfalls.  
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construction sector expansion have been the most 
dynamic. 
The evidence presented above tends to suggest that 
the effects of internal and external imbalances on 
public finances are strongly interconnected. These 
links are complex, however, and a closer 
inspection of the mechanisms at hand is warranted 
in order to derive policy implications. The 
following section aims at illustrating these 
mechanisms using the Commission services' 
QUEST III model with credit-constrained 
households.  
2.4. MODEL SIMULATIONS WITH QUEST III (152) 
2.4.1. Main elements analysed in the model 
and features of the simulation. 
The QUEST III model is used to analyse the 
role of fiscal policy in the context of building-
up of imbalances in a representative small euro 
area Member States. Some key characteristics 
of pre-financial crisis developments, i.e. an 
asset price bubble, widening current account 
imbalances and favourable public finances 
outcomes (tax revenue windfalls) are 
replicated. The focus is on the effect of 
different fiscal policy rules and shocks on the 
government budget balance, government debt, 
output growth and external imbalances. The 
effects of fiscal policy are analysed by 
assessing different fiscal response functions for 
expenditure reflecting different assumptions on 
the degree of temporariness of revenues and 
different degrees of caution. Revenue 
deviations from baseline may reflect structural 
shocks or temporary developments reflected in 
asset price booms, swings in current accounts, 
persistent deviation of inflation and wage 
growth from competitors in the euro area and 
in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes.  
(152) The QUEST III model is a multi-region dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DGSE) model used by the European 
Commission for economic policy analysis. It is described 
in detail in Ratto, Roeger and In 't Veld (2009). The version 
used here contains credit and liquidity constrained 
consumers. It is described in Roeger and In ’t Veld (2009). 
2.4.2. Description of the shock 
For illustrative purposes, a housing price bubble is 
simulated by shocking the housing risk premium 
so that housing prices rise more than 40% above 
their baseline level. In the fourth year the bubble 
bursts when the risk premium remerges. In 
somewhat more than three years the housing prices 
return to baseline.  
To allow a more sustained deviation of output 
from baseline, a shock is given to labour 
supply. (153)  Labour supply is positively shocked 
during the bubble. This coincides with the 
observation of immigration in e.g. Ireland and 
Spain. After the burst of the bubble, the labour 
supply shock is reversed, reflecting in particular 
emigration of migrant workers as labour demand 
falls during the bust. This requires eventually 
adjustment of the government expenditure path to 
lower revenues. 
Three different stylised fiscal policy scenarios are 
presented in Graph IV.2.8. The corresponding 
budgetary rules acting on government 
consumption rules are applied consistently, both 
during the boom and the bust. In Section IV.3 
alternative fiscal policies during the bust are 
simulated.  
The first expenditure policy rule reflects an 
unchanged budget balance. It is pro-cyclical in the 
sense that windfall revenues during the boom are 
spent and revenue shortfalls during the bust are 
compensated by a reduction in government 
consumption. It implies a deteriorating (primary) 
cyclically-adjusted balance during the boom and 
an improvement during the bust. Note that the 
balanced-budget condition is unlikely to hold in a 
very severe downturn. It can only reasonably be 
expected to hold in case limited fiscal space forces 
policy makers into very strong pro-cyclical fiscal 
tightening to avoid macro-financial stress. 
The second policy rule mimics a neutral fiscal 
policy scenario, so that the budget balance 
deteriorates broadly in line with the size of the 
automatic stabilisers. This implies that any 
(153) Without structural shocks, the forward-looking rational 
expectations in the model do not allow sizeable and/or 
sustained endogenous deviations of prices and real 
variables from baseline, both in booms and busts. 
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possible additional windfall revenues not captured 
by the automatic stabilisers would be spent.  
The third policy rule reflects counter-cyclical 
budgetary policy as the government consumption- 
to-GDP ratio is reduced during the boom and 
increases during the bust. This implies a 
substantial improvement of the cyclically-adjusted 
balance during the boom period. It reflects not 
only the full working of the automatic stabilisers, 
but e.g. also savings of revenue windfalls and/or 
cautious assumptions on the structural nature of 
revenues.  
In these simulations, the fiscal policy stance during 
the building-up of the bubble has implications for 
the GDP growth path. In particular, in the boom 
period, the difference in growth between pro- and 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy is limited due to 
strong crowding-out of private consumption and a 
deteriorating current account with pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy. This implies that the model does not 
indicate strong self-reinforcing effects of 
expansionary fiscal policy through lowering real 
interest rates during the boom. (154) If the 
expenditure rules are unchanged throughout the 
boom and bust, the trough of GDP growth in the 
bust is much shallower with the neutral or 
countercyclical fiscal policy than with an 
unchanged budget balance. Deviations of GDP 
growth from baseline in the medium run reflect the 
given supply shock as well as prospective 
government debt developments crowding out 
consumption and investment.  
Fiscal policy has an important effect on the current 
account balances in this simulation. Pro-cyclical 
(154) However, in the presence of market distortions, less 
rational and less forward-looking agents, fiscal-policy 
intervention could potentially promote a return to 
sustainable paths if self-reinforcing dynamics lead to 
overheating. A restrictive policy would be suitable for large 
current account deficits caused by overheating; an 
expansionary policy may help to jump-start an economy 
experiencing disinflation despite trade and current account 
surpluses. In practice, the characterization of 
accommodative and restrictive fiscal policies is tricky, 
especially during long phases of excess demand or 
inadequate demand. It is then notoriously difficult to 
measure potential output and growth. The reason is that the 
effects of automatic stabilizers - namely, the cyclical 
improvement of public finances in economic upswings - 
can conceal pro-cyclical discretionary policies or 
insufficiently counter-cyclical policies. 
fiscal policy with an unchanged budget balance 
during the boom leads to a sharp deterioration, 
while countercyclical policy keeps the current 
account balance close to baseline. After a rapid 
reversal due to domestic demand contraction and 
some slight improvement in the export 
performance, the current account balance reverts to 
baseline. Note that this baseline can reflect either a 
deficit or a surplus position depending on the 
country's characteristics (e.g. preferences as 
regards savings, net foreign assets or investment 
opportunities, etc.)  
The debt-to-GDP ratio first declines for all policy 
rules, as output rises above baseline. As the budget 
balance improves in the scenarios with neutral and 
countercyclical fiscal policy, the decline in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is much stronger than in the 
balanced budget scenario. The drop in output 
reverses this trend. The deterioration of the debt-
to-GDP ratio is limited in the pro-cyclical scenario 
with an unchanged budget balance such that it 
matches the debt-to-GDP ratio of the 
countercyclical scenario three years after the bust. 
To achieve a countercyclical effect during the 
boom period, a cautious rule-based expenditure 
path may be more effective than actual 
discretionary tightening measures considering the 
long policy lags. These caveats may play a less 
important role during the bust, especially in the 
current context, as output may remain below 
potential for a number of years and policy lags 
may be smaller during crisis periods. The 
simulations thus allow analysing the impact of 
fiscal policy on the current account and GDP 
growth in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, as 
well as the developments of government debt in 
the medium run with different assumptions of 
reversibility of the measures.  
These simulations indicate that prudent fiscal 
policy during the good times can play an important 
role in containing the output drop following a 
boom. The latter is especially true in countries that 
have limited fiscal space that would prevent 
countercyclical policies or require procyclical 
tightening during the bust.  
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Graph IV.2.8: Fiscal policy in the context of building-up of imbalances in a representative small euro area Member State  
(% of potential GDP) 
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Source: Commission services based on QUESTIII model. 
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Sections IV.1 and IV.2 illustrated the recent 
evolution of asset prices and credit and their 
impact on public finances in the EU over the past 
decade. The outbreak of the financial crisis 
initiated a reversal of these apparently favourable 
developments. Public finances have been affected 
directly through sharply declining tax revenues 
from the second half of 2008 and the increase in 
public spending through the play of automatic 
stabilisers and, later, the active fiscal policies 
deployed under the European Economic Recovery 
Programme. Distressed banking systems have also 
increased the toll on public finances via financial 
support to the financial sector and indirectly 
through increased contingent liabilities linked to 
mounting implicit and explicit government 
liabilities. The reversal of the credit and property 
booms might also have an impact on budgetary 
developments over the medium term. The 
anticipation of these developments affects fiscal 
space at present and thus risk premia on sovereign 
borrowing. In turn, this affects the role that fiscal 
policy can play in reducing the output costs of the 
financial crisis.  
The section presents a composite indicator of fiscal 
space for EU countries that reflects the importance 
of external and internal imbalances for budgetary 
policies over a medium-term horizon. Together 
with the economic conditions, a country’s fiscal 
space determines the appropriate fiscal policy 
response to the crisis and during the adjustment to 
imbalances. Then, illustrative simulations are run 
highlighting how differences in fiscal space -that 
could translate into fluctuations in sovereign and 
country-wide risk premia– affect the impact of 
fiscal policy on output stabilisation. The 
simulations are carried out using the QUEST III 
model in order to analyse the link between fiscal 
policy and macroeconomic outcome following a 
macroeconomic shock represented by a burst of a 
housing bubble.  
3.1. THE FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: FISCAL SPACE 
MATTERS 
The level of government debt and deficit prior to 
the downturn determine importantly the ability to 
conduct countercyclical policy. A number of other 
factors are likely to impinge on the ability of 
countries to react to the negative impact of 
financial crisis such as the level of contingent 
liabilities of the financial sector, the current 
account deficit which signals the ability of 
countries to meet their commitment with potential 
foreign owners of domestic debt, etc. Each of these 
factors contributes to the exposure of a given 
country to the risk of failing to meet fiscal policy 
objectives. (155) These elements can be 
encapsulated in the concept of fiscal space, i.e., 
according to Heller (2005) the "room in a 
government´s budget that allows it to provide 
resources for a desired purpose without 
jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial 
position or the stability of the economy." Although 
initially developed for emerging economies, the 
concept of fiscal space proves to be particularly 
useful in the present context. In the current 
context, the concept of fiscal space can in 
particular help assessing whether EU countries 
have the ability to run countercyclical fiscal 
policies without compromising the medium- and 
long-run sustainability of their public finances. EU 
governments need to ensure that fiscal stimulus 
does not compromise their ability to finance 
expenditure from future revenues and thus, do not 
weigh too heavily on future growth. If debt-
financed, expenditure should be assessed by 
reference to its effects on the underlying growth 
rate and the country's revenue-generating capacity.  
This section presents a measurement of fiscal 
space based on a composite indicator. The 
indicator presented in this note may be particularly 
useful in the current context of uncertainty, where 
the flexibility of the Stability and Growth Pact is 
used to the fullest extent and the standard 
benchmarks for assessing Member States' room for 
fiscal manoeuvre (MTOs, minimum benchmarks 
and 3% threshold) are temporarily but effectively 
being superseded by broader considerations of 
fiscal space. 
The fiscal space composite indicator includes five 
elements. The first aspect concerns (i) general 
government gross debt. A differentiation on the 
basis of debt level that determine Member States' 
ability to cater for liabilities is also included with 
(ii) potential government contingent liabilities to 
(155) See in particular Hemming and Petrie (2000). 
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the financial sector. Standard fiscal indicators can 
give misleading signals in a context of protracted 
competitiveness swings. Revenue buoyancy during 
periods of deteriorating competitiveness and asset 
price booms should not be misinterpreted as
durable improvements in the underlying budget
position. (156) The composite indicator considers
(partly) these distortions by adding (iii) estimates
of foreseeable revenue shortfalls in the medium
run and including (iv) the current account balance
as an indicator of external imbalances. 
Government potential constraints with regards to
the increase in public expenditure in the short run
is further represented by (v) the share of non-
discretionary expenses which is a proxy for the
vulnerability of public expenses to meet short-run
obligations such as interest payment on public debt
and public pensions. (157) 
Contingent liabilities have increased as a result of
EU governments' interventions to support 
distressed banking sector. Large increases in
government debt and payments may indeed
emerge from explicit and implicit government
guarantees on banks loans and deposits.
Governments' implicit and explicit guarantees to
private investment may in turn feed into greater
exposure through moral hazard and thus amplify 
the risk of an over-exposure of public finances to
private liabilities. (158) Even if public debt is
relatively low, the materialisation of contingent
liabilities may weigh heavily on future debt 
developments. Contingent government liabilities
need thus to be considered in order to assess the 
risk of financial crises for public finances, beyond
public debt and deficit figures. (159) 
(156) In a context of domestically-led growth with strong wage 
growth and inflation, tax elasticities are usually 
exceptionally high due to composition effects and property 
price booms. In addition, part of the increase in nominal 
tax revenues may be temporary if competitiveness needs to 
be restored through relative price and wage declines. As a 
result, measures of the structural balance and debt to GDP 
improve strongly, while in fact, the competitiveness loss
could impinge on the ability to maintain sound fiscal
positions in the long run if future wage and price 
adjustment is necessary. 
(157) See in particular Hemming and Perrie (2000). 
(158) See for instance, Corsetti et al. (1999) for an analysis in the 
context of the 1990s Asian crisis. 
(159) For a comprehensive review of the fiscal risks linked to 
implicit liabilities, see Polackova and Schick (2002). 
Graph IV.3.1. below reports the evolution of
implicit liabilities related to the banking sector in 
the EU since 1999 using data from Standard &
Poor's. Annex IV.1 provides more details on the
calculation of this indicator. (160) The level of
contingent liabilities has increased markedly since 
2005 in most EU countries, including both euro 
area and non-euro area EU15 countries. At
country-level, the increase was especially 
pronounced for small countries; in particular in
Cyprus (from 68.6 of GDP in 1999 to 119.2% in
2009), Luxembourg (from 62.4% to 90.7%),
Portugal (from 23.5% to 39.1%) and Slovenia
(from 9.9% to 28.1%). 
Graph IV.3.1: Government contingent liabilities related to the 
banking sector in the EU, 1999-2009
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Annex IV.1 provides the definition and source of
the above individual indicators while Annex IV.2
provides the method used to construct the fiscal 
space indicator summarising the information 
contained therein. The fiscal space indicator is
calculated the annual (unweighted) average of 
variables (i)-(v) for the period 1999-2009. This is 
the longest time span that can be considered given 
data availability. (161) The value of the indicator 
varies between +30 and -30, positive values 
(160) See also Standard & Poor's (2002) for detailed analysis of
contingent liabilities in the European banking sector. 
(161) In an alternative version of the fiscal space indicator a 
variable measuring the medium-term primary balance gap 
(relative to the debt-stabilising level and including pre-
financing of additional cost of ageing up to 2020 has also 
been included, based on the methodology described in 
European Commission, 2006). The fiscal space indicator 
presented here does not include this variable, however, 
given that it primarily focuses on charting the evolution of
fiscal space in EU countries, while the sustainability 
indicator is only available at three-year intervals, in line
with the updating of projections for age-related
expenditures.  
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indicating good performance. Importantly, the 
benchmark used to assess countries' evolution is 
based on the EU average composite indicator at the 
beginning of the period, i.e., in 1999, thereby 
allowing to chart the evolution of EU countries' 
fiscal space over the past ten years. 
The results presented in Graphs IV.3.2 indicate 
that fiscal space varies widely across countries. 
However, in all countries fiscal space deteriorates 
over time. In a large majority of cases, this trend 
started long before the outbreak of the financial 
crisis in the EU in 2008. This is particularly true 
for Ireland, Spain, the UK and Hungary, which, at 
least until 2004-2005, had relatively favourable 
positions compared to the rest of the EU but 
experienced rather sharp falls.  
A similar and even more pronounced deterioration 
can be observed for Malta, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Very few countries have managed to maintain a 
relatively favourable fiscal space (e.g. Finland, 
Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia). Italy, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Greece and Portugal, which started from relatively 
unfavourable positions, have seen their fiscal space 
shrink rather rapidly since 2005. The estimations 
made for the most recent years 2008 and 2009 
(based on The Commission services Spring 2009 
forecast) signal further deterioration in countries' 
fiscal space suggesting that the scope for active 
fiscal policies would strongly be constrained in 
most Member States. 
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Graph IV.3.2: Shrinking fiscal space in the EU 
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Notes: Annex IV.2 provides details on the calculations of the fiscal space indicator. 
Source: Commission services 
185 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
3.2. FISCAL SPACE AND SOVEREIGN BOND 
SPREADS 
Changes in government bond spreads arguably
reflect overall market perceptions of EU countries 
relative fiscal space. Graph IV.3.43 shows the 
correlation between the fiscal space and the spread
of the 10-year government bonds over the German 
bonds for the EU countries. (162)  
(162) Bond yields data as of the 20/01/2009. 
The relation between these two variables is clearly 
negative. Deviations from the fitted values may be
partly stemming from liquidity premia, as the total
outstanding amount of debt is lower for smaller
Member States. In particular in France, Germany 
and Italy interest rates on sovereign bonds benefit
from the liquidity of the bond market, while the 
opposite effect plays in smaller Member States 
with low debt. The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark 
and Finland appear to be in the most favourable
position with regards to fiscal space but pay some
liquidity premium.
(Graph IV.3.2. continued) 
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Source: Commission services.
186 
Part IV
Public Finance in Booms and Busts 
Graph IV.3.3: Fiscal space and government bond spreads in the 
euro area
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(1) Details about the fiscal space indicator provided in Annex IV.2. 
Source: Commission services 
Importantly, for non-euro area countries, such as
Denmark, Sweden and the UK, government bond 
spreads also reflect exchange rate risks, which 
makes a comparison with euro area countries
problematic. Also the perceived risk of default on 
sovereign debt may be correlated with the
exchange rate risk. This may concern especially 
recently acceded Member States. Graph IV.3.4 
provides a similar plot for the non euro area
countries for which comparable data on spreads 
and fiscal space are available. Although the limited 
number of observations prevents any conclusive
statements on the relationship between fiscal space 
and spreads, the countries considered also show a 
negative correlation between fiscal space and 
spreads. It must be said, however, that the
relationship between fiscal space and government 
bond spreads is less clear-cut in the non-euro area
compared to the euro area case.   
Graph IV.3.4: Fiscal space and government bond spreads in non 
euro-area countries
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(1) Details on the fiscal space composite indicator given in Annex IV.2. 
3.3. FISCAL STIMULUS WITH LIMITED FISCAL 
SPACE: SIMULATION RESULTS WITH THE 
QUESTIII MODEL 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, fiscal 
stimulus is widely used to reduce the depth of the
downturn. The impact of fiscal stimulus depends
crucially on whether it is credibly temporary or 
perceived to be permanent. In the latter case, 
economic agents would anticipate higher tax 
liabilities and –in case of limited fiscal space- risks 
to macrofinancial stability, increasing savings and 
demanding risk premia, leading to stronger
crowding out and a smaller GDP effect. Therefore,
in countries with limited fiscal space it is
particularly important that the stimulus should not
be perceived as permanent so as to avoid adverse
reactions in debt markets. Convincing economic
agents of the temporary nature of the fiscal 
stimulus is not straightforward, especially as 
history does not speak in favour of most
governments' capacity to rapidly reverse stimulus.  
This section shows simulations for the effect of a 
fiscal stimulus that is not perceived to be 
temporary. Economic agents anticipate that the 
stimulus measures will not be discontinued after 
one or two years. This may be due to concerns
about the political incentives and track record of 
the government, in relation to the expected state of 
the economy. In case of a protracted period of very
low growth, policy makes may be reluctant to
discontinue fiscal measures as announced if the 
economy remains weak. 
Source: Commission services 
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Graph IV.3.5 shows four different GDP paths 
following a 1% of GDP government expenditure
shock in the QUESTIII model: (163) 
(i) A short-term fiscal multiplier of close to
1.5 is obtained in case of a credible temporary 
shock reversed after one year. The model does not 
give any negative long-run effects due to the
assumed accompanying monetary accommodation.  
(ii) If the shock is permanent instead, the 
short-term multiplier drops to less then 0.4. The
increase in debt and the higher future taxes lead to
output loss of 0.6% of GDP after ten years.
(iii) If the shock is permanent and there is 
limited fiscal space leading to an increase in the
sovereign risk premium by 100 basis points, the
output loss after 10 years is 0.4% of GDP higher
due to the further increase in taxes required by the 
still higher debt.(164) Surprisingly, the short-term
multiplier –at just above 0.4- is fractionally higher 
than without the risk premium, due to the marginal
effects of the interest payments on consumers 
disposable income. (165) 
(iv) Adding an economy-wide risk premium
of 25 basis points lowers GDP further in the short
and long run. The short-run multiplier is only 
marginally above zero, while after ten years, 
output is more than 1.5% of GDP below baseline. 
There is some empirical evidence that private 
sector risk premia are correlated to the sovereign 
risk premium.  (166)(167) 
(163) The simulations assume the monetary accommodation of 
the shock (i.e. keeping the nominal interest rate 
unchanged), which in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
seems a reasonable assumption. The initial level of 
government debt is 60% of GDP. 
(164) The simulation assumes an initial debt-to-GDP ratio of 
60%.  
(165) The model assumes that government debt is refinanced 
annually which implies that the risk premium feeds through
on government interest expenditures within a year, rather 
than over a number of years. Government debt is assumed 
to be bought by domestic Ricardian consumers who only 
increase savings to the extent that it reflects future taxes
that they need to pay. The credit- and liquidity-constraint
consumers do not adjust their savings. 
(166) See Peter and Grandes (2005). 
(167) Note that when increases in sovereign risk premia represent 
a transfer of credit risk from the private to the public 
sector, the correlation between private and sovereign risk 
Graph IV.3.5: Fiscal stimulus and risk premia (% of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services based on QUESTIII model. 
This simulation shows that the effect of a fiscal 
stimulus – even if consisting of government 
expenditure with a direct impact on demand and
GDP - could easily turn negative in vulnerable 
countries with limited fiscal space. The
simulations indicate that an increase of the risk 
premium on sovereign debt significantly reduces
the fiscal multiplier in high-debt countries in the 
medium to long run. An economy-wide increase in
risk premia would imply that not only a large part
of the fiscal stimulus leaks across borders and 
through Ricardian behaviour, but the increase in
risk premia counteracts the positive effect on
output and demand even in the short term.  
3.4. FISCAL POLICY DURING THE BUST: THE 
ROLE OF FISCAL SPACE 
In this section the QUEST III model is used to
analyse the effects of different fiscal policy stances 
as the economy experiences a severe downturn 
following a boom driven by a property price 
bubble and an undervalued initial real exchange
rate. (168) The difference between countries with 
premia would be negative (bank rescues and guarantees).
See ECB (2009). 
(168) The undervalued real exchange rate has been proxied by a 
series of shocks to foreign prices rather than a single shock 
to avoid an excessively rapid adjustment. The shock
triggers an increase in wage and price inflation of over 1 
percentage point above the baseline, implying a drop in the 
real interest rate. Imports increase more than exports, 
leading to a current account deficit. After the bubble bursts 
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large and small fiscal space is simulated by
changes in country risk premia in response to fiscal
policy.  
As the financial crisis develops, global demand
shortfalls and depreciations of key trading partners 
affected by the crisis imply a reduction of foreign
prices. This can be considered a stylised 
characterisation of key features of the present
financial crisis for some euro-area Member States 
and EU Member States with fixed exchange rate
regimes and currency boards. 
The simulations consider a representative small
euro-area Member State. Different policy reactions 
during the bust may be due in particular to (i)
uncertainty about the depth of the downturn in real 
time; (ii) constraints due to limited fiscal space 
(which in turn is related to the conduct of fiscal
policy during the boom period); (iii) preferences as 
regards fiscal policy intervention; and (iv)
current account and real exchange rate adjustment is
required. This appears matching the necessary unwinding
of imbalances in most EU Member States that have 
experienced the strongest and most protracted booms. The 
housing price bubble is simulated by a series of shocks to
the risk premium on housing investment that decreases
each quarter and than returns to baseline in the 13th 
quarter. It pushes up property prices (in particular the land
component), stimulates housing investment and
consumption, through wealth effects and reduced collateral 
constraints for liquidity constraint households.    
uncertainty about the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
The starting position is the scenario in which
windfall revenues during the boom have been
spent and the government debt-to-GDP ratio is at
baseline at the start of the downturn, such that the 
boom has not been used to save for rainy days.
During the downturn, several fiscal policy 
scenarios are presented in Graph IV.3.6.
• The first fiscal policy scenario shows a 
substantial discretionary increase in
government consumption by 2.5% of GDP
compared to the government consumption
before the downturn. In the three following
years, the fiscal stimulus is gradually reversed
as government consumption returns to baseline. 
That means that it does not only reverse the
discretionary fiscal stimulus of 2.5% of GDP
that was given during the downturn, but also
the gradual increase in government spending 
compared to baseline during boom period of 2
% of GDP as windfall revenues were partly
spent. (169)  
(169) Note that the effectiveness of the stimulus is substantially 
reduced if the stimulus is perceived to be permanent rather 
than temporary.  
Graph IV.3.6: Quest III simulations of the unwinding of imbalances and fiscal policy: countries with  large fiscal space (% of GDP) 
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Notes: Time indicated in years.  
The graphs show deviations from the baseline (the path without given shocks) which is represented by the horizontal axis.
Source: Commission services based on QUESTIII model. 
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• The second policy scenario mimics neutral 
fiscal policy with full working of the automatic 
stabilisers in t and t+1. In t+2 and t+3,
government consumption returns to baseline,
i.e. it reverses the 2% of GDP increase in 
government expenditure that occurred during
the boom.
• The third policy scenario is pro-cyclical as the 
budgetary deterioration due to the automatic
stabilisers is countered by a reduction in 
government consumption and the budget
balance is brought back close to baseline from
the outbreak of the crisis. This will occur in
particular in case fiscal space is depleted due to 
incautious policies during the boom period. 
The simulations indicate that fiscal policy can
potentially make a considerable difference in the 
depth of the downturn, especially in countries with
sufficient fiscal space that would not suffer from a 
substantial increase in country risk premia. Further 
contracting aggregate demand deepens the
downturn in our simulation of an unchanged
budget balance by more than 2 percentage points 
compared to the neutral fiscal policy in which the 
automatic stabilisers are allowed to play fully. If in
addition government consumption is 
discretionarily increased further immediately after 
the bust, the output loss is further contained. 
These effects are mirrored in the current account 
developments and the budgetary indicators. High
real interest rates due to real exchange rate 
depreciation, reversing the appreciation during the 
boom period, together with substantial budget
deficits and low output growth lead to a very rapid
and substantial increase in the government debt-to-
GDP ratio. Remarkably, these effects imply also a
substantial increase in the debt ratio in the case of 
strong procyclical consolidation efforts. 
If however, a country with limited fiscal space 
engages in countercyclical fiscal policy, the effect
on GDP is uncertain. Consider for instance the
case in which the fiscal stance affects risk premia
discussed in Section IV.3.3. If only sovereign risk
premia are affected, the economic effects are not 
substantial.  
Graph IV.3.7 provides a stylised illustration of the 
effects of changes to the country risk premium in
countries with very limited fiscal space. It 
combines the fiscal shocks of Graph IV.3.7 with
possible financial market reactions to increased 
risk of sovereign default and repercussions for risk
premia in the overall economy (this can be due to 
exchange rate risk, but also to other links between 
sovereign and private defaults). That means not 
only the sovereign risk premium is shocked, but
also the risk premia for households and firms 
change, although to a lesser extent than the country
risk premium.
Graph IV.3.7: Quest III simulations of the unwinding of imbalances and fiscal policy: countries with  small fiscal space (% of GDP)
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The graphs show deviations from the baseline (the path without given shocks) which is represented by the horizontal axis.
Source: Commission services based on QUESTIII model  
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Three scenarios are considered:  
• The first scenario shows a substantial 
discretionary increase in government 
consumption by 2.5% of GDP compared to the 
government consumption before the downturn. 
In the three following years, the fiscal stimulus 
is gradually reversed as government 
consumption returns to baseline. The fiscal 
stimulus is assumed to lead to an increase of 
the sovereign risk premium by 100 basis points 
and of the overall country risk premium by 50 
basis points compared to the baseline scenario.   
• The second policy scenario mimics neutral 
fiscal policy with full working of the 
automatics stabilisers in t and t+1. In t+2 and 
t+3, government consumption returns to 
baseline, i.e. it reverses the 2% of GDP 
increase in government expenditure that 
occurred during the boom. The country risk 
premia are not affected.  
• The third policy scenario is pro-cyclical a 
reduction in government consumption largely 
counters the budgetary deterioration due to the 
automatic stabilisers and the budget balance is 
brought back close to baseline from the 
outbreak of the crisis. Both sovereign and 
country risk premia are reduced by 100 basis 
points. This could occur in countries with 
severe risk of balance of payment and/or a 
currency crisis.  
As in the simulations for countries with large fiscal 
space (i.e. no risk premium response), procyclical 
tightening leads to a debt-to-GDP ratio that is 20 
percentage points lower than in the strong fiscal 
stimulus scenario and a rapid return to baseline 
growth. However, these simulations illustrate how 
the benefits to economic growth in the short run 
may be nullified by movements in risk premia.  
While the financial market reaction to fiscal policy 
and expectations of fiscal space developments 
cannot be accurately forecast, these simulations 
highlight the need to differentiate fiscal policy 
across Member States according to their fiscal 
space and the market spreads on sovereign, 
corporate and financial sector bonds. When 
considering the pace of deficit reduction over the 
coming years, taking account of fiscal space may 
enhance the growth path and lead to a better 
outcome for individual Member States and the 
euro area and the EU as a whole.  
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While the global financial crisis represents a 
common shock of unprecedented scale, the impact 
on EU countries and their ability to conduct active 
fiscal policies is far from homogenous. This 
chapter analysed in particular the effect of property 
prices and credit expansions on fiscal policy. The 
analysis suggests that rapid credit expansions and 
asset price booms and busts as experienced in EU 
countries over the past decade can have a large 
impact on public finances. Booms feed substantial 
government revenue windfalls, which often are 
matched by government expenditure increases. 
The effects of such automatic fiscal stabilisers on 
budget balances -and thus economic activity- are 
large during boom-bust phases; larger than 
measured by the differences between actual 
balances and conventional measures of “structural 
budget balances”. In addition to the automatic 
stabilisers governments may take discretionary 
measures when the recession sets in to sustain 
economic activity to reduce its depth. However, 
besides the asymmetry it introduces in the 
operation of fiscal policy, the effectiveness of 
typical expansionary Keynesian policies in 
downturns may be limited if fiscal space is 
constrained; more so, if it leads to rising sovereign 
and economy-wide risk premia. 
A core concern is to ensure sufficient 
consolidation during apparent "good times". 
Revenue windfalls during asset price boom periods 
are often misread as durable improvements in the 
underlying budget position. Creating a sufficient 
safety margin to accommodate debt increases 
during bust phases, can avoid amplification of 
booms, and assure greater resilience during 
downswings. Countries with limited fiscal space - 
i.e., a high public debt, a high share of non-
discretionary expenses and potential large tax 
revenue shortfalls together with competitiveness 
challenges threatening medium-term growth 
perspectives– need to engage in particularly 
cautious fiscal policies in booms to avoid adverse 
financial market reactions and constraints on the 
fiscal stabilisation tool during busts, leading to 
deep recessions.  
Broader surveillance based on a wider set of 
indicators could provide a useful signalling device 
for the capacity of countries to meet their financial 
obligations. A broad definition of fiscal space, 
covering a wider set of variables would facilitate 
early indication of risks of budgetary stress and, by 
the same token, of the ability to conduct counter-
cyclical fiscal policies when favourable conditions 
revert sharply. Such monitoring also needs to be 
consistent with a deeper analysis of underlying 
fiscal positions during booms, when revenues may 
be swollen by transient factors not captured in 
cyclical adjustment calculations. In addition to the 
usual indicators of government debt and deficit, 
particular attention could be given to external and 
domestic imbalances, including contingent 
liabilities related to private sector credit, foreign 
currency liabilities and current account 
developments.  
While the results presented here provide evidence 
on the effect of boom-bust periods on public 
finances, questions remain regarding the potential 
medium-run effects of boom and busts periods on 
public finances as well as -crucially- the way 
public finances can help prevent the occurrence of 
or at least mitigate most damaging effects of such 
asset related cycles. 
First, while a number of authors have provided 
insights regarding the impact of credit conditions 
and asset prices on fiscal variables, the evolution 
of private credit to the economy and its potential 
link to property prices in particular should be more 
closely analysed in the context of the EU given the 
evidence of their disruptive effects on economic 
activity and their potential for imparting a pro-
cyclical bias to discretionary fiscal policy. (170) 
Structural features of EU credit and housing 
markets and their link with fiscal policy and 
economic activity would need to be analysed in 
depth.  
Second, the existing literature is relatively scant on 
the effects of unwinding of macroeconomic 
imbalances on budgetary developments over the 
medium term. Little evidence is available on the 
long-run fiscal adjustment following a prolonged 
period of deteriorating competitiveness and 
increasing current account imbalances. Existing 
studies tend to suggest, however, that post-boom 
periods accompanied by the correction of current 
(170) See for instance, Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) and Morris 
and Schuknecht (2007). 
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al imbalances, in particular in 
the euro area. (174)  
(housing) or debt over equity can contribute to the 
account imbalances may be particularly costly 
from a growth perspective and fiscal policy may 
play an important role during both the building-up 
and unfolding of such external 
imbalances.(171)(172) Existing evidence on the 
fiscal cost of unwinding internal imbalances 
suggests also that wide asset price variations may 
have durable impact on public finances. (173) The 
dynamics of current account and competitive 
adjustment in the euro area are of particular 
interest. The loss of the exchange rate as 
adjustment instrument may imply protracted 
periods of self-reinforcing destabilising dynamics 
due to price and wage rigidities. Current account 
imbalances and net foreign asset positions can in 
turn play an important role in a context of 
exacerbated tensions in financial markets. The 
current reversal in countries with the largest 
imbalances provides scope for further analysis of 
the role of fiscal policy in the build-up and 
unwinding of extern
Third, whereas the effectiveness of across-the-
board counter-cyclical fiscal policy is subject to 
well-known caveats, targeting fiscal measures on 
microeconomic channels during periods of boom, 
bust and external adjustment have to be further 
investigated. In particular, policy incentives that 
favour investment in non-productive capital 
(171) See for instance Corsetti et al. (1999) and Mussa (2005). 
(172) Freund and Warnock (2005) investigate characteristics of 
current account adjustments in industrial countries. In their 
sample of 25 episodes the peak current account deficit is 
mostly around 5 to 6 % of GDP. The authors find that the 
current account adjustments typically take three to four 
years to resolve and involve slowing economic growth, a 
significant real depreciation (10 to 20%), accelerating real 
export growth, declining investment and eventually an 
improvement in the budget balance. There are just few 
exceptions of current account adjustment in which these 
characteristics did not occur. In the context of the current 
account imbalances in the euro area and in countries with a 
currency board, it would thus be interesting to have a closer 
look at these exceptions that did not experience nominal or 
real depreciation of the exchange rate. 
(173) See for instance Kuttner and Posen (2001) and Eschenbach 
and Schuknecht (2002). 
(174) Adjustment dynamics in EMU have been studied intensely 
over the past decade. See e.g. Langedijk and Roeger (2007) 
and Deroose et al. (2004). The role of fiscal policy and the 
effect of adjustment on fiscal developments are however 
only scantly analysed due to the short timeframe and lack 
of reversals in fortunes. However, recent developments 
showing a reversal in countries with the largest imbalances 
provides scope for further analyses.  
build up of macroeconomic imbalances. (175) 
While there seems to be a good case for removal of 
such incentives as they amount to tax distortions, it 
is much more controversial whether tax policy 
should be actively aiming at combating asset price 
bubbles and affecting competitiveness (e.g. 
through their impact on unit labour costs), since 
taxation is normally best though of as a long-term 
issue.  
Fourth, unsustainable booms are easier to identify 
ex-post than during the good times. An improved 
identification of large tax revenue windfalls, 
especially taxes linked to the most volatile 
components of government revenues such as 
property and corporate taxes, could provide timely 
warning of difficult times ahead and better 
identification of underlying temporary 
developments of government revenues. (176) A 
better and more regular identification and 
forecasting of tax revenue windfalls, possibly 
using infra-annual information on budgetary data, 
could also prove instrumental to better 
understanding the temporary nature of fiscal 
developments. (177) 
(175) See Keen and Perry (2009) who argue that while not a 
proximate cause of the crisis, tax distortions may have 
intensified its effects and shaped some aspects of its form.   
(176) See Kremer et al. (2006). 
(177) While challenging from a policy perspective given 
coverage limitations and statistical definitions, the use of 
intra-annual data has attracted growing attention in the 
forecasting literature given the potentially wealth of 
information contained in disaggregated data with high 
frequency. See for instance Onorante et al. (2008) and Leal 
et al. (2008). 
ANNEX IV 
DATA SOURCE AND METHODS 
AIV.1. DETERMINANTS OF REVENUES WINDFALLS 
AND SHORTFALLS 
The variables used to estimate the determinants of 
government revenues windfalls/shortfalls in the 
euro area are the following: 
Growth surprise: This indicator was calculated by 
making use of the information contained in the 
SCP regarding GDP growth forecasts made by 
national governments in year t-1. The growth 
surprise is equal to: 
Growth surprise = Δ GDPt ex-post  - Δ GDPt,t-1 SCP 
where Δ GDPt,t-1 SCP  is the annual 
percentage change in nominal GDP forecast in 
year t-1 for the year t and  ΔGDPt ex-post   is the 
percentage change in nominal GDP that has 
effectively taken place in year t. Note that nominal 
rather than real GDP figures are considered in 
order to account for the influence of inflation 
developments. 
Source: Commission services. 
Composition effect: For an unchanged rate of 
GDP growth, tax revenues can change depending 
on the composition of GDP growth if, for instance, 
GDP growth is driven by tax-poor rather than tax-
rich GDP components. The growth rates of each 
tax basis can thus be compared to the overall GDP 
growth rate in order to investigate whether GDP 
growth composition is likely to influence tax 
yields. The following formula can be used in order 
to obtain an aggregate measure of the composition 
effect:  
Composition effect  =
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Source: Commission services. 
Asset prices development: Asset prices 
developments (including the equity and housing 
markets) may also play a role in explaining 
revenue windfalls given that taxation of capital 
revenues and transactions in housing market (VAT 
and/or stamp duties) can significantly influence tax 
revenues, especially during periods of abrupt price 
changes.  The variables used are the annual change 
in equity prices and housing prices and are taken 
from the BIS database. It must be noted that this 
data contains information for a limited set of 
countries only (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands) such 
that estimations using this information could yield 
results different from the overall sample. Source: 
Bank for International Settlements and 
Commission services. 
Oil prices: Oil prices can have an influence of 
revenue windfall as abrupt changes in these prices 
can be expected to also exert an influence on tax 
revenues through indirect taxes. The data used for 
the regressions is the annual change of the Brent 
price expressed in euro per barrel. Source: Reuters. 
Trade balance: The effect of trade balance can be 
investigated separately by calculating the annual 
change in the deficit/surplus in total international 
trade (including intra-area trade) in percentage of 
GDP of each country. Source: Commission 
services. 
AIV.2. VARIABLES DEFINITION, SOURCES AND 
CALCULATION OF THE FISCAL SPACE 
COMPOSITE INDICATOR 
(i) Gross debt– is defined in percentage of GDP at 
market prices. Source: Commission services. 
(ii) Contingent liabilities in the financial sector
–The potential contingent liability represents the 
potential level of problematic banking assets in the 
system, and estimates the potential scale of costs to 
the government. The risks are quantified by 
developing estimates of the potential contingent 
liability arising from financial sector difficulties in 
a reasonable worst-case economic downturn, 
modified by the likelihood of that downturn 
where the tax bases are considered at time t-1 and 
include private consumption (for indirect 
consumption taxation), the gross operating surplus 
(as a proxy for the tax bases used for profit taxes) 
and the total wage bill (for wages and social 
security expenditures). These different tax bases 
are added up in order to obtain an aggregate 
measure of the composition effect. 
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occurring over the medium to long-term. 
Deepening stress in a financial system often 
contributes to a downgrade. Importantly this 
indicator is not a prediction of the potential up-
front or final direct costs to the government but 
rather an indicator of the potential risk linked to 
financial distresses for governments' finances. The 
potential liabilities are calculated by multiplying 
domestic credit as a percentage of GDP to a 
measure the potential contingent liability in 
relation to the size of the economy. The stock of 
domestic credit to the private sector and non-
financial public enterprises are the basis in this 
computation, because it represents the subset of 
financial system assets in which losses are most 
likely to occur, and because systemic figures on 
bank credit to this sector are readily available. 
Claims against the government sector, conversely, 
are excluded. This component of domestic credit is 
not a potential additional source of burden to the 
government as it is already part of the 
government's debt burden. Source: Standard & 
Poors. 
(iii) Medium term tax shortfalls - The estimate of 
revenue shortfalls in the medium term concern the 
two most volatile components of tax revenues: 
corporate taxes and property taxes, the latter 
including taxes on transactions in the housing 
market. The estimate of the tax shortfall is made 
assuming that corporate taxes and property taxes 
return to their pre-bubble ratio to GDP identified 
by the breaking points in the trend level of each tax 
revenues. The difference between the current level 
of tax revenues related to corporate and property 
taxes (expressed in percentage of GDP) and their 
pre-bubble value is used as proxy of tax revenue 
shortfalls. Source: Commission services. 
(iv) Current account balance – is defined in 
percentage of GDP at market prices. Source: 
Commission services.
(v) Non- discretionary expenses are the sum of 
interest payment on debt, and payments on social 
benefits other than social transfers in kind of the 
general government. This latter variable is mostly 
represented by payment of pensions. The sum of 
these two variables is measured in percentage of 
GDP at market prices. Source: Commission 
services.
Accordingly a large government debt, high 
contingent liabilities, potentially high tax revenues 
shortfalls and a large share of non-discretionary 
expenses are expected to deteriorate countries' 
fiscal space and thus enter the composite indicator 
with a negative sign. The indicators (i)-(v), hereby 
xi, are standardised using the procedure described 
in OECD (2005) according to the following 
formula): 
(1) xi = 10* (Indicator – average of indicator) 
/ Standard deviation of indicator 
This normalisation assumes that observations are 
normally distributed and assigning a maximum and 
minimum score to outliers would deliver scores 
ranging from -30 to +30. The benchmarks are 
given by the reference group represented by the 
EU average of the fiscal space indicator in 1999. 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government deficit amounted 
to 1.2% of GDP. The difference between the 
outturn and the balanced budget target in the April 
2008 update of the stability programme can be 
explained by the weakening of Belgium's 
economic performance and its impact through the 
automatic stabilisers, by the overly optimistic 
revenue projections in the initial budget and by 
higher than planned expenditure. The structural 
deficit increased by 0.7% of GDP as a result of 
measures to reduce the tax wedge on labour, a 
further rise of social benefits and a more rapid 
payment of invoices at the end of the year. After 
having declined for many years, general 
government debt increased from 84% of GDP in 
2007 to 89.6% of GDP in 2008, mainly as a result 
of the operations to stabilise the financial system. 
For 2009, the deficit target of the general 
government balance is 3.4% of GDP according to 
the April 2009 update of the stability programme 
(178). The initial budget planned a 1.2% of GDP 
deficit, but had to be adapted in view of the 
deteriorated economic environment and the 
introduction of a recovery package. The 
Commission services expect the deficit to amount 
to 4.5% of GDP. The main reason for this 
divergence is the different macroeconomic 
scenario, with the Commission services projecting 
a GDP contraction of 3.5%, compared to 1.9% in 
the budget. To cushion the impact of the economic 
downturn, the different government tiers have 
implemented fiscal stimulus packages. Whereas 
the budgetary impact of the regional packages is 
negligible, the federal one amounts to 0.5% of 
GDP. It is aimed at reducing the tax burden on 
labour and the VAT rate for residential 
construction, supporting the purchasing power of 
households, i.a. through higher unemployment 
benefits and a heating subsidy, and accelerating 
public investment. The packages come on top of 
measures foreseen in the initial budget (0.4% of 
(178) The programme can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
GDP), including personal income tax reductions 
and higher social benefits to support households' 
purchasing power. The stimulus measures in most 
parts are broadly in line with the EERP. In 
particular, the reduction of the labour tax burden, 
of which a considerable part is granted to all 
workers, and the heating subsidy, which is 
provided to all households, do not appear 
sufficiently targeted. In addition, a substantial part 
of the stimulus, including the reduction of the tax 
burden on labour, is permanent and not 
accompanied by consolidating measures. Overall, 
fiscal policy is expansionary in 2009. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast, which is based on a no-policy 
change assumption, general government deficit 
would amount to 6.1% of GDP in 2010. The fiscal 
stimulus package implemented by the Belgian 
government continues to have a budgetary impact 
in 2010 (0.4% of GDP). The April 2009 update of 
the stability programme targets a 4% of GDP 
deficit, considerably better than the Commission 
services projection. This large difference can be 
broadly explained by differing macroeconomic 
projections. In addition, the stability programme 
takes into account unspecified measures 
amounting to 0.5% of GDP. Finally, a more 
negative outturn in 2010 also contributes to the 
larger deficit in 2009. The Commission services’ 
spring 2009 forecast expects the debt-to-GDP ratio 
to rise rapidly and come out above 100% of GDP 
in 2010, as a result of low nominal GDP growth 
and large budget deficits. Measures taken up to 
now to stabilise the financial system led to an 
increase of public debt of about 6% of GDP, the 
bulk of which has been recorded as a stock-flow 
adjustment in 2008. The April 2009 update of the 
stability programme includes lower public debt 
projections, mainly as a result of its more 
favourable macroeconomic scenario, with higher 
nominal GDP growth and smaller deficits, and the 
fact that the programme implicitly takes into 
account unspecified corrective measures. To the 
extent that the guarantees provided to banks 
(which amount to over one third of GDP) would be 
called, public debt may further increase. 
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Table V.1.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2013, Belgium (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.2 -1.2 -4.5 -6.1
48.1 48.6 48.4 48.2
Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.8 12.5 12.3 12.3
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 16.3 16.5 15.9 15.9
- social contributions 15.7 16.2 16.6 16.5
48.3 49.8 52.9 54.3
Of which: - compensation of employees 11.7 12.0 12.6 12.7
- intermediate consumption 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.9
- social payments 15.4 15.9 17.0 17.8
- gross fixed capital formation 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8
- interest expenditure 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.0
3.6 2.5 -0.6 -2.1
44.0 44.5 44.1 44.0
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
-1.5 -2.2 -3.2 -4.0
2.3 1.5 0.7 0.0
84.0 89.6 95.7 100.9
2.8 1.2 -3.5 -0.2
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
-0.2 -1.2 -3.4 -4.0 -3.4 -2.6 -1.5
3.6 2.5 0.4 -0.1 0.6 1.5 2.5
-0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.3 -2.0 -2.4 -2.6 -2.4 -1.9 -1.2
84.0 89.6 93.0 95.0 94.9 93.9 92.0
2.8 1.1 -1.9 0.6 2.3 2.3 2.1
Outturn and forecast(1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme(4)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
(1)  Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in April 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Belgium.
Table V.1.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Belgium
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•     VAT reduction for residential construction 
(-0.1% of GDP)
•   Reduction in the tax wedge on labour
    through subsidies (0.1% of GDP)
•   Acceleration of payment of invoices
    (0.1% of GDP)
•     Flemish reduction of personal income 
taxes (-0.2% of GDP)
•    Increases in social benefits
     (0.1% of GDP)
•     Federal measures to reduce personal 
income taxes (-0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and April 2009 update of the stability programme of Belgium. 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government surplus in 
Bulgaria was 1.5% of GDP, against an official 
target of 3% of GDP set out in the December 2007 
update of the convergence programme (179). The 
budgetary under-performance was due to lower 
than expected revenues and lack of strict 
expenditure control. The deterioration in revenues 
reflects the negative impact of the global economic 
downturn taking hold since the last quarter of 2008 
when the GDP growth rate decelerated sharply and 
the growth composition became less tax intensive. 
However, discretionary measures, such as the 
introduction of a 10% flat-rate personal income tax 
since the beginning of 2008 as well as a significant 
underperformance in planned EU funds absorption 
have also led to lower revenue growth. On the 
expenditure side, discipline has not been fully 
maintained. Additional social and infrastructure 
maintenance spending of around 1.8% of GDP was 
adopted through a supplementary budget in mid-
2008. In addition, pensions were increased by 
more than the statutory rate and budgetary sector 
wage increases were higher than initially planned. 
In line with the budgetary surplus, the general 
government gross debt decreased to 14.1% of GDP 
from 18.2% of GDP in 2007. 
The official target for the general government 
budget balance in 2009 is a surplus of 1.5% of 
GDP, as reported in the April 2009 fiscal 
notification. The target was revised downwards 
from a surplus of 3% of GDP in the December 
2008 update of the convergence programme 
reflecting the negative impact of the economic 
crisis on the budget revenue. Still, the revised 
target is above the Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast which expects the general 
government balance to deteriorate to a deficit of 
0.5% of GDP based on a much less favourable 
macroeconomic scenario. Due to the lack of fiscal 
room for manoeuvre, as a result of large external 
(179) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
and domestic macroeconomic imbalances, the 
2009 budget does not foresee any fiscal stimulus 
measures in response to the economic downturn. 
Instead, the fiscal policy stance is broadly neutral 
and geared towards preserving investor confidence 
and contributing to macroeconomic stability 
through targeting positive budgetary balances. 
Hence, to ensure meeting the budgetary target, the 
so-called '90%' budget execution rule, which was 
abandoned in 2008, has been re-introduced in the 
2009 budget. Under this rule, only 90% of the non-
interest budget allocations (excluding social 
transfers) can be disbursed to the spending units in 
the course of the year. Given higher risks to the 
public finances in the current economic juncture, 
maintaining a budget surplus would require further 
expenditure cuts beyond the 90% rule, which 
might prove difficult in a rapidly deteriorating 
economic environment. 
Under a no-policy-change assumption, the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast 
foresees a general government deficit of 0.3% of 
GDP in 2010, which is below the latest official 
projection of a 1.5% of GDP surplus. The 
difference reflects a less favourable growth 
scenario, implying a less tax-intensive composition 
of growth. 
In line with the economic slowdown and 
deteriorating budgetary outcomes, the Commission 
services' spring 2009 forecast projects the general 
government gross debt to increase to 16% and just 
above 17% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. According to the latest official 
forecast by the authorities, the debt ratio would 
increase to almost 17% of GDP this year and then 
fall to around 15% of GDP next year, based on less 
favourable nominal GDP projections, while 
assuming sustained fiscal surpluses. At the same 
time, debt-increasing stock-flow adjustments due 
to a further accumulation of net financial assets are 
envisaged. 
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Table V.2.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Bulgaria (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
0.1 1.5 -0.5 -0.3
41.5 39.0 39.0 39.0
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 18.5 18.0 17.9 17.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5
- social contributions 8.7 8.1 7.9 7.9
41.5 37.4 39.5 39.3
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.8
- intermediate consumption 8.0 7.5 7.6 7.4
- social payments 10.9 10.5 11.1 11.0
- gross fixed capital formation 4.8 5.6 6.7 7.0
- interest expenditure 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8
1.1 2.4 0.3 0.4
34.1 33.6 33.3 33.4
-3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.2 0.4 0.2 1.5
3.2 1.3 1.0 2.2
18.2 14.1 16.0 17.3
6.2 6.0 -1.6 -0.1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
1.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
-3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.9 2.6 3.2 3.6 3.6
18.2 15.4 15.4 15.3 15.2
6.2 6.5 4.7 5.2 5.8
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Convergence programme(4)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Bulgaria.
Table V.2.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Bulgaria
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•        Limiting the disbursement of non-interest
      expenditure (excluding social security
      transfers) to 90% of budgeted allocations
      in case of a worse-than-budgeted revenue
      outcome (-2.3% of GDP)
•      Higher capital spending (0.1% of GDP)
•        Reduction in the pension social
  contribution rate by 4% (-0.9% of GDP)
•        Increasing pensions from 1 April and 
      further pension indexations from 1 July
      2009 (1% of GDP)
•        Increase in the mandatory minimum
  insured income thresholds (0.7% of GDP)
•        Increase in allocations for salaries in the
      budgetary sector by 10% (0.3% of GDP)
•        Increase of the healthcare contribution 
  rate by 2% (0.5% of GDP)
•        Increase in excise rates on kerosene, 
  coal, electricity for economic and 
  administrative needs and cigarettes (0.3% 
  of GDP)
•        Increase in property valuations for local
  property taxes (0.3% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Source: Commission services, December 2008 Convergence Programme, December 2008 Addendum to the Convergence Programme. 
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The estimated outturn for the general government 
balance in 2008 is 1.5% of GDP compared to a 
target of 1.2% of GDP in the most recent 
November 2008 update of the convergence 
programme. The main reason for the slight 
deviation was a shift in revenues from tobacco 
excise duty from 2008 to 2007. The debt ratio in 
2008 was 29% of GDP. 
The target for the general government balance is 
2009 is -4.5% of GDP based on the Ministry of 
Finance’s latest April 2009 forecast, compared to a 
target of -1.6% in the latest November 2008 
convergence programme(180). The main reason for 
the change is a significantly more pessimistic 
growth outlook. While the convergence 
programme foresaw modest growth in 2009, the 
most recent April 2009 forecast predicts that 
output will contract by 2.3% of GDP. The target of 
-4.5% of GDP for the general government balance 
in 2009 compares to a forecast of -4.3% of GDP in 
2009 in the Commission services’ spring 2009 
forecast. The difference partly reflects higher 
growth in government consumption in the Ministry 
of Finance’s April 2009 forecast. The Czech 
Republic has adopted two packages of stimulus 
measures in response to the downturn. The first 
stimulus package, adopted at the time of the 2009 
budget, was mainly focused on cutting social 
security contributions paid by employees as well 
as additional spending on infrastructure 
investment. The second stimulus package, adopted 
in February 2009, comprises a range of revenue 
and expenditure measures aimed to support mainly 
small and medium size enterprises during the 
downturn. Principally, these include a provision 
for accelerated write-downs on capital goods, tax 
reductions on the purchase of small motor 
vehicles, as well as grants and subsidies. Both 
stimulus packages also include modest sized 
capital injections in order to ease credit conditions 
for SMEs. Both stimulus packages will have an 
expansionary impact on public finances in 2009. 
Nearly all the stimulus measures are of a 
(180) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.
temporary nature and should not interfere with the 
achievement of medium-term fiscal targets. The 
exception is the reduction in social security 
contributions, with a fiscal impact of about -½% of 
GDP, which in the event of a prolonged downturn 
may have to be counterbalanced by other 
measures. The stimulus measures are timely in that 
the Czech economy already registered negative 
growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and is forecast 
to contract sharply in 2009 due to the impact of the 
economic crisis, triggered by a steep fall in 
external demand. In this respect, the reduction in 
social security contributions will take immediate 
effect from January 2009 while the impact of 
expenditure measures will be felt more gradually 
through the year. The measures taken are 
appropriately targeted in that they will stimulate 
domestic demand, partially compensating for the 
decline in external demand, and provide bridging 
support for small businesses including easing 
credit conditions. As a result of the stimulus 
measures, the fiscal stance in 2009 will be 
expansionary.  
The Commission services spring 2009 forecast 
projects the general government deficit for 2010 at 
4.9% of GDP, derived under the no-policy change 
assumption. This is significantly above the deficit 
target of 1.5% of GDP set in the most recent 
update of the convergence programme and reflects 
the expectation of only weak growth in 2010 as 
well as further rises in unemployment, which will 
put pressure on social and welfare expenditure. In 
structural terms, the budget is set to be 
contractionary due to the phase-out of fiscal 
stimulus measures implemented in 2009. 
Government debt is set to rise to about 34% of 
GDP in 2009 and 38% of GDP in 2010 mainly due 
to the impact of worsening cyclical factors. The 
capital injections included in both stimulus 
packages will have a minor impact on the debt of 
about 0.1% of GDP.  
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Table V.3.1: Budgetary developments2007-2012, Czech Republic (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.6 -1.5 -4.3 -4.9
42.0 40.9 41.6 42.7
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 11.2 11.1 11.4 11.6
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.4 8.7 8.7 9.0
- social contributions 16.3 16.2 16.5 16.7
42.6 42.4 45.9 47.6
  Of which: - compensation of employees 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0
- intermediate consumption 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0
- social payments 12.9 12.7 14.2 15.1
- gross fixed capital formation 4.7 4.8 5.4 5.8
- interest expenditure 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1
0.5 -0.3 -3.2 -3.7
37.0 36.7 37.3 38.0
-0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.5 -3.4 -4.0 -3.7
-1.4 -2.3 -2.9 -2.5
28.9 29.8 33.7 37.9
6.0 3.2 -2.7 0.3
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-1.0 -1.2 -1.6 -1.5 -1.2
0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1
-0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.7 -1.9 -1.7 -1.3 -1.1
28.9 28.8 27.9 26.8 25.5
6.6 4.4 3.7 4.4 5.2
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme(4)
General government balance
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Primary balance
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission Services and convergence programme of Czech Republic 
Table V.3.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Czech Republic 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
• Reduced SS contribution (-0.5% of GDP) • Infrastructure investment (+0.4% of GDP)
•  Write-down of capital goods (-0.2% of GDP)
• Government Consumption and Wages
(-0.6% of GDP)
• Indexation of pensions (+0.2% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Czech Ministry of Finance 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government recorded a budgetary 
surplus of 3.6% of GDP in 2008, higher than the 
target of 3% of GDP indicated in the December 
2007 update of the convergence programme. This 
overachievement is all the more remarkable, as the 
economic situation in 2008 turned out to be 
significantly worse than anticipated. While the 
convergence programme had expected the 
economy to grow by 1.1%, it actually shrank by as 
much. Part of the benign budgetary outcome is 
owed to a more favourable starting position than 
was thought at the time, and the 2007 surplus has 
consequently been revised upwards by ¾% of 
GDP to 4.5% of GDP. Also, certain volatile 
revenues, e.g. from oil and gas extraction, came 
out higher than predicted. Unemployment, and 
hence related expenditure, remained remarkably 
low and even fell by ½ pp although economic 
activity slowed down.  
The sizable surplus could not, however, prevent a 
large increase in the general government debt-to-
GDP ratio from to 26.8% in 2007 to 33.3% in 
2008. The issuing of new 30-year government 
bonds from November 2008, primarily addressing 
the needs of the pension sector, implied an 
equivalent increase in financial assets and 
liabilities. As only the latter are taken into account 
in the gross debt ratio, this largely explains the 
large stock-flow adjustment of around 8% of GDP. 
The budgetary situation in 2009 will deteriorate 
substantially from the surplus registered in 2008. 
While the December 2008 update of the Danish 
convergence programme(181) and the April 2009 
fiscal notification foresee a balanced budget, the 
Commission spring forecast expects a deficit of 
1.6% of GDP. The difference between the two is 
mainly explained by the now outdated growth 
projections of the Danish government, which 
foresaw only a mild GDP contraction by 0.2%, 
(181) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and by the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
while the spring forecast expects a more 
substantive fall by 3.3% in 2009.  
Three factors contribute to the expected budget 
decline. Most importantly, the economic downturn 
will activate the very strong automatic stabilisers 
in Denmark, accounting for roughly half of the 
change in the budgetary position. This is amplified 
by the diminishing revenue from volatile sources, 
such as the fall in oil and gas revenues and falling 
tax receipts on financial assets. In addition, 
discretionary policy measures have a sizeable 
expansionary impact in 2009. The tax adjustments 
decided in August 2007, will reduce revenues by 
some 0.5% of GDP. Also, agreements on green 
transport and municipal investment will add some 
0.4% of GDP to expenditures.  
While the original motivation of the 2009 tax 
adjustments precedes the crisis, the measures taken 
are in line with the European Economic Recovery 
Plan, as they are timely and, combined with the 
financial packages, targeted at the segments of the 
economy most at risk through the crisis. Many of 
the measures taken are of temporary nature. A 
number of them, however, such as the tax 
reductions are not, and could permanently lead to a 
weaker performance of public finances in so far as 
employment effects fail to materialise or financing 
falls short of estimates. 
For 2010, the Commission services project a 
significant widening of the deficit to nearly 4% of 
GDP under a no-policy change scenario. This is 
significantly higher than the deficit of 1.2% of 
GDP foreseen by the Danish convergence 
programme, which employs a now outdated and 
too optimistic growth scenario.  The most 
important fiscal development for 2010 is the so-
called Spring Package, which is estimated to 
reduce tax revenues by a further 0.6% of GDP. 
The deficit figure for 2010 is topped off by a 
sizeable one-off for the pension yield 
compensation amounting to about ¾ % of GDP.  
Rising deficits combined with stability measures 
for the domestic financial banks and vulnerable 
partner countries (Iceland, Latvia) are leading to a 
rapid increase in gross debt levels from 27 % of 
Part V
Member State developments, Denmark 
205 
Table V.4.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2015, Denmark (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
4.5 3.6 -1.5 -3.9
55.4 55.4 53.4 53.1
 Of which : - taxes on production and imports 17.8 17.4 17.8 18.2
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 29.6 29.6 27.4 26.8
- social contributions 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
50.9 51.8 55.0 57.0
Of which: - compensation of employees 16.9 17.1 18.3 18.4
- intermediate consumption 8.9 9.1 9.4 9.4
- social payments 15.0 14.9 16.5 17.2
- gross fixed capital formation 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1
- interest expenditure 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.6
6.1 5.0 0.1 -2.3
48.7 48.4 46.7 46.4
0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6
3.0 4.2 1.2 -0.4
4.5 5.6 2.9 1.2
26.8 33.3 32.5 33.7
1.6 -1.1 -3.3 0.3
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2015
4.5 3.0 0.0 -1.2 0.3 0.1 -0.1
6.1 4.2 1.5 0.2 1.6 1.3 0.7
-0.1 -1.0 -1.7 -1.7 -0.2 0.0 0.0
3.7 4.0 2.6 1.7 1.3 0.6 0.2
26.3 30.3 27.9 26.3 25.4 24.6 22.6
1.6 0.2 -0.2 0.7 1.9 1.7 1.6
General government balance
Primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
- Total expenditure
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Convergence programme(4)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts 
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures 
(4) Submitted in December 2008 
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Denmark.
Table V.4.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Denmark
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•      Tax credit for companies (-0.1% of GDP) •     Building repair and maintenance 
        (0.1% of GDP)
•     Municipal investments (0.1% of GDP)
•      Income tax cuts (-0.3% of GDP)
•     Green transport infrastructure
        (0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, Danish Ministry of Finance. 
GDP in 2007 to 34 % in 2010. A major risk to debt
developments exists insofar as some of the rather 
sizeable banking guarantees of the Danish
government might be called upon.
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, Germany registered a close-to-balance 
position (-0.1% of GDP), which was an 
improvement on the planned deficit of ½% of GDP 
foreseen in the end-2007 update of the stability 
programme. The better-than-expected outcome 
was driven by substantially higher-than-anticipated 
revenue growth, in particular from income-related 
taxes due to higher wage and employment growth. 
Expenditure was around ¾% of GDP higher than 
previously expected mainly due to one-off 
measures related to the bank rescue operations and 
higher outlays for retirement benefits as a result of 
ad hoc changes in the pension adjustment formula. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio increased to almost 66% on 
the back of state guarantees granted to troubled 
Landesbanken (around 2% of GDP) (182).  
The Bundesrat adopted the 2009 federal budget on 
19 December 2008 and a supplementary budget on 
20 March 2009. A target of a 2.9% of GDP deficit 
was presented in the December 2008 update of the 
stability programme (183) and confirmed by the 
German authorities in the April 2009 fiscal 
notification. The Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast projects a deficit of almost 4% of 
GDP. This mainly reflects a more pessimistic 
macroeconomic scenario and the extension of the 
environmental premium adopted in April 2009. 
The deficit will be mainly fuelled by increased 
expenditure to automatic stabilisers and fiscal 
stimulus measures to address the economic crisis. 
The deterioration of the labour market is expected 
to lead to lower tax revenues, higher 
unemployment benefits and higher expenditure on 
short-time work.   
The main measures in the 2009 budget are the 
elements of a sizeable fiscal stimulus package for 
(182) In 2008, the German authorities have recorded the 
guarantees given to the troubled Landesbanken as debt-
increasing, but without any impact on the deficit. These 
guarantees will only affect the deficit if and when called. 
(183) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found 
at:http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
2009 (around 1½% of GDP) and 2010 (around 2% 
of GDP) adopted in line with the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). The package 
consists of a mix of revenue and expenditure 
instruments which aim at bolstering private 
consumption, boosting public and private 
investment, ensuring access to finance, avoiding 
lay-offs, improving access to training and which 
include measures that support the automobile 
industry. By and large, the allocation of funds 
corresponds to the areas most affected by the 
crisis. While some of the instruments are of 
temporary nature, a substantial part of them will be 
permanent. Thus, the full reversibility of the short 
term stimulus measures is not ensured.  
However, the German authorities envisage a debt 
repayment schedule to facilitate the redemption of 
debt caused by temporary measures from 2010 
onwards. They also intend to introduce a new 
constitutional budgetary rule to limit the structural 
deficit (184), which will be an important anchor to 
bring about the necessary fiscal consolidation 
process once the crisis recedes. This is in line with 
the EERP which also underscores the need for 
strengthening national budgetary rules and 
frameworks. Overall, fiscal policy is expansionary 
in 2009.  
For 2010, the December 2008 update of the 
stability programme targets a deficit of 4% of GDP 
driven by further discretionary fiscal expansion 
(around 2% of GDP). Under a no-policy-change 
scenario, the Commission projects a deficit of 
almost 6% of GDP. The difference is due to more 
pessimistic macroeconomic assumptions 
underlying the Commission forecast. 
In the light of higher deficits, lower nominal GDP 
and financial market stabilisation measures, the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast projects 
the debt ratio to increase from almost 66% of GDP 
in 2008 to around 79% of GDP in 2010.  
(184) The new rule foresees a structural deficit limit of 0.35% of 
GDP for the federal government as of 2016 and structurally 
balanced budgets for the Länder governments as of 2020. 
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Debt developments are subject to the risks attached 
to the deficit and additional risks related to
possible further capital injections and potential 
bank takeovers (with an impact on the debt, though
some effect on the deficit cannot be excluded). 
Fiscal costs of the crisis and adjustment to 
economic imbalances  
Table V.5.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Germany (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.2 -0.1 -3.9 -5.9
44.0 43.8 44.3 43.0
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.6 12.5 13.0 12.8
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 11.2 11.3 10.5 9.6
- social contributions 16.5 16.4 17.1 16.9
44.2 43.9 48.2 49.0
  Of which: - compensation of employees 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.5
- intermediate consumption 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.6
- social payments 17.3 16.9 18.8 19.1
- gross fixed capital formation 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.0
- interest expenditure 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0
2.6 2.6 -1.0 -2.9
39.8 39.7 39.7 38.8
-0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.1
-1.2 -1.2 -2.4 -3.9
1.6 1.6 0.6 -0.9
65.1 65.9 73.4 78.7
2.5 1.3 -5.4 0.3
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-0.2 -0 -3 -4 -3 -2½
2.6 2½ 0 -1 0 ½
-0.3 -½ 0 -0 -0 0
-0.9 -0.8 -2.5 -3.4 -2.4 -2.1
65.1 65½ 68½ 70½ 71½ 72½
2.5 1.3 -2¼ 1¼ 1¼ 1¼
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Germany. 
Table V.5.2: Main measures in the budget for 2009, Germany 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•  Reduction in social contributions rates
 (-0.3% of GDP)
• Investment, incl. infrastructure 
(+0.3% of GDP)
•  Income support, incl. lower income tax
 (-0.2% of GDP)
• Environmental premium 
(+0.2% of GDP)
•  Support to private investment, incl. more 
 favourable depreciation rules 
 (-0.1% of GDP)
•  Industry support 
(+0.1% of GDP)
•  Re-introduction of commuter allowance 
 (-0.1% of GDP)
•  Labour market support 
 (+0.1% of GDP)
•  Higher expenditure on the health-care 
 sector (+0.2% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1)  Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and the Federal Ministry of Finance.
Since 1995, Germany has significantly improved
its cost and price competitiveness, mainly through 
sustained wage moderation coupled with labour
shedding. Relying on a technologically strong
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manufacturing industry and benefiting from a 
booming world economy and greater exchange rate 
stability after the creation of the euro area, exports 
have provided a strong growth impulse. 
Consequently, the external balance moved into a 
surplus, mainly owing to growing corporate net 
saving and significant improvements of the general 
government fiscal position since 2005.  
Due to its high export dependence and 
specialisation on particularly volatile investment 
goods, Germany is being hit hard by the current 
downturn. In the light of the sharp contraction in 
world trade and the inevitable correction of global 
economic imbalances, the German economy faces 
sharp adjustment processes. Given the sustained 
fall in orders, exports of goods and services are 
projected to drop by over 16% in 2009. The 
current account surplus would thus shrink from 
6½% of GDP in 2008 to 3½% of GDP in 2009, 
mainly driven by a narrowing in the trade balance 
from 7½% of GDP in 2008 to 5% in 2009.  
Facing a much worse business outlook, tighter 
financing conditions, and a plunge in capacity 
utilisation, companies will further curtail 
investment, deplete savings and reduce costs. The 
household saving rate is expected to increase on 
the back of precautionary motives given the 
growing risks of unemployment, negative wealth 
effects and possible Ricardian effects linked with 
rising budget deficits. Consequently, private 
consumption is likely to decline. In the light of 
weak domestic demand, the economic recovery 
will largely rely on a positive impulse from 
abroad. While Germany should be well positioned 
to benefit from a rebound in external demand, its 
specialisation on investment goods and the sharp 
drop in global capacity utilisation during the 
current crisis imply a risk of a fairly protracted 
recovery.  
The deterioration of labour markets and erosion of 
tax bases across all categories will be reflected in 
higher fiscal deficits. The expansionary policies to 
address the crisis will burden the budget further. 
Even though the fiscal stimulus measures will not 
be sufficient to prevent a significant contraction of 
GDP in 2009, they will help soften the downturn. 
In particular, tax relief measures and higher 
transfer payments should limit the negative impact 
of the crisis on households. Higher government 
consumption and substantial increases in public 
investment should also act as stabilising factors. 
Rising fiscal deficits will support domestic demand 
and thus – via higher demand for imports – 
contribute to reducing the current account surplus 
further. 
Given the rising deficits and mounting debt, fiscal 
consolidation will become all the more necessary 
once the crisis recedes. Importantly, as the 
additional revenue from higher economic growth 
might be limited (185), the consolidation efforts 
will likely need to rely on tax increases and/or 
expenditure cuts. In the latter case, the new 
budgetary rule would be instrumental.  
However, the fiscal consolidation and the expiry of 
the stimulus could weigh on the economic 
recovery. Therefore, concrete measures need to be 
devised to aid budgetary consolidation and at the 
same time strengthen potential growth and support 
the economic recovery. Moreover, structural 
reforms to enhance competition in product markets 
and to improve the quality of and access to 
education and training raised within the framework 
of the Lisbon Strategy, could help limit the impact 
of the crisis on long-term economic growth and to 
lay the basis for a sustainable recovery.  
(185) Only some of the stimulus measures have been designed 
with a view to strengthen long-term growth (e.g. 
infrastructure, R&D, lower wage costs), which could 
translate into future return to the public sector in the form 
of higher revenues from increased economic growth. 
6. ESTONIA 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government posted a deficit of 3.0% 
of GDP in 2008, following six years of budgetary 
surpluses. The outcome was considerably worse 
than the surplus target of 1.3% set in the 
November 2007 convergence programme, due to a 
sharp revenue contraction mirroring the worse-
than-expected decline in economic activity. 
Despite the adoption of a restrictive supplementary 
budget in mid-2008, total expenditure increased by 
close to 20% compared to 2007, worsening the 
structural balance and implying a significantly 
counter-cyclical fiscal stance. The debt-to-GDP 
ratio increased only modestly, however, from 3.5% 
of GDP as of end-2007 to 4.8%, mainly on account 
of new borrowing by local governments, since the 
deficit of the central government was largely 
financed by running down accumulated surpluses 
of previous years.
The 2009 budget law was adopted on 10 December 
2008 and, according to the December 2008 update 
of the convergence programme, implied a general 
government deficit of 1.7% of GDP186. However, a 
steep deterioration in the economic outlook, in 
particular around the turn of the year, indicated 
that risks to the budgetary outlook were rapidly 
building up. With a view to limiting the depletion 
of reserves, as well as the objective of accession to 
the euro area, the government and Parliament 
adopted a series of consolidation measures. A 
restrictive supplementary budget of above 3% of 
GDP, mainly lowering planned expenditure, was 
adopted in February. This was followed in end-
April by additional consolidation measures of 
around 1% of GDP (including a temporary 
suspension of the state contribution to the 
mandatory funded pension scheme) affecting both 
revenue and expenditure. The April 2009 fiscal 
notification, which took into account the February 
supplementary budget, revised the 2009 general 
government deficit target to 2.9% of GDP. The 
(186) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and by the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast, taking 
into account both the February and April 
consolidation measures, expects the headline 
deficit to be maintained at 3.0% of GDP in 2009, 
against a considerable further deterioration of 
cyclical conditions. The implied restrictive fiscal 
stance is in line with the European Economic 
Recovery Plan agreed in December 2008, 
facilitating the correction of previously high 
external and internal imbalances. The authorities 
have adopted some measures to underpin the 
economic recovery, without these measures having 
a significant short-term budgetary impact (most 
notably the advancement of the adoption of the 
new Labour Law, frontloading the use of EU 
structural funds in certain sectors and broader use 
of state-backed guarantees). The intensified use of 
EU structural funds will increase both revenue and 
expenditure levels, without greatly affecting the 
overall balance.  
For 2010, the Commission services' spring 2009 
forecast projects a deficit of 3.9% of GDP, 
assuming unchanged policy. While tax revenue is 
expected to continue declining, some of the 
consolidation measures adopted in 2009 will have 
a positive budgetary impact also in 2010, in 
particular the temporary suspension of state 
contributions into the mandatory funded pension 
scheme. The most recent update of the 
convergence programme, based on the assumption 
of a significantly less severe and protracted 
recession as compared to the Commission services' 
spring forecast, projected a general government 
deficit of 1.0% of GDP in 2010. 
The Commission services' spring 2009 forecast 
projects the general government debt-to-GDP ratio 
to increase from 4.8% in 2008 to 6.8% in 2009 and 
to 7.8% in 2010. These projections are based on 
the assumption that the deficit is financed by a 
combination of gradual running down of 
accumulated surpluses of previous years (around 
8% of GDP as of end-2008) and new borrowing. In 
the most recent update of the convergence 
programme the deficit was assumed to be financed 
solely on account of the accumulated reserves, 
implying a stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
around 3½% of GDP. 
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Nordic financial groups, capital inflows amounted directly through a surplus of government saving
Macroeconomic imbalances, adjustment and 
the role of public finances 
During the period between 2004 and 2007, the 
Estonian economy experienced the combined
positive shock from EU accession and financial
deepening. As country risk premia fell and the 
Estonian banking sector was integrated into major 
to 10-20% of GDP per year. Coupled with 
optimistic expectations of households, this
triggered a credit and real estate boom which 
resulted in unsustainable domestic-demand-led
growth significantly above potential. In the 
absence of an independent monetary policy, fiscal
policy remained one of the few available options to
address the overheating of the economy, be it 
Table V.6.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Estonia (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
2.7 -3.0 -3.0 -3.9
38.2 37.9 42.0 43.4
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 13.8 12.3 12.8 12.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 7.8 8.1 7.6 7.6
- social contributions 11.1 12.1 14.0 14.8
35.5 40.9 45.0 47.3
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.0 11.5 12.5 13.0
- intermediate consumption 6.5 7.2 7.1 6.9
- social payments 9.0 10.8 13.1 14.0
- gross fixed capital formation 5.4 5.6 6.2 6.8
- interest expenditure 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5
2.9 -2.7 -2.7 -3.4
33.0 32.7 34.7 35.6
0.4 0.2 0.6 1.2
-0.8 -4.1 -1.0 -1.9
-0.7 -3.9 -0.6 -1.4
3.5 4.8 6.8 7.8
6.3 -3.6 -10.3 -0.8
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2.7 -1.9 -1.7 -1.0 0.1 0.2
2.9 -1.8 -1.5 -0.8 0.3 0.4
0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0
-0.1 -2.4 -0.1 0.4 1.2 0.7
3.5 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.0 2.8
6.3 -2.2 -3.5 2.6 4.8 5.0
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme (4)
General government balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance (3)
Structural primary balance
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenues
Primary balance
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.  
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Estonia 
Table V.6.2: Main measures in the budget for 2009, Estonia 
Revenue measures(1)(2) Expenditure measures(1)(3)
• Advancement of enforcement of the 
new Labour Law (+0.2% of GDP)
•    Increase in social tax minimum contribution
 basis (+0.5% of GDP)
•  Increase in pensions
(+0.6% of GDP)
• Suspension of state contributions to the
 mandatory funded pension scheme from
 01.06.09 (+0.6% of GDP)
•    Increase in unemployment insurance
contribution rate (+0.3% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1)  Including supplementary budget of February 2009 and consolidation measures of April 2009.
(2) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(3) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, convergence programme, Budget Law and other legal acts of Estonia 
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l growth 
led to an accumulation of sizeable macroeconomic 
al 
environment, the economy started decelerating in
hole-economy wage growth is expected to turn 
negative in the course of 2009, reversing some of
ears of above-potential 
growth, fiscal policy fell short of decisevely 
rowing (% of GDP) and 
Wover investment, or by anchoring expectations.
While neutralising the combined impact of capital
inflows and elevated expectations solely through 
fiscal policy would not have been feasible, a 
tighter fiscal stance could have mitigated the
overheating tendencies of the economy.  
The prolonged period of above-potentia
the losses in cost competitiveness accumulated
during the boom period. The reversal of excessive 
wage growth in the public sector proved to be
more difficult than in the private sector, but was 
eventually achieved in consecutive consolidation 
measures. To facilitate the adjustment on the 
labour market, the authorities advanced the 
enforcement of the new Labour Law that makes 
lay-offs less costly for enterprises, while 
strengthening the social safety net. However, a 
rapid increase in unemployment since end-2008 
renewed the discussion regarding the financial
sustainability of the unemployment insurance, 
despite an increase in the insurance rate from 0.9%
to 3% as from June 2009. 
Overall, throughout the y
imbalances. Wage growth of around 10% on
average between 2000 and 2005 increased further 
to over 20% in 2007. Wage growth in the public 
sector was particularly high during the boom years 
when the labour market situation remained tight, 
although this followed a period of public sector
wages lagging behind those in the private sector.
The unemployment rate reached a trough of below 
5% in late 2007 and early 2008. The external
deficit peaked at just over 17% of GDP in 2007, 
while core inflation hit its highest point of above
9% in early 2008. High public sector expenditure 
growth over this period, routine recourse to mid-
year supplementary budgets that revised 
expenditure targets further upwards and structural 
tax cuts reinforced the overall optimistic
expectations of domestic agents. However, part of
the windfall revenues was also saved, leading to
the accumulation of a central government fiscal 
buffer of around 11½% of GDP at end-2007. 
Though still supported by a favourable extern
counteracting the overheating tendencies. 
Surpluses were nevertheless recorded, preserving
some room for policy manoeuvre that has been 
helpful during the financial crisis. Looking ahead, 
the planned sharply restrictive fiscal stance in 2009 
will avoid the emergence of persistent fiscal 
imbalances, in particular by bringing the public
expenditure and revenue in line with more 
moderate rates of output growth expected over the 
medium term. The ability of the state to meet its
domestic and external obligations also in the 
following years will in turn foster the confidence 
of domestic agents and markets and thus support
the recovery of the economy. 
Graph V.6.1: Estonia: Net lending / bor
structural balance (% of GDP) 
2007. However, 2008 marked an abrupt reversal of 
the cycle that was increasingly aggravated by the 
deepening global financial crisis, with the 
economy contracting by 3.6% in that year. The
turnaround resulted in a rapid decline of the 
macroeconomic imbalances. The external deficit 
halved in 2008 compared to the previous year and 
continued to rapidly decline in the first months of 
2009. While headline inflation remained high in 
2008 due to world commodity prices and 
substantial administrative price increases, the 
ongoing adjustment in prices and domestic costs
(wages) is projected to keep inflation below 1% in
2009 and 2010. After an initially slow reaction, the 
adjustment on the labour market gathered pace in 
late 2008 and early 2009.  
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit reached 7.1% of 
GDP in 2008, compared to a planned deficit of 
0.9% of GDP in the budget for 2008. After a slight 
surplus of 0.2% in 2007, this significantly worse-
than-expected outturn was mainly due to the 
different macroeconomic scenario (real GDP fell 
by 2.3% compared to positive growth of 3.0% 
underlying the budget) and the working of the 
automatic stabilisers on taxes and unemployment 
benefits as well as the massive impact of the 
permanent loss of housing boom related tax 
revenue. Primary spending was also somewhat 
higher than targeted although some savings were 
made in mid-year. General government gross debt 
reached 43.2% of GDP in 2008, up from 25.0% in 
2007. This increase was mainly driven by a very 
sizeable stock-flow adjustment (9.1 percentage 
points of GDP, mainly related to the precautionary 
accumulation of liquid assets) as well as by the 
large primary deficit. 
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2009 forecast, the deficit is projected to widen 
further to 12% of GDP in 2009, the highest in the 
euro area. The deficit target for this year was 
revised up to 10¾% in the supplementary budget 
adopted in April 2009, from 9.5% in the January 
2009 addendum to the stability programme 
update(187) and 6.5% in the October 2008 budget. 
The projected deterioration of the deficit would 
take place despite successive consolidation efforts 
since mid-2008, including the supplementary 
budget, with an estimated overall net deficit-
reducing effect of around 4% of GDP in 2009. The 
main measures include the introduction of an 
income levy (estimated yield 0.7% of GDP), the 
reprioritisation of public investment (1.2% of 
GDP) and a “pension levy” on public sector wages 
(0.4% of GDP). In spite of tax-raising measures, 
current revenue is expected to decrease by over 
12%, reflecting the further adjustment in the 
(187) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.  
housing market and the continued fall in economic 
activity. The projected growth in current 
expenditure of almost 6% is largely driven by a 
steep increase in social spending in response to the 
rapid rise in unemployment and by sharply rising 
debt service costs. The Commission services’ 
higher deficit forecast compared to the target is 
mainly due to a more pessimistic economic 
outlook, including a higher forecast unemployment 
rate.  
As part of a broader consolidation effort, Ireland 
adopted some measures to support economic 
activity and to promote structural reforms, in line 
with the European Economic Recovery Plan. The 
size of the recovery package is adequate in view of 
the absence of room for manoeuvre implied by the 
fiscal deterioration. Direct support to the economy 
is targeted at the most vulnerable groups and 
sectors expected to be most affected by the crisis. 
The measures in response to the crisis were taken 
in a timely manner. Given that the overall thrust of 
fiscal policy is consolidation oriented, the 
measures are of a permanent rather than temporary 
nature.  
Risks to the budgetary targets are related to the 
short-term economic outlook as well as to 
contingent liabilities arising from the 
government’s support for the financial sector.  
For 2010, the Commission services’ spring 2009 
forecast projects the deficit to widen to 15½% of 
GDP on a no-policy-change basis. The difference 
to the authorities’ target of 10¾% of GDP is 
mainly due to different projections for the 2009 
budgetary outcome and the implementation of the 
no-policy change assumptions, which inter alia 
implies the non-inclusion of the indications for the 
budgetary measures for 2010 presented in the 
April supplementary budget.  
The debt ratio should reach 61.2% of GDP in 2009 
and almost 80% in 2010, more than three times the 
value recorded in 2007. This is due to the large 
primary deficits as well as increasing interest 
expenditure and falling nominal GDP, while no 
impact of the government’s support measures for 
Part V
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the financial sector is included in the Commission
services’ projections.
Tax revenue exposure to the property market 
While the deterioration in the public finances since 
2006 reflects to a large extent the loss of housing-
related revenue, the same revenue item also drove 
the improvement in the fiscal balance witnessed in 
the preceding years. In particular, following the 
predominantly export-led growth of the 1990s, 
domestic demand took over as the main driver of
the strong growth rates in the first half of the 
current decade. The buoyant domestically-driven 
expansion, led by the construction sector, produced
revenue windfalls and a growing general 
Table V.7.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Ireland (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
0.2 -7.1 -12.0 -15.6
35.9 33.8 33.7 33.5
Of which : - taxes on production and imports 13.3 11.9 10.8 10.5
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 12.6 11.1 10.7 10.6
- social contributions 6.3 6.7 6.9 7.2
35.7 41.0 45.8 49.1
Of which: - compensation of employees 9.4 10.3 11.1 11.3
- intermediate consumption 5.3 5.8 5.8 6.2
- social payments 9.8 11.5 14.8 16.1
- gross fixed capital formation 4.4 5.4 4.4 4.5
- interest expenditure 1.0 1.1 2.3 3.2
1.1 -6.1 -9.8 -12.5
31.2 28.5 27.8 27.7
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
-1.8 -7.5 -9.8 -12.2
-0.9 -6.4 -7.6 -9.0
25.0 43.2 61.2 79.7
6.0 -2.3 -9.0 -2.6
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0.2 -6.3 -9.5 -9.0 -6.4 -4.8 -3.8
1.2 -5.2 -7.3 -6.4 -3.5 -1.7 -0.7
0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
-1.7 -6.2 -8.1 -7.4 -5.0 -4.1 -3.1
24.8 40.6 52.7 62.3 65.7 66.2 67.2
6.0 -1.4 -4.0 -0.9 2.3 3.4 4.4
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme(4)
General government balance
Primary balance
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2009 (addendum to the October 2008 stability programme update).
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source:  Commission services and stability programme of Ireland.
Table V.7.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Ireland 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•   Reduction of stamp duty top rate (-0.1% of GDP) •   Social welfare package (0.3% of GDP)
•   Widening of standard rate tax band (-0.1% of GDP)
•   Introduction of income levy (0.7% of GDP) •   Reprioritisation of public investment (-1.2% of GDP)
•   Introduction of health levy, change in pay related social
insurance (0.5% of GDP)
•   Savings in social transfers (-0.3% of GDP)
•   Stricter rules for interest related tax relief (0.1% of GDP) •   “Pension levy” on public sector wages (-0.4% of GDP,
taking into account tax deductibility)
•   Increase in standard VAT rate (0.1% of GDP) •   Reduction in public service payroll (-0.2% of GDP)
•   Increase in excise duties (0.3% of GDP) •   Postponement of agreed pay increase (-0.1% of GDP)
•   Advancing corporation and capital gains tax payment
dates (0.3% of GDP)
•   Reduction in overseas development aid (-0.1% of GDP)
•   Increase in capital gains tax rate (0.1% of GDP)
•   Transfer of pension fund assets (0.3% of GDP, one-off)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source:  Commission services and the budget for 2009 (including July 2008 package, the January 2009 addendum to the stability programme update
and the April 2009 supplementary budget).
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government surplus until 2006, when the housing 
market peaked. Between 2002 and 2006, general
government revenue rose by 3¾ percentage points
of GDP and it is estimated that 2¾ percentage
points of this increase were directly related to
property-related taxes, in particular from the
booming housing market. Moreover, buoyancy of
other tax categories during that period reflected the 
overall tax-rich composition of growth as an 
indirect effect of the property market cycle.
Revenue outcomes also reflected some limited 
discretionary measures (188).
grew very strongly relative to GDP and thus
contributed to high tax revenue growth.
Graph V.7.1: Ireland - property-related tax revenue 
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Three tax categories are directly related to property
transactions: stamp duty on land and property,
capital gains tax and value-added tax on new
houses. Revenue from these tax categories 
recorded exceptionally high growth rates during
the housing boom period and their share in total
tax revenue increased from 8.4% in 2002 to 18%
in 2006 (189). However, from 2007 the situation 
quickly turned as the housing cycle receded and 
the share in total tax receipts in 2008 was below 
that recorded in 2002. Expressed as a share of 
GDP, property-related tax revenue is estimated to
have decreased from a peak of 4.6% in 2006 to
1.6% of GDP in 2008. 
Source: Irish Revenue Commissioners, Department of Finance,
Commission services’ calculations
However, neither GDP nor revenue levels were
sustainable in view of the housing boom. From
2007, with the housing market starting to correct,
revenue growth moderated significantly, while
expenditure growth rose further, well above the
growth rate of nominal GDP. The general
government balance deteriorated by some
3 percentage points of GDP in 2007, to a broadly 
balanced position, and further worsened by some
7 percentage points in 2008 to a deficit not seen in 
Ireland for 20 years. 
Over the period 2003 to 2006 budgetary outturns 
were better than planned largely due to revenue 
windfalls owing to the favourable economic
conditions. The overall tax-to-GDP elasticity
exceeded its long-term average value. First, 
individual elasticities relative to the respective tax
bases were generally above unity for all major tax
categories. Second, individual tax bases (the wage
bill, private consumption and investment (190))
(188) Tax-increasing measures with an estimated effect of 0.6% 
of GDP on average were taken in 2002 and 2003, while 
tax-decreasing measures followed and amounted to on 
average 0.5% of GDP annually from 2005 to 2007 . The 
estimated effects are taken from the successive budgets and 
are expressed in cash terms. They do not account for an 
impact of the budget measures on the economy with
changes in consumption and investment patterns leading to
additional tax buoyancy. 
(189) The analysis in the paragraph draws mainly on data on a 
cash basis for central government, for which more detailed 
information is available. 
(190) The sum of private consumption and gross fixed capital 
formation is used as a proxy for the tax base for indirect 
taxation, given the significant share of indirect taxation
related to investment. 
8. GREECE 
215 
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit reached 5% of 
GDP in 2008 (including 0.4% of GDP deficit-
decreasing one-off measures), against an official 
target of 1.6% of GDP included in the December 
2007 update of the stability programme (191). The 
deviation of almost 3½ percentage points of GDP 
reflects both revenue shortfalls and expenditure 
overruns. Total revenue was almost 1 percentage 
point of GDP less than budgeted, due to the lower-
than-expected yield of the revenue-enhancing 
measures implemented in 2008. Expenditure 
overruns in turn, amounted at around 2¼% of 
GDP, reflecting primary current expenditure 
slippages and higher-than-estimated debt-servicing 
payments. As the impact on the Greek economy of 
the global economic downturn has been limited the 
government did not implement any fiscal stimulus 
and financial sector rescue operations in 2008. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio increased to 97¾% in 2008, due 
both to the rise in general government deficit and 
the slowdown in GDP growth. Stock-flow 
adjustment remained sizeable, reaching the highest 
level of the recent years. 
Despite the worse-than-expected budgetary outturn 
in 2008, the deficit target for 2009 remains 
unchanged at 3.7% of GDP (including a deficit-
reducing one-off measures of 0.5% of GDP), as set 
in the January 2009 update of the stability 
programme. On account of a less favourable 
growth scenario and a prudent assessment of the 
revenue enhancing measures, consistent with past 
outcomes, the Commission services project a 
deficit of just above 5% of GDP in 2009. Overall, 
the fiscal stance is foreseen to be mildly restrictive 
in 2009. Given the lack of room for fiscal 
manoeuvre and in view of the large economic 
imbalances, the Greek government has not adopted 
a short-term stimulus package in response to the 
economic slowdown, in line with the EERP. 
However, a number of fiscal consolidation 
(191) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
measures have been undertaken by the Greek 
authorities. More specifically, the revenue-to-GDP 
ratio is projected to grow by 1 percentage point of 
GDP in 2009, on the back of a revenue-enhancing 
package presented in the stability programme. This 
package includes higher excise duties on tobacco 
and alcohol products, an increase in the advance 
payment rate for enterprises and the introduction 
of a tax on dividends, capital gains and stock 
options. On the revenue side, the authorities have 
also proceeded with the settlement of past years' 
tax obligations, including the collection of 
delinquent obligations to the state. Moreover, in 
March, an additional one-off supplementary tax 
contribution was decided to be imposed on tax-
payers with an annual income above 60.000 euro. 
Total expenditure in turn, is estimated to decrease 
by about ¼ of a percentage point of GDP in 2009, 
stemming from a wide spending-constraining set 
of measures, including limitations for  public 
sector employment growth, cuts in the public 
sector's high-level officials' remuneration and a 
10% cut in current expenditure. In addition, the 
Greek government announced a public wages 
freeze for 2009 and the intensification of efforts to 
contain primary expenditure.  
Under no-policy-change assumption, the 
Commission services' project the 2010 deficit at 
5¾% of GDP. This compares with the revised 
official target of 2.9% of GDP, from 3.2% of GDP 
set in the stability programme. The 2010 target is 
not underpinned with concrete measures. 
The Commission services' spring 2009 forecast 
projects the debt-to-GDP ratio to exceed 103½% in 
2009 and rise further to 108% in 2010. These 
projections are higher than the official targets for 
both years, due to a less favourable growth 
projection and more realistic deficit estimations.
Apart from the rising deficit and declining GDP, a 
sizeable stock-flow adjustment contributes to the 
strong rise in the debt ratio. Additional financial 
transactions within the framework of the financial 
sector support package may also put further 
upward pressure to the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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Table V.8.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Greece (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
-3.6 -5.0 -5.1 -5.7
40.1 39.9 40.2 39.5
 Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.2 12.3 12.7 12.6
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 7.9 7.7 8.1 7.6
- social contributions 13.9 14.0 14.2 14.1
43.7 44.9 45.3 45.2
Of which: - compensation of employees 11.0 11.2 11.8 11.7
- intermediate consumption 5.1 4.6 4.8 4.9
- social payments 17.3 18.4 19.1 18.9
- gross fixed capital formation 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8
- interest expenditure 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.8
0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9
32.0 31.4 32.3 31.6
-0.2 0.4 0.7 0.0
-4.6 -6.6 -5.8 -4.8
-0.6 -2.3 -1.2 0.0
94.8 97.6 103.4 108.0
4.0 2.9 -0.9 0.1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-3.5 -3.7 -3.7 -3.2 -2.6
0.6 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.7
-0.5 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0
-4.4 -4.5 -4.3 -2.8 -2.2
94.8 94.6 96.3 96.1 94.7
4.0 3.0 1.1 1.6 2.3
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Greece. 
Table V.8.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Greece 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•        Ad hoc Social Cohesion benefits to low income
      pensioners and registered unemployed.
•        Ad hoc housing benefit to registered unemployed
      on mortgage (housing loan taken before 2009)
•        Twofold increase in the Easter bonus for
      registered unemployed
All above mentioned measures are financed
through the National Fund for Social
Cohesion (0.2% of GDP)
•       Increase in the excise duties of tobacco and
 alcohol (0.15% of GDP)
•        Restraining public sector employment 
      growth (0.3% of GDP)
•       Increase in the advance payment rate for
 enterprises to 80% from 65% (0.15% of GDP)
•        Cuts in the public sector's high-level
      officials' remuneration (<0.1% of GDP)
•       The introduction of a tax rate of 10% on
 dividends; the same rate holds for capital
gains from selling stocks (<0.1% of  GDP)
•        10% cut in elastic public expenditure 
items
•       The introduction of a new tax on stock options, in
  line with rules pertaining to wage income (<0.1% GDP)
•        Public wages freezing for 2009  (0.2 of GDP)
•       Tax settlement (0.5% of GDP)
•       One-off supplementary tax contribution on tax-
 payers with annual income above 60.000 euro
 (>0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, stability programme of Greece and 2009 Budget Law 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
For 2008, the general government deficit reached 
3.8% of GDP. This is a much worse budgetary 
outcome than in 2007 (a surplus of 2.2% of GDP), 
and well below the target in the 2008 budget law (a 
surplus of 1¼% of GDP). The deviation from the 
target is due to both discretionary measures, such 
as the tax allowance of €400 per taxpayer, and the 
functioning of automatic stabilisers.  
The latest update of the stability programme 
submitted on 30 January 2009, covering the period 
2008-2011, targets a government deficit of 5.8% of 
GDP in 2009. These figure rest on the 
programme's assumptions that GDP will decline 
by 1.6% in 2009. According to the Commission 
services' spring 2009 economic forecasts, the 
government deficit is projected to reach 8½% of 
GDP in 2009. The more marked deterioration in 
public finances in the Commission service's 
forecasts results, notably from a significantly 
sharper contraction of growth in the forecast and a 
concomitant gloomier labour market outlook. In 
2009, all major tax categories are expected to 
recede, while total expenditure is projected to 
sharply increase in terms of GDP. The sizeable 
government deficit is also due to the discretionary 
measures adopted in response to the economic 
downturn. Spain has implemented a large fiscal 
stimulus (192), including a package in November 
2008 of around 1% of GDP adopted in line with 
the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) 
and aiming mostly at fostering public investment. 
Such fiscal expansionary measures are at the base 
of a clearly expansionary fiscal policy in 2009.  
In 2010, the Commission services' spring 2009 
forecast estimates the general government deficit 
at 9¾% of GDP in 2010, based on the customary 
no-policy-change scenario. These are well below 
the deficit target of 4.8% in 2010 set out in the 
January 2009 update of the stability programme. 
This budgetary target does not appear to be 
achievable given the deteriorating economic 
(192) This fiscal stimulus is explained in more detail in the next 
section. 
situation and the impact of automatic stabilisers. 
According to the Commission services' forecasts 
revenues in 2010 are projected to grow by around 
3%, above nominal GDP growth, reflecting mainly 
the reversal of one-off revenue-decreasing 
measures of the precedent year. Total expenditure 
is assumed to grow above nominal GDP, by 5¼%, 
mainly due to the functioning of automatic 
stabilisers, especially higher unemployment 
benefits and, to a less extent, the increased burden 
of interest payments associated with debt 
repayments.  
The government debt-to-GDP ratio grew (by 2¾ 
percentage points) to 40.3% in 2008, after a 
number of years of continued decline. Given the 
high budgetary deficits and the stagnating nominal 
GDP growth, debt is projected to continue to rise 
rapidly by more than 20 percentage points to 
exceed 62% in 2010. 
The economic impact of the Spanish fiscal 
stimulus measures to withstand the crises  
This section aims at assessing the economic impact 
of the Spanish fiscal stimulus, considering the 
multipliers of the Commission services' spring 
2009 economic forecasts, considering also 
simultaneous monetary accommodation 
(Commission services' spring 2009 forecast193). 
Theory suggests that fiscal policies have a relevant 
role to play in the face of a global recession. In 
particular, a sizeable fiscal stimulus has the 
potential to mitigate the downward trend in 
demand and thus to limit its negative knock-on 
effects on both investment and employment. In this 
sense, the Spanish stimulus measures provide a 
temporary support to economic activity in 2009. Its 
impact will be also reinforced by the functioning 
of automatic stabilisers, which will work fully in 
Spain. 
(193)Box 1.6.1, Table 1.  
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The Spanish fiscal stimulus has been articulated in 
four packages: April 2008, August 2008,
November 2008, and early 2009
(February/March/April) and amounts to around 3%
of GDP in 2009. Overall, the Spanish fiscal 
stimulus is expected to have a temporary impact on
GDP of around 2¼% in 2009, taking into
consideration the presence of simultaneous
monetary accommodation. However, different 
types of measures have dissimilar effects on
economic activity.  Here we analyse the November 
2008 package as an example of government 
investment support and the combined April-
August 2008 packages, as an illustration of
disposable income supporting measures. These are
the main fiscal stimulus packages adopted in by 
the Spanish authorities. 
Table V.9.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Spain (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
2.2 -3.8 -8.6 -9.8
41.0 36.6 36.6 37.3
11.7 9.8 9.4 10.0
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 12.9 10.7 10.4 10.7
- social contributions 13.0 13.0 13.0 12.9
- Total 38.8 40.5 45.2 47.1
10.2 10.7 11.7 12.6
- intermediate consumption 5.1 5.4 6.0 6.4
- social payments 11.6 12.3 14.1 15.4
- gross fixed capital formation 3.8 3.8 4.7 3.7
- interest expenditure 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9
Primary balance 3.8 -2.3 -6.9 -7.8
37.1 32.8 32.0 32.7
0.0 -0.3 -0.7 0.0
1.6 -3.9 -6.8 -8.2
3.2 -2.4 -5.2 -6.3
36.2 39.5 50.8 62.3
3.7 1.2 -3.2 -1.0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
2.2 -3.4 -5.8 -4.8 -3.9
3.8 -1.9 -4.1 -2.9 -1.9
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.6 -3.5 -4.7 -3.4 -2.8
36.2 39.5 47.3 51.6 53.7
3.7 1.2 -1.6 1.2 2.6
  Of which :
  Of which:
Real GDP growth (%)
Structural balance(3)(5)
Government gross debt
Stability programme(4)
General government balance
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.  
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in Jan 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Spain.
Table V.9.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Spain 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
• Specific reduction of tax withholdings to taxpayers with
mortgages  (-0.15% of GDP)
• Central Government Fund for Local Public Investment
(+0.72% of GDP)
•  Change of the system of VAT returns (-0.56% of GDP) • Fund to improve certain strategic sectors (Fondo para la
dinamización de la economía y el empleo) (+0.27% of GDP)
• Reduction in Personal Income Tax  (-0.47% of GDP)
•  Abolition of the wealth tax (-0.21% of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Ministry of Finance.
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First, the November 2008 package, the largest 
stimulus package in Spain, awards particular 
priority to measures aimed at expanding 
infrastructure and other productive investment, 
which are likely to have a significant impact on the 
Spanish economy. The DGSE models (194) and 
other empirical research have found that public
investment has relatively strong short-run as well
as long-run effects on the economy (195). These
models find a short-run fiscal multiplier of public 
investment slightly larger than 1 in the first year. 
In the current economic crisis, the effect of public 
infrastructure on productive public inputs with 
immediate demand-side effects is particularly
needed in the short run, while it can also increase
the productivity of the economy in the medium to
long run. Moreover, the composition of this 
stimulus and its focus on local government 
investment projects seems to be very favourable to
domestic production and employment as its
imported content is likely to be very limited. The 
November package is expected to have a 
temporary impact on GDP of below 1½%.
(194) Ratto M., W. Roeger and J. in 't Veld (2008): "QUEST III:
an estimated DSGE model of the euro area with fiscal and 
monetary policy", European Economy, Economic Papers. 
July N° 353. European Commission. Brussels. 
(195) See for instance:  Aschauer, D. (1989), 'Is public
expenditure productive?', Journal of Monetary Economics, 
23, pp 177–200; or Giordano, R, S. Momigliano, S. Neri, 
and R. Perotti (2007), 'The effects of fiscal policy in Italy:
Evidence from a VAR model', European Journal of
Political Economy, 23(3), pp 707-733. 
Nevertheless, not all measures appear to be equally
effective or well targeted. The April and August 
2008 stimulus packages focused on income
support measures and included tax cuts of over 1 
pp of GDP in total. These two packages are 
expected to have a more limited impact and 
simulations point to a temporary impact on GDP of
slightly below ¾%.  
These effects on GDP growth are calculated using 
multipliers simulated for the EU. However, in the 
case of Spain these effects on GDP could be more 
moderate due to potentially smaller multipliers,
particularly in the case of income support 
measures (packages of April and August 2008).
The high indebtedness of the Spanish economy 
could be triggering a more acute process of
deleveraging than in other countries in the euro
area. The result is that the measures may be less 
effective because instead of fully boosting 
consumption or private investment, they would 
increase the saving rate in a context of credit 
restrictions, high unemployment and high current
account and budget deficits. 
Table V.9.3: GDP effects of fiscal measures 
Fiscal measure 
Investment subsidy 0.46 0.02 1.37 0.07 2.19 0.11
Government investment 0.84 0.77 1.07 0.98 1.40 1.29
Government consumption 0.36 0.01 0.99 0.04 1.40 0.06
Consumption tax 0.37 0.28 0.67 0.52 0.99 0.76
Government transfers 0.22 0.02 0.55 0.04 0.78 0.05
Labour tax 0.48 0.00 0.53 0.01 0.68 0.01
Corporate profit tax 0.32 0.35 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06
Permanent
stimulus
Temporary
stimulus  
(one year)
Temporary with 
monetary
accommodation*
M
Permanent
stimulus
M 
Temporary
stimulus  
(one year)
M Temporary with 
monetary
accommodation*
Notes: M stands for multiplier 
GDP percentage difference from baseline for global shocks of 1% of (baseline) GDP, assuming long run financing through labour tax increases.
* Unchanged nominal interest rates for 1 year.
Source: Commission services 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The French authorities set out a deficit target of 
3.4% in the April 2009 fiscal notification, which 
compares with the initial target of 2.3% in the 
2007 update of the stability programme. This gap 
of around 1% of GDP can be largely explained by  
a worse-than-anticipated outcome in 2007 mainly 
due to lower than expected revenue (0.3 pp) and a 
markedly weaker growth in 2008 than anticipated 
(0.7% according to the notification and 2-2.5% in 
the 2007 update of the stability programme), 
lowering tax revenue compared to plan (0.5 pp). 
Public debt increased in 2008 to 68% of GDP, 
from 63.8% in 2007. In the context of the financial 
crisis, the government established two funds that 
increased debt by almost 1½% of GDP: one was 
established to subordinate bank debt issues without 
acquiring voting rights and the other to guarantee 
bank debt. 
The latest update of the stability programme of 
December 2008 (196) projected public deficit at 
3.9% of GDP in 2009 based on a growth 
assumption of +0.5%. On account of a new growth 
projection (-1.5%), the deficit would reach 5.6% of 
GDP in 2009, as announced by the Government in 
March, including the almost 1% of GDP budgetary 
impact of the measures in response to the 
economic crisis. Adopted measures encompass 
public investment, labour market, support to firms 
and support to household purchasing power. They 
are in line with the European Economic Recovery 
Plan, as they are targeted, timely, and temporary, 
therefore reversible, with no costs for public 
finances beyond 2010. Apart from the measures in 
response to the economic crisis, those included in 
the 2009 Budget Law are broadly neutral, as they 
refer, for example, to a new tax on capital gains, 
which would offset the cost of the new minimum 
income aimed at making work pay (Revenu de 
Solidarité Active). Risks to the official target stem 
mainly from a likely worse growth outcome in 
(196) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/sg_
programmes9147_en.htm. 
2009 than expected by the Government, which still 
projects growth at -1.5%. The official target of a 
5.6% of GDP deficit substantially differs from the 
6.6% of GDP deficit projection in the Commission 
services' spring forecast. The forecast includes all 
the previously mentioned measures, and is based 
on a -3.0% growth for 2009. In this context, 
expenditure would rise sharply (from 52.7% of 
GDP in 2008 to 55.6% of GDP in 2009), in line 
with deteriorating labour market conditions, and 
tax revenue would decrease significantly (from 
49.3% of GDP in 2008 to 49% in 2009). 
Specifically, on top of normal functioning of 
automatic stabilisers, revenues could suffer from 
the decline in asset prices weighing on corporate 
and real estate transaction taxes (see next section).  
The French authorities set a deficit target for 2010 
of 2.7% of GDP in the latest update of the stability 
programme. This target was revised twice to 
eventually reach 5.2% of GDP, on account of a 
new growth projection for 2010 (+1.0%, instead of 
+2.0% in the latest update of the stability 
programme) and of a base effect stemming from a 
revision of the deficit forecast for 2008 and 2009. 
Under the customary no-policy-change 
assumption, the Commission forecasts a further 
deterioration in the general government deficit to 
7% of GDP in 2010. The phasing-out of the 
recovery plan in 2010 would have a positive 
impact on the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, but it 
would be more than offset by the impact of the 
normal functioning of automatic stabilisers.  
The debt ratio in the Commission services ' spring 
forecast is expected to increase sharply in 2009, 
when it would almost reach 80% of GDP; it would 
further increase in 2010 to reach 86% of GDP. 
These figures compare with official targets set out 
at 74% of GDP for 2009 and 77½% of GDP for 
2010, which do not include the impact of the 
liabilities stemming from the SFEF (Société de 
Financement de l'Economie Française), a scheme 
to improve the liquidity of the banks. Risks to debt 
developments are mainly linked to snow-ball 
effects from higher than anticipated deficits, as 
well as to potential additional capital injections. 
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Asset prices and the evolution of fiscal revenue 
Between 2004 and 2008 and coinciding with a 
substantial increase of equity and real estate prices, 
revenues, net of discretionary measures, have
recorded an average GDP-share of around ¼ pp. 
above their 10-year average. This contrasts with 
the declining path of the revenue ratio since 2006, 
and shows the strong dynamism of tax revenues 
over the past 5 years.  
Graph V.10.1: Fiscal revenue and fiscal revenue net of 
discretionary measures (in % of GDP) 
Average
 1999-2008
49.1
49.6
50.1
50.6
51.1
51.6
52.1
52.6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Fiscal revenue (in % of GDP)
Fiscal revenue net of discretionary
measures (in % of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
Specifically, corporate tax and other current taxes
on income and wealth have been particularly
robust: together, they increased from 5.9% of total
fiscal revenue in 2003 to 7.8% in 2007.  
The sharp increase in corporate taxes over the past 
five years is linked to the unusually high profits, 
notably of the financial sector, which accounts for 
around ¼ of total corporate tax. Other current taxes 
on income and wealth rely on financial and
housing assets; the value of those investments has
increased markedly from 2004 to the end of 2008.
If we consider the CAC40 index as a proxy for 
equity prices, this index has increased by around
47% from 2004 to 2007; over the same period, 
housing prices have increased by around 33%.  
A quantitative estimate of the impact on public 
revenue of the recent and rapid deterioration of 
equity markets as well as the decline in housing 
prices can be found in a recent paper from Morris
and Schucknecht (2007)197. Asset price elasticities
to fiscal revenue are obtained by regressing tax
revenues for four tax categories. Table V.10.1
presents the sensitivities for France. Specifically,
asset prices are expected to notably impact
corporate tax, especially through the housing 
market.
Table V.10.1: Increase in revenue (in % of GDP) given a 10% 
increase in equity and real estate prices
Coefficient
Equity prices 0.07
Housing prices 0.16
Equity prices 0.04
Housing prices 0
Equity prices 0
Housing prices 0
Equity prices 0.01
Housing prices 0.05
Equity prices 0.12
Housing prices 0.21
Grand total 0.33
Total
Direct taxes on
corporations
Direct taxes on
households
Indirect taxes
Taxes on financial
transactions
Source: Commission services.
These elasticities can be used to calculate the 
impact on fiscal revenue of equity and real estate 
price increases between 2004 and 2007, i.e. during 
the asset price boom. A preliminary estimate
would point to an overall increase of around 1¼% 
of GDP, from which almost 1% of GDP would
correspond to corporate tax and the rest equally 
shared by taxes on financial transactions and direct
taxes on households. In this vein, it cannot be
discarded that part of tax revenues, considered
initially as permanent, turn out to be of a 
temporary nature in the end.  
Therefore, the fiscal revenue ratio might decrease 
in line with the correction of asset prices, implying
that, in a context in which public finances will 
have to be brought back to a sustainable path, 
expenditure restraint would represent the adequate 
consolidation strategy. 
(197) Morris, R., and L. Schuknecht, 'Structural balances and
revenue windfalls: the role of asset prices revisited', 
Working Paper Series, ECB, March 2007 
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Table V.10.2: Budgetary developments 2007-2013, France (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-2.7 -3.4 -6.6 -7.0
49.6 49.3 49.0 49.3
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.1 14.8 14.7 14.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 11.4 11.4 11.0 11.1
- social contributions 18.0 17.9 18.1 18.0
52.3 52.7 55.6 56.4
  Of which: - compensation of employees 12.8 12.7 13.2 13.3
- intermediate consumption 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.3
- social payments 17.4 17.6 18.9 19.1
- gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.5
- interest expenditure 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.1
0.0 -0.6 -3.8 -4.0
43.2 42.7 42.4 42.6
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
-3.9 -4.3 -5.5 -5.5
-1.2 -1.5 -2.7 -2.5
63.8 68.0 79.7 86.0
2.2 0.7 -3.0 -0.2
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-2.7 -2.9 -3.9 -2.7 -1.9 -1.1
0.1 0.0 -1.1 0.1 0.9 1.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.9 -2.6 -3.0 -1.9 -1.4 -0.9
63.9 66.7 69.1 69.4 68.5 66.8
2.2 1.0 0.2-0.5 2.0 2.5 2.5
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme(4)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Outturn and forecast(1)
General government balance(2)
- Total revenues
(1) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2008
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of France. 
Table V.10.3: Main budgetary measures for 2009, France 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•   Acceleration of government payments 
      to corporations (-0.3% of GDP)
•     Sectoral aid for housing and automobile 
      industry (0.1% of GDP)
•     Social measure in favour of the low income 
      households (0.1% of GDP)
•      Additional public investment (-0.3% of GDP)
•   Increase of the tax on the turnover of 
      complementary insurance and on 
      pharmaceutical companies (0.1% of GDP)
•      Making work pay measure (Revenu de 
       Solidarité Active) (0.1% of GDP)
•   New tax on capital gains (0.1% of GDP)
•   Fiscal package (-0.1% of GDP)
•   Change in the dividend taxation (-0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditures.
Source: Commission services and Budget Law. 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit increased to 2.7% 
of GDP in 2008, from 1.5% in 2007. In spite of a 
positive base effect, the deficit target set in the 
November 2007 update of the stability programme, 
at 2.2% of GDP, was not met. This was due to both 
the adverse economic developments and the 
execution of various discretionary measures. The 
revenue ratio fell by nearly ½ of a percentage point 
of GDP. A still healthy growth of direct taxes and 
social contributions, supported by the rise in 
employment and wages, was offset by a substantial 
fall of indirect taxes, partly due to the abolition of 
the tax on primary residential property and the cut 
of the labour tax wedge. Primary expenditure 
growth largely outpaced the slower nominal GDP 
growth. In particular, a sizeable increase in 
compensation of employees and intermediate 
consumption pushed current spending up, whereas 
capital expenditure dropped. Higher interest rates 
entailed increased debt servicing costs. The 
structural balance decreased by ½ percentage point 
of GDP relative to 2007. The gross debt ratio 
increased by 2.3 percentage points of GDP in 
2008, to just below 106%, also reflecting the 
precautionary accumulation of liquid assets held 
with the Bank of Italy at the end of the year.  
In the summer 2008 the government adopted a 
three-year fiscal package – later confirmed by the 
2009 Budget Law – planning an expenditure-based 
budgetary consolidation over the period 2009-
2011. The February 2009 update of the stability 
programme(198) restated the pledge to fiscal 
consolidation by broadly confirming the medium-
term projections for individual spending categories 
and the measures for their achievement, with some 
deviations from the original yearly targets 
stemming from the actions put in place to respond 
to the economic crisis, in the context of the 
European Economic Recovery Plan.  
(198) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
On the back of a deeper contraction of real GDP 
than assumed in the stability programme (-4.4% 
instead of -2%), the Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast anticipates the headline deficit to 
increase to 4½% of GDP in 2009. Revenues are set 
to decline in response to the downturn. The 
Commission services expect direct taxes paid by 
corporations to be driven down by falling profits, 
while social contributions would decrease in line 
with the reduction in the total wage bill. Indirect 
taxes are expected to decline by more than nominal 
consumption, in particular due to a further shift 
away from more tax-intensive durable goods 
consumption. Conversely, personal income taxes 
would increase marginally relative to 2008, also on 
the back of the growth of pensions indexed to the 
high inflation recorded in 2008. Because the 
downturn is driven by relatively less tax-rich 
components, such as exports and investment, and 
given the impact of the discretionary measures, the 
decline in nominal GDP will outpace that of 
revenues, resulting in an increasing revenue-to-
GDP ratio. The primary expenditure ratio is 
forecast to increase by around 3 percentage points 
of GDP relative to 2008, as significant spending 
increases combine with a declining nominal GDP. 
The income-support recovery measures, together 
with the budgeted spending, would entail a 3½% 
annual rise in current primary expenditure. In 
addition, the announced acceleration in public 
investment, the repurchase of some previously 
securitised real estate and the incentives for 
energy-efficient durable goods are expected to 
generate a significant increase in capital spending. 
The government balance in structural terms is 
expected to improve by around ¾ of a percentage 
point of GDP in 2009 compared with 2008. As this 
improvement is mainly due to lower interest 
expenditure, the fiscal stance planned for 2009 
appears broadly neutral.  
In a context of economic stagnation and under the 
usual no-policy-change assumption, the spring 
2009 forecast projects a further increase in the 
overall deficit in 2010, to around 4¾% of GDP. 
This is the result of the additional fall in taxes paid 
by companies and higher servicing cost of debt.  
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
The lower nominal GDP level and the eroded
primary surplus will weigh on the government debt
ratio, which is forecast to increase to around 116%
of GDP by 2010. 
The Commission services' spring forecast is 
broadly in line with the new economic and
budgetary projections released by the government 
on 2 May 2009. Slightly higher interest
expenditure in the latter explains a marginally
higher deficit ratio in 2009. For 2010, the 
government projects less dynamic primary 
expenditure growth and a faster recovery in
revenue growth, resulting in an unchanged deficit
ratio compared to 2009. 
Italy's public debt amid increased risk aversion 
The global financial crisis has led to increased risk 
aversion in financial markets, highlighting the 
vulnerability of the Italian economy stemming
from the very high public debt. The spread
between yields paid on Italian and German bonds
has widened by more than in most other euro area
countries. For 10-year bonds, this differential 
reached a peak of around 170 bps in January 2009, 
from an average of 25 bps over 1999-2007, to then
fall partially back to around 90-100 bps in May
2009. Although substantial, this is well short of the 
spreads recorded before the monetary union, when
they incorporated exchange risk premia (Graph)
V.11.1). The government's prudent fiscal response
Table V.11.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Italy (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
-1.5 -2.7 -4.5 -4.8
46.4 46.0 46.7 46.3
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.7 13.7 13.8 13.7
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 15.1 15.4 15.5 15.1
- social contributions 13.3 13.7 13.9 13.8
47.9 48.8 51.2 51.1
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.6 10.9 11.4 11.3
- intermediate consumption 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.6
- social payments 17.1 17.7 19.1 19.1
- gross fixed capital formation 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.4
- interest expenditure 5.0 5.1 4.7 4.8
3.5 2.4 0.2 0.1
43.1 42.8 43.3 42.8
0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1
-2.9 -3.4 -2.6 -2.8
2.1 1.8 2.0 2.0
103.5 105.8 113.0 116.1
1.6 -1.0 -4.4 0.1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-1.6 -2.6 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9
3.4 2.5 1.3 1.9 2.6
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
-2.5 -2.9 -2.7 -2.0 -1.7
104.1 105.9 110.5 112.0 111.6
1.5 -0.6 -2.0 0.3 1.0
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in February 2009 
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Italy. 
Table V.11.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Italy 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•   Corporate income tax relief (-0.1% of GDP) •   One-off income support to households (+0.2% of GDP)
•   One-off tax on revaluation of company assets (+0.2% of GDP)
•   Intensified fighting of tax evasion/avoidance (+0.1% of GDP)
•  Taxes on energy/banking/insurance sectors (+0.3% of GDP) •   Rationalisation of government resources ( -0.3% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Ministry of the Economy and Finance 
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to the downturn, together with the relative 
soundness of the banking system, may also have 
contributed to containing the perception of Italy's 
fiscal risk by financial markets. 
Graph V.11.2: Interest rates on Italian securities
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A lesson learned from the current crisis is that 
looking at financial stock variables - that is, assets 
and liabilities - in a country's sectoral and 
aggregate balance sheets provides a more complete 
picture of its systemic vulnerability than looking at 
public debt alone (Table V.11.3). Despite the high
government debt, which reflects the accumulation 
of government deficits in the past, the balance
sheet of the Italian economy shows a broadly 
balanced position vis-à-vis the rest of the world,
which in turn reflects overall positive trade 
balances of goods and services over the past
decades.  
Source: EcoWin
While persistently large spreads will raise the cost 
of the debt service in the long term, so far their
impact on government interest expenditure has
been limited. This is because the wider spreads are
the result of a significant drop in long-term yields 
on German bonds, while yields on Italian bonds
have remained broadly stable since mid-2008. 
Short-term yields are even substantially lower than 
last year, implying a lower service cost of the debt
in 2009 compared with 2008 (Graph V.11.2). In
addition, careful debt management by the
Treasury, explicitly aimed at raising the overall 
average maturity of the public debt and increasing
the liquidity of Italian government bonds in the
securities' market after the financial crisis in
1992/1993, has allowed successful public debt
auctions even in the recent months. This is 
reassuring, in particular given the large volume of
sovereign issuances anticipated at the global level 
and the fact that foreign investors represent more 
than half of the total investors in Italian 
government securities. 
Table V.11.3: Net financial assets (stocks - % of GDP) 
1997 2002 2007 Q32008
General government -104.5 -100.3 -91.7 -92.1
Households and NPISH 183.4 201.2 197.1 175.5
Financial corporations 3.4 -2.9 -4.2 -0.3
Non-financial corporations -82.0 -102.2 -100.5 -88.6
Total economy 0.3 -4.1 0.7 -5.5
Source: Bank of Italy - Financial accounts 
The absence of major external imbalances is the
mirror image of the relatively sound financial
position of the private sector. In particular, 
households have relatively low indebtedness and 
continue to accumulate sizeable savings. This 
might in part reflect precautionary savings due to
the persistently fragile situation of the Italian
public finances. Still, the internal imbalances 
created by the very high public debt do affect
Italy's financial vulnerability and may lead to a 
relatively high cost of capital for the entire 
economy, thus weighing on its growth potential.    
12. CYPRUS 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government surplus is estimated to 
have fallen to 1% in 2008 from 3.4% of GDP in 
2007, which compares with a target of 0.5% of 
GDP set in the December 2007 stability 
programme of Cyprus (199). The better-than-
expected outcome reflects higher than expected 
revenue, lower interest payments and a positive 
base effect from 2007, when the final budget 
surplus rose to 3.4% of GDP compared to an 
anticipated outcome of 1.5%. No one-off or other 
temporary measures were implemented. The 
general government debt ratio in 2008 declined by 
about 10¼ percentage points of GDP to around 
49¼% of GDP, benefiting largely from the 
planned reduction of deposits with the central bank 
(sinking funds), a primary surplus and a positive 
growth effect.  
According to the most recent update of the 
Stability Programme, submitted on 13 February 
2009, the budgetary target for 2009 is a deficit of 
0.8% of GDP. (200) Compared with the surplus of 
1% of GDP targeted in the 2009 budget law 
(approved by the Parliament on 18 December 
2008), it represents a downward revision by 1¾ 
percentage points of GDP. This is explained by a 
downward revision of total revenue projections, 
consistent with slower growth prospects. 
Specifically, the revenue-to-GDP ratio is set to 
decline in 2009 compared with the outturn of 
2008, mainly due to subdued activity in the real 
estate sector and reduced corporate profitability. 
No one-off measures are planned. Public 
expenditure is expected to increase only slightly, 
as higher social transfers are offset by savings in 
interest payments. Overall, the stance of fiscal 
policy will be expansionary in 2009, in line with 
the EERP. The budgetary outcomes are subject to 
downside risks. In particular, the macroeconomic 
(199) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/netstartsearch/ 
pdfsearch/pdf.cfm?mode=_m2 
(200) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.        
scenario projected in the update appears to be 
based on favourable growth assumptions 
throughout the programme period. On the revenue 
side, risks are higher than in previous years and are 
associated with a possible sharper contraction and 
rebalancing of economic growth towards a less-tax 
rich composition of growth. In view of the 
expected economic slowdown and the pressure to 
stimulate domestic demand through increased 
public expenditure, the risks of potential overruns 
are non negligible. The evolution of the debt ratio 
may be less favourable than projected in the 
update, given the risks to the macroeconomic 
scenario and the budgetary targets. Also, the 
rapidly decreasing primary surplus, coupled with 
measures to support the financial sector, may put 
upward pressure on the debt ratio. 
The Commission services spring 2009 forecast 
projects a higher fiscal deficit, of almost 2% of 
GDP, in line with a slower GDP growth scenario. 
This projection takes into account additional 
revenues from the recently adopted pension reform 
and an extra-budgetary package of social 
expenditure measures.  In structural terms, the 
worsening in 2009 is expected to be about 2¼ 
percentage points of GDP.  The structural balance 
points to a significant deviation from the MTO, 
defined as a balanced budget in structural terms. 
The projected increase of the fiscal deficit is 
mainly explained by an increase in current primary 
expenditure, in particular social payments and 
wages.  
For 2010, based on the customary no-policy-
change assumption, the Commission services 
spring 2008 forecast projects the deficit to edge up, 
due to an increase in current primary expenditure. 
Also the debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to increase 
slightly, contrary to the downward path foreseen in 
the Stability Programme update.    
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Table V.12.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Cyprus (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
3.4 0.9 -1.9 -2.6
46.4 44.9 42.5 42.4
 Of which : - taxes on production and imports 19.7 18.7 17.6 17.6
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 14.0 13.1 11.4 11.4
- social contributions 7.7 8.3 8.7 8.7
42.9 44.0 44.4 45.0
Of which: - compensation of employees 14.5 14.3 14.6 14.6
- intermediate consumption 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.6
- social payments 11.6 12.5 13.0 13.5
- gross fixed capital formation 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
- interest expenditure 3.1 2.9 2.3 2.2
6.5 3.8 0.4 -0.4
40.6 39.4 37.1 37.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.8 0.3 -1.9 -2.1
5.9 3.2 0.4 0.1
59.4 49.1 47.5 47.9
4.4 3.7 0.3 0.7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
3.4 1 -0.8 -1.4 -1.9 -2.2
6.5 3.9 1.5 0.8 0.2 -0.2
0 0 0 0 0 0
3.4 0.7 -0.8 -1.2 -1.7 -2.1
59.4 49.3 46.8 45.4 44.2 44.2
4.4 3.8 2.1 2.4 3 3.2
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Cyprus. 
Table V.12.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Cyprus 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•    Reduction of landing fees at airports levied on airline 
 companies and cancelation of overnight stay fees
 levied by local authorities on hoteliers for the period 
 1.4.2009 - 31.12.2009 (-0.12% of GDP)
•  Boosting tourism promotion and encouraging 
 domestic tourism (0.13% of GDP)
•    Application of the reduced VAT rate on hotel 
 accommodation of 5% instead of 8% for the period 
 1.5.2009 - 30.04.2010 (<0.1% of GDP, the impact in 
 2009)
• Increase of public infrastructure investments (1.2% of
 GDP)
•    Increase of the excise duty on petrol, due to the 
 expiration of the transitional period granted upon EU 
 accession (0.15% of GDP)
•  Compensating measures offsetting the impact of the 
 increase on the excise duty on petrol.  (0.15% of
 GDP)
•    No dividend income from semi-governmental 
 organisations (-0.5% of GDP)
•  Application of the minimum VAT rate on building land 
 (<0.1% GDP)
•    Reduction of the corporate  tax rate for the semi-
 governmental organisations from 25% to 10% to 
harmonise it with the one applied to private enterprises
 (-0.2% of GDP)
•    Withholding tax on interest earned by the Social
 Security Funds will be reduced from 10% to 3%, 
bringing it in line with the tax levied on other pension 
funds. Due to consolidation reasons, this measure 
 has no fiscal impact.
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and 2009 Budget Law. 
13. LATVIA 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
According to the April 2009 EDP notification, the 
general government deficit was 4.0% of GDP in 
2008. This is a far weaker outturn than the target 
surplus of 0.7% of GDP set in the initial budget 
and weaker than the 3.5% of GDP deficit projected 
in the convergence programme update submitted in 
January 2009. This reflects a significantly 
worsened economic environment, a sharp 
contraction of tax revenues and substantially 
higher-than-budgeted expenditures, including an 
increase in social transfers. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased to 19.5% in 2008 from 9.0% in 2007, 
mainly as a result of bail-out financing to the 
largest domestic bank (Parex Banka).  
An initial, very expansionary budget for 2009 was 
adopted in November 2008 but prior to 
implementation was replaced by the outline budget 
law adopted on 12 December 2008 as an integral 
part of the government's economic stabilisation 
programme, following Latvia's request for 
international financial assistance. This revised the 
target general government deficit to 5.3% of 
GDP201. Major consolidation measures comprised 
tax reforms, public sector wage cuts and 
procurement reductions, while maintaining core 
social protection and EU-supported project 
spending. However, VAT increases implemented 
in early 2009 failed to bring the expected results 
and public spending in the first months of 2009 
was well above corresponding 2008 levels. In 
particular, social transfers increased significantly 
due to generous pension increases in 2008. Public 
finances are thus set to deteriorate significantly 
more in 2009 than assumed in the budget forecast, 
mainly due to the weaker macroeconomic context, 
but also due to higher discretionary expenditure. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
forecast, without further measures, the general 
government deficit could exceed 11% of GDP. 
(201) ESA basis: see January 2009 update of the convergence 
programme. The programme as well as its assessment by 
the Commission and by the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
In response to these trends, the government is 
expected to propose additional fiscal consolidation 
measures, with an objective, endorsed by Latvia's 
international lenders, being to achieve well-
grounded structural consolidation measures. Based 
on these, a supplementary budget is expected to be 
adopted by the parliament in June.  
The European Economic Recovery Plan called for 
a differentiated approach to fiscal support 
measures. As a country facing significant external 
and internal imbalances, Latvia is focusing its 
budgetary policy at correcting such imbalances 
through fiscal consolidation. The main goal of the 
medium-term budgetary strategy is to fulfil 
Maastricht budgetary criteria in 2011, with 
planned general government deficits remaining 
around 5% of GDP in 2010 but falling below 3% 
in 2011.  
The authorities have proposed some measures to 
support economic activity without a significant 
short-term budgetary impact, most notably 
frontloading use of EU structural funds in certain 
sectors and broader use of state-backed guarantees. 
The intensified use of EU structural funds will 
increase revenue and expenditure levels without 
greatly affecting the overall budget balance. 
For 2010, the Commission services' spring forecast 
projects a deficit of 13% of GDP, assuming 
unchanged policy. While the tax revenues will 
continue declining, some of the consolidation 
measures already or expected to be adopted in 
2009 will have a positive impact also in 2010, in 
particular the proposed reforms in healthcare, 
education and public administration.  
According to the Commission services' spring 
forecast, general government debt is projected to 
reach some 34% of GDP in 2009 and around 50% 
in 2010, mostly reflecting the take-up of 
international assistance provided by the EU, IMF 
and other contributors. The January 2009 update of 
the convergence programme put the general 
government debt estimate at 32.4% of GDP in 
2009 and 45.4% of GDP in 2010. 
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Table V.13.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Latvia (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.4 -4.0 -11.1 -13.6
35.5 35.5 35.7 36.2
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.2 10.8 9.9 9.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.2 9.7 8.8 8.0
- social contributions 8.9 8.8 9.8 10.2
35.9 39.5 46.8 49.8
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.6 12.0 12.0 12.5
- intermediate consumption 6.1 7.2 7.4 7.2
- social payments 7.1 8.3 12.5 13.4
- gross fixed capital formation 5.7 4.9 5.6 6.1
- interest expenditure 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.3
0.1 -3.1 -9.7 -11.3
30.5 29.4 28.5 28.1
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8
-4.5 -5.8 -9.5 -11.5
-4.1 -4.9 -8.1 -9.2
9.0 19.5 34.1 50.1
10.0 -4.6 -13.1 -3.2
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.1 -3.5 -5.3 -4.9 -2.9
0.5 -2.9 -3.7 -3.5 -1.4
0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
-3.3 -5.1 -4.9 -3.3 -1.5
9.5 19.4 32.4 45.4 47.3
10.3 -2.0 -5.0 -3.0 1.5
Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme(4)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
- Total expenditure
General government balance
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Latvia 
Table V.13.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Latvia
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
·  Increase of standard VAT rate from 18% to 21%;
 increase of reduced VAT rates from 5% to 21%
 (+1.92% of GDP).
· Increase in social payments (+2.1% of GDP).
·   Increases of excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, petrol,
  and certain non-alcoholic beverages (+0.74% of GDP).
· Maintaining the rate of social contribution accruing into
  the state funded pension scheme at 8% and increas-
  ing the minimal wage (+0.34% of GDP).
·   Reducing of PIT from 25% to 23%; increasing of
  minimal wage from 160 LVL to 180 LVL; increas-
  ing of threshold of PIT tax-exemtion from
  80-90 LVL (0.63% of GDP).
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2)  Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, convergence programme, Budget Law and other legal acts of Latvia 
14. LITHUANIA 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government deficit amounted 
to 3.2% of GDP mainly due to expansionary fiscal 
policy. This outturn compares with a target deficit 
of 0.5% of GDP set in the 2007 update of 
Lithuania's convergence programme and in the 
Law on Fiscal Discipline adopted in November 
2007. Revenue growth was somewhat weaker than 
expected due to slowing GDP growth. Particularly 
VAT collection was significantly lower than 
planned. However, the sharp rise in the 
government deficit mostly reflects a considerable 
upward revision of expenditure, without adoption 
of a supplementary budget. Following policy 
decisions during the year, social transfers and 
public sector wages increased substantially. On the 
other hand, public investment was lower than 
planned. The debt-to-GDP ratio continued to 
decrease from 17.0% in 2007 to 15.6%, mainly 
due to strong nominal growth and run-down of 
financial assets. 
The budget for 2009 was approved by parliament 
on 22 December 2008. The general government 
target, confirmed in the January 2009 update of the 
convergence programme202, is a deficit of 2.1% of 
GDP. Main measures on the revenue side comprise 
a cut in the personal income tax rate from 24% to 
21% (from it levying a 6% tax to the health 
insurance fund), an increase in the corporate profit 
tax from 15% to 20%, an increase in VAT rate 
from 18% to 19%, substantial increases in excise 
duties on tobacco, fuel and alcohol and the 
abolition of most existing tax exemptions. On the 
expenditure side, the budget includes significant 
cuts in current expenditure but also reflects higher 
social transfers and wage increases for certain 
categories of public sector employees. 
Furthermore, the contribution rate to the second 
pillar pension funds was temporarily reduced from 
5.5% to 3%. In view of a sharper than expected 
deterioration in the macroeconomic outlook at the 
(202) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.        
beginning of 2009 and weaker than planned 
revenue collection, despite revenue increasing 
measures, a supplementary budget was approved 
by parliament on 7 May 2009 targeting a general 
government deficit of 2.9% of GDP. It includes 
further substantial fiscal consolidation measures, 
mainly in the form of current expenditure cuts 
(including public sector wage and staffing levels) 
and investment. Contributions to the second pillar 
pension funds have been reduced further from 3% 
to 2%. A restrictive fiscal stance is in line with the 
European Recovery plan as Lithuania aims at 
correcting internal and external imbalances, taking 
into account the difficulty to secure new financing 
due to market risk aversion. Furthermore, the 
Lithuanian authorities adopted a comprehensive 
package of measures aiming at business support by 
reducing administrative burden, improving access 
to finance and facilitating exports and investment. 
As energy dependency is high on the agenda, the 
government passed measures to improve energy 
efficiency. The use of EU structural funds is also 
planned to be simplified and enhanced. 
Despite these consolidation measures, the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast projects 
the general government deficit in 2009 to widen 
further to 5.4% of GDP. This reflects a markedly 
more cautious assessment of revenue prospects 
compared to the budget but also higher social 
benefits due to deteriorating labour market 
situation. Despite the government's intentions to 
cut some national investment programmes, overall 
investment should remain at a similar level to 
2008, due to accelerating absorption of EU funds.  
In 2010, based on the no-policy change 
assumption, the Commission services' spring 2009 
forecast projects the general government deficit to 
widen further to 8.0% of GDP, due to continuing 
negative domestic growth. This contrasts with the 
most recent update of the convergence programme, 
which on the basis of more favourable growth 
assumptions foresees the general government to 
record a deficit of 1.0% in 2010. The spring 2009 
forecast projects the general government debt to 
increase rapidly to about 32% over the forecast 
period mainly due to high forecast primary 
deficits.  
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Table V.14.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Lithuania (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
-1.0 -3.2 -5.4 -8.0
33.9 34.0 34.1 34.8
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 11.6 11.5 10.7 10.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.3 9.3 8.8 8.6
- social contributions 8.9 9.3 9.5 9.5
34.9 37.2 39.5 42.7
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.0 10.8 11.1 11.2
- intermediate consumption 5.4 5.7 4.9 5.2
- social payments 9.2 11.0 13.1 14.5
- gross fixed capital formation 5.2 4.9 5.0 5.8
- interest expenditure 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.5
-0.3 -2.6 -4.3 -6.5
29.9 30.3 29.2 28.7
-0.6 -0.1 0.5 0.6
-2.8 -5.2 -4.3 -5.5
-2.1 -4.5 -3.1 -3.9
17.0 15.6 22.6 31.9
8.9 3.0 -11.0 -4.7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-1.2 -2.9 -2.1 -1.0 0.0
-0.5 -2.3 -1.2 0.0 1.1
0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0
-2.6 -4.9 -1.8 0.1 1.1
17.0 15.3 16.9 18.1 17.1
8.9 3.5 -4.8 -0.2 4.5
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme(4)
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
(1)  Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services, convergence programme of Lithuania and the Ministry of Finance.
Table V.14.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Lithuania 
Revenue measures(1)(3) Expenditure measures(2)(3)
•  Reduction of personal income tax from
 24% to 21% (-0.45% of GDP)
•   Higher social transfers other than in kind
(0.9% of GDP)
•   Increase of corporate income tax and tax
 on dividends from 15% to 20%
(0.4% of GDP)
•   Reduction of contributions to pension
 funds (2nd pillar) (0.48% of GDP)
•  Increase of VAT from 18% to 19%
(0.9% of GDP)
• Reduction in transfers to local
  governments (-0.5% of GDP)
•  Inclusion of some professions to social
security system (0.17% of GDP)
• Cuts in public sector wages
  (-0.7% of GDP)
•  Increase in excise duties on fuel, tobacco
and alcohol (0.65% of GDP)
•     Cuts in current government expenditure
 (-0.9% of GDP)
•  Ongoing pension reform (2nd pillar)
 (-0.3% of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) Including May 2009 supplementary budget. 
Source: Commission services, convergence programme of Lithuania and the Ministry of Finance.
15. LUXEMBOURG 
232 
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
According to recently released data, the general 
government surplus amounted to 2.6% of GDP in 
2008, 1 percentage point of GDP below the 3.6% 
of GDP surplus recorded in 2007. The initial target 
set by the 2007 stability programme was a surplus 
of 0.8% of GDP, slightly down from an estimated 
1.0% in 2007. Thus, the 2008 surplus turned out to 
be 1.8 percentage point of GDP higher than 
planned but its decrease with respect to 2007 was 
0.8 percentage point of GDP stronger. The much 
larger than expected surplus in 2008 was thus 
exclusively due to the base effect associated to a 
similar upward revision of the 2007 outcome since 
expenditure rose much stronger than revenues in 
2008: the 2007 programme projected government 
revenues to increase by 5.6%, while expenditure 
was planned to rise by 5.9% but, actually, revenues 
increased slightly more than expected, by 6.7%, 
while spending rose substantially faster than 
forecast, by 10.1%. Current expenditure increased 
by 9.7% and government investment surged by 
18%. The revenue and expenditure ratios both 
strongly increased in 2008, but, besides the 
stronger than expected increase in revenues and 
spending, this was for a large part due to the very 
weak GDP growth in 2008 (+0.7% in value and -
0.9% in volume). The public debt rose from 6.9% 
of GDP in 2007 to 14.7% in 2008 as a result of the 
financing of the loans granted by the authorities to 
two large banks.  
The 2008 update of the stability programme (203)  
planned the general government surplus to 
decrease from 2.3% of GDP in 2008 to 1.1% in 
2009 but, in view of the sharp deterioration in 
economic conditions and the stimulus measures 
already taken at the moment, the January 2009 
addendum, apart from revising downwards the 
2008 surplus to 2.0% of GDP, significantly 
lowered the 2009 target to a deficit of 0.6% of 
(203) Submitted in October 2008 with an addendum submitted in 
January 2009. The programme as well as its assessment by 
the Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
GDP. The Commission services’ spring 2009 
forecast projects the general government balance 
to deteriorate from a surplus of 2.6% of GDP in 
2008 (instead of 2% in the January addendum)  to 
a  deficit of 1.5% in 2009. The main reasons for 
this difference with the addendum's projection are 
the further deterioration in economic perspectives 
(the addendum used the macroeconomic scenario 
of the Commission services' January interim 
forecast, which projected real GDP to contract by 
0.9% in 2009, to be compared with a decline of 3% 
in the spring forecast) and the sizeable stimulus 
measures decided since January. The 2009 budget 
already foresaw an important increase in income 
tax brackets and, since then, the Luxembourgish 
authorities have decided a whole series of 
additional measures, especially another sizeable 
increase in government investment. These 
measures comply in general terms with the 
principles of the European Economic Recovery 
Plan as they are timely and in most cases targeted, 
especially the increase in public investment. The 
cuts in income tax are not temporary as they were 
primarily designed to compensate for the non-
indexation of tax brackets since 2001. However, 
taking into account the very favourable condition 
of Luxembourg's public finances, this does not 
really constitute a risk to their long-term 
sustainability. In total, with stimulus measures 
amounting to about 3.3% of GDP (including the 
tax cuts decided in the budget), Luxembourg's 
fiscal policy in 2009 appears clearly expansionary. 
Some risks to the budgetary targets could stem 
from possible additional measures of support to the 
financial sector (Luxembourg has guaranteed the 
commitments of one big bank towards other 
financial institutions for a maximum amount equal 
to about 12% of GDP) but there is not indication to 
date that these risks could materialise.        
The Commission services project the deficit to 
increase (under the no-policy change assumption 
but including the stimulus measures already 
decided) from 1.5% in 2009 to 2.8% in 2010, 
while the January addendum to the 2008 
programme plans it to widen from 0.6% of GDP to 
1.5%. This difference is partly due to the lower 
deficit projection for 2009 in the addendum and 
partly to a more pessimistic macroeconomic 
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Table V.15.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2010, Luxembourg (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
3.6 2.6 -1.5 -2.8
40.8 43.3 42.7 42.9
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.6 12.8 13.1 13.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 13.4 14.4 12.8 12.7
- social contributions 11.0 11.7 12.1 12.0
37.2 40.7 44.2 45.7
  Of which: - compensation of employees 7.3 7.9 8.3 8.5
- intermediate consumption 3.1 3.4 3.7 3.7
- social payments 22.5 24.5 26.3 27.3
- gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.9 4.6 5.1
- interest expenditure 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6
3.9 2.9 -0.9 -2.2
37.4 38.6 37.8 37.9
- Total expenditure
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Primary balance
Tax burden
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.9 2.0 0.6 0.1
1.1 2.3 0.6 0.7
6.9 14.7 16.0 16.4
5.2 -0.9 -3.0 0.1
2007 2008 2009 2010
3.2 2 -0.6 -1.5
3.5 2.3 -0.3 -1.2
0 0 0 0
3.5 2.3 -0.3 -1.2
7 14.4 14.9 17
5.2 1 -0.9 1.4
General government balance
Primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP growth (%)
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in October 2008. For the period 2008-2010, data from the January 2009 addendum.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Luxembourg.
Table V.15.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Luxembourg 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•    Indexation by 9% of personal income tax
  brackets: 0.9% of GDP
• Increase in government investment:
0.7% of GDP
•    Replacement of the tax reduction
  for children by a tax bonus: 0.3% of GDP
• Increase by 2% in old-age (and
assimilated) pensions: 0.2% of GDP
•    Abolition of the "droit d'apport" (tax paid
  on the capital of a new company or an
  increase in the capital of an existing one):
  0.3% of GDP
• Encouragement of the recourse to partial
unemployment (especially via the reim-
bursement by the government of the employers'
part of the allowance): 0.4% of GDP
Measures in response to the downturn
(1)  Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, addendum to Luxembourg's 2008 stability programme and "Plan de soutien à la conjoncture" of the Luxembourgish
government.
scenario for 2010 in the Commission services'
spring forecast (GDP growth of +0.1% instead of 
+1.4% in the addendum).   
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2009 forecast, the public debt should rise from 
14¾% of GDP in 2008 to 16% in 2009 and 16½%
in 2010 as a result of the deficits and the financing
of several investment projects financed by public-
private partnership. These projections are close to
those of the January addendum to the stability
programme (14.9% in 2009 and 17.0% in 2010). 
16. HUNGARY 
234 
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the budget deficit was 3.4% of GDP, 
sharply down from 9.2% of GDP in 2006 and 
4.9% of GDP in 2007. It was also significantly 
lower than the original deficit target of 4% of GDP 
set in the November 2007 update of the 
convergence programme. This overachievement by 
0.6% of GDP is fully explained by better-than-
expected revenues. In particular, this concerns 
personal income taxes which were higher by 
around 0.2% of GDP (partly linked to further 
efforts to address tax evasion) as well as inflows 
from other revenues of over 0.5% of GDP (mainly 
due to the own revenues of budgetary institutions). 
Divergences in the expenditure side happened to 
offset each other. Most notably, savings in public 
investments by ¾ of GDP were almost 
counterbalanced by increased railway-related costs 
(around 0.6% of GDP, chiefly linked to a one-off 
capital transfer to the railway company). The debt-
to-GDP ratio was increased by 7 percentage points 
of GDP in 2008 as international loans were drawn 
on, mainly to increase reserves.  
The 2009 budget adopted by Parliament on 15 
December 2008 sets a general government deficit 
target of 2.6% of GDP, in line with the adjustment 
path of the December 2008 convergence 
programme(204). This represented a tightening 
from the previous 3.2% of GDP in the context of 
the Government's new economic programme, 
which was endorsed by an IMF-EU-WB loan of 
EUR 20 bn in October 2008. While there was no 
major change on the revenue side, the budget 
contained further restraints for the operational 
costs of budgetary institutions and savings in the 
chapter-administered government programmes. 
Additional measures targeted a nominal cut in the 
public wage bill as well as a substantial slowdown 
in the increase of social transfers in cash. Given 
the sizeable macroeconomic imbalances, the 
Government did not adopt fiscal stimulus 
(204) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.  
measures, which is fully in line with the EERP. 
Thereby the government's response to the financial 
crisis comprised budget-neutral measures, such as 
a strengthening of active labour market policies 
and a support package to improve SME's access to 
financing. These schemes are chiefly financed 
from EU funds as well as by reshuffling among 
existing expenditure lines. The Government also 
adopted a new fiscal policy framework, containing 
multiannual numerical rules and the establishment 
of the Fiscal Council. In view of the significant 
deterioration in the 2009 growth outlook (from -
1% to -3.3%), the Government revised slightly its 
deficit target to 2.9% of GDP in February while 
adopting additional corrective measures of around 
0.7% of GDP. Following a further deterioration in 
anticipated GDP growth to around -6%, the 
authorities announced new corrective measures 
amounting to 1% of GDP in April so as to respect 
the revised target. The Commission services' 
spring 2009 forecast projects a deficit of 3.4% of 
GDP for 2009. It could not take into account the 
recent decision of the European Court of Justice, 
which found the Hungarian regulation on VAT 
deduction in 2004-2005 to be against the EU law 
(around 0.25% of GDP). The distance vis-à-vis the 
2.9% target of GDP is chiefly explained by the fact 
that not all the measures announced by the new 
government in April were detailed enough to be 
incorporated in the forecast. The fiscal stance 
remains considerably restrictive in 2009. 
For 2010, the Commission services’ forecast, on 
the basis of a no-policy-change assumption, 
projects a deficit of 3.9% of GDP against the 
official target of 2.8% of GDP. The forecast does 
not take into account any expenditure cuts linked 
to the announced additional structural reform steps 
in the pension, social support and public 
administration systems in view of the lack of detail 
as well as the pending Parliamentary approvals. 
The Commission services' spring 2009 forecast 
projects the debt-to-GDP ratio to sharply increase 
to around 81% in 2009 and to over 82% in 2010. 
These dynamics are mainly explained by the 
combination of the revaluation of FX-denominated 
debt due to the depreciating exchange rate and the 
lacklustre nominal GDP outlook.  
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Table V.16.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Hungary (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-4.9 -3.4 -3.4 -3.9
44.8 46.5 47.4 48.1
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.6 15.7 16.3 16.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 10.2 10.6 10.1 10.1
- social contributions 13.6 13.9 14.0 13.8
49.7 49.8 50.8 52.0
  Of which: - compensation of employees 11.5 11.6 11.2 11.6
- intermediate consumption 6.7 7.0 7.2 7.2
- social payments 15.2 15.9 16.5 16.8
- gross fixed capital formation 3.6 2.8 3.1 3.6
- interest expenditure 4.0 4.2 4.8 4.9
-0.9 0.8 1.4 1.0
39.4 40.2 40.4 40.8
-0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0
-5.5 -4.5 -1.7 -2.0
-1.5 -0.3 3.1 2.9
65.8 73.0 80.3 82.3
1.1 0.5 -6.3 -0.3
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-5.0 -3.4 -2.6 -2.5 -2.2
-0.9 0.6 1.9 2.0 2.2
-0.9 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
-4.5 -3.0 -1.8 -1.5 -1.3
65.8 71.1 72.5 72.2 69.0
1.1 1.3 -0.9 1.6 2.5
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Primary balance
Structural balance(3)(5)
Outturn and forecast(1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenues
One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme(4)
General government balance
(1) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in  December 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Hungary.
Table V.16.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Hungary 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•      Temporary 8% tax (surcharge) on the profits of energy
companies (the so-called 'Robin Hood tax') for 2009 and 2010
(+0.1% of GDP)
•       Modernisation and subsidy programme for district heating
schemes (+0.1% of GDP, financed from the earmarked 'Robin
Hood' tax)
•       Capping the 13th monthly pension payment for pensioners
at the level of the average pension and abolishing it for some
groups of early pensioners (-0.2% of GDP)
•       Partly compensated suspension of the 13th monthly salary
in the public sector and a nominal freeze of public wages (net
impact: -0.25% of GDP)
•       Across-the-board cuts in the operational costs of budgetary
institutions (-0.2% of GDP)
•       Cuts in chapter-administered and other government
programmes (e.g. transport development and environmental
protection, -0.25% of GDP)
•       Savings in social transfers due to the postponement of the
forthcoming steps of the 5-year pension correction programme
and the regular indexation of family allowances from 1 January to
1 September 2009 (-0.15% of GDP combined)
•      Introducing a duty-free limit for succession at HUF 20 million
(~EUR 70 000) (-0.04% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Source: Commission services and 2009 budget bill; "Annual report on the budget proposal" by the State Audit Office. 
17. MALTA 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government deficit is 
estimated to have reached 4.7% of GDP, against a 
target of 1.2% of GDP in the November 2007 
stability programme. Revenue is estimated to have 
been around 0.4 percentage points of GDP lower 
than planned in the 2007 update as a result of 
lower tax revenue and lower-than-anticipated 
absorption of EU structural funds. The 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in 2008 is estimated to 
have been 3 percentage points higher than targeted, 
reflecting an unplanned deficit-increasing one-off  
related to early retirement schemes given to Malta 
Shipyards employees (0.8 percentage points), the 
reclassification of the shipyards into the general 
government sector (1.3 percentage points) (205) as 
well as higher compensation of employees and 
energy subsidies given to households. General 
government debt is estimated at slightly above 
64% of GDP, substantially higher than the target 
of 60% of GDP, primarily reflecting the 
deterioration in the primary balance and weaker 
economic growth.  
The 2009 budget targets a general government 
deficit of 1.5% of GDP for 2009, confirmed by the 
2008 update of the stability programme(206). The 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast projects 
the deficit at 3.6% of GDP. A comparison between 
the deficit projections is complicated by the fact 
that the stability programme target is predicated on 
a deficit outturn of 3.3% of GDP for 2008 and on 
an outdated macroeconomic scenario. That said, 
the main reasons for the higher headline deficit in 
the spring forecast are: (i) much weaker revenue, 
specifically from direct taxes (less by 1.7 
percentage points); (ii) an assumed lower 
absorption of EU structural funds; and (iii) a less 
pronounced decline in the expenditure ratio, 
(205) Netting out the sales of Malta Shipyards Ltd., which are 
booked under revenue, the impact of the re-classification 
on general government deficit amounts to 0.4% of GDP. 
(206) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.        
especially in government consumption. Malta has 
adopted several measures to support the economy 
in 2009, but embedded in a broader consolidation 
effort in view of the high general government 
deficit and debt ratios and the deteriorating 
competitive position. The measures are aimed at 
increasing public investment in infrastructure and 
the environment, as well as supporting 
manufacturing, tourism and SMEs and households' 
purchasing power. Most of the measures are timely 
and targeted. Concerning temporariness, while the 
public investment measures are of a temporary 
nature, no concrete end-date is foreseen for the ad-
hoc support to companies and the remaining 
measures are of a permanent nature. With an 
overall budgetary impact of 1.5% of GDP, the 
measures will be more than financed by an 
increase in excise duty on a number of products 
and a reduction in various subsidies, notably 
energy subsidies to households, suggesting that the 
fiscal stance can be characterised as restrictive in 
2009. 
Under the no-policy-change scenario, the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast projects 
a further decline in the general government deficit 
in 2010, to 3.2% of GDP. The 2008 update of the 
stability programme targets a deficit-to-GDP ratio 
of 0.3%. The deviation is mostly accounted for by 
the significantly favourable macroeconomic 
scenario underpinning the programme's budgetary 
projections. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast, the debt ratio is forecast to rise to 
67% of GDP in 2009 and, under the no-policy-
change scenario, almost 69% of GDP in 2010. In 
contrast the 2008 update of the stability 
programme projects a downward trend in gross 
debt, to 56¼% in 2010. The deviation from the 
targets is driven by the higher deficits in 2009 and 
2010 and weakening economic growth. The 
contribution of the stock-flow adjustment to the 
change in the debt ratio is negligible over the 
forecast horizon. 
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Table V.17.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Malta (% of GDP) (1)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-2.2 -4.7 -3.6 -3.2
40.4 40.6 40.8 41.6
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.7 14.7 15.1 15.1
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 13.3 13.1 12.5 12.9
- social contributions 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.6
42.6 45.3 44.4 44.8
  Of which: - compensation of employees 13.0 13.9 13.6 13.7
- intermediate consumption 5.4 6.8 6.3 6.5
- social payments 12.6 13.5 13.8 13.7
- gross fixed capital formation 4.0 2.7 3.4 3.4
- interest expenditure 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5
1.1 -1.4 -0.2 0.4
34.7 34.4 34.0 34.5
0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.0
-3.3 -4.9 -3.6 -2.8
0.0 -1.6 -0.2 0.7
62.1 64.1 67.0 68.9
3.6 1.6 -0.9 0.2
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-1.8 -3.3 -1.5 -0.3 1.2
1.6 0.0 1.9 3.0 4.3
0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
-2.8 -3.7 -1.7 -0.2 0.9
62.2 62.8 61.9 59.8 56.3
3.7 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.8
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2008 
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Malta. 
Table V.17.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Malta 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•    Widening of personal income tax bands (-0.2% of GDP) •    Support for tourism (0.1% of GDP)
•  Motor Vehicle Licences reform (-0.1% of GDP) • Infrastructure - roads, maritime facilities (0.2% of GDP)
•    Education  (0.1% of GDP)
•    Investment projects related to industry  (0.1% of GDP)
•    Higher incentives for investment (0.2% of GDP)
• Investment in educational institutions (0.3% of GDP)
• Sustainable development at local level  (0.1% of GDP)
•    Increase in excise duty (0.3% of GDP) •    Environmental measures (0.1% of GDP)
•    Environmental measures (0.1% of GDP) • Reduction in energy subsidies (-1% of GDP)(3)
• Reduction in other subsidies (-0.4% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) Measure not specific to 2009 budget
Source: Commission services, 2009 budget and addendum to the updated stability programme 2008-2011.
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Recent developments and medium term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government balance came out 
at a surplus of 1% of GDP, a significant 
improvement with respect to the surplus of 0.3% 
of GDP recorded in 2007. The November 2007 
update of the stability programme had targeted a 
general government surplus of 0.5% of GDP for 
2008, which was revised up in September 2008 in 
the context of the budget preparation to a surplus 
of 1.2% of GDP. The better-than-expected 
outcome of the general government balance as 
compared to the November 2007 stability 
programme, can be mainly explained by the better-
than-expected non-tax gas revenues, related to the 
unforeseen sharp increase in the oil price in 2008. 
This outweighed the somewhat lower tax revenues, 
related to a lower-than-expected GDP growth in 
2008 (2% compared to 2½% in the November 
2007 update of the stability programme), and the 
worse local government balance. The government 
debt ratio increased by 12.6% of GDP in 2008 to 
58.2% of GDP, despite the budget surplus. This 
increase can be fully explained by government 
operations to stabilise financial markets (such as 
share acquisitions and capital injections). 
For 2009, the budgetary target was revised down 
by the Dutch government from surplus of 1.2% of 
GDP as presented in both the draft budget and the 
November 2008 update of the Stability 
programme (207) to a deficit of 3.8% of GDP in the 
spring 2009 budget memorandum. This is more 
negative than the Commission services' 2009 
spring forecast, which projects a general 
government deficit of 3.4% of GDP for 2009. The 
downward revision is due to several factors. First, 
the economic growth projection for 2009 has been 
lowered by 4¾ percentage points to -3½% since 
the November 2008 update of the stability 
programme, leading to a sharp fall in tax revenues 
and at the same time to an increase in cyclically 
sensitive expenditure like social security. Second, 
(207) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
gas revenues are expected to decrease in 2009, as a 
result of a lower oil price. Finally, the government 
decided on additional recovery measures (¾% of 
GDP). In the 2009 budget it was already decided to 
decrease social contributions for employees (¼% 
of GDP) in order to support household incomes. 
The additional measures focus on increasing public 
and private investment, protecting employment,  
ensuring access to finance and on providing 
liquidity support for companies, mostly through 
tax measures. The recovery packages are timely 
and targeted, in line with the EERP, and partially 
temporary. The fiscal stance is expected to be 
expansionary. There are significant downside risks 
to the budgetary target due to guarantees to the 
financial sector. 
The government balance in 2010 is expected to 
deteriorate further to -6.1% of GDP according to 
the Commission services' spring 2009 forecast, 
under a no-policy change assumption. The most 
recent budgetary figure for 2010 published by the 
Dutch government in the supplementary coalition 
agreement foresees a general government balance 
of -5.7%. The difference mainly comes from the 
fact that a planned consolidation effort, amounting 
to ¾% of GDP in 2010, was not taken into account 
in the spring forecast, as no specific measures had 
been identified by the Dutch authorities. The 
difference between the two forecasts was 
somewhat smaller than the consolidation effort, 
given that public gas revenues are approximately 
¼% of GDP higher in the spring forecast, as a 
result of a somewhat higher oil price projection. 
The size and composition of the recovery package 
in 2010 does not deviate substantially from 2009. 
Despite the projected budget deficit, the spring 
forecast expects the debt-to-GDP ratio to decrease 
slightly to 57% in 2009, because of the repayment 
of a €34 billion (around 6% of GDP) short term 
loan by Fortis Bank. In 2010, the debt ratio is 
foreseen to increase again to 63.2% of GDP in 
2010, surpassing the 60% of GDP threshold. The 
high level of guarantees to the financial sector 
constitutes a risk for a further increase in the gross 
public debt ratio. 
Part V
Member State developments, The Netherlands 
239 
Table V.18.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Netherlands (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
0.3 1.0 -3.4 -6.1
45.6 46.4 44.9 44.1
Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.6 12.2 12.4 12.1
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 12.0 11.6 11.7 11.2
- social contributions 14.3 15.2 13.9 14.4
45.3 45.4 48.3 50.2
Of which: - compensation of employees 9.2 9.2 9.7 9.9
- intermediate consumption 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.5
- social payments 10.4 10.3 11.2 12.0
- gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.6
- interest expenditure 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.7
2.6 3.2 -0.8 -3.4
38.9 39.0 38.0 37.7
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
-1.0 -0.5 -2.6 -4.3
1.2 1.7 0.0 -1.6
45.6 58.2 57.0 63.1
3.5 2.1 -3.5 -0.4
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.3 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.1
2.6 3.4 3.3 2.9 3.1
0 0 0.3 0 0
-0.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.2
45.7 42.1 39.6 38 36.2
3.5 2¼ 1¼ 2 2
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Primary balance
Structural balance(3)(5)
Outturn and forecast(1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenues
One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability(4)
General government balance
(1)  Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from
the programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of the Netherlands. 
Table V.18.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Netherlands
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•     Reduction in social contributions
   (-0.3% of GDP)
•  Increase in infrastructure projects
(-0.1% of GDP)
•     Accelerated depreciation for investments
   (-0.2% of GDP)
•  Labour market measures (e.g. part-time
unemployment) (-0.1% of GDP)
•        Lower health care premiums
   (-0.1% of GDP)
•  Increase in education expenditure
(-0.3% of GDP)
•     Exceptional expenses deductible
   (0.1% of GDP)
•     Increase in excise duties (0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, 2009 budget and supplementary coalition agreement. 
19. AUSTRIA 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
At 0.4% of GDP, the general government deficit 
for 2008 turned out lower than the initial 0.6% of 
GDP targeted in the November 2007 Stability 
Programme. The favourable outturn was mainly 
due to higher-than-expected revenues from wage 
and income taxes as well as capital yields taxes 
and lower interest payments. These positive 
developments more than offset new policy 
measures aimed at curbing the loss in household 
purchasing power as a consequence of high 
inflation such as reduced social contribution rates 
for low-income earners and increased social 
payments. After the debt-to-GDP ratio fell below 
the 60% threshold in 2007, it increased to 62.5% in 
2008, mainly because of support measures for 
commercial banks in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. These “below-the-line” measures 
increased the debt-to-GDP ratio without affecting 
the deficit. 
The federal budgets for 2009 and 2010 were 
presented to the parliament in April 2009 and will 
be adopted by end of May. In the Stability 
Programme (208) a general government budget 
deficit target of 3.5% of GDP was announced for 
2009. The Commission services' spring 2009 
forecast, which is based on a more pessimistic 
macroeconomic scenario (209), projects a higher 
deficit of 4¼% of GDP. Sizeable revenue losses 
and increased expenditure due to automatic 
stabilisers and discretionary fiscal measures to 
address the economic crisis as well as efforts to 
stabilise financial markets will contribute to a 
significant deterioration of Austria's public 
finances in 2009. Hence, the fiscal stance will be 
expansionary. 
The discretionary stimulus measures adopted are in 
line with the European Economic Recovery Plan 
(208) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
(209) In the stability programme Austrian authorities assume a 
fall of real GDP by 2.2%, whereas Commission services 
project a decline of 4%. 
as far as targeting and timeliness is concerned. The 
measures focus mainly on household income 
support, the labour market to avoid lay-offs (short-
time work), and improved training. Support to 
credit-constrained enterprises comes mainly in off-
budget form as guarantees and subsidised loans. 
Some fiscal measures were already taken in 2008 
to support private household purchasing power, 
but will remain largely effective in 2009. The 
discretionary impulses are timely as a major part of 
them took effect in the first quarter 2009. 
However, most of the measures are permanent, 
hence their reversibility is not ensured. 
For 2010, the Austrian Stability Programme 
foresees a government deficit of 4.7% of GDP. 
Under the no-policy-change assumption the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast projects 
the deficit to widen to 5¼% of GDP. The 
difference results, apart from the base effect, from 
a less optimistic macroeconomic outlook in the 
Commission forecast.  
In the light of the higher deficits, stock-flow 
adjustments as a consequence of financial 
stabilisation measures “below the line” and lower 
nominal GDP, the Commission services’ forecast 
foresees the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase to 
70½% in 2009 and 75¼ of GDP in 2010.  
The macroeconomic scenario underlying the 
authorities' budgetary projections in the April 2009 
Stability Programme is subject to considerable 
uncertainty with respect to the duration, extent and 
impact of the recession. In particular, the growth 
assumptions appear quite favourable. 
Consequently, the programme’s fiscal targets are 
subject to substantial downside risks. The fiscal 
risks in the context of the support programmes for 
enterprises and commercial banks are currently 
estimated to be limited, as large parts of them are 
off-budget in the form of guarantees. These 
operations have a budgetary effect only in the 
event of public guarantees being called. However, 
if the number of non-performing domestic and 
foreign loans increases to a degree that the 
solvency of major Austrian banks is put at risk, 
public finances would deteriorate further as 
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Table V.19.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Austria (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.5 -0.4 -4.2 -5.3
48.0 48.2 47.4 46.7
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.1 14.1 14.3 14.3
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 13.5 14.0 12.6 12.2
- social contributions 15.9 16.0 16.3 16.2
48.5 48.6 51.6 52.1
 Of which: - compensation of employees 9.1 9.1 9.8 9.8
- intermediate consumption 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.6
- social payments 18.0 18.1 19.7 19.9
- gross fixed capital formation 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
- interest expenditure 2.7 2.5 3.0 3.2
2.2 2.1 -1.1 -2.1
42.3 42.9 42.2 41.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.8 -1.8 -3.2 -3.8
1.0 0.8 -0.1 -0.6
59.4 62.5 70.4 75.2
3.1 1.8 -4.0 -0.1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-0.5 -0.4 -3.5 -4.7 -4.7 -4.7
2.3 2.2 -0.6 -1.7 -1.4 -1.3
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
-1.7 -1.6 -3.1 -3.9 -4.0 -4.1
59.4 62.5 68.5 73.0 75.7 77.7
3.1 1.8 -2.2 0.5 1.5 2.0
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in April 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and Austrian Stability Programme April 2009.
Table V.19.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Austria 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
• Income tax reduction 
(-0.7% of GDP)
•  Labor market package - short-time work
  (0.1% of GDP) 
• Increased tax allowances for children
(-0.1% of GDP)
• Repeal  of university fees
(-0.1% of GDP)
• Tax exemptions 
(-0.1% of GDP)
• Reduction of VAT on pharmaceuticals
(-0,1% of GDP)
• Reduction in unemployment insurance
contributions (-0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source:  Commission services and Austrian Stability Programme April 2009. 
substantial additional capital injections by the 
government would be necessary. 
20. POLAND 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
Due to the reduction of social contributions 
(estimated at nearly 1½% of GDP), an increase in 
personal income tax reliefs for families, a generous 
indexation of pensions and social benefits and a 
deterioration of the economic situation towards the 
end of the year, the general government deficit was 
expected to widen in 2008. It increased by about 2 
percentage points to 3.9% of GDP in 2008, which 
is significantly more than planned in the March 
2008 convergence programme (210) (2.5%). In 
particular, non-tax revenues were much lower 
(mainly capital transfers due to underexecution of 
projects cofinanced with EU funds) while 
intermediate consumption (including military 
expenditure) and compensation of employees 
much higher than presented in the programme. At 
47.1% of GDP, debt turned out to be by almost 3 
percentage points higher in 2008 than projected in 
the March 2008 convergence programme. It 
resulted mainly from a considerably higher deficit 
but also a deep depreciation of the Polish currency 
resulting in a sharp increase of the foreign-
denominated fraction of the debt. 
Despite an additional reduction of central 
government expenditure of ¾% of GDP, 
introduced after the adoption of the 2009 budget, 
the general government deficit is forecast to 
deteriorate to about 6½% of GDP in 2009. This is 
the expected outcome of the recession and 
discretionary measures. Automatic stabilisers will 
contribute to an increase in social transfers on top 
of high statutory growth under new indexation 
rules referring to high inflation and wages in 2008. 
Among the stimulus measures, a rise in public 
investment, a personal income tax reform and a 
reduction of the tax burden for businesses are set 
to be costly for the Polish public finances. An 
increase in excise duties, a reduction in subsidies 
and the replacement of early pensions with less 
(210) The successive updates of the convergence programme and 
the assessments by the Commission and Council of them 
can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
costly “bridge pensions” will be insufficient to 
offset the effects of the rapid deterioration of the 
economic situation and the deficit-increasing 
measures. The Polish authorities revised their 2009 
deficit target from 2.5% of GDP presented in the 
December 2008 convergence programme to 4.6% 
in the April 2009 fiscal notification. The difference 
between the Commission services’ deficit forecast 
and the national target results mainly from 
different growth scenarios. Besides, the Polish 
authorities may anticipate some corrective 
measures, to be included in an amended budget, 
which are not yet publically known. 
In 2010, the general government deficit is expected 
to further deteriorate to more than 7% of GDP on 
the back of still weak growth and a further 
weakening of the labour market as well as a one-
off measure (debt cancellation). Also the 
assumption of no policy change has been applied. 
In particular, nominal expenditure growth targets 
presented in the latest convergence programme are 
included in the forecast, contributing to an increase 
of the general government expenditure ratio of 
about ⅔ percentage point. This spending growth 
comprises a further increase in social expenditure, 
due to rising unemployment, and ambitious 
investment plans which, however, may be revised. 
Higher risk aversion towards emerging markets 
and quickly mounting debt are expected to result in 
an increase in interest expenditure. Finally, 
possible changes on the revenue side, e.g. raising 
healthcare contributions, are not considered.  
As a consequence of high deficits and still slow 
privatisation, gross debt is projected to increase 
sharply to 54% of GDP in 2009 and further to only 
slightly less than 60% in 2010. The debt 
projections are subject to significant uncertainty 
because of the high volatility of the exchange rate 
and the ensuing valuation effects of the foreign-
denominated part of the debt. 
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Public investment: refocusing is desirable 
There appears to be a positive relationship between 
public investment, private investment and GDP
growth in Poland, as indicated by impulse response
functions based on vector autoregression (Graph
V.20.1). First, a demand stimulus can already be
noticed after 1-2 quarters. 
Table V.20.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Poland (% of GDP) (1)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-1.9 -3.9 -6.6 -7.3
40.2 39.2 39.5 39.5
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.2 14.2 14.5 14.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 8.6 8.6 8.1 8.2
- social contributions 12.0 11.4 11.4 11.2
42.1 43.3 46.1 46.8
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.6 9.8 10.4 10.5
- intermediate consumption 6.0 6.2 6.1 5.9
- social payments 14.2 14.1 15.2 15.4
- gross fixed capital formation 4.1 4.6 5.5 6.0
- interest expenditure 2.3 2.2 2.9 3.0
0.4 -1.7 -3.7 -4.4
34.6 34.0 33.9 33.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
-3.2 -5.3 -6.0 -5.6
-0.9 -3.1 -3.1 -2.9
44.9 47.1 53.6 59.7
6.6 4.8 -1.4 0.8
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-2.0 -2.7 -2.5 -2.3 -1.9
0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
-2.5 -3.1 -2.5 -2.3 -1.7
44.9 45.9 45.8 45.5 44.8
6.7 5.1 3.7 4.0 4.5
Outturn and forecast(2)
Primary balance
General government balance
- Total revenues
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme(4)
General government balance
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2008
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Poland 
Table V.20.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Poland 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•    Investment (+0.3% of GDP)
• Personal income tax (-0.6% of GDP) •    Investment (+0.6% of GDP)
• Taxes on business (-0.2% of GDP) •    Subsidies (-0.2% of GDP)
•   Excise duties (+0.2% of GDP) • Intermediate consump. (-0.7% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and budget for 2009.
Second, the supply-side effect appears to be visible 
in the positive impact on private investment. The 
impact materialises after 2-3 quarters and reaches
its maximum after 6 quarters.
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Graph V.20.1: Orthogonalised impulse-response functions based on 
vector autoregression for Poland 
Graph V.20.3: The evolution of public investment (ESA95) by local 
and central government in Poland
% of GDP
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Source: Commission services.
In contrast, central government investment was
larger in higher-income regions (Graph V.20.4).
Graph V.20.4: Regional GDP per capita and public investment 
(non ESA95) in different government subsectors, 
long-term averages for 1999-2006 
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Note: The outlier (black dot) is the capital region.
Demand side: impact of public
investment (% of GDP) on private
investment (% of GDP)
-0.5
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Quarters
Supply side: Impact of public
investment (% of GDP)
on real GDP growth (%)
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Note: Orthogonalised impulse-response. Sample period: 1999Q3-
2007Q4. Dashed lines indicate 90% confidence band. VAR includes two 
lags of GDP growth, private investment and public investment (in the 
order of endogeneity) and quarterly dummies.
Source: Commission Services.
The execution of public investment, though
improving, was always below plans in the recent 
years (Graph V.20.2) and the underperformance 
appears in central government. 
Graph V.20.2: Short-term plans and outturns 
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Source: Polish central statistical office (GUS). 
Note: * Pre-Accession Economic Programme 2003.
The positive link between public investment and 
growth in Poland should be exploited more, in
particular now, when there is a need to counteract 
a deep growth slowdown and, at the same time,
seek to fully use EU funds to finance a large part
of public investment. Being in the EDP, Poland
should not increase expenditure, but take the 
opportunity to change its composition.
Source: Commission services.
The local government investment ratio declined 
since 1999 until EU accession, whereas central 
government investment followed the opposite
pattern (Graph V.20.3). After accession, central 
government investment levelled off around 1½% 
of GDP while local government investment 
increased from less than 2% to about 2½%. 
Besides, the central government investment could 
be refocused towards less developed regions. In
these regions the impact of the crisis is stronger 
and socially more painful due to a low 
diversification of their production structures and an
underdevelopment of services. However, the return 
on scarcer infrastructure is likely to be higher. 
Local government investment in Poland appears to 
counteract regional income dispersion, since 
poorer regions invested more (relative to their
GDP) than richer regions in 1999-2006. 
21. PORTUGAL 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government deficit in Portugal 
was 2.6% of GDP, against an official target of 
2.4% of GDP set out in the 2008 Budget Law and 
the December 2007 update of the stability 
programme(211). This fiscal outturn benefited from 
deficit-reducing one-off operations worth over ¾% 
of GDP. The budgetary under-performance in 
2008 stemmed mainly from lower-than-projected 
economic growth, as GDP stagnated in volume 
terms in 2008 compared with a forecast of 2.2% 
growth in the Budget Law, having nonetheless 
benefited from a better-than-expected 2007 
budgetary execution by some ½% of GDP. In 
2008, general government gross debt amounted to 
66.4% of GDP, after 63.5% of GDP in 2007. 
Besides the deficit and GDP outturns, this reflects 
also a debt-increasing stock-flow adjustment of 
almost 1½% of GDP on account inter alia of 
acquisition of financial assets and repayments of 
commercial debt. 
The target for the 2009 general government 
balance set in the January 2009 update of the 
stability programme was a deficit of 3.9% of GDP. 
However, in mid May, in the Medium-Term 
Steering Report on Fiscal Policy (Relatório de 
Orientação da Política Orçamental), this target 
was revised to 5.9% of GDP. This compares with a 
deficit projection of 6.5% of GDP in the 
Commission services' spring 2009 economic 
forecasts, with the latter reflecting a sharper 
recession than foreseen in the former (GDP is 
expected to decline by 3.7% in volume terms, 
against 3.4%). Besides the severe economic 
downturn, fiscal developments in 2009 reflect also 
the impact of a number of discretionary fiscal 
measures that Portugal has adopted to stimulate 
economic activity. Notably, in the context of the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), a 
package was adopted in December 2008 focused 
on public investment and on a mix of revenue and 
(211) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
expenditure instruments to support employment, 
social protection, investment and exports. This 
package represents a fiscal impulse of 1¼% of 
GDP in 2009 (of which 0.8% of GDP is to be 
financed out of the national budget and the rest 
through EU funds). Overall, the package is in line 
with the EERP: its measures are timely and 
targeted at the areas most affected by the crisis. In 
addition, most of the measures are temporary and 
limited to 2009. This fiscal stimulus adds to a 
number of other separate measures that had 
already been announced earlier in 2008 to support 
households' income and firms' investment 
amounting to almost ½% of GDP, to the reduction 
in the standard VAT rate from 21% to 20% as 
from July 2008, as well as to some minor measures 
taken already in 2009 (see Table V.21.2). All in 
all, an overall expansionary fiscal policy is 
expected for 2009. 
Under the no-policy-change assumption, the 
Commission services' spring 2009 economic 
forecasts foresee a general government deficit of 
6.7% of GDP in 2010. This compares with an 
official target of a deficit of 2.9% of GDP set in 
the January 2009 update of the stability 
programme. Besides the base effect coming from 
the differences on the 2009 fiscal outlook, this 
divergence reflects a much less favourable GDP 
growth scenario in the Commission forecasts. 
On the back of the continued economic downturn 
and the deteriorating budgetary outcomes, the 
Commission services' spring 2009 economic 
forecasts project the government debt to increase 
to 75½% and 81½% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. According to the January 2009 
update of the stability programme, the debt ratio 
would increase to 69.7% of GDP this year and to 
70.5% of GDP next year. Government efforts to 
support the financial markets, notably provisions 
for granting of guarantees to new borrowing by 
banks and the possibility of reinforcing banks' 
capital through government investment up to a 
combined total of some 12% of GDP until end 
2009, have not had a detrimental fiscal impact, but 
possible rescue operations may put upward 
pressure on government finances. 
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Table V.21.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Portugal (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010
-2.6 -2.6 -6.5 -6.7
43.1 43.2 42.4 42.0
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.0 14.6 14.4 14.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.7 9.9 9.6 9.4
- social contributions 12.7 13.0 11.8 12.0
45.7 45.9 48.9 48.7
  Of which: - compensation of employees 12.9 12.9 11.6 11.6
- intermediate consumption 4.1 4.4 4.8 5.0
- social payments 15.1 15.6 17.1 17.5
- gross fixed capital formation 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.0
- interest expenditure 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.3
0.2 0.3 -3.6 -3.4
36.8 36.8 35.0 35.0
0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0
-3.3 -3.8 -5.5 -5.1
-0.5 -0.9 -2.5 -1.8
63.5 66.4 75.4 81.5
1.9 0.0 -3.7 -0.8
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-2.6 -2.2 -3.9 -2.9 -2.3
0.2 0.8 -0.6 0.4 1.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.7 -2.0 -3.0 -1.8 -1.2
63.6 65.9 69.7 70.5 70.0
1.9 0.3 -0.8 0.5 1.3
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance (3)(5)
Structural balance (3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme (4)
General government balance
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenues
(1) Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in Jan 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Portugal. 
Table V.21.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Portugal 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•    Temporary reduction of social contributions for
     some selected groups (-0.2% of GDP)
•    Renewal of schools premises (0.2% of GDP)
•   Support to firms liquidity through changes in the
    procedures and timing of some tax payments
    (-0.1% of GDP)
•    Investment (and support to investment) in energy
 and telecommunications infra-structure 
 (0.2% of GDP)
•    Special support to activity, exports and SMEs
 (0.1% of GDP)
•    Reduction of the VAT standard rate by one
     percentage point as from July 2008 (-0.15% of GDP)
•    Support to household income (0.2% of GDP)
•    Lower tax burden related to housing assets
(-0.1% of GDP)
•    Support to firms (0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1)  Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and January 2009 stability programme update.
22. ROMANIA 
247 
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government recorded a deficit 
of 5.4% of GDP, more than double compared to 
the official target of 2.4% of GDP set in the budget 
rectification from March 2008, down from the 
initial target of 2.9% of GDP foreseen in the 
December 2007 convergence programme (212). 
The significant deviation is mainly due to weak 
budgetary planning and execution, which resulted 
in substantially higher-than-planned current 
spending, notably in public wages and social 
transfers. In addition, overly optimistic revenue 
projections did not materialise and a sudden drop 
in revenue collection in the last two months of the 
year owing to the economic slowdown added to 
the worse-than-expected outcome. The debt to 
GDP ratio stood at 13.6% in 2009, up by almost 
1pp compared to 2008.  
In view of the large domestic and external 
imbalances and the adverse effect of the global 
financial turmoil on the economy, the Romanian 
authorities made a request for multilateral financial 
assistance in March 2009213. In this context, the 
government envisages a significant fiscal 
adjustment effort targeting a deficit of 5.1% of 
GDP in 2009 against a sharp deterioration of the 
macroeconomic outlook. The 2009 budget adopted 
in February 2009 contains several measures to 
lower the deficit, including a recruitment freeze 
and the reduction of various bonuses in the public 
sector, cuts in expenditure for goods and services 
and subsidies, limiting pension increases to 
inflation, a 3.3pps rise in the pension contribution 
rate and a bringing forward of the schedule to 
(212) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
(213) The total multilateral financial assistance amounts to up to 
EUR 20 billion over the period to the first quarter of 2011. 
The EU provides a medium-term loan of up to EUR 5bn in 
conjunction with EUR12.95 billion from the International 
Monetary Fund. Additional multilateral support of €2 
billion will be provided by the World Bank (€1 billion), the 
European Investment Bank and the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (€1 billion together) on 
top of their general lending activities. 
increase excise taxes. Under the economic 
programme to be undertaken in the framework of 
the multilateral financial assistance, the 
government has pledged to undertake additional 
expenditure-driven fiscal adjustment measures, 
These measures, reflected in a budget rectification 
approved by the government in April 2009 include 
further cuts in the public sector wage bill, 
expenditure on goods and services, some capital 
spending and subsidies. On the revenue side, 
measures aim at eliminating certain tax deductions 
and allowances (in particular for company cars and 
depreciation of revalued assets). On the other 
hand, the government plans a substantial increase 
in public investment in 2009 compared with 2008, 
also as a means to sustain the economic recovery. 
In addition, given the need for fiscal consolidation, 
only a limited set of fiscal stimulus measures has 
been adopted aiming at supporting businesses, 
labour market, a good functioning of the labour 
market and supporting household income. Taking 
into account the above-mentioned fiscal 
adjustment measures, the Commission services' 
spring 2009 forecast projects the general 
government deficit to reach 5.1% of GDP in 2009. 
Overall, the fiscal policy stance seems restrictive. 
Based on the no-policy change assumption, the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast projects 
the general government deficit to increase to 5.6% 
of GDP in 2010. However, in the multilateral 
financial assistance programme, the authorities 
committed to continue the fiscal adjustment 
throughout 2010, aiming at a deficit of below 3% 
of GDP in 2011. 
The high primary deficits and a significant 
increase in interest payments on government debt 
will result in the debt-to-GDP ratio rising to 18¼% 
in 2009 and 22¾% in 2010. 
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Table V.22.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Romania (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
-2.5 -5.4 -5.1 -5.6
34.0 33.1 33.4 33.3
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.7 12.3 11.7 11.5
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 6.8 6.9 6.5 6.5
- social contributions 10.6 10.3 10.9 10.7
36.6 38.5 38.5 38.9
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.4 10.2 9.3 9.3
- intermediate consumption 6.2 6.5 5.1 5.1
- social payments 9.3 10.6 11.8 11.7
- gross fixed capital formation 5.7 5.4 6.3 6.7
- interest expenditure 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.6
-1.8 -4.7 -3.6 -4.0
29.4 28.9 28.4 28.2
-0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
-4.4 -7.9 -5.2 -4.7
-3.7 -7.2 -3.7 -3.1
12.7 13.6 18.2 22.7
6.2 7.1 -4.0 0.0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-2.5 -5.4 -5.1 -4.1 -2.9
-1.8 -4.7 -3.6 -2.4 -1.4
-0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
-3.7 -6.8 -3.3 -0.7 1.3
12.7 13.6 18.0 20.8 22.0
6.2 7.1 -4.0 0.1 2.4
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Convergence programme(4)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in June 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Romania.
Table V.22.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Romania 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•        Public investment (+1% of GDP)
•       Instituting a minimum "social" pension 
    (+0.1% of GDP)
•        Increasing the social contribution rate
   (+0.8% of GDP)
•        Lower expenditure on goods and services 
     (-1.3% of GDP)
•        Bringing forward the schedule to increase
   excise duties (+0.1% of GDP)
•        Cuts in personnel expenditure
     (-0.9% of GDP)
•        Updating the tax base for local property
   taxes, bringing to the market value
   (+0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and the Romanian Ministry of Finance 
23. SLOVENIA 
249 
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government deficit amounted 
to 0.9% as planned in the November 2007 update 
of the stability programme. The impact of a 
significantly better starting position – arising from 
the fact that the 2007 outcome was a surplus 
instead of a deficit, a difference of just over 1 
percentage point of GDP - and stronger revenue 
growth in 2008 than budgeted were offset by much 
higher expenditure growth than planned. Revenue 
surprised on the upside in capital taxes (part of 
personal income tax), social contributions and non-
tax revenues. Expenditure overruns occurred in 
public investment, social transfers (especially 
pensions) as well as compensation of employees. 
General government gross debt declined to just 
below 23% of GDP. 
According to the April 2009 update of the stability 
programme(214), the general government deficit is 
targeted to widen to 5.1% of GDP in 2009, higher 
than the target of 3.7% set in the March 2009 
supplementary budget and the original target of 
0.6% of GDP set in the November 2007 budget 
covering 2008-2009 in line with the two-year 
rolling budgetary procedure. The new target 
embodies additional consolidation measures, 
amounting to 0.9% of GDP, expected to be 
presented in summer 2009 in a second 
supplementary budget for 2009. The Commission 
services' spring 2009 forecast does not include 
these as yet unspecified measures and projects a 
deficit of 5.5% of GDP. The government’s 
response to the European Economic Recovery 
Plan, the Slovenian government has been timely, 
with the approval of two stimulus packages, the 
first one in December 2008 and the second one in 
February 2009. These measures are designed to 
mitigate the impact of the crisis on productive 
capacity and jobs. The main measure is the wage 
subsidy per employee to companies that reduce 
(214) The programme can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. As soon as they are 
completed, the assessment of the programme by the 
Commission and the Council will be made available there 
as well. 
their working time from 40 hours per week to 32 - 
36 hours, which can be granted for a maximum 
period of 6 months. Subsidies to increase 
investment and R&D and support to SMEs and 
start-ups would further stimulate the economy, 
together with tax allowances for investment. Most 
of these measures are temporary - valid for either 
one or two years - but their extension cannot be 
excluded, especially if a more protracted recession 
than currently foreseen were to unfold. Further 
support to the economy should come from 
decisions taken earlier (by the previous 
government and confirmed by the present one), all 
reducing the tax burden on companies, in 
particular the phasing-out of the payroll tax by the 
end of 2008 and a further lowering of the corporate 
income tax rate by 1 percentage point in January 
2009. These measures are of a permanent nature. 
Other developments impacting public finances in 
2009 are a rise in the public sector wage bill as a 
percent of GDP (in spite of some steps to limit the 
increase) and in social transfers. Overall, the 2009 
fiscal stance can be characterised as expansionary. 
On the basis of the no-policy-change assumption, 
the Commission services' spring 2009 forecast 
projects the general government deficit to widen to 
6.5% of GDP in 2010. The April 2009 update of 
the stability programme targets a deficit of 3.9% of 
GDP in 2010. The large divergence is due to 
different macroeconomic scenarios but mainly to 
the application of the no-policy-change 
assumption, since the programme target is 
conditional on the adoption of further 
consolidation measures.  
The Commission services’ spring forecast foresees 
general government gross debt to rise steeply to 
around 29¼% of GDP in 2009 (slightly lower than 
in the updated stability programme) and to 
continue to increase in 2010, to some 35% of 
GDP. The stock-flow adjustment of 0.6% of GDP 
in 2009 reflects the recapitalisation of the Slovene 
Export and Development Bank and of the Fund for 
Entrepreneurship, as part of the measures to ease 
credit conditions for companies and support the 
financing of exports. 
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Table V.23.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Slovenia (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
0.5 -0.9 -5.5 -6.5
42.9 42.7 42.2 42.1
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.6 14.0 14.2 14.2
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.5 9.3 8.9 8.9
- social contributions 14.0 14.3 14.2 14.1
42.4 43.6 47.7 48.6
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.6 10.8 11.9 12.5
- intermediate consumption 5.9 6.1 6.5 6.6
- social payments 14.4 14.7 15.8 15.8
- gross fixed capital formation 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.4
- interest expenditure 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.8
1.8 0.2 -3.9 -4.7
38.2 37.7 37.4 37.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.7 -2.5 -4.9 -5.2
-0.4 -1.3 -3.3 -3.4
23.4 22.8 29.3 34.9
6.8 3.5 -3.4 0.7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.5 -0.9 -5.1 -3.9 -3.4
1.8 0.2 -3.6 -2.2 -1.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.6 -2.9 -4.1 -2.3 -2.0
23.4 22.8 30.5 34.1 36.3
6.8 3.5 -4.0 1.0 2.7Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Stability programme(4)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in April 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Slovenia. 
Table V.23.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Slovenia
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•  Elimination of payroll tax (-0.6% of GDP) •  Wage subsidy for shorter hours worked
(0.6% of GDP)
•  Reduction of corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point,
from 22% to 21% (-0.1% of GDP)
•  Support for SMEs and start-up companies
(0.1% of GDP)
•  Additional investment allowance for companies
 (-0.1% of GDP)
•  Subsidies for investment in new technologies and
R&D (0.2% of GDP)
•  Additional investment allowance for sole proprietors
 (-0.2% of GDP) 
• Increase in excise duties (0.9% of GDP) •  Public sector wage bill (0.2% of GDP) (implementation
of decision to eliminate “wage isparities” (0.4% of GDP)3
 partly offset by measures to restrain the wage bill)
• Increases in specific transfers in kind (0.1% of GDP)3
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) Measure decided in 2008.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Slovenia. 
24. SLOVAKIA 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government deficit reached 
2.2% of GDP, slightly better than the planned 
target of 2.3% of GDP foreseen in the November 
2007 Convergence Programme. Factors 
contributing to the better-than-expected budget 
outcome included revenue increasing measures 
(e.g. broadening of the corporate and personal 
income tax base, increase in the maximum ceiling 
of social contributions), more transfers from the 
fully-funded to the PAYG pillar of the pension 
system, one-off revenues (e.g. sale of surplus 
emission quotas), and better results from regional 
administrative units and municipalities. These 
revenue measures more than compensated for the 
negative impact stemming from the write-off of 
claims with non-financial corporations and the 
takeover of a debt related to privatization. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio decreased further in 2008 to 
27.6% due to growth in the nominal GDP and 
stock-flow adjustment. 
In the April 2009 update of the Stability 
Program(215), the authorities revised the estimate 
for the 2009 budged deficit upwards to 3% of GDP 
from originally envisaged 1.7% in the December 
budget. There remains, however, a stark contrast to 
the Commission services' 2009 spring forecast, 
which projects a general government deficit of 
4.7% of GDP in 2009. The main reason for this 
large discrepancy is the much bleaker 
macroeconomic outlook in the forecast. While the 
Stability Program estimates economic activity to 
expand by 2.4% in 2009, the Commission services 
anticipate a GDP contraction of 2.6%. Overall, 
fiscal policies can be regarded as expansionary. 
The government foresees to spend some 0.5% of 
GDP on anti-crisis measures that are largely being 
counterbalanced by savings in other areas. On the 
revenue side, the main measures include a 
temporary increase in the tax-free income, in-work 
benefit for low-income employees and a decrease 
(215) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/
main_en.htm. 
of social contributions for mandatorily insured 
self-employed. The expenditure side supports the 
labour market through the funding of social 
enterprises and subsidies to employers for social 
benefits payments. R&D spending is increased as 
well as support of financing for SMEs, while a car 
scrapping scheme is introduced. In addition, a 
large stimulating effect is expected from improved 
drawing of EU structural funds and progress with 
public private partnership (PPP) projects for 
motorway construction. The adopted measures are 
broadly in line with the European Economic 
Recovery Plan. Most of them are to take effect in 
the first half of 2009, are targeted on specific 
sectors or groups and with few exceptions are 
temporary. However, the launch of the PPP 
projects may be postponed due to difficulties 
related to securing the necessary financing. 
Moreover, these projects are expected to put 
pressure on the budget in later years when the 
government will start paying regular instalments 
for availability. 
According to the Commission services' 2009 
spring forecast, the general government deficit is 
projected to deteriorate further to 5.4% of GDP in 
2010 on the basis of the no-policy-change 
assumption. Lower revenue, due to the 
expectations of subdued economic growth, coupled 
with higher unemployment related expenditure are 
the two main factors explaining the fiscal 
deterioration. On the basis of a more favourable 
macroeconomic scenario and a stronger economic 
recovery, the 2008 stability program plans a 
general government deficit of 2.9% of GDP.  
In view of large deficits, government gross debt 
will increase substantially although remaining at 
relatively contained levels. In 2009 and 2010 the 
gross government debt is projected to increase to 
32% and roughly 36% of GDP, respectively, from 
around 27½% of GDP in 2008.  
European Commission 
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Effectiveness of fiscal stimuli in a small, open 
economy 
Discretionary fiscal policy normally tends to yield
positive fiscal multipliers although the exact size 
and timing of its effect remain uncertain. 
Simulations have shown that the impact of
measures directly supporting aggregate demand is
larger than an equivalent reduction of taxes and the
size of the impact declines with the degree of 
openness. (216) In a closed economy the multiplier 
depends only on the marginal propensity to
consume and tax rates, but in an open economy a 
third factor – the propensity to import - affects the 
(216) "Does discretionary fiscal stabilisation warrant a comeback
in the EU", Box I.1.1 of Public Finances in EMU 2008, 
European Economy, 4/2008. 
Table V.24.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2012, Slovakia (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
-1.9 -2.2 -4.7 -5.4
32.5 32.7 33.6 34.1
 Of which : - taxes on production and imports 11.2 10.7 10.6 10.2
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 6.2 6.4 6.2 5.9
- social contributions 11.8 12.1 12.5 12.6
34.4 34.9 38.3 39.4
Of which: - compensation of employees 6.8 6.6 6.8 6.9
- intermediate consumption 4.5 3.8 4.6 4.3
- social payments 11.6 11.3 12.3 12.8
- gross fixed capital formation 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.1
- interest expenditure 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4
-0.5 -0.9 -3.3 -4.0
29.6 29.3 29.5 28.8
0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
-3.8 -4.7 -5.0 -4.7
-2.4 -3.5 -3.7 -3.3
29.4 27.6 32.2 36.3
10.4 6.4 -2.6 0.7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-1.9 -2.2 -3 -2.9 -2.2
-0.6 -0.9 -1.7 -1.7 -1.0
0.8 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1
-4.2 -3.8 -4.4 -3.5 -2.6
29.4 27.6 31.4 32.7 32.7
10.4 6.4 2.4 3.6 4.5
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Primary balance
Structural balance(3)(5)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme(4)
General government balance
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.  
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in April 2009.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and Stability programme for Slovakia 2008-2012. 
Table V.24.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009, Slovakia 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•     Income tax (-0.2% of GDP) •  Subsidy of purchases of new cars
(0.1% of GDP)
•    Excise duties on tobacco (0.2% of GDP) •  Changes in welfare measures
 (0.5% of GDP)
•       Changes in social contributions and
  capital transfers from the second pension
  pillar (0.4% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, Stability programme of Slovakia for 2008-2012 and 2009 budget. 
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size of the fiscal multiplier. Hence, the 
effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy is 
reduced as a part of the increase in consumption is 
spent on imports. 
The Slovak government reacted to the global 
economic downturn by adopting three anti-crisis 
packages including measures aimed at alleviating 
the negative effects of the crisis. The first anti-
crisis package, adopted in November 2008, was 
followed by two additional packages in February 
2009. While some of the adopted measures target 
the labor market and business sector, most 
measures aim directly or indirectly at supporting 
domestic aggregate demand (an increase of tax-
free income, decrease of social contributions for 
selected groups, support of R&D activities). 
The high trade openness is one of the main traits of 
the Slovak economy. In 2008, the sum of exports 
and imports amounted to almost 170% of GDP 
compared with the EU average of slightly more 
than 80%. Moreover, Slovakia is a net import 
country that has recorded a trade balance in surplus 
only twice since 1993. The negative trade balance 
is caused by imports of raw materials, foodstuff, 
and consumer goods. In addition, it is explained by 
the import of capital goods which is directly 
related to FDI with the aim to establish export 
facilities (e.g. construction of plants for the car and 
electronic production). Considering Slovakia's 
strong trade linkages with other economies and its 
position of a net importer, two important 
implications may be drawn as regards the 
effectiveness of the fiscal policy response to the 
current economic downturn. 
First, given the size of imports, the impact of extra 
spending by the government to smooth the output 
over a cycle can be expected to be only partial. 
This is best illustrated by the example of the 'car 
scrapping' scheme, which was adopted in Slovakia 
in the first quarter of 2009.  
The Slovak government allocated some EUR 55 
million to support purchases of new cars that were 
conditioned by scrapping of old ones. The car 
brands produced in Slovakia account for only 20% 
of the domestic car market. The remaining 80% of 
cars sold in Slovakia are imported. The scheme 
can hence support domestic car producers only to a 
limited extent, as car producers located in other 
countries will benefit as well. Due to Slovakia's 
position as a net importer, other demand 
stimulating measures can be expected to have 
similar outcomes. 
Second, for smaller economies, an improvement in 
the economic situation of foreign partners can be 
expected to influence domestic growth through 
higher demand for exports. As roughly 85% of 
Slovak exports are directed to EU countries, 
proactive anti-crisis measures of other EU member 
states that aim at increasing private consumption 
should therefore have a positive impact on 
Slovakia through increased demand for Slovak 
products, in particular if stimulus measures are 
concerted. 
Openness of an economy may thus indeed trim the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies especially if they 
are pursued in isolation to other countries. 
However, if the economy is integrated in a larger 
economic space (e.g. the EU), demand stimulating 
fiscal packages intended to ease the impact of a 
downturn have their role to play also in small open 
economies provided that they are carried out 
across countries, as intended with the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). The 
coordination among the EU members of the fiscal 
response to the crisis ensures that free riding 
behavior is reduced and that the cost related to 
tackling the crisis is shared among all member 
states. 
25. FINLAND 
254 
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government surplus reached 4.2% of 
GDP in 2008, which is considerably higher than 
the target of 3.7% of GDP set in the November 
2007 update of the Stability Programme. The 
difference arises mainly from the base effect as the 
surplus recorded in 2007 was 0.8 percentage points 
higher than planned. This originates principally 
from two sources. Firstly, economic growth was 
higher than expected in 2007, boosting tax revenue 
while expenditure remained contained. Secondly, a 
change in the recording of property income from 
social security's assets resulted in an upward 
revision by almost 0.4% of GDP (for further 
details, see the Commission services' assessment 
of the 2007 Stability Programme update). The 
underlying revenue and expenditure trends in 2008 
have remained close to what was planned in the 
previous programme update, with the discretionary 
stimulus measures taking effect in the main from 
2009 onwards. The general government debt ratio 
continued to decline, as over the past years, and 
settled at 33.4% of GDP in 2008, down from 
35.1% recorded in the previous year. The large 
size of the fiscal surplus would suggest an even 
faster decline in the debt ratio. However, about 3 
percentage points of the surplus is accounted for 
by the accumulation of pension funds assets, which 
does not impact on the general government gross 
debt ratio (recorded as stock flow adjustment). 
The most recent Ministry of Finance forecast from 
spring 2009 projects the general government 
balance to fall rapidly to a deficit of 1.9% of GDP 
in 2009, considerably worse than a surplus of 2.1% 
of GDP targeted in the most recent Stability 
Programme update from December 2008 (217). The 
rapid deterioration in this projection reflects 
primarily a markedly weaker economic outlook 
than expected in autumn 2008 and the additional 
stimulus measures adopted in the meantime. In 
comparison, the Commission services' most recent 
(217) The programme as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_polic 
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.  
forecast from spring 2009 expects the fiscal deficit 
to reach 0.8% of GDP in the same year, which 
would be more benign than expected by the 
Finnish authorities on account of somewhat more 
positive expectations of short term economic 
prospects and related tax revenues. The Finnish 
stimulus measures were announced in several 
waves, totalling 1.6% of GDP in 2009 and 
concentrating mainly on permanent tax cuts 
supporting consumers' purchasing power (see 
Table 2). Overall, the stimulus packages comply 
with the general principles of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan, being targeted and 
timely. However, the bulk of the fiscal stimulus is 
provided through permanent tax cuts that are not 
planned to be reversed given the initially large 
fiscal surplus and the Government's longer term 
tax policy aims. Fiscal policy will therefore be 
expansionary over 2009-2010, which will help to 
mitigate the effects of the economic crisis but at 
the same time erode the strong budgetary position 
that was built up over the previous years. Some 
compensating tax rises (energy tax, real estate tax, 
pension contributions), are planned to take effect 
from 2011, but their size is considerably less than 
the cost of the current stimulus. Overall, the 
government has not yet announced a 
comprehensive fiscal consolidation strategy to 
restore the long term sustainability of public 
finances once the present economic crisis abates. 
The general government deficit is projected to 
increase further in 2010 and reach 2.9% of GDP, 
under the no-policy change assumption. This 
differs largely from the projection for a surplus of 
1.1% of GDP in the December 2008 Stability 
Programme, a target by now outdated.  
On account of the budgetary surpluses turning into 
deficits and some financial transactions impacting 
on the stock flow adjustment, the general 
government debt ratio is forecast to increase 
sharply over 2009 and 2010 to almost 46% of GDP 
(assuming that the banking sector does not resort 
to state financing schemes). The debt ratio 
projections in the December 2008 Stability 
Programme (34% of GDP in 2010) are similarly 
outdated, as noted above. 
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Table V.25.1: Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Finland (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
5.2 4.2 -0.8 -2.9
52.5 52.5 52 51.5
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 13 12.8 13 12.6
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 17.5 17.4 16 15.9
- social contributions 12 12.1 12.3 12.1
47.3 48.3 52.8 54.3
  Of which: - compensation of employees 13 13.2 14.3 14.6
- intermediate consumption 9 9.4 10.5 10.9
- social payments 15.1 15.2 16.8 17.3
- gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.9
- interest expenditure 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4
6.7 5.6 0.5 -1.5
43.1 42.8 41.9 41.3
0 0 0 -0.2
3.2 2.8 0.8 -0.7
4.6 4.2 2.1 0.7
35.1 33.4 39.7 45.7
4.2 0.9 -4.7 0.2
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
5.3 4.4 2.1 1.1 1.0
6.8 5.8 3.4 2.4 2.2
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
4.5 3.7 2.4 1.7 1.6
35.1 32.4 33.0 33.7 34.1
4.5 2.6 0.6 1.8 2.4
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme(4)
General government balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2008
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Finland 
Table V.25.2: Main measures in the budget for 2009, Finland 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•      Income tax cuts (-0.7% of GDP)
•      Supporting enterprises access to finance
         (0.2% of GDP)
•      Lowering tax on pension income (-0.1% of GDP) •      Boosting infrastructure investment (0.1% of GDP)
•     Increasing various  tax deductibles (-0.1% of GDP) •      Boosting construction of rental housing        (0.05% of GDP)
•      Increases of alcohol and tobacco excises 
         (0.05% of GDP)
•      Funding municipal mergers (0.05% of GDP)
Other measures
Measures in response to the downturn
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and 2008 Stability Programme and the Budget for 2009.
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2008, the general government recorded an 
estimated surplus of 2.5% of GDP. This was 
somewhat worse than the 2.8% initially foreseen in 
the convergence programme of December 
2007.(218) The worse-than-expected general 
government balance was mainly the result of 
unexpectedly low tax receipts from capital gains 
and corporate income, reflecting the impact of 
falling stock market indices and the economic 
slowdown, in particular towards the end of the 
year. Thanks to the surplus, government debt is 
estimated to have fallen to 38% of GDP in 2008. 
According to the macroeconomic scenario 
underpinning the spring budget bill presented in 
April 2009, the government forecasts a general 
budget deficit of 2.7% of GDP in 2009. This is 
close to the view taken in the Commission spring 
forecast, which foresees a deficit of 2.6% of GDP 
in 2009 based on a slightly more optimistic 
macroeconomic scenario, but is significantly worse 
than the surplus of 1.1% of GDP envisaged in the 
2008 update of the convergence programme (based 
on the 2009 budget bill scenario). The difference is 
mainly due to the sharp and sudden deterioration in 
the macroeconomic situation and outlook that has 
taken place since the publication of the 2009 
budget bill in September 2008, but also to further 
discretionary fiscal stimulus measures. As the 
economic situation and outlook has worsened, the 
focus of these measures has shifted from structural 
objectives, such as improving the incentives to 
work through reduced income taxes (the main 
theme of the 2009 budget bill), to short-term 
stimulus objectives, such as improving matching 
on the labour market (bill to promote employment 
and transition of January 2009) and increased state 
transfers to the regional and local level of 
government to dampen employment cut-backs 
(supplementary budget bill of April 2009). Many 
of the measures are permanent in nature, notably 
(218) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
the reductions in labour income taxes, and thus do 
not follow the general principle of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan that stimulus measure 
should be temporary. However, these measures do 
not only have a stimulus role to play, but are also 
intended to raise long-term potential growth, for 
example by stimulating people to take up work, 
work longer hours or acquire human capital. The 
measures do to a large extent follow the principles 
that they should be timely and well-targeted. 
Including the measures contained in the 2009 
budget bill, fiscal policy could clearly be 
characterised as expansionary in 2009. Additional 
measures proposed as the downturn worsened have 
been rather limited in size. This reflects the 
government's concerns about maintaining public 
finances on a sustainable footing, in particular in 
view of the heightened uncertainty about the 
duration of the downturn and the large contingent 
liabilities implied by extensive guarantees to the 
financial sector. There is also the risk that the 
sharp rise in unemployment could lead to higher 
structural unemployment with adverse effects on 
the fiscal balance.  
In the Commission spring forecast, the fiscal 
deficit is foreseen to widen to 3.9% in 2010. This 
forecast is based on a no-policy-change 
assumption and reflects the costs of rising 
unemployment. In the most recent update of the 
convergence programme, the general government 
surplus was seen to rise from 1.1% of GDP in 
2009 to 1.6% of GDP in 2010. As was the case for 
2009, this large discrepancy mainly reflects the 
much rosier macroeconomic scenario in the 
updated programme. 
According to the Commission spring forecast, 
government debt is expected to reach 44% and 
47% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. This 
compares with 32% and 28% of GDP, 
respectively, in the updated convergence 
programme. Apart from the differences stemming 
from different macroeconomic scenarios, the 
convergence programme still assumed 
privatisation receipts of SEK 50 billion a year, 
whereas the Commission assumes no further 
privatisations and possible public capital 
injections. 
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Table V.26.1: Budgetary developments 2007-2011, Sweden (% of GDP) (1) 
2007 2008 2009 2010
3.8 2.5 -2.6 -3.9
56.3 55.7 54 53.4
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 16.8 18.2 18.3 18.3
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 19.1 17.5 15.6 15.4
- social contributions 12.8 11.9 12.1 11.9
52.5 53.1 56.6 57.3
  Of which: - compensation of employees 15.1 14.9 15.6 15.5
- intermediate consumption 9.4 9.7 9.8 9.8
- social payments 15.3 15.1 16.8 17.4
- gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.7
- interest expenditure 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
5.6 4.2 -1.2 -2.5
48.3 47.2 45.6 45.1
0 0.3 0.1 0
1.9 1.7 -0.5 -1.9
3.7 3.4 0.9 -0.5
40.5 38 44 47.2
2.6 -0.2 -4 0.8
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
3.6 2.8 1.1 1.6 2.5
5.4 4.7 2.6 3 3.8
0.8 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
2.2 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.5
40.6 35.5 32.2 28.3 23.8
2.7 1.5 1.3 3.1 3.5
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(3)(5)
Convergence programme(4)
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Sweden.
Table V.26.2: Main measures in the budget for 2009, Sweden 
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
• Lower taxes on earned income
    (-0.5% of GDP)
•  Increased investment in and maintenance
of infrastructure (+0.2% of GDP)
•        Tax deductibility of home improvement 
   services  (-0,1% of GDP)
•  Increased education and research
expenditure (+0.1% of GDP)
•     Lower corporate income tax
   (-0.2% of GDP)
•  Increased coaching, activation and training
of unemployed (+0.1% of GDP)
•        Lower taxes on pensions (-0.1% of GDP)
•        Lower social contributions (-0.3% of GDP)
•        Changed under-pricing rules for certain
    companies (+0.2% of GDP)
•        Changed deductibility of interest costs for
    companies  (+0.2% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
Other measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) On-going measure, not specific to 2009 Budget
Source: Commission services and 2008 stability programme and the Budget for 2009. 
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit in 2008/09(219) is 
estimated at 7.2% of GDP, up from 2.8% in 
2007/08. The estimate for 2008/09 is 4.3 
percentage points (pp) higher than the projection in 
the United Kingdom's convergence programme of 
November 2007(220). Underlying the very 
significant overshoot in the headline deficit in 
2008/09 was the impact of the economic recession 
on taxation receipts and the cost of the fiscal 
stimulus measures announced by government in 
November 2008. In addition, on the expenditure 
side, government financial sector interventions 
contributed to an unanticipated one-off deficit-
increasing rise in capital transfers of ¾% of GDP. 
In 2008/09, payments made by the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) to 
depositors of defaulting banks led to a (deficit-
neutral) increase in the revenue and expenditure 
ratios by almost 1½ pp. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
surged upward by 12 percentage points, to around 
55%, with financing transactions related to bank 
nationalisations accounting for almost half of the 
increase in debt. 
The 2009 Budget, which was presented on 22 
April 2009221 , envisages a significantly weaker 
outlook for public finances compared to the most 
recent convergence programme. According to the 
Budget projections, the deficit in 2009/10 will 
reach 12.7% of GDP, up by 4½ percentage points 
compared to the programme and broadly in line 
with the Commission services' spring 2009 
forecast of 13% of GDP. In addition to the carry-
over of part of the deficit overshoot recorded in 
2008/09, around two-thirds of the upward revision 
(219)   The UK financial year runs from April to March.  
(220) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy
/sg_programmes9147_en.htm
(221) The cut-off date for the Commission projections preceded 
the government's statement on the 23 April that it now 
envisages elements of compensation to those negatively 
affected by the removal of the 10% starting rate on 
income tax (one of the measures announced in the March 
2007 budget).   
in the deficit forecast is due to the deeper 
contraction in overall economic activity, the 
impact of lower-than-expected inflation on tax 
bases, and higher reductions in revenue from two 
hitherto major sources: the financial sector and the 
housing market (see following section).  
Fiscal policies in 2009/2010 can be regarded as 
expansionary, departing from a high structural 
government deficit already before the economic 
recession. In response to the economic downturn, a 
major stimulus package was adopted in November 
2008 as part of the Pre-Budget Report, heavily 
weighted towards supporting household 
purchasing power. A smaller package was 
announced as part of the 2009 Budget, which put 
more emphasis on supporting industrial and 
business sectors and the labour market. Overall, 
the cost of fiscal stimulus measures amounts to 
around 1½% of GDP. The measures are consistent 
with the EERP: they are focused on supporting 
domestic demand when economic activity is 
expected to be at its weakest, targeted at those 
sectors worst affected by the crisis, and many of 
the measures should be temporary. 
Under a no-policy-change assumption, the 
Commission services' forecast a deficit in 2010/11 
of 12¾% of GDP. The latter is ¾ percentage points 
higher than in the latest government projections, 
almost entirely on account of the weaker 
macroeconomic outlook in the forecast. In 
addition, there remain significant negative risks, 
mainly stemming from:  pressure to extend to 2010 
at least some of the temporary stimulus initiatives 
if the path of economic recovery envisaged by the 
UK authorities does not materialise, the possible 
realisation of contingent liabilities incurred by the 
government as a result of its financial sector rescue 
operations, and potentially higher debt-servicing 
costs in the face of increased market concern about 
growing government debt. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
is forecast by the Commission services to increase   
by almost 30 percentage points to close to 85% by 
2010/11, including as a result of additional debt-
increasing financial transactions of around 2½% of 
GDP in 2009/10.  
Part V
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Revenue losses from banking sector asset 
writedowns  
This section evaluates the fiscal consequences of
the losses incurred by the financial sector on
investments in international structured financial
instruments and on domestic mortgage lending. 
The emergence of the financial sector crisis since
August 2007 has translated into a sharp increase in 
banks' losses from asset writedowns, principally 
from marking asset values to market. These losses 
include those due to defaults on US residential
mortgage-backed securities, as well as those 
triggered by exposures to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 and investments 
related to Icelandic banks.  
Banks' credit losses imply lower corporate tax 
revenue on financial sector profits and reduced
income tax receipts on distributed profits. In the
UK, financial sector writedowns of structured
financial instruments, particularly those backed by
the US sub-prime mortgages, could reduce tax 
revenues on financial sector profits by around
1½% of GDP, predominantly due to lower
corporate tax income. 
Table V.27.1: Budgetary developments 2007/08-2013/14, United Kingdom (% of GDP) (1) 
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
-2.8 -7.2 -13.0 -12.8
41.6 41.1 38.4 39.0
Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.4 11.5 11.2 11.7
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 17.0 15.8 14.6 14.9
- social contributions 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.3
44.4 48.3 51.2 51.8
Of which: - compensation of employees 10.9 11.2 11.9 12.1
- intermediate consumption 11.9 12.2 13.9 13.9
- social payments 12.7 13.5 15.1 15.2
- gross fixed capital formation 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.5
- interest expenditure 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.1
-0.6 -5.0 -10.7 -9.6
38.4 37.9 34.9 35.5
0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0
-3.7 -6.7 -11.6 -11.3
-1.6 -4.5 -9.5 -8.2
43.3 55.4 72.4 83.4
3.0 -0.9 -3.0 0.7
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
-2.8 -5.5 -8.2 -7.1 -5.6 -4.4 -3.4
-0.6 -3.4 -6.4 -4.5 -2.6 -1.4 -0.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-3.2 -5.3 -7.2 -6.2 -5.1 -4.2 -3.5
43.2 52.9 60.5 65.1 67.5 68.6 68.5
3 -¼ -½ 2 3 3 3
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme(5)
General government balance
Primary balance
- Total expenditure
Outturn and forecast(2)
General government balance (3)
- Total revenues
Real GDP growth (%)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(4)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance(4)(6)
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Commission services’ spring 2009 economic forecast. The UK financial year runs from April to March. The excessive deficit procedure applies to 
the UK on a financial year basis. The figures for 2008/09 are Commission estimates based on provisional outturn data. 
(3) Total revenues exclude UMTS receipts in line with the decision by Eurostat of 14 July 2000. 
(4) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(5) Submitted in December 2008.
(6) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of the United Kingdom.
Table V.27.2: Main budgetary measures for 2009/10, United Kingdom
Revenue measures(1) Expenditure measures(2)
•   VAT rate reduction (-0.6% of GDP) •   Front-loading capital spending (0.2% of GDP)
•   Lower income taxation (-0.3% of GDP) •   Support for business and industry (0.2% of GDP)
•   Tobacco and alcohol duties (0.1% of GDP) •   Social and housing ependiture (0.2% of  GDP)
•   Deferral of business rate increase (-0.1% of GDP)
Measures in response to the downturn
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, 2008 Convergence Programme and 2009 Budget. 
259 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
260 
The particularly marked downward adjustment in 
house prices in the UK also carries the risk of an 
increase in mortgage defaults, which, combined
with the effect of the broader macroeconomic
weaknesses on the banking sector's loan book, 
would feed into higher credit losses. The stress-
testing calibrations published by the Bank of
England(222) in October 2008 indicate that, in a 
risk scenario characterised by a contraction in
output and a sharp fall in asset prices, bank write-
offs on lending to households, principally due to
increasing mortgage defaults, and non-financial
companies(223) would result in cumulative 
domestic credit losses for UK banks of up to £70 
billion (4½% of annual average GDP) over the 
next five years. The potential losses envisaged by
the Bank of England in the risk scenario would 
lead to cumulative reductions in corporate tax 
receipts on financial sector profits during the next 
five years of 1¼% of GDP. This compares with 
annual average corporate tax revenues during the
past five years of around 4% of GDP. 
Table V.27.3: Fiscal costs of banking sector credit losses 
Loss in
corporate tax
revenue
Loss in income
taxes on
distributed 
profits (2)
€ bln % of GDP
UK 77.0 4.2 1.19 0.22
Germany (3) 58.4 2.3 0.53 0.08
Switzerland 50.1 14.2 3.01 1.28
France 23.2 1.2 0.34 0.15
Netherlands 14.4 2.4 0.62 0.21
Belgium 15.7 4.5 1.48 0.31
USA/Canada 590.9 4.7 1.42 0.29
Europe (4) 267.2 2.1 0.46 0.14
Credit losses Potential fiscal costs (1)
 Qtr.4 2007 and 2008
% of GDP
(1) Estimates based on statutory tax rates on corporate profits and
dividend income. Tax rates derived from Tax Database, Centre for Tax 
Policy and Administration, OECD:
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_
1_1_1,00.htm
(2) Estimates assume dividends as a share of profits of 35%, reflecting 
computations based on the UK economic accounts. 
(3) Estimates based on an effective corporate tax rate of 38½% in 2007
and 28½% in 2008. 
(4) Europe includes banks from countries that are not members of the 
European Union, primarily those registered in Switzerland. 
Source: Bloomberg (data reported as of 4 April 2009), Commission 
estimates. 
The estimates above probably represent a ceiling 
to the tax losses that the governments of Member 
States could incur from reported asset writedowns. 
In fact, a part of the reported writedowns could
include asset value reductions that only decrease 
equity and are excluded by the banks from their 
earnings figures. Some of the credit losses are 
expected to be recorded outside the Member State 
where the parent bank is registered, through
subsidiaries based in other Member States or other
jurisdictions. Tax legislation in some Member 
States, including in the UK, also allows companies 
to carry forward losses to offset against income in
future accounting periods. This may prolong the 
impact of higher losses on tax revenues. However,
prevailing liquidity constraints reduce the
likelihood of corporations carrying forward lower
tax liabilities from credit losses. In the UK, losses 
incurred in 2008, for example, could be used to
claim refunds of corporate taxes paid in the
preceding year, which would bring forward the
significant negative effect of financial sector losses
on UK public finances.   
The April 2009 UK budget assumes that weaker
financial sector profitability and the downturn in
the property market will lower receipts from the
two sectors in 2009/10 by 1¾% of GDP compared 
to 2007/08(224). The above estimates on potential 
tax revenue losses as a result of lower financial
sector profits, coupled with previous Commission 
services' estimates on the prospective reduction in
stamp duty intakes by ½% of GDP over the two-
year period ending 2009/10 as a result of the 
downturn in the UK housing market(225), indicate
that there are significant risks that the fall in
revenue losses from property and financial sector
activity could be higher than envisaged in the latest 
budget.  
(222) Bank of England Financial Stability Report, October 2008,
Issue No. 24, pp. 28. 
(223) In the stress scenario, mortgage arrears are estimated to
rise  to a peak of 4.4%, while UK corporate insolvencies 
rise to 1.7%. 
(224) "The impact of the financial and housing sector on the 
public finances", Box C3, Budget 2009.  
(225) "The economic and fiscal significance of the UK housing
market", United Kingdom Macro Fiscal Assessment of 
December 2008 Update of the Convergence Programme, 
Annex 1; 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publicati
on14266_en.pdf
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Member States 
BE Belgium 
BG Bulgaria 
CZ Czech Republic 
DK  Denmark 
DE Germany 
EE Estonia  
EI  Ireland 
EL  Greece 
ES  Spain 
FR  France 
IT  Italy 
CY Cyprus 
LV Latvia 
LT Lithuania 
LU  Luxembourg 
HU Hungary 
MT Malta 
NL  The Netherlands 
AT  Austria 
PL Poland 
PT  Portugal 
RO Romania 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovakia 
FI  Finland 
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SE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
EA Euro area 
EU European Union 
EU-25 European Union, 25 Member States (excl. BG and RO) 
EU-27 European Union, 27 Member States 
EU-15  European Union, 15 Member States before 1 May 2004  
EU-10 European Union, 10 Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004  
(CZ, EE, CY, LV, LH, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK) 
Non-EU countries 
AU  Australia 
CA  Canada 
CH  Switzerland 
JP   Japan 
KO South Korea 
NO Norway 
NZ  New Zeeland  
US(A)  United States  
Currencies 
EUR  euro 
ECU  European currency unit 
BGL Bulgarian lev 
CZK  Czech koruna 
DKK  Danish krone 
EEK  Estonian kroon 
GBP  Pound sterling 
LTL Lithuanian litas 
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LVL Latvian lats 
HUF Hungarian forint 
RON New Rumanian leu 
SEK  Swedish krona 
SKK Slovak koruna 
CAD  Canadian dollar 
CHF  Swiss franc 
JPY  Japanese yen 
SUR  Russian rouble 
USD  US dollar 
Other [From 2008; still needs to be revised]
AMC      Asset management company 
AMECO Macro-economic database of the European Commission 
CAPB Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
CMFB    Committee on monetary, financial and balance-of-payment statistics 
COFOG Classification of the functions of government 
DEA  Data envelope approach 
DG ECFIN Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs 
DR Debt requirement 
DSGE Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
DWF      Discount window facility 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Council 
EDP Excessive deficit procedure 
EERP European Economic Recovery Plan 
EFC Economic and Financial Committee 
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union 
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EPC Economic Policy Committee 
ESA(95) European System of National and Regional Accounts 
ESSPROS European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
EU KLEMS European database on capital, labour, energy, material and services 
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLS  Generalised least squares 
IBP Initial budgetary position 
ICT  Information and communication technologies 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INSEE   Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 
ISCED   International Standard Classification of Education 
LIME     Working group on methodology to assess Lisbon-related Structural Reforms 
LTC Long-term budgetary cost of ageing 
MTBF  Medium-term budgetary framework 
MTO Medium-term budgetary objective 
NAIRU  Non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary least squares 
PBB  Performance-based budgeting 
PISA  Programme for International Student Assessment 
pp Percentage points 
PPS Purchasing power standard 
QPF Quality of public finances 
R&D Research and development 
RAMS  Recently acceded Member States 
RoEA Rest of euro area 
265 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2009 
266 
ROW Rest of the world 
SCPs Stability and convergence programmes 
SFEF     Société de financement de l'économie française 
SGP  Stability and Growth Pact 
SLS       Special liquidity scheme 
SSC Social security contributions 
TFP  Total factor productivity 
VAT Value added tax 
WGHQPF Working Group on the quality of public finance 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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Asset management company  Public or private 
body aiming at restructuring, recovering or 
disposing of nonperforming assets. 
Automatic stabilisers  Features of the tax and 
spending regime which react automatically to the 
economic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a 
result, the budget balance in percent of GDP tends 
to improve in years of high growth, and deteriorate 
during economic slowdowns. 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)  
Annual guidelines for the economic and budgetary 
policies of the Member States. They are prepared 
by the Commission and adopted by the Council of 
Ministers responsible for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (ECOFIN). 
Budget balance  The balance between total public 
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a 
positive balance indicating a surplus and a 
negative balance indicating a deficit. For the 
monitoring of Member State budgetary positions, 
the EU uses general government aggregates. See 
also structural budget balance, primary budget 
balance, and primary structural balance. 
Budgetary rules  Rules and procedures through 
which policy-makers decide on the size and the 
allocation of public expenditure as well as on its 
financing through taxation and borrowing. 
Budgetary sensitivity  The variation in the budget 
balance in percentage of GDP brought about by a 
change in the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated 
to be 0.5 on average. 
Candidate countries  Countries that wish to 
accede to the EU. Besides the accession countries, 
they include Croatia and Turkey. 
Close-to-balance requirement  A requirement 
contained in the 'old' Stability and Growth Pact, 
according to which Member States should, over 
the medium term, achieve an overall budget 
balance close to balance or in surplus; was 
replaced by country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objectives in the reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Code of Conduct  Policy document endorsed by 
the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005 setting 
down the specifications on the implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the format and 
content of the stability and convergence 
programmes. 
COFOG  (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) A statistical nomenclature used to 
break down general government expenditure into 
its different functions  including general public 
services, defence, public order and safety, 
economic affairs, environmental protection, 
housing and community amenities, health, 
recreation, culture and religion, education and 
social protection. 
Composite indicator: a compilation of several 
indicators into a single index reflecting the 
different dimensions of a measured concept. 
Convergence programmes  Medium-term 
budgetary and monetary strategies presented by 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. 
They are updated annually, according to the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Prior 
to the third phase of EMU, convergence 
programmes were issued on a voluntary basis and 
used by the Commission in its assessment of the 
progress made in preparing for the euro. See also 
stability programmes. 
Crowding-out effects  Offsetting effects on output 
due to changes in interest rates and exchange rates 
triggered by a loosening or tightening of fiscal 
policy. 
Cyclical component of budget balance  That part 
of the change in the budget balance that follows 
automatically from the cyclical conditions of the 
economy, due to the reaction of public revenue and 
expenditure to changes in the output gap. See 
automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing and structural 
budget balance. 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance  See 
structural budget balance. 
Defined-benefit pension scheme  A traditional 
pension scheme that defines a benefit, i.e. a 
pension, for an employee upon that employee's 
retirement is a defined benefit plan. 
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Defined-contribution pension scheme  A scheme 
providing for an individual account for each 
participant, and for benefits based solely on the 
amount contributed to the account, plus or minus 
income, gains, expenses and losses allocated to the 
account. 
Demand and supply shocks  Disturbances that 
affect the economy on the demand side (e.g. 
changes in private consumption or exports) or on 
the supply side (e.g. changes in commodity prices 
or technological innovations). They can impact on 
the economy either on a temporary or permanent 
basis. 
Dependency ratio  A measure of the ratio of 
people who receive government transfers, 
especially pensions, relative to those who are 
available to provide the revenue to pay for those 
transfers. 
Direct fiscal costs (gross, net) of a financial 
crisis  The direct gross costs are the fiscal outlays 
in support of the financial sector that increase the 
level of public debt. They encompass, for example, 
recapitalisation, purchase of troubled bank assets, 
pay-out to depositors, liquidity support, payment 
when guarantees are called and subsidies. The 
direct net costs are the direct gross cost net of 
recovery payments, such as through the sale of 
acquired assets or returns on assets. Thus, the net 
direct fiscal costs reflect the permanent increase in 
public debt. 
Direct taxes  Taxes that are levied directly on 
personal or corporate incomes and property. 
Discretionary fiscal policy  Change in the budget 
balance and in its components under the control of 
government. It is usually measured as the residual 
of the change in the balance after the exclusion of 
the budgetary impact of automatic stabilisers. See 
also fiscal stance. 
Early-warning mechanism  Part of the preventive 
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is 
activated when there is significant divergence from 
the budgetary targets set down in a stability or 
convergence programme. 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)  
Formerly the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a 
Committee of the Council of the European Union 
set up by Article 114 of the Treaty. Its main task is 
to prepare and discuss (ECOFIN) Council 
decisions with regard to economic and financial 
matters. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC)  Group of 
senior government officials whose main task is to 
prepare discussions of the (ECOFIN) Council on 
structural policies. It plays an important role in the 
preparation of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, and it is active on policies related to 
labour markets, methods to calculate cyclically-
adjusted budget balances and ageing populations. 
Effective tax rate  The ratio of broad categories of 
tax revenue (labour income, capital income, 
consumption) to their respective tax bases. 
Effectiveness  The same concept as efficiency 
except that it links input to outcomes rather than 
outputs. 
Efficiency  Can be defined in several ways, either 
as the ratio of outputs to inputs or as the distance 
to a production possibility frontier (see also Free 
Disposable Hull analysis, Data Envelope analysis, 
stochastic frontier analysis). Cost efficiency
measures the link between monetary inputs (funds) 
and outputs; technical efficiency measures the link 
between technical inputs and outputs. Output 
efficiency indicates by how much the output can be 
increased for a given input; input efficiency
indicates by how much the input can be reduced 
for a given input. 
ESA95 / ESA79  European accounting standards 
for the reporting of economic data by the Member 
States to the EU. As of 2000, ESA95 has replaced 
the earlier ESA79 standard with regard to the 
comparison and analysis of national public finance 
data. 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)  A procedure 
according to which the Commission and the 
Council monitor the development of national 
budget balances and public debt in order to assess 
and/or correct the risk of an excessive deficit in 
each Member State. Its application has been 
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
See also stability programmes and Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
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Expenditure rules  A subset of fiscal rules that 
target (a subset of) public expenditure. 
Fiscal consolidation  An improvement in the 
budget balance through measures of discretionary 
fiscal policy, either specified by the amount of the 
improvement or the period over which the 
improvement continues. 
Fiscal decentralisation  The transfer of authority 
and responsibility for public functions from the 
central government to intermediate and local 
governments or to the market. 
Fiscal federalism  A subfield of public finance 
that investigates the fiscal relations across levels of 
government. 
Fiscal governance  Comprises all rules, 
regulations and procedures that impact on how the 
budget and its components are being prepared. The 
terms fiscal governance and fiscal frameworks are 
used interchangeably in the report. 
Fiscal impulse  The estimated effect of fiscal 
policy on GDP. It is not a model-free measure and 
it is usually calculated by simulating an 
econometric model. The estimates presented in the 
present report are obtained by using the 
Commission services’ QUEST model. 
Fiscal institutions  Independent public bodies, 
other than the central bank, which prepare 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, monitor 
the fiscal performance and/or advice the 
government on fiscal policy issues. 
Fiscal rule  A permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator 
of fiscal performance, such as the government 
budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major 
component thereof. See also budgetary rule, 
expenditure rules. 
Fiscal stance  A measure of the effect of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In this report, it is 
defined as the change in the primary structural 
budget balance relative to the preceding period. 
When the change is positive (negative) the fiscal 
stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive). 
General government  As used by the EU in its 
process of budgetary surveillance under the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the excessive deficit 
procedure, the general government sector covers 
national government, regional and local 
government, as well as social security funds. 
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to 
and from the EU Budget. 
Government budget constraint  A basic 
condition applying to the public finances, 
according to which total public expenditure in any 
one year must be financed by taxation, government 
borrowing, or changes in the monetary base. In the 
context of EMU, the ability of governments to 
finance spending through money issuance is 
prohibited. See also stock-flow adjustment, 
sustainability. 
Government contingent liabilities  Obligations 
for the government that are subject to the 
realization of specific uncertain and discrete future 
events. For instance, the guarantees granted by 
governments to the debt of private corporations 
bonds issued by enterprise are contingent 
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay 
depend on the non-ability of the original debtor to 
honour its own obligations. 
Government implicit liabilities  Government 
obligations that are very likely to arise in the future 
in spite of the absence of backing contracts or law. 
The government may have a potential future 
obligation as a result of legitimate expectations 
generated by past practice or as a result of the 
pressure by interest groups. Most implicit 
liabilities are contingent, i.e., depend upon the 
occurrence of uncertain future events. 
Growth accounting  A technique based on a 
production function approach where total GDP (or 
national income) growth is decomposed into the 
various production factors and a non-explained 
part which is the total factor productivity change, 
also often termed the Solow residual. 
Indirect taxation  Taxes that are levied during the 
production stage, and not on the income and 
property arising from economic production 
processes. Prominent examples of indirect taxation 
are the value added tax (VAT), excise duties, 
import levies, energy and other environmental 
taxes. 
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Integrated guidelines  A general policy 
instrument for coordinating EU-wide and Member 
States economic structural reforms embedded in 
the Lisbon strategy and which main aim is to boost 
economic growth and job creation in the EU. 
Interest burden  General government interest 
payments on public debt as a share of GDP. 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs
Partnership between the EU and Member States 
for growth and more and better jobs. Originally 
approved in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was 
revamped in 2005. Based on the Integrated 
Guidelines (merger of the broad economic policy 
guidelines and the employment guidelines, dealing 
with macro-economic, micro-economic and 
employment issues) for the period 2005-2008, 
Member States drew up three-year national reform 
programmes at the end of 2005. They reported on 
the implementation of the national reform 
programmes for the first time in autumn 2006. The 
Commission analyses and summarises these 
reports in an EU Annual Progress Report each 
year, in time for the Spring European Council. 
Maastricht reference values for public debt and 
deficits  Respectively, a 60 % general government 
debt-to-GDP ratio and a 3 % general government 
deficit-to-GDP ratio. These thresholds are defined 
in a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union. See also Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Maturity structure of public debt  The profile of 
total debt in terms of when it is due to be paid 
back. Interest rate changes affect the budget 
balance directly to the extent that the general 
government sector has debt with a relatively short 
maturity structure. Long maturities reduce the 
sensitivity of the budget balance to changes in the 
prevailing interest rate. See also public debt. 
Medium-term budgetary framework  An 
institutional fiscal device that lets policy-makers 
extend the horizon for fiscal policy making beyond 
the annual budgetary calendar (typically 3-5 
years). Targets can be adjusted under medium-
term budgetary frameworks (MTBF) either on an 
annul basis (flexible frameworks) or only at the 
end of the MTBF horizon (fixed frameworks). 
Medium-term budgetary objective (MTO)
According to the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact, stability programmes and convergence 
programmes present a medium-term objective for 
the budgetary position. It is country-specific to 
take into account the diversity of economic and 
budgetary positions and developments as well as 
of fiscal risks to the sustainability of public 
finances, and is defined in structural terms (see 
structural balance). 
Minimum benchmarks  The lowest value of the 
structural budget balance that provides a safety 
margin against the risk of breaching the Maastricht 
reference value for the deficit during normal 
cyclical fluctuations. The minimum benchmarks 
are estimated by the European Commission. They 
do not cater for other risks such as unexpected 
budgetary developments and interest rate shocks. 
They are a lower bound for the 'medium-term 
budgetary objectives (MTO). 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)  An indicator 
combining the change in real short-term interest 
rate and in the real effective exchange rate to 
gauge the degree of easing or tightening of 
monetary policy. 
Mundell-Fleming model  Macroeconomic model 
of an open economy which embodies the main 
Keynesian hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity 
preference). In spite of its shortcomings, it remains 
useful in short-term economic policy analysis. 
NAIRU  Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment. 
Non-Keynesian effects  Supply-side and 
expectations effects which reverse the sign of 
traditional Keynesian multipliers. Hence, if non-
Keynesian effects dominate, fiscal consolidation 
would be expansionary. 
Old age dependency ratio  Population aged over 
65 as a percentage of working age population 
(usually defined as persons aged between 15 and 
64). 
One-off and temporary measures Government 
transactions having a transitory budgetary effect 
that does not lead to a sustained change in the 
budgetary position. See also structural balance.
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Outcome indicator Measures the ultimate results 
(outcomes) of policy choices (e.g. education 
attainment, healthy life years, economic growth).  
Output costs from a financial crisis  This is the 
gap between the hypothetical output development 
without a crisis and the actual output realised 
against the back of the crisis. Various methods are 
available to calculate output losses, in particular 
either using the trend GDP growth or the level of 
GDP as a benchmark.  
Output gap  The difference between actual output 
and estimated potential output at any particular 
point in time. See also cyclical component of 
budget balance. 
Output indicator  Measures the technical results 
(outputs) of policy choices (e.g. number of 
university graduates, number of patents, life 
expectancy). 
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG)  Pension 
system in which current pension expenditures are 
financed by the contributions of current 
employees. 
Pension fund A legal entity set up to accumulate, 
manage and administer pension assets. See also 
private pension scheme.
Performance-based budgeting A budgeting 
technique that links budget appropriations to 
performance (outcomes, results) rather than 
focusing on input controls. In practice, 
performance-informed budgeting is more common 
which basis decisions on budgetary allocation on 
performance information without establishing a 
formal link. 
Policy-mix  The overall stance of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The policy-mix may consist of 
various combinations of expansionary and 
restrictive policies, with a given fiscal stance being 
either supported or offset by monetary policy. 
Potential GDP The level of real GDP in a given 
year that is consistent with a stable rate of 
inflation. If actual output rises above its potential 
level, then constraints on capacity begin to bind 
and inflationary pressures build; if output falls 
below potential, then resources are lying idle and 
inflationary pressures abate. See also production 
function method and output gap. 
Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEPs)  
Annual programmes submitted by candidate 
countries which set the framework for economic 
policies The PEPs consist of a review of recent 
economic developments, a detailed 
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public 
finance issues and an outline of the structural 
reform agenda. 
Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Framework 
(PFSF)  Framework for budgetary surveillance of 
candidate countries in the run up to accession. It 
closely approximates the policy co-ordination and 
surveillance mechanisms at EU level. 
Primary budget balance  The budget balance net 
of interest payments on general government debt. 
Primary structural budget balance  The 
structural budget balance net of interest payments. 
Principal components  A statistical technique 
used to reduce multidimensional data sets to lower 
dimensions for analysis. This technique provides a 
compression of a set of high dimensional vectors 
(or variables) into a set of lower dimensional 
vectors (or variables) and then reconstructing the 
original set summarizing the information into a 
limited number of values. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy  A fiscal stance which 
amplifies the economic cycle by increasing the 
structural primary deficit during an economic 
upturn, or by decreasing it in a downturn. A 
neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance unchanged over the economic 
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See 
also tax-smoothing. 
Production function approach  A method to 
estimate the level of potential output of an 
economy based on available labour inputs, the 
capital stock and their level of efficiency. Potential 
output is used to estimate the output gap, a key 
input in the estimation of cyclical component of the 
budget. 
Public debt  Consolidated gross debt for the 
general government sector. It includes the total 
nominal value of all debt owed by public 
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institutions in the Member State, except that part 
of the debt which is owed to other public 
institutions in the same Member State. 
Public goods  Goods and services that are 
consumed jointly by several economic agents and 
for which there is no effective pricing mechanism 
that would allow private provision through the 
market. 
Public investment  The component of total public 
expenditure through which governments increase 
and improve the stock of capital employed in the 
production of the goods and services they provide. 
Public-private partnerships (PPP)  Agreements 
that transfer investment projects to the private 
sector that traditionally have been executed or 
financed by the public sector. To qualify as a PPP, 
the project should concern a public function, 
involve the general government as the principal 
purchaser, be financed from non-public sources 
and engage a corporation outside the general 
government as the principal operator that provides 
significant inputs in the design and conception of 
the project and bears a relevant amount of the risk. 
Quality of public finances  Comprises all 
arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that 
support the macroeconomic goals of fiscal policy, 
in particular economic growth. 
Quasi-fiscal activities  Activities promoting 
public policy goals carried out by non-government 
units. 
QUEST  The macroeconomic model of the EU 
Member States plus the US and Japan developed 
by the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission. 
Recently acceded Member States  Countries that 
became members of the EU in May 2004 and 
include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Two additional countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria joined in January 2007. 
Ricardian equivalence  Under fairly restrictive 
theoretical assumptions on the consumer’s 
behaviour (inter alia infinite horizon for decision 
making), the impact of fiscal policy does not 
depend on whether it is financed by tax increases 
or by a widening deficit. The basic reasoning 
behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and 
was revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s. 
Securitisation  Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with 
the intention of paying interest and capital out of 
the proceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or 
from future revenue flows. 
Sensitivity analysis  An econometric or statistical 
simulation designed to test the robustness of an 
estimated economic relationship or projection, 
given various changes in the underlying 
assumptions. 
Significant divergence  A sizeable excess of the 
budget balance over the targets laid out in the 
stability or convergence programmes, that triggers 
the Early warning procedure of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Size of the public sector  Typically measured as 
the ratio of public expenditure to nominal GDP. 
‘Snow-ball’ effect  The self-reinforcing effect of 
public debt accumulation or decumulation arising 
from a positive or negative differential between the 
interest rate paid on public debt and the growth 
rate of the national economy. See also government 
budget constraint. 
Social security contributions (SSC)  Mandatory 
contributions paid by employers and employees to 
a social insurance scheme to cover for pension, 
health care and other welfare provisions. 
Sovereign bond spread  The difference between 
risk premiums imposed by financial markets on 
sovereign bonds for different states. Higher risk 
premiums can largely stem from (i) the debt 
service ratio, also reflecting the countries' ability to 
raise their taxes for a given level of GDP, (ii) the 
fiscal track record, (iii) expected future deficits, 
and (iv) the degree of risk aversion. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)  Approved in 
1997 and reformed in 2005, the SGP clarifies the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
surveillance of Member State budgetary policies 
and the monitoring of budget deficits during the 
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two 
Council Regulations setting out legally binding 
provisions to be followed by the European 
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Institutions and the Member States and two 
Resolutions of the European Council in 
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. 
Stability programmes  Medium-term budgetary 
strategies presented by those Member States that 
have already adopted the euro. They are updated 
annually, according to the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. See also Convergence 
programmes. 
Stock-flow adjustment  The stock-flow 
adjustment (also known as the debt-deficit 
adjustment) ensures consistency between the net 
borrowing (flow) and the variation in the stock of 
gross debt. It includes the accumulation of 
financial assets, changes in the value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining 
statistical adjustments. 
Structural budget balance  The actual budget 
balance net of the cyclical component and one-off 
and other temporary measures. The structural 
balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in 
the budget balance. See also primary structural 
budget balance. 
Sustainability  A combination of budget deficits 
and debt that ensure that the latter does not grow 
without bound. While conceptually intuitive, an 
agreed operational definition of sustainability has 
proven difficult to achieve. 
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the relative 
change in tax revenues with respect to a relative 
change in GDP. The tax elasticity is an input to the 
budgetary sensitivity. 
Tax gaps  Measure used in the assessment of the 
sustainability of public finances. They measure the 
difference between the current tax ratio and the 
constant tax ratio over a given projection period to 
achieve a predetermined level of debt at the end of 
that projection period. 
Tax smoothing  The idea that tax rates should be 
kept stable in order to minimise the distortionary 
effects of taxation, while leaving it for the 
automatic stabilisers to smooth the economic 
cycle. It is also referred to as neutral discretionary 
fiscal policy. See also cyclical component of fiscal 
policy. 
Tax wedge  The deviation from equilibrium 
price/quantity as a result of a taxation, which 
results in consumers paying more, and suppliers 
receiving less. When referring to labour tax wedge 
more specifically, the tax wedge is usually 
regarded as the difference between the difference 
between the salary costs of an average worker to 
their employer and the amount of net income that 
the worker receives in return, the difference being 
represented by taxes including personal income 
taxes and compulsory social security contributions. 
Total factor productivity  Represents the share of 
total output not explained by the level of inputs 
(labour, capital or primary product). It is generally 
considered as a measure of overall productive 
efficiency. 
UMTS  Third generation of technical support for 
mobile phone communications. Sale of UMTS 
licences gave rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 
2001. 
Welfare state  Range of policies designed to 
provide insurance against unemployment, sickness 
and risks associated with old age. 
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4. USEFUL INTERNET LINKS 
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European Union 
European Commission ec.europa.eu 
Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
Eurostat  epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
European Council consilium.europa.eu 
European Parliament www.europarl.europa.eu 
Economics and Finance Ministries 
Belgium  www.treasury.fgov.be/interthes Ministère des Finances - 
Ministerie van Financen 
Bulgaria www.minfin.bg Ministry of Finance 
Czech Republic www.mfcr.cz Ministry of Finance 
Denmark www.fm.dk Ministry of Finance 
Germany www.bundesfinanzministerium.de Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
Estonia www.fin.ee Ministry of Finance 
Ireland www.irlgov.ie/finance Department of Finance 
Greece www.mnec.gr/en/ Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Spain www.mineco.es/ Ministerio de Economía y 
Hacienda 
France www.finances.gouv.fr Ministère Économie, Finances et 
l'Industrie 
Italy www.tesoro.it Ministero dell’Economia e delle 
Finanze 
Cyprus www.mof.gov.cy Ministry of Finance 
Latvia www.fm.gov.lv Ministry of Finance 
Lithuania www.finmin.lt Ministry of Finance 
Luxembourg www.etat.lu/FI Ministère des Finances 
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Hungary www.p-m.hu Ministry of Finance 
Malta finance.gov.mt Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs 
Netherlands www.minfin.nl Ministerie van Financien 
Austria www.bmf.gv.at Bundesministerium für Finanzen 
Poland www.mofnet.gov.pl Ministry of Finance 
Portugal www.min-financas.pt Ministério das Finanças 
Romania www.mfinante.ro Ministry of Finance 
Slovenia  www.gov.si/mf Ministry of Finance 
Slovak Republic www.finance.gov.sk Ministry of Finance 
Finland www.vn.fi/vm Ministry of Finance 
Sweden finans.regeringen.se Finansdepartementet 
United Kingdom  www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Her Majesty's Treasury 
Central Banks 
European Union www.ecb.int European Central Bank 
Belgium  www.nbb.be Banque Nationale de Belgique / 
Nationale Bank van België 
Bulgaria www.bnb.bg Bulgarian National Bank 
Czech Republic www.cnb.cz Czech National Bank 
Denmark www.nationalbanken.dk Danmarks Nationalbank 
Germany www.bundesbank.de Deutsche Bundesbank 
Estonia www.eestipank.info Eesti Pank 
Ireland www.centralbank.ie Central Bank of Ireland 
Greece www.bankofgreece.gr Bank of Greece 
Spain www.bde.es Banco de España 
France  www.banque-france.fr Banque de France 
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Italy www.bancaditalia.it Banca d'Italia 
Cyprus www.centralbank.gov.cy  Central Bank of Cyprus 
Latvia www.bank.lv Bank of Latvia 
Lithuania www.lb.lt Lietuvos Bankas 
Luxembourg www.bcl.lu Banque Centrale du Luxembourg 
Hungary www.mnb.hu National Bank of Hungary 
Malta www.centralbankmalta.com Central Bank of Malta 
Netherlands www.dnb.nl De Nederlandsche Bank 
Austria www.oenb.at Oestereichische  Nationalbank 
Poland www.nbp.pl Narodowy Bank Polski 
Portugal www.bportugal.pt Banco de Portugal 
Romania www.bnro.ro National Bank of Romania 
Slovenia  www.bsi.si Bank of Slovenia 
Slovak Republic www.nbs.sk National Bank of Slovakia 
Finland www.bof.fi Suomen Pankki 
Sweden www.riksbank.com Sveriges Riksbank 
United Kingdom www.bankofengland.co.uk Bank of England 
EU fiscal surveillance framework 
Stability and Growth Pact: 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/index_en.htm?cs_mid=570 
Excessive deficit procedure: 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy554_en.htm 
Early warning mechanism: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy1075_en.htm 
Stability and convergence programmes: 
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ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
Sustainability of public finances: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy546_en.htm
Quality of public finances 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12186_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/epc_publications_en.htm#Quality%20of%20public%20finances 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/index_en.htm 
  
 

 
 
 
European Commission 
 
European Economy No. 5/2009 — Public finances in EMU — 2009  
 
 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
 
2009 — xii, 285 pp. — 21 x 29.7 cm 
 
ISBN 978-92-79-11366-6 
DOI 10.2765/8146 
 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 50 
 
The European Economy series contains important reports and communications from the Commission 
to the Council and the Parliament on the economic situation and developments, such as the Economic 
forecasts, the annual EU economy review and the Public fi nances in EMU report. 
Subscription terms are shown on the back cover and details on how to obtain the list of sales agents 
are shown on the inside back cover.
Unless otherwise indicated, the texts are published under the responsibility of the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, BU24, B-1049 
Brussels, to which enquiries other than those related to sales and subscriptions should be addressed.
LEGAL NOTICE
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on its behalf may be held 
responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this 
publication, or for any errors which, despite careful preparation and checking, may appear.
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, 2009
ISBN 978-92-79-11366-6
DOI 10.2765/8146
© European Communities, 2009
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Luxembourg
How to obtain EU publications
Publications for sale:
● via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
● from your bookseller by quoting the title, the publisher and/or ISBN number;
● by contacting one of our sales agents directly. 
You can obtain their contact details by linking http://bookshop.europa.eu, 
or by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758
Free publications:
● via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
● at  the European Commission’s representations or delegations. 
You can obtain their contact details by linking  http://ec.europa.eu/ 
or by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758.
Public Finances in EMU 
 2009
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 5|2009
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
P
u
blic F
in
an
ces in
 E
M
U
 20
0
9
 
EURO
PEA
N
 EC
O
N
O
M
Y 5|2009
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 50
European Economy (6 issues minimum per year): EUR 160
The annual subscription runs from 1 January to 31 December of each year.
Payments to be made only to sales agents on the list (see inside backcover for details).
These are surface mail rates. For air subscription rates, please apply to the sales offi ces.
www.ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance
The annual report on public fi nances in EMU was launched in 2000, one year 
after the Stability and Growth Pact took full effect. The report brings together in 
a single publication a review of key policy developments and analytical fi ndings in 
the area of public fi nances. First, it provides a detailed description and analysis of 
recent budgetary developments and an assessment of the outlook over the coming 
years. Second is an examination of the developments in the EU’s fi scal surveillance 
framework and possible ways forward. The third and fourth part of the report 
provide analytical work on topical issues for fi scal policy makers. This year the focus 
is on the fi scal cost of fi nancial crises. In particular, the report assesses the prospects 
for public fi nances and policy needs ahead based on past experiences with fi nancial 
crises. The analysis reveals that direct and indirect fi scal costs of the fi nancial crisis 
will be massive. It fi nds that quick, resolute and comprehensive policy responses in 
the fi nancial sector, together with an exit strategy of timely unwinding government 
interventions can contain the costs. The fi nal part of the report part discusses the 
fi scal developments in the 27 EU Member States.
KC
-A
R-09-005-EN
-C
